THE KINGDOM OF THE HITTITES
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UXORI MEAE CARISSIMAE
Acknowledgements

In the first edition of this book, I expressed my gratitude to Professor Silvin Košak for his most useful comments on the book in its draft form, particularly in relation to the passages in translation. His valuable contribution to the preparation of that edition continues to be reflected in the new edition. For its infrastructural support in the preparation of this new edition, my thanks are due to the School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics, University of Queensland. I am also grateful to Wolfson College, Oxford, for providing me with a congenial environment in which to live and to work during various visits to Oxford while both editions were being researched and written. Finally I wish to express once again my gratitude for the advice which Professor Gurney, unfortunately now deceased, gave me over many years on a wide range of matters relating to the Hittite world. He did much to stimulate my initial interest in this world and was always most generous in sharing his ideas on many of the knotty problems of Hittite scholarship.

T.R.B.
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## Abbreviations

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<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Archäologischer Anzeiger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABoT</td>
<td>K. Balkan, <em>Ankara arkeoloji müzesinde bulunan Boğazköy-tableteri</em> (İstanbul, 1948)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfO</td>
<td>Archiv für Orientforschung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJA</td>
<td>American Journal of Archaeology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Archiv Orientalí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOAT</td>
<td>Alter Orient und Altes Testament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOF</td>
<td>Altorientalische Forschungen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Anatolian Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATHE</td>
<td>B. Kienast, 'Die altassyrischen Texte des orientalischen Seminars der Universität Heidelberg und der Sammlung Erlenmeyer-Basel' (Berlin, 1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASOR</td>
<td>Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIN</td>
<td>Babylonian Inscriptions in the Collection of James B. Nies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiOr</td>
<td>Bibliotheca Orientalis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo</td>
<td>Boğazköy: Istanbul and Berlin, inventory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BoTu</td>
<td>E. Forrer, <em>Die Boghazköy-Texte in Umschrift = WVDOG</em> 41, 42 (Berlin, 1922, 1926)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>Annual of the British School at Athens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAH</td>
<td>Cambridge Ancient History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Cuneiform Texts from Cappadocian Tablets in the British Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHD</td>
<td>The Hittite Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPh</td>
<td>Classical Philology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Classical Review</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CRAI: Comptes rendus de l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres


EA: The El-Amarna letters, most recently ed. by Moran, 1987, 1992


Fs Bittel: R. M. Boehmer and H. Hauptmann, Beiträge zur Altertumskunde Kleinasiens (Festschrift für Kurt Bittel) (Mainz am Rhein, 1983)


Fs Houwink ten Cate: T. van den Hout and J. de Roos, Studio Historiae Ardens (Ancient Near Eastern Studies Presented to Philo H. J. Houwink ten Cate on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday) (Istanbul, 1995)

Fs Imparati: S. de Martino and F. Pecchioli Daddi, Anatolia Antica. Studi in memoria di Fiorella Imparati (Eothen 11) (Florence, 2002)

Fs Laroche: Florilegium Anatolicum (Mélanges offerts à Emmanuel Laroche) (Paris, 1979)

Fs Mansel: Mélanges Mansel (Ankara, 1974)

Fs Mazar: A. M. Maeir and P. de Miroschedjí (eds), I Will Speak the Riddles of Ancient Times, Archaeological and Historical Studies in Honor of Amihai Mazar on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday (Winona Lake, forthcoming)
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>KatHet</td>
<td>Katalog der Ausstellung: <em>Die Hethiter und ihr Reich. Das Volk der 1000 Götter</em> (Kunst- und Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn, 2002), (Stuttgart, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBo</td>
<td>Keilschrifttexte aus Boghazköi, Leipzig and Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kt</td>
<td>excavation no. of the texts from Kültepe Kanesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTHahn</td>
<td>J. Lewy, <em>Die Kültepe-texte aus der Sammlung Frida Hahn</em> (Berlin and Leipzig, 1930)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KTP</td>
<td>F. J. Stephens, <em>The Cappadocian Tablets in the University of Pennsylvania Museum</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUB</td>
<td>Keilschrifturkunden aus Boghazköi, Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAAA</td>
<td><em>Liverpool Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAOG</td>
<td><em>Mitteilungen der altorientalischen Gesellschaft</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDAI</td>
<td><em>Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDOG</td>
<td><em>Mitteilungen der deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td><em>Middle Euphrates Texts</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIO</td>
<td><em>Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MsK</td>
<td>Texts from Meškene (Emar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MsT</td>
<td>Texts from Maṣat (Tapikka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVAG</td>
<td><em>Mitteilungen der vorderasiatisch-ägyptischen Gesellschaft</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NABU</td>
<td><em>Nouvelles Assyriologiques Brèves et Utilitaires</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nies Babylonian Collection, Yale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td><em>Oriens Antiquus</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJA</td>
<td><em>Oxford Journal of Archaeology</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLZ</td>
<td><em>Orientalische Literaturzeitung</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or</td>
<td><em>Orientalia</em></td>
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### Abbreviations

<table>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td><em>Revue archéologique</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAss</td>
<td><em>Revue d’Assyriologie et d’Archéologie orientale</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHA</td>
<td><em>Revue Hittite et Asianique</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIA</td>
<td><em>Reallexikon der Assyriologie und vorderasiatischen Archäologie</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Tablets from Ras Shamra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSV</td>
<td><em>Bible, Revised Standard Version</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAK</td>
<td><em>Studien zur altägyptischen Kultur</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBo</td>
<td>H. G. Güterbock, <em>Siegel aus Boğazköy I-II</em> (Berlin, 1940, 1942)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEA</td>
<td><em>Studien Micenei ed Egeo-Anatolici</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StBoT</td>
<td><em>Studien zu den Boğazköy-Texten</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAPS</td>
<td><em>Transactions of the American Philosophical Society</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td><em>Tablettes cappadociennes</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCu</td>
<td><em>Textes cunéiformes, Louvre</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTKB</td>
<td>Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTKY</td>
<td>Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUAT</td>
<td><em>Texte aus der Umwelt des Alten Testament</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜBA-AR</td>
<td><em>Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi Arkeoloji Dergisi</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UF</td>
<td><em>Ugarit-Forschungen</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Urk</td>
<td><em>Urkunden des ägyptischen Altertums</em> (Leipzig and Berlin, 1906–58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBoT</td>
<td><em>Verstreute Boghazköy-Texte</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td><em>Die Welt des Orients</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVDOG</td>
<td><em>Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen des deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WZKM</td>
<td>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZA</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und vorderasiatische Archäologie</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZDMG</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft</em></td>
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## Hittite Kings

### OLD KINGDOM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>King</th>
<th>Reign</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labarna\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>–1650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hattusili I</td>
<td>1650–1620</td>
<td>(grandson?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mursili I</td>
<td>1620–1590</td>
<td>(grandson, adopted son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hantili I</td>
<td>1590–1560</td>
<td>(brother-in-law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zidanta I</td>
<td></td>
<td>(son-in-law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammuna</td>
<td>1560–1525</td>
<td>(son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huzziya I</td>
<td></td>
<td>(brother of Ammuna’s daughter-in-law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telipinu</td>
<td>1525–1500</td>
<td>(brother-in-law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alluwamna</td>
<td></td>
<td>(son-in-law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahurwaili</td>
<td></td>
<td>(interloper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hantili II</td>
<td>1500–1400</td>
<td>(son of Alluwamna?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zidanta II</td>
<td></td>
<td>(son?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huzziya II</td>
<td></td>
<td>(son?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muwattalli I</td>
<td></td>
<td>(interloper)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NEW KINGDOM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>King</th>
<th>Reign</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tudhaliya I/II</td>
<td>1400–1350</td>
<td>(grandson of Huzziya II?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnuwanda I\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>1400–1350</td>
<td>(son-in-law, adopted son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hattusili II?</td>
<td></td>
<td>(son?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tudhaliya III</td>
<td></td>
<td>(son?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppilliumu I</td>
<td>1350–1322</td>
<td>(son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnuwanda II</td>
<td>1322–1321</td>
<td>(son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mursili II</td>
<td>1321–1295</td>
<td>(brother)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muwattalli II</td>
<td>1295–1272</td>
<td>(son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urhi-Teshub</td>
<td>1272–1267</td>
<td>(son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hattusili III</td>
<td>1267–1237</td>
<td>(uncle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tudhaliya IV</td>
<td>1237–1228</td>
<td>(son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurunta\textsuperscript{c}</td>
<td>1228–1227</td>
<td>(cousin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tudhaliya IV\textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>1227–1209</td>
<td>(cousin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnuwanda III</td>
<td>1209–1207</td>
<td>(son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppilliumu II</td>
<td>1207–</td>
<td>(brother)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For possible earlier kings called Tudhaliya and Huzziya, see Ch. 4, n. 3.
Includes period of co-regency
Conjectural Great King of Hatti; see Ch. 12.
2nd period as king? See Ch. 12.

Note:
All dates are approximate. Sequential reigns are bracketed when it is impossible to suggest even approximate dates for individual kings.
Preface to the New Edition

In my Introduction to the first edition of this book, published in 1998 (paperback 1999), I remarked that probably for many years to come we could hope to write no more than a provisional history of the Hittite world, taking stock of information available to us at the time of writing, and recognizing that parts of this history might already be in need of revision by the time it appeared in print. I wrote those words in 1996, just prior to dispatching the manuscript of the book to the publisher. Since then, there have been many new contributions to the field of Hittite scholarship, reflecting both new discoveries as well as reassessments and updates of material brought to light in earlier years.

To begin with written records, the most important document to be published in recent years is a letter composed by one of the first Hittite kings, Hattusili I, to a man called Tuniya, ruler of the northern Mesopotamian kingdom of Tikunani. The letter has considerable significance for early Hittite history, but unfortunately it came to my attention too late for incorporation in my original manuscript. The new edition provides a welcome opportunity to make good the omission (see Ch. 4). Hieroglyphic inscriptions like that recently discovered on the rock-face at Hatip near Konya, or the recently deciphered Karabel inscription (see Ch. 12 for both of these), also make valuable contributions, despite their brevity, to our attempts to fill some of the gaps in our knowledge of the Hittite world. More is yet to come. We still await a full publication of the archives with over 3,000 tablets discovered at Sapinuwa (mod. Ortaköy) during the excavations conducted on the site from 1990 onwards. The tablets will undoubtedly cast important light on the administration of one of the Hittite kingdom’s major provincial centres, as well as on regional administration in the kingdom in general.

In the Hittite capital Hattusa, ongoing excavations under the current director Jürgen Seeher have provided new information about the capital’s practical facilities, as well as its overall ceremonial and administrative character, illustrated particularly by the recently unearthed grain-storage complexes. Information extracted from these and other
finds is often of considerable interest and value to historians, particularly when it complements or adds to the knowledge we are able to piece together from written records. Sometimes fresh investigations of fragmentary and apparently mute archaeological remains can lead to new historical interpretations, and in some cases to the overturning of long-held assumptions. To give but one example, Dr Seeher is now convinced that archaeological evidence dating to the last period of Hattusa's existence conjures up a very different scenario for the city's end than has been traditionally supposed (see Ch. 13).

While it is impossible to do full justice within the scope of this new edition to all advances in the field of Hittite historical studies in the last few years, I have attempted to indicate as many of these advances as possible in the pages which follow. This may partly be evident from the Bibliography, which contains almost 300 new items, the great majority of which have appeared since the dispatch of the first edition to the publisher in June, 1996. Sections of every chapter have been rewritten, sometimes quite substantially. Two of the maps have been redrawn (Maps 3 and 4) and an extra map added (Map 5), and there are some minor alterations to the List of Hittite Kings (p. xiii). In a number of cases the revisions I have made reflect recent advances in Hittite scholarship, in other cases they reflect second thoughts about what I wrote in the first edition, or errors that needed to be rectified. The same applies to the numerous minor changes I have made throughout the book. I must confess to a number of lapsus calami in the first edition, and in so doing express my gratitude to my international Hittite colleagues for the constructive suggestions and comments they have made about the book, both in reviews as well as in personal communications. A great number of the improvements in the new edition are directly attributable to what they have said or written. I cannot of course hope to have satisfied them in all respects by what I myself have now written.

One of the important purposes of this book is to provide its readers, especially those academically and professionally involved in a study of the ancient Near Eastern civilizations, with comprehensive documentation on (a) the original sources of information on Hittite history, (b) editions and translations of these sources by modern scholars, and (c) the debates and discussions to which they have given rise in the scholarly literature. The endnotes which contain much of this documentation have been considerably augmented in this edition—to the point where
it seems best to locate them at the end of the book rather than at the bottom of the relevant pages as footnotes, where they would often have taken up a substantial portion of each page. Since the book is aimed at the general as well as the more specialized reader, this is an important consideration. The book can be read essentially as a historical narrative in its own right, without the offputting effect of large quantities of notes and references directly appended to the text on each page.

Increasing public awareness of and interest in the Hittite world have become quite marked in the last few years. This is reflected on a modest scale in the gratifying response to the first edition of this book. On a much larger scale it is reflected in the enormous public response to the highly successful Hittite exhibition staged in Bonn and Berlin in 2002. The media have also played a promotional role. Recent television documentaries on Troy have highlighted Troy’s Hittite connections, and a major bio-documentary film called ‘The Hittites’, by the Turkish film director Tolga Örnek, was released in 2003 and shown initially in cinemas in Turkey, Europe, and the USA.

Part of the interest in the world of the Hittites has arisen from a widespread interest in the Near Eastern world in general, and the growing awareness that the Hittites were not only a part of this world, but were for a time the dominant power within it. A great deal of credit for this must go to those scholars who have done much to make the Hittites accessible to the general reader, partly through the presentation of reliable and very readable translations of Hittite texts, like those published in the Scholars Press (Atlanta) series. My hope is that *The Kingdom of the Hittites* along with my complementary volume *Life and Society in the Hittite World*, will not only make useful contributions to the scholarly literature on the ancient Near Eastern world but also maintain and enhance awareness, within the general reading community, of one of this world’s most fascinating civilizations.

Trevor Bryce
February 2004
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Introduction

During the last 150 years, the ancient Near East\textsuperscript{1} has provided a rich field of investigation for scholars from a wide range of disciplines. Archaeologists, anthropologists, historians, and philologists have all made substantial contributions to our knowledge of the ancient civilizations which rose, flourished, and fell in the land-mass extending from the Aegean coast of modern Turkey through Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia to the eastern frontiers of modern Iran. Some of these civilizations date back to the very beginnings of urban settlement in the Near East. Others of more recent origin provide evidence of highly developed political and social organizations, reflected particularly in the finds of tablet archives. These and other written sources of information have provided a basis for research into the political and social history of the Near East from the Early Bronze Age onwards. They are also of fundamental importance to the study of the scripts and languages of the region, which include Sumerian, Akkadian,\textsuperscript{2} Hittite, hieroglyphic and cuneiform Luwian, Ugaritic, and the Iron Age languages of the first millennium BC.

Of course none of the civilizations or languages which developed in the region can properly be studied in isolation. The Near Eastern world, then as now, was characterized by a high degree of cultural coherence as well as cultural diversity, and by a complex network of political and commercial interrelationships. It is virtually impossible to acquire expertise on a particular Near Eastern civilization unless one has an understanding of the broad political and cultural context in which it arose and ran its course.

Hittitology is a relative newcomer to the field of Near Eastern studies. Little more than a century ago, when important advances had already been and were continually being made in the study of the Bronze Age civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt, the Hittites were regarded as
no more than a small Canaanite tribe living somewhere in Palestine—an assumption based on a few scattered biblical references. We now know that Hatti, the kingdom of the Hittites, was one of the great powers of the Late Bronze Age, rivalling and eventually surpassing in the fourteenth century its two most powerful contemporaries, the kingdoms of Mitanni and Egypt. From their capital Hattusa in central Anatolia, the kings of the Land of Hatti controlled a widespread network of vassal states, which at the height of Hittite political and military development in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries extended from the Aegean coast of Anatolia in the west through northern Syria to Damascus in the south, to the western fringes of Mesopotamia in the east.

There have been many important advances in the field of Hittite scholarship during the last hundred years, advances which have contributed much to our understanding of the political configuration of the Near Eastern world in the Late Bronze Age. Even in the last two decades, important discoveries have been made. Many of these have come to light during the ongoing excavations at Hattusa, particularly in the so-called Upper City where the unearthing of no fewer than twenty-six temples in relatively recent times (we previously knew of only five temples in Hattusa) has provided us with important new perspectives on the sacred and ceremonial character of the royal capital. More recently again, the discovery of large grain silo complexes in the city has provided valuable information on Hattusa's role in the storage and redistribution of food supplies, especially in the last decades of the Late Bronze Age. Of particular value to the historian are the continuing discoveries of inscribed tablets, most notably the famous bronze tablet which came to light in 1986 under a pavement just inside the walls of Hattusa. The tablet contains a range of hitherto unknown information about the Hittite kingdom in the last century of its existence. At the other end of the historical spectrum, a recently discovered letter dating to the reign of King Hattusili I, the likely founder of the Hittite capital, has given us a major new insight into how far the power and influence of the kingdom extended in its early days. Also noteworthy amongst recent finds in Hattusa is a cache of more than 3,500 seal impressions, the majority bearing the names and titles and genealogy of Hittite kings. This discovery, in one single archive, increases many times over the number of sealings previously known to us from a range of find-spots. Excavations in regional centres of the kingdom have also produced
important new written sources—hieroglyphic inscriptions at several sites in southern Anatolia, cuneiform tablet archives at Emar on the Euphrates and at Maṣat (anc. Tāpikka), Kuṣakli (anc. Sarissa), and Ortaköy (anc. Sapinuwa) in central Anatolia.

We are confronted with what is almost an embarrassment of riches. It may be many years before the new material is fully analysed, and the information it contains fully taken into account. This serves to highlight the dynamic nature of the field of Hittite studies. Long held theories or assumptions have constantly to be revised or discarded in the light of new information. Additional pieces are constantly being added to the incomplete jigsaw of the world of the Hittites.

Thus now, and probably for many years to come, we can write no more than a provisional history of this world, taking stock of what information is available to us at the time of writing, and recognizing that parts of such a history may already be in need of revision by the time it appears in print. The task is made all the more difficult by the fact that on many aspects of Hittite history there is a wide divergence of scholarly views. Within the compass of the present work, it is impossible to represent these views fully or to justify in detail a particular line taken on a controversial issue. Inevitably there will be scholars who will disagree with a number of the conclusions and interpretations and reconstructions of historical events dealt with in the pages which follow. That is an occupational hazard of writing a book of this kind. The aim of the book is to present a view of Hittite history which is consistent with the evidence so far available to us, but also to indicate to the reader where there is a divergence of scholarly opinion, and where different or contrary views have been presented.

The focus will be primarily on the political and military history of the Hittite world. This provides an important context for an investigation of the many other aspects of Hittite civilization, including religion, social customs and mores, art, and literature. Such aspects have been dealt with in a number of other books, of both a specialized and a general nature. The most recent publication in the latter category is by the author of the present work.\(^5\)

In writing a history of any people, ancient or modern, one should as far as possible allow the people to speak for themselves. In line with this principle, the chapters which follow contain numerous passages from the original texts. Many of the passages have already been translated
elsewhere. But the general reader’s access to them is limited by the several different modern languages in which the translations appear, and sometimes by the relative difficulty of obtaining these translations. As a rule, a passage included in this book has been translated afresh only if no reliable English translation of it is currently available. Sometimes an existing translation has been slightly modified, as indicated by the insertion of the words ‘after’ or ‘adapted from’ before the translator’s name. Occasionally the modification is made to take account of revised readings and interpretations of particular words or phrases in the translated passage. More often it is made for minor stylistic reasons, or to ensure consistency in the way certain terms or expressions are rendered throughout the book.

Readers should further note that like many ancient texts, Hittite written records are often fragmentary, and a precise, literal translation of them involves a number of restorations of words, phrases, or sentences which have been lost from the original. Such restorations are conventionally indicated by square brackets in the edited texts. Where there is little or no doubt about a restoration, I have removed the brackets in the translations for ease of reading. But where there is significant doubt about a reading or restoration, I have indicated this either in the translation itself or in its accompanying endnote. Even so, anyone wishing to make a detailed study of the texts will need to consult the original scholarly editions and translations of them. Details are provided at the end of each passage or in the endnotes.

The great majority of tablets from the archives of the Hittite capital have been published, and are still being published, in two main series: Keilschrifttexte aus Boghazkoi (Leipzig and Berlin), and Keilschrifturkunden aus Boghazkoi (Berlin). These publications consist of copies of the original cuneiform inscriptions, and provide the basis for subsequent editions of the inscriptions in transliteration and translation. There are similar publications of tablets found at other sites; for example, the tablet archives discovered at Ras Shamra (anc. Ugarit) in Syria, and the archive discovered at Maşat (anc. Tapikka) within the Hittite homeland. Most of the tablets published up to the beginning of the 1970s have been catalogued according to type and subject matter by the French scholar Emmanuel Laroche in his Catalogue des textes hittites (Paris, 1971; suppl. 1972). Since Laroche’s Catalogue contains much useful supplementary information about the texts, the CTH number is
generally included with the original publication reference for the text. For a general overview of the nature of our written sources on Hittite history, and their value and their shortcomings, the reader is referred to Appendix 2.

Hittite personal and place names have been reproduced alphabetically in a variety of different ways, depending, for example, on whether stem-forms or inflected forms are represented, and on whether cuneiform $h$ and $i$ in Hittite are transliterated simply as $h$ and $i$, or as $kh$ and $sh$. The names produced by using inflected forms and $kh$ and $sh$ transliterations are often very cumbersome, and can have somewhat messy consequences when one tries to pronounce them; for example, Khattushash, Khattushilish, Shuppiluliumash, Tudkhaliyash. I have therefore adopted the simplest of the commonly used transliterations when representing Hittite names: thus Hattusa, Hattusili, Suppiluliuma, Tudhaliya. But while many scholars believe that cuneiform $s$ in Hittite may in fact represent a simple $s$, when it occurred in Akkadian and Hurrian it was pronounced as a palatal sibilant and is commonly represented in Akkadian and Hurrian names as $sh$. That is the convention adopted here: thus Ishtar, Tushratta, Washshuganni.

Finally, some comments about the division of Hittite history into two or more chronological phases. (The problems of determining an absolute chronology for the Hittite kingdom are discussed in Appendix 1.) It is common practice for historians to divide the history of the ancient Near Eastern kingdoms which extended over some hundreds of years into several major phases. Thus the histories of pharaonic Egypt and Assyria are each divided into three phases, designated as the Old, Middle, and New Kingdoms. These divisions are often associated with the disappearance of one line of rulers and the emergence of another, sometimes with a considerable interval of time between the two, or with a serious downturn in the fortunes of a kingdom, followed by its entry into a powerful new phase of its history—or vice versa. Sometimes there are marked differences in the political, cultural, and material character of the various phases of a kingdom’s history, which provides further justification for distinguishing them from one another.

Hittite history presents us with no easily distinguishable phases. In the first place, throughout the 500 years of its existence the kingdom of Hatti remained under the rule of kings who almost certainly came from
a single small group of closely related families. From the beginning to the end of the Late Bronze Age kingdom, there was no clearly demonstrable change of dynasty. There were, as we shall see, a number of palace coups which unseated a king and put a pretender on the throne. However, usurpers seem (almost) invariably to have been related by blood or marriage ties to their victims. And later kings traced their ancestry back to the earliest occupants of the Hittite throne.

Further, we cannot easily divide Hittite history into different phases on the basis of a major decline followed by a major upsurge in the kingdom’s fortunes, or vice versa. The kingdom waxed and waned dramatically on a number of occasions throughout its history. It would be meaningless to attempt to represent all these as distinct phases in its historical development.

None the less, a number of Hittite scholars have followed the pattern adopted for other Near Eastern kingdoms by dividing Hittite history into three main phases—Old, Middle, and New Kingdoms. But those who do so disagree on where one ends and the other begins. This merely serves to emphasize that any attempts to split Hittite history into two or more distinctive phases is little more than an arbitrary exercise.

The matter is further confused by philologists’ and palaeographers’ use of the terms Old, Middle, and Late to designate particular phases in the development of the Hittite language and the cuneiform script in which it was written. At least in their case there is demonstrable justification for such divisions, and broad agreement amongst them. But changes in language and script cannot be assumed to have broader cultural or political significance in the absence of other significant and clearly defined factors which might support this.

While any attempt to divide Hittite history into different phases would probably be quite meaningless to the Hittites themselves, it may be advisable, if only as a matter of convenience, not to diverge too widely from a long established and generally accepted convention. With this in mind, I believe that the most acceptable solution is to divide the history of the Hittite Kingdom into no more than two main phases, an Old and a New Kingdom (to use the standard terminology), beginning the former with the reign of the first king called Labarna in the early seventeenth century and the latter with the reign of the first king called Tudhaliya in the late fifteenth or early fourteenth century.
The Hittite civilization was part of a continuum of human development which in Anatolia as elsewhere in the Near East extended back many millennia. By way of introduction to the Hittites, we shall turn our attention first to some of the antecedent civilizations in the region, especially those that emerged and flourished in central Anatolia from c.3000 BC onwards, in the periods commonly referred to as the Early and Middle Bronze Ages.
1

The Origins of the Hittites

Anatolia in the Early Bronze Age

To the nineteenth-century scholar, Anatolia was little more than a mysterious blank on the Bronze Age Near Eastern landscape during the period when the great civilizations of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt were in their prime. Even the excavations at Hissarlik conducted by Heinrich Schliemann between 1871 and 1890 did little to change this picture. For the material civilization which Schliemann uncovered on the alleged site of Troy was something of an enigma, a precocious development in north-west Anatolia, on the very edge of a dark subcontinent.

Since the early years of the twentieth century, that picture has changed dramatically. We now know that Anatolia was the homeland of a large complex of civilizations, the earliest of which extended back thousands of years before the beginning of the Bronze Age. Indeed we must uncover many layers of Anatolian prehistory before we see revealed, finally, the first settlements and communities of the period archaeologists have called the Bronze Age.

This period extended over some 2,000 years of history and civilization in the Near East, roughly from the late fourth to the late second millennium BC. It was a period characterized by many great achievements in the development of human society and civilization within the region. Yet there was no sharp or sudden break with what had gone before. In their earliest phase, many Bronze Age sites reflect no more than a gradual and sometimes almost imperceptible cultural development out of the preceding ‘Chalcolithic Age’. There was no major cultural revolution, no evident intrusion of newcomers into Anatolia, except in the Cilician Plain, and very few signs of destruction of existing communities. A number of the features of the Chalcolithic cultures persisted in the ‘new age’ with little or no change.1
For archaeologists, the hallmark of this new age was the introduction of a metal alloy called bronze, consisting of a small percentage of tin (up to 10 per cent) mixed with copper—producing a tougher, more durable metal than copper on its own. This technological advance did not lead to sudden revolutionary changes in society. Copper remained for some time the metal most commonly used by the Early Bronze Age peoples. Yet the production of the first bronze artefacts in Anatolia was a development of great significance, one which was to have a profound influence on the course of Anatolian history for the next two millennia.

There is an important reason for this. While Anatolia was richly endowed with deposits of copper, lead, nickel, and arsenic, we have yet to find evidence anywhere in the region that there were substantial tin deposits which were worked during the Bronze Age.² To date, there is no clearly demonstrable proof that the peoples of Anatolia did not have to rely largely if not exclusively on supplies of tin from external sources. The actual sources are still a matter of some debate. But very likely much if not all of the tin used in Anatolia came from the south-east via Mesopotamia and Syria. Increasing demand in Anatolia for raw materials like tin and other commodities which were not obtainable locally created the need for trade links with areas further afield, particularly to the south-east. This must have been an important factor in the development of stable, coherent, political and administrative organizations capable of establishing and maintaining such links.

The Early Bronze Age Kingdoms

By the middle of the third millennium (the Early Bronze II phase), there were wealthy ruling houses and important centres of civilization in various parts of Anatolia. Notable amongst these were Troy and Poliochni in the north-west, Beycesultan in the south-west, and Tarsus in the Cilician Plain in the south-east.

But our main focus will be on central Anatolia. Here developed a number of prosperous settlements, presumably the nuclei of small kingdoms, in a region extending from just below the southern bend of the river now known as the Kızıl Irmak (Red River)³ northwards towards the Pontic zone along the southern shore of the Black Sea.
Prominent amongst these settlements was the site now known as Alaca Höyük, which lies some 180 kilometres north-east of the modern Turkish capital Ankara. The settlement which was founded here in the Late Chalcolithic period reached its peak in the Early Bronze II phase, as illustrated by its thirteen ‘royal’ shaft graves and their spectacular grave goods, generally dated to c.2300–2100. But it continued as a flourishing community to the end of the Late Bronze Age. Its Bronze Age name is unknown, though Hittite Arinna, city of the Sun-Goddess, is possibly to be identified with it. Other important settlements were Hattus, the site of the later Hittite capital Hattusa, Alışar lying 80 kilometres to the south-east of Hattus (and probably the ancient Ankuwa), Zalpa, which lay in the Pontic region, and Kanesh.

The last of these, Kanesh, is located in the fertile Kayseri Plain just south of the southern bend of the Kızıl Irmak river on the site with a mound now known as Kültepe. A Chalcolithic site in origin, it has a history of continuous occupation down to the Roman period. But its most flourishing phase occurred during the Early and Middle Bronze Ages.

The name of a king of Kanesh called Zipani figures in a well-known tradition which deals with a rebellion of seventeen local rulers against the Akkadian king Naram-Sin (c.2254–2218), whose kingdom at the height of his power extended from the Persian Gulf to central Anatolia. A king of Hatti called Pamba is also included amongst the list of rebels. This is admittedly a late attested tradition (c.1400). But if it does have a basis in historical fact, it provides us with valuable written evidence of the existence of organized kingdoms within the central Anatolian region during the Early Bronze Age.

In a number of respects, the Early Bronze II phase seems to represent the climax of a range of social, political, and cultural developments which had been taking place in various parts of Anatolia from the Late Chalcolithic period onwards, with little interruption and without major population changes, except perhaps in the north-west and south-east (to be discussed below). But by the end of this phase, perhaps around 2300, we have evidence in some regions of major and sometimes violent changes. This is so particularly in the west and the south. In these regions there are signs of major conflagrations, and as far as we can presently determine, relatively few of the established Early Bronze II communities survived into the final phase of the Early Bronze Age.
A number of scholars associate the apparent upheavals of this period with the arrival or incursions of Indo-European newcomers into Anatolia.

The Indo-European Presence in Anatolia

Before the end of the third millennium there were three known groups of people in Anatolia who spoke Indo-European languages; in the west the Luwians, in the north the Palaians, and in central or eastern Anatolia the speakers of a language called Nesite. The names we give these groups derive from the names of their languages, as identified in the cuneiform tablets found in the archives of the Hittite capital Hattusa. These archives contain texts written in a number of languages, including several Indo-European languages identified by the terms luwili (in the language of Luwiya),9 palaumnili (in the language of Pala)10 and nešili, našili, or nišili (in the language of Nesa).11 The locations of these groups have been determined primarily on the basis of the geographical distribution of place-names, divine names, and personal names in their respective languages.

The origins of the Indo-Europeans are disputed. Homelands in the east (eastern Anatolia, southern Caucasus, northern Mesopotamia), the north (southern Russia, north of the Black Sea), and the west (central Europe, the Balkans) have all been proposed, but no consensus has been reached.12 Opinions also differ widely on when they came. Most scholars believe that they arrived in Anatolia some time during the third millennium. Some argue that the Luwians were the first, entering Anatolia early in the third millennium, with the Nesites arriving towards the end of the millennium.13 Others believe that the order should be reversed, with the Nesites (and Palaians) representing the first phase of Indo-European migration, and the Luwians arriving towards the end of the millennium.14 Another view is that the Indo-Europeans arrived in a single mass, subsequently dispersing within Anatolia some time after their arrival.15 Yet another view is that Anatolia had already been the home of Indo-European speakers for some 4,000 years before the beginning of the Bronze Age—i.e. from c.7000 BC.16 While we still cannot reach finality on the matter of the origins of the Indo-European groups and the nature of their migration into Anatolia,17 there are several important questions we should at this stage address. Where do
these groups belong within the context of the Early Bronze Age kingdoms? Who were the inhabitants of these kingdoms? Who were the kings who ruled over them?

The Hattians

From at least as early as the time of the Akkadian empire of Sargon, the region in which the central Anatolian kingdoms lay was known as the Land of Hatti. Scholars have long assumed that the predominant population of the region in the third millennium was an indigenous pre-Indo-European group called the Hattians. Evidence of a ‘Hattic’ civilization is provided by the remnants of one of the non-Indo-European languages found in the later Hittite archives. The language is identified in several of the texts in which it appears by the term hattili—i.e. ‘(written) in the language of Hatti’. The few texts that survive are predominantly religious or cultic in character. They provide us with the names of a number of Hattic deities, as well as Hattic personal and place-names. The Turkish archaeologist Ekrem Akurgal has pronounced the material culture of the Early Bronze Age kingdoms of central Anatolia to be ‘definitely of native Anatolian character’.

The Hattians may then have been the people who built and inhabited the Early Bronze Age kingdoms of central Anatolia. If so, where do the Indo-Europeans fit into this picture? A number of scholars believe that the royal tombs of Alaca Höyük may help provide the answer.

Attention has been drawn, particularly by Akurgal, to the burial methods used at Alaca Höyük and to the ‘royal standards’ which the graves contained. Akurgal claims that while the style of the objects shows that they were executed by native Anatolian, or Hattic, artists, the solar discs and theriomorphic standards, of a kind also found at Horoztepe and Mahmatlar in the Pontic region, represent non-Hattic, Indo-European concepts. Similarly the method of burial has an Indo-European character; the graves remind us of later Mycenaean burials, and of those of the Phrygians found at Gordion and Ankara.

This has led to the conclusion that the occupants of the tombs may have been Kurgan immigrants from the region of Maikop in southern Russia, immigrants who spoke an Indo-European language. From this Akurgal draws the further conclusion that the tombs belonged to ‘Hittite princes’ who installed themselves in the country of the Hattians,
as rulers of a native Hattic population; hence an Indo-European invasion towards 2200 and the installation of the first Indo-European tribes in the Kızıl Irmak basin at this time. But such a theory is by no means universally accepted. For example, it has been claimed that we have no firm evidence for an Indo-European invasion of Anatolia, nor indeed any evidence that Hittite culture is Indo-European in origin. So the overall situation regarding the history of Indo-European settlement in Anatolia remains a confused and confusing one. Can we draw any firm conclusions at all, from the very limited data and the maze of scholarly theories available to us, about the ethnopolitical scene in central Anatolia up to the end of the Early Bronze Age (c.2000 BC)? In reviewing our current state of knowledge, we will have to begin with several negatives. But it is as well to state these, since in the past so many tenuously or falsely based assumptions about the Indo-European presence in the region have passed into conventional wisdom and from there into the realm of ‘established fact’. 

Briefly, the overall situation can be summarized thus:

1. None of the evidence at our disposal points unequivocally to a major influx of newcomers into Anatolia, whether Indo-European or otherwise, during the third millennium.

2. We are unable to determine with any certainty the predominant ethnic character of the populations who inhabited the Early Bronze Age kingdoms. It is possible, though not provable, that the dominant culture of central Anatolia in the Early Bronze Age was that of a non-Indo-European population whom we call the Hattians. This does not exclude the possibility that there were already peoples of Indo-European origin in the same region during this period.

3. We do not know when Indo-European groups first appeared in Anatolia, whether a century, a millennium, or several millennia before their first attested appearance in written records. Archaeological evidence has not provided us with conclusive evidence as to the date of an Indo-European arrival.

4. We can however be certain of an Indo-European presence in central Anatolia by the end of the third millennium, since Indo-European personal names appear in the records of Assyrian merchants who set up trading colonies in the region early in the second millennium.
5. Whenever Indo-European immigrants arrived, whether initially as invaders or as peaceful settlers who came in small groups over a period of several centuries, they probably mixed freely with the local populations and adopted many elements of their culture.

6. Nevertheless, a number of elements that can be identified as Indo-European persisted through this and the succeeding ages. This is particularly evident in the survival of the Indo-European language called Nesite—which became the official language of the later Hittite kingdom.

7. It is possible that the burial practices and grave goods at Alaca Höyük towards the end of the third millennium reflect a predominantly Indo-European culture in at least the immediate region. If so, the persons for whom the tombs were constructed may have spoken ‘Nesite’, or an earlier form of it, and have been amongst the Indo-European ancestors of the Late Bronze Age Hittites. The wealth of the grave goods suggest that their recipients were members of an élite ruling class. A similar conclusion may be drawn about the sites of Horoztepe and Mahmatlar in the Pontic zone. However, the theory that these sites indicate a line of foreign kings who imposed themselves on a local population has yet to be substantiated.

8. More generally, a large number of the Early Bronze Age settlements of central Anatolia may have included persons of Indo-European origin in their populations.

9. The close similarities between the three attested Indo-European languages in Bronze Age Anatolia indicate that those who spoke them were originally, and remained, in relatively close contact with one other. Had they arrived in Anatolia in separate migratory waves some centuries apart, the language differences are likely to have been much more marked. The differences that do exist appear to be consistent with the theory that the main dispersion of Indo-European speakers occurred within Anatolia, perhaps no more than a few centuries before the languages make their appearance in written records.\(^{25}\)

10. The likelihood is that this dispersion occurred during the course of the third millennium. It is possible that the destruction of Troy II\(g\) towards the end of the millennium was associated with the arrival of one
Ethnicity in the Middle Bronze Age

In the Middle Bronze Age (twentieth–eighteenth centuries), the Assyrians established a number of merchant colonies in the eastern half of Anatolia for the purpose of trading with the towns and palaces belonging to the various local kingdoms. Most of these kingdoms had already been established during the Early Bronze Age. The headquarters of the colony network was the city of Nesa or Kanesh, which as we have noted lay just south of the Kızıl Irmak river. In the Assyrian texts found in this city, the great majority of names are of Indo-European origin. This has led scholars to conclude that Nesa was the main centre of Indo-European settlement in central Anatolia during the colony period; other sites were supposedly inhabited by the indigenous Hattic people. And the conflicts between a dynasty established at Nesa and the rulers of other central Anatolian kingdoms have been seen as ethnically based conflicts between Indo-Europeans and Hattians, leading to the eventual triumph of the former over the latter.

However, the notion of struggles between competing ethnic groups, of conflicts fought in order to preserve or achieve the supremacy of one such group over another, is almost certainly meaningless in this period. We do not know what the ethnic composition was of the other central Anatolian kingdoms, nor the ethnic identity of the rulers of these kingdoms. By the early second millennium, the population of the region may well have been a very mixed one, which included Indo-European and Hurrian as well as Hattic elements.

Nevertheless Indo-European elements seem to have been particularly prominent in the city of Nesa—to the extent that the Indo-European language spoken in the region became closely identified with the name of the city. Already in this period Nesite was probably becoming established as the Anatolian language used for written records and written communications. It was used by the dynasty which imposed its rule upon the city and subsequently extended its sway by military conquest over much of the eastern half of Anatolia. But initially the establishment and spread of Nesite as a written language probably occurred in a commercial context, as a result of...
Nesa’s prominence at the centre of the Assyrian trading network.\textsuperscript{34} Moreover if Luwian was already widely spoken in other regions of Anatolia,\textsuperscript{35} communication with these regions would have been much easier if the medium used was that of a closely related language.

This brings us to an important question.

\textbf{Who Were the Hittites?}

The Hittite kingdom was founded in the early or middle years of the seventeenth century (in accordance with the so-called middle chronology). Its permanent capital was established at Hattusa,\textsuperscript{36} located 150 kilometres east of Ankara. The kingdom lasted some five centuries, throughout the period known as the Late Bronze Age.

Following upon our earlier comments, we should discard the once widely held notion that Hittite history began with a distinct ethnic group of Indo-European origin imposing its supremacy over a native Hattic population of central Anatolia.\textsuperscript{37} Indeed the German scholar Gerd Steiner has gone so far as to claim that Indo-Europeans played only a minor role in the history of the Hittite kingdom, as subjects of kings who were Hattic in origin.\textsuperscript{38} Certainly, a number of Hattic elements were present in Hittite civilization, although mainly in the areas of religion, art, and mythology. And Hattic personal and place-names persisted throughout the period of the Hittite kingdom. It is possible that the names of some of the kings were Hattic in origin,\textsuperscript{39} and of course the Hattic legacy is ever present in the very name by which the kingdom was known—the Land of Hatti.

But alongside this, we must set the lack of any ‘perceptible trace of Hattic precedents underlying the historical, administrative, legal or diplomatic literature of the kingdom’,\textsuperscript{40} and most recently it has been claimed that ‘the supposed impact of Hattic on Hittite language and institutions has been consistently overestimated’.\textsuperscript{41} Even the royal titles \textit{Labarna} (variant \textit{Tabarna}) and \textit{Tawananna}, long thought to be Hattic in origin, have recently been claimed to be Indo-European (see Ch. 4, n. 16). There is also the indisputable fact that the Indo-European Nesite language was the official written language of the royal court. It was used in a wide variety of documents, both religious and secular, it was the medium of communication between Hittite kings and their regional
governors and other officials, and between the kings and their vassal rulers in Anatolia, particularly in the west and south-west where Luwian was widely spoken. It was also the language used by the Hittite king in his correspondence with the king of Ahhiyawa.

Since Nesite was the official language of the Hittite kingdom, it is a natural assumption that this was the language spoken by its ruling class. If not, an explanation for its use has to be found.

Professor Steiner has offered such an explanation, along the following lines: Nesite had already been established as an important language of communication in Anatolia during the Assyrian colony period, emanating as it did from the headquarters of the colony network. Its use may have spread quite widely beyond the Nesa region, perhaps already serving as a kind of *lingua franca* in Anatolia. It would have been much more readily learnt and understood in many parts of western and south-eastern Anatolia where Luwian was spoken, than the Hattic language, or any other language spoken within the sphere of Assyrian merchant activities. Primarily for this reason Nesite (Hittite) continued to be used as the official chancellery language in Hattusa when the Hittite kingdom was established, and as the language of written communications between the royal court and the various peoples of Anatolia, particularly in the west.

One of the main problems with this theory is that the Nesite (Hittite) language underwent a number of changes throughout the 500 years of its use in the Hittite texts—changes which reflect not a fossilized chancellery language but a living, spoken language. Yet the theory may not be entirely without merit. Practical considerations of the kind mentioned by Steiner may well have helped ensure Hittite’s survival and continuing development as the kingdom’s official language, both spoken and written, irrespective of the ethnic origins of those who spoke or wrote it.

But there may have been other reasons for the continuing use of Hittite, at least within the royal court. The royal succession in Hatti remained the prerogative of a small group of families throughout the entire history of the Hittite kingdom. And those who occupied the throne frequently proclaimed their genealogical links with their earliest known predecessors. These links helped substantiate their claims to the throne. If the earliest members of the dynasty used the Indo-European Nesite language at least as the official language, then the retention of
this language would have helped reinforce the sense of dynasty, of unbroken family continuity through a succession of generations. Nesite was to remain the language of royalty throughout the period of the Hittite kingdom. This need not indicate continuing political supremacy by a particular ethnic group. Rather it reflects the retention of an important dynastic tradition.

As a result of marriage alliances, adoptions, and coups, several ethnic elements—Hattic, Luwian, and Hurrian amongst them—were intermingled in the small number of families which provided the occupants of the Hittite throne. To judge from the names of the kings, their consorts, and other members of their families, membership of the élite ruling class was not based on any sense of ethnic exclusivity. But once they were admitted to the ranks of royalty, all members conformed with and perpetuated its established traditions, which included the use of Nesite as the chief official language of the court. This does not mean that the use of Nesite was confined to the members of royalty. At the very least it extended down through the various levels of the kingdom’s administrative hierarchy. It was, for example, the language used by scribes and other officials in the kingdom’s regional centres, as illustrated by the personal notes exchanged, as appendages to official dispatches, between Hattusa-based bureaucrats and their counterparts in Tapikka (mod. Maşat).

However widespread its use, Nesite was but one of a number of languages spoken in the kingdom. A few persistent echoes of the old Hattic language might still have been heard here and there. Babylonian-speaking scribes and Hurrian-speaking priests and diviners were almost certainly to be found in the homeland’s major regional centres as well as in the capital. But it was the thousands of prisoners-of-war regularly transported to the homeland in the wake of military conquests who made the most significant impact on the ethnic composition of the kingdom’s home territories. The Hittites, so called, had neither a single common ethnic core, nor a single common language. They were a multi-racial population who spoke a wide range of languages.

How then did the term ‘Hittite’ come about? It occurs first as a biblical term (hittî, hittîm) used in reference to a small Canaanite tribe who dwelt in the hills of Palestine in the early centuries of the first millennium BC. The term was subsequently adopted by scholars to refer
to the kingdom which dominated Anatolia throughout the Late Bronze Age.\textsuperscript{45} As far as we know, the Late Bronze Age ‘Hittites’ never used any ethnic or political designation when referring to themselves, certainly not one which reflected an Indo-European origin. They simply called themselves ‘people of the Land of Hatti’. That is, they identified themselves by the region in which they lived, using a name which may already have been in currency for many centuries, perhaps even millennia, and probably long before the arrival of any Indo-European groups in the region.\textsuperscript{46}

They were a mixed population, consisting of a number of different ethnic elements—Indo-European (Nesites and Luwians), Hattic, Hurrian, and probably increasingly a range of other population elements from Mesopotamia and Syria. Many of them, perhaps the great majority, probably did not speak the official language of the kingdom. What gave them a recognizable common identity, in their own eyes and in the eyes of their neighbours, was not a common language, nor a common cultural or ethnic identity, but the fact that they lived within a clearly defined region which differentiated them from other subjects of the king who lived further afield in vassal states.

The region in which they lived is often referred to as the Hittite homeland. Within this region they belonged to cities, towns, or cult centres governed by laws promulgated by the king and administered by councils of elders or regional governors acting on the king’s behalf. Or they lived on small farms, or on rural estates whose owners owed direct allegiance to the king, often in return for royal favours received or promised. Thus through a series of hierarchical intermediaries they too were the subjects of the king, and could be called upon to provide him with revenue in kind and to fight in his armies.

The overall picture of the Near East in the Late Bronze Age is a complex one—a picture of constantly shifting balances of power amongst the major kingdoms of the region, of expanding and contracting spheres of influence, of rapidly changing allegiances and alliances as Great Kings vied with one another for supremacy over their neighbours. Within this context the kingdom of the Hittites emerged, struggled for survival, triumphed, and fell. In the pages which follow, we shall track the progress of this kingdom, from its beginnings in the seventeenth
century, through five centuries of triumphs and disasters, until its final collapse early in the twelfth century.

But before we embark on this study, we should retrace our steps to the centuries preceding the rise of the Hittite kingdom—to the period of the Assyrian merchant colonies. This was one of the most fascinating, and one of the best documented periods of early Anatolian history. With the establishment of their colonies the Assyrians brought to Anatolia, for the first time, the art of writing. It is with this period that a study of the history of ancient Anatolia can truly begin.
Anatolia in the Assyrian Colony Period

The Merchant Colonies

Early in the second millennium, the Assyrians established a number of merchant colonies in Anatolia. As we have noted, the appearance of these colonies marked the beginning of a major new era in Anatolian history—the era of the written record, some thousand years after the first written records were produced in Mesopotamia. The Assyrian merchants kept copious accounts of their business transactions on clay tablets inscribed in Old Assyrian cuneiform, and maintained regular written contact with officials, business associates, and family connections resident in the Assyrian capital Ashur. ‘Contracts and judicial records of every kind recorded and validated a variety of legal transactions of which they served as written evidence, also in lawsuits. Many lists, notes and memorandums enabled the traders to keep track of their goods and transactions, especially lists of outstanding claims which were used for collecting debts and for the periodic settling of accounts arranged by the organization of the traders, the kārum.’

In archaeological terminology the period of the Assyrian colonies, covering the first two centuries or so of the second millennium, is commonly known as the Middle Bronze Age. During this period, the Assyrians were very active in international trading and commercial ventures. Their activities in Anatolia are but one example of these ventures. In the course of their merchant operations, the Assyrians set up a number of settlements extending from their homeland north-westwards into central Anatolia. Twenty-one such settlements are attested in their texts. So far we have been able to locate only three of these, two within the Kızıl İrmak basin (Hattus = Hittite Hattusa, and the settlement on the site now called Alişar), and one just to the south.
Map 1. Assyrian merchant trade routes
of the Kızıl Irmak river, Kültepe (anc. Kanesh), in the region of modern Kayseri.

From all three sites tablets recording the Assyrian merchants’ operations and transactions have been unearthed, with by far the largest number coming from Kanesh. In 1986, the Turkish archaeologist Tahsin Özgüç noted that 11,000 tablets had been discovered since the beginning of systematic excavations at Kanesh in 1948. Those found prior to 1948 were widely scattered in many public and private collections. A recent estimate now puts the total number of tablets from Kanesh at almost 21,500, with very likely more still to be discovered. The great majority of these tablets have yet to be studied in detail. Two types of settlement are identified in the texts—major communities called kāru (singular kārum) and minor settlements called wabaratum (singular wabartum). The latter may have functioned primarily as military posts set up by the Assyrians at strategic locations to protect the caravans of merchandise from hostile natives.

The City of Kanesh

The focal point of the merchant operations was the city of Nesa or Kanesh, on the site now known as Kültepe (ash-mound). There are two main sections of the site, the excavation of which was begun in 1948 under the direction of Dr Özgüç:

1. Kültepe Höyük, a 20-metre high mound, about 500 metres in diameter, rising above the Kayseri plain. This was the site of the local Anatolian settlement, dominated by the palace of its ruler.
2. Kültepe Kārum (or Kārum Kanesh), the Assyrian commercial centre at the foot of the mound on the north-east and south-east. The kārum was not inhabited exclusively by Assyrian traders; it also included many Anatolians among its inhabitants, as indicated by the names of house-owners with Anatolian names, like Peruwa, Galulu, Saktanuwa, Suppiahsu.

There are four major occupation levels at Kanesh. The first two (IV and III) belong to the Early Bronze Age. Level III was destroyed by fire in the Early Bronze III phase. This was followed by the Middle Bronze Age, the period of the Assyrian colonies, represented archaeologically by two levels, II and Ib. Old Assyrian chronology provides some assistance
in determining the dates and duration of these two levels. This is because a large number of the texts found at Kültepe, Ališar, and Hattusa include as a date formula the name of the eponym limum, an official appointed each year at Ashur. Surviving lists of these officials help establish a chronological sequence of the kārum tablets by synchronizing the limum lists with the Assyrian king lists, since it was customary for an Assyrian king to be made limum in one of the early years of his reign. A recent analysis of relevant archaeological and prosopographical data has made a further contribution to a reconstruction of the chronology of the period.\textsuperscript{15}

Level II of the kārum at Kanesh lasted some 70 to 80 years, from relatively late in the reign of Erishum I\textsuperscript{16} until the end of the reign of Puzur-Ashur II, i.e. from some time in the last quarter of the twentieth century until the second half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{17} It ended in destruction by fire. The site was left unoccupied for a period of perhaps 30 years before resettlement took place in the Ib phase—the last phase of the merchant colonies.\textsuperscript{18} It is still not certain whether the settlement on the mound suffered destruction at the same time as the kārum. Quite possibly it remained intact, since a number of the tablets found in the palace at Kanesh are to be ascribed to the intermediate period between levels II and Ib.\textsuperscript{19} Level Ib had a flourishing existence\textsuperscript{20} before it too was destroyed by fire. Roughly speaking, it extended from the late nineteenth century to about the middle of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{21} In contrast to level II from which some thousands of tablets have been unearthed, documentary evidence from Ib is sparse. This level has yielded no more than 250 tablets.\textsuperscript{22}

The Kingdoms of Central Anatolia in the Colony Period

From information provided in the Assyrian texts, we can conclude that during the colony period, central Anatolia was dominated by several kingdoms sometimes called mātu (singular mātum) in the merchant texts—the kingdoms of Hatti, which probably incorporated most of the territory lying within the Kızıl Irmak basin, Kanesh, immediately to the south, Burushattum (variant Purushattum; Purushanda in Hittite texts), and Wahsusana.\textsuperscript{23} The latter two were probably neighbouring kingdoms south of the Kızıl Irmak. Wahsusana was perhaps located in the vicinity of modern Niğde.\textsuperscript{24} Burushattum was situated on an important
trade route from Assyria passing through Washaniya, Nenassa, and Ullamma. It probably lay to the south-east of the Salt Lake (Turkish Tuz Gölü), and may be buried under the mound on the site now known as Acem Höyük (c.6 kilometres north-west of Aksaray).

In a tradition preserved in later times in a text known as the ‘King of the Battle’ (šar tamḫārī), the Akkadian king Sargon (c.2334–2279) conducted an expedition against Nur-Dagan, ruler of Purushanda, in response to an appeal from a delegation of oppressed Akkadian merchants in the city. The expedition was successful. Sargon attacked and defeated Nur-Dagan who humbly yielded to his conqueror, praising him as a mighty king without peer. This tradition, like that associated with Sargon’s grandson Naram-Sin, may well have been based on historical fact. If so, it provides evidence that there was already a kingdom of Burushattum/Purushanda in the Early Bronze Age, one abounding in natural resources according to the tale.

To the list of central, or central-northern, Anatolian kingdoms, we can probably add Zalpa (Zalpuwa), which lay to the north of the kingdom of Hatti in or near the Pontic zone.

We cannot be sure how far the authority or influence of each of these kingdoms extended at the beginning of the colony period. However, each had as its focal point a chief city whose ruler (rubā‘um in the merchant texts) exercised authority broadly over the communities lying within his kingdom. Some of these communities must have been quite substantial settlements with Assyrian colonies attached to them, and under the control of a local vassal, also called a rubā‘um in the texts. The local rubā‘um probably enjoyed a large measure of autonomy in running the affairs of the community or communities lying within his immediate authority. But he was always subject to the overriding authority of the ruler of the mātum to which he belonged.

What was the nature of the relationship between the Assyrians and the local rulers? It was once believed that the colonies were established in the wake of Assyrian military conquests, reflecting Assyrian domination over the regions where they were located. But in fact the colonies were simply ‘guest enclaves’ based on trading pacts between Assyria and the local rulers, with the latter retaining overall control of the Assyrian merchants’ activities in their region.

Negotiations between the kings, or sub-kings, and the colonies in their region required the involvement of the central colony
administration at Kanesh. Sometimes a local ruler had to be reminded of this, as we learn from a letter written by the officials of the kārum in Wahsusana. The letter was in response to a request the colony had received from the rubāʿum at Washaniya, which lay nearby. The rubāʿum had written to advise the merchants at Wahsusana that he had succeeded to his father’s throne and wished to renew a treaty with them. He was informed of the correct procedure to be followed:

We answered: ‘The kārum at Kanesh is our superior. We shall write so that they may write either to you (directly) or to us. Two men from the Land will come to you and then they can make you swear the oath! It is up to you now! Let your orders come here! We have given our messengers (an allowance of) 20 minas of copper.’ (KTP 14, 9–23, after Larsen (1976: 249))

Although the reading and interpretation of this letter are not entirely certain, the colony officials at Wahsusana clearly did not have the authority to deal directly with the new king, at least in the first instance. The matter had to be referred to Kanesh, which would send two envoys to arrange renewal of the treaty.

**The Incentives for Assyrian Commercial Enterprise**

What attractions did Anatolia hold for Assyrian merchant enterprises? In the first place, a stable political environment must have been an important factor. At the beginning of the colony period, the local rulers coexisted on relatively peaceful terms, and the control they exercised over their own kingdoms was sufficient to assure foreign merchants of safe and profitable trading ventures. As we know from a number of their documents, Assyrian merchants were very sensitive to such matters, and were extremely reluctant to trade in areas where conditions were unsettled. For the Assyrian colonists, central Anatolia offered the attractions of a series of already well-established urban centres within the framework of relatively coherent political structures conducive to profitable commercial activities throughout the region.

However, the overall success of the enterprise rested basically on the fact that each side had exportable goods much in demand by the other. The main items exported to Anatolia by the Assyrians were woollen textiles and a metal called *annukum*. Though it was once argued that this was the Assyrian word for lead, we now know that the metal in
question was tin. As we have already noted, the Anatolian communities may have been largely if not solely dependent on foreign importation of tin to make bronze. For the central and eastern Anatolian communities, the only feasible source of supply in this period was Assyria. The Assyrians may in turn have obtained the metal from the mountains of south-west Iran (ancient Elam), whence traders brought it to Ashur. The texts available to us indicate the importation of some 80 tonnes of tin over a 50-year period, which would have been used in the production of some 800 tonnes of bronze.

The textiles were manufactured in pieces about four metres square. Some of them were produced in Assyria but the majority were of Babylonian origin. They were noted for their fine quality, particularly in comparison with those manufactured locally in Anatolia. Letters exchanged between the merchants stationed in the colonies and their female relatives or business associates in Ashur contain very precise instructions as to the method of manufacture and the size of textiles to be sent to Anatolia. Our most informative source in this respect is a letter from Puzur-Ashur, an Assyrian merchant living in Anatolia, to Waqartum, a woman in the Assyrian capital Ashur:

Thus (speaks) Puzur-Ashur: ‘Say unto Waqartum: 1 mina of silver, its tax added, its duties paid for, Ashur-idi is bringing you under my seal. The fine textile which you sent me—keep producing similar textiles and send (them) to me with Ashur-idi, and I will send you ½ mina of silver (apiece).

Let them comb one side of the textile; they should not shear it; its weave should be close. Compared with the previous textile which you sent me, process 1 mina of wool extra (in) each (piece), but keep them thin! The other side one should comb slightly(?). If it is still hairy, one should shear it like a kutānum (i.e. a linen cloth).’ (TCu 3/1, 17, 1–22, trans. Veenhof (1972: 104))

Though lacking in tin, Anatolia had rich deposits of a number of other metals, including copper, silver, and gold. This was obviously what attracted the Assyrian merchants, who brought their tin and textiles to Anatolia to trade them for Anatolian metals, especially silver and gold. They supplemented their import ventures with internal commercial activities, trading wool, woollen fabrics, and copper amongst the local communities with the ultimate goal of acquiring silver and gold to be conveyed back to Ashur.

A loan and credit system operated widely throughout the communities of eastern Anatolia during the colony period. Rates of interest were
high, ranging from 30 per cent to as much as 180 per cent.\textsuperscript{47} There were a number of occasions when debtors were unable to repay the original loan at harvest time, particularly after a bad year, or even meet the interest repayments. Non-payment of debts was clearly a source of tension between debtors and creditors. A debtor might in fact be forced to sell a member of his family, or his whole family, including himself, to discharge a debt.\textsuperscript{48} In some cases the local king took action to resolve problems of indebtedness by issuing a decree cancelling all debts.\textsuperscript{49} Understandably a creditor often sought to protect at least part of his original loan in the event that such a decree was issued:

Salmuh and Iskunanika, his wife, Ispunahsu and Kiri owe 21 sacks of grain, half (of which is) wheat, half (is) barley, (and) 15 shekels of silver to Peruwa. They will give (back) the silver and the grain at harvest time. They themselves will haul (the grain) to (the village) Hailawakuwa. They will measure out the grain with the (measuring) pot of Peruwa. The silver and the grain are bound to their joint guarantee, (and) that of their family. Before: Kakria; before: Idi(s)-Su’in; before: Ili-(i)ddinassu.\textsuperscript{50} If the king cancels the obligation to pay debt, you will pay me my grain. (kt d/k 48b 5–24, trans. Balkan (1974: 35))\textsuperscript{51}

The Organization of the Merchant Enterprises\textsuperscript{52}

Effective exploitation of the mutually beneficial trade links between Assyria and Anatolia obviously required organization on a large and complex scale. Anatolian society was at least one ‘which could buy and absorb thousands of expensive textiles and could process considerable amounts of tin in an important bronze industry. The Anatolian palaces carried out complicated clearance operations of Assyrian imports and maintained a satisfactory transfer of payments with the \textit{Bı¯t Kārim}.\textsuperscript{53}

On the Assyrian side, the organization of the system involved the establishment and administration of the colonies, the setting up of boards to arbitrate on trading disputes, the maintenance of close contacts with the Assyrian capital Ashur, the drawing up of commercial treaties with the local Anatolian rulers, and the financing of commercial enterprises.

The Assyrian state exercised some measure of control over trading operations and the conduct and administration of the colonies through the agency of the \textit{Bı¯t Ālim}, literally the ‘City House’.\textsuperscript{54} But the trading enterprises themselves were financed and often operated by a wealthy
Assyrian business entrepreneur or investor—ummeānum in the texts. He could act as an exporter-importer in his own right, or form a consortium with other entrepreneurs. He often established branch offices of his business in the colonies. The branch offices were usually managed by younger male members of his family sent out to the colonies for indefinite periods of time—in some cases until the head of the business in Ashur died or retired. However a number of Assyrians decided to make Anatolia their permanent home. They established or relocated their families and households there, bringing their wives or prospective wives from Ashur, or marrying local Anatolian girls.55

As a rule, the ummeānum placed the actual running of his trading operations in the hands of a tamkārum, an agent responsible for the conduct of his affairs in Anatolia, the sale of his merchandise, the decision as to where it would be sold, and all dealings with his Anatolian customers.56 But the most onerous responsibilities usually fell on the kassāru, transporters who were hired as caravan personnel to take the merchandise to Anatolia, and from Anatolia to Assyria, and to ensure that the caravans actually reached their destinations. They assumed all responsibility for payments en route. They spent virtually all their lives as commercial travellers, except for four winter months of each year when all trading operations ceased. In return for their services, they apparently received interest-free loans, or working capital, which would enable them to acquire merchandise of their own for sale in Anatolia or en route to Anatolia.57

**Transporting and Selling the Merchandise**

The caravans were made up of the so-called black donkeys of Cappadocia. They were probably bred and trained in Assyria, and were sold to the merchants for 20 shekels of silver each. An average-size caravan consisted of some 200 to 250 animals, with each donkey carrying about 130 minas (= c.65 kilograms) of tin or 60 minas of textiles (consisting on average of 25–6 pieces) or a mixture of the two.58 The merchandise was placed in two packs slung on either side of the donkey, plus a top pack or saddle pack. As a rule the side packs were not to be opened during the journey, but the top pack was probably accessible and contained such items as food, animal fodder, the traveller’s private possessions, and what is referred to as ‘loose tin’ in contrast to ‘sealed tin’.59
Tolls and levies were demanded by every town of significant size through which the caravan travelled on its journey, in Mesopotamia, northern Syria, and Anatolia. When it passed through the territory of the various administrative centres, it was subject to a further tax, the *nishatum*, a flat rate levied by the administration of 5 per cent on textiles and 3 per cent on tin. It seems too that the palace exercised the right to buy up to 10 per cent of a consignment of textiles before it was cleared for sale on the open market. The palace also had a monopoly on rare luxury items, like meteoritic iron. In return for these privileges, the palace gave the merchants important guarantees, relating (for example) to residential rights and promises of protection when travelling in areas within the palace’s jurisdiction. The merchants were subject to other taxes from their own people—for example, an export tax on leaving Ashur, and probably also some kind of levy on goods which was imposed by the administration of a particular colony, as payment towards general administration expenses, and for storage of goods.

Once all these taxes and tolls had been cleared, the merchant then had to sell his produce. Tin was much easier to dispose of, and presumably the merchant simply discharged his cargo at one of the metallurgical centres. Textiles probably involved more effort. The merchant may have had to hawk them around, and sell them individually or in small quantities. Also, the transport costs of textiles was obviously higher since they required more than twice the number of donkeys to carry them than were needed for their equivalent weight in tin. This probably explains why the gross profit on textiles was twice that of tin.

**How to Avoid the Taxes**

Gross profits from the merchants’ trading activities were high, approximately 100 per cent on tin and 200 per cent on textiles. Understandably so. The initiative and enterprise in these commercial ventures seem to have been all on the merchants’ side. It was they who organized and operated the system, and they who apparently suffered all the risks. Further, their profit margins were substantially reduced by basic travelling expenses on the long, difficult, and often hazardous treks from Assyria to Anatolia, and by the succession of tolls, levies, and taxes imposed by their own officials in the colonies and by the local Anatolian
There was undoubtedly much incentive for finding ways of avoiding these outlays.

One way of doing so was to bypass the towns which imposed the tolls by leaving the main highway and travelling along a side road, know as the ḫārran sūqinnim—literally, the ‘narrow track’. But this could be a hazardous undertaking, partly because such tracks were likely to be infested with brigands, and partly because they may have taken the caravans a long way from food and water. Hence the caution which the merchants showed in venturing from the beaten track, as illustrated by a letter from Buzazu to his business associate Puzur-Ashur:

Let them travel on to Timilkia to reach my merchandise and, if the ‘narrow track’ is safe, my tin and textiles of good quality, as much as he had brought across the country, should indeed come to me with a caravan by way of the ‘narrow track’. If however the ‘narrow track’ is not appropriate, let them bring the tin to Hurrama and let then either the native inhabitants of Hurrama bring all the tin in quantities of 1 talent each into the town, or let one make packets of 10 or 15 minas each, and let the personnel (of the caravan) bring them into the town under their loincloths. Only after they have safely delivered 1 talent are they allowed to bring another 1 talent into the town. As soon as some of the tin has safely arrived in town you should send it on to me each time with the first caravan leaving. (BIN iv 48, 12–29, trans. Veenhof (1972: 312, 324))

As the letter indicates, the alternative method of avoiding tolls and levies was to try to convey the goods through a town secretly, without the knowledge of the local authorities. But smuggling was also a hazardous business, for discovery could mean confiscation of an entire consignment of merchandise and imprisonment for the offenders, as Puzur-Ashur was warned by another of his business associates:

The son of Irra sent his smuggled goods to Pushu-ken, but his smuggled goods were caught whereupon the palace seized Pushu-ken and put him in jail. The guards are strong. The queen has sent messages to Luhusaddia, Hurrama, Salahsuwa and to her (own) country concerning the smuggling, and look-outs (literally, ‘eyes’) have been posted. Please do not smuggle anything. (ATHE 62, 28–37, trans. Veenhof (1972: 308))

Smuggling of valuable items out of Anatolia also sometimes occurred, for example the illegal export of the rare and precious meteoritic iron (amūtum, ašium).
In general, the merchants had to be careful to avoid conflict with the local administrations.\textsuperscript{66} And in cases where merchants violated their agreements with them, the latter were prompt to take swift and severe action, including imprisonment of the merchants and confiscation of their silver and gold.\textsuperscript{67}

**Political Developments in Anatolia in the Colony Period**

One important consequence of the Assyrians’ trading enterprises in Anatolia was that it almost certainly encouraged a greater sense of territorial consciousness amongst the local rulers. There were important practical considerations involved in the clear definition of territorial boundaries, both of the individual towns through which the merchants passed as well as of the kingdoms to which these towns belonged. The boundaries determined which local administration had jurisdiction over the merchants at a particular stage on their journey—and therefore the right to the various tolls and levies imposed upon them. Further, effective operation of the system must have required a high degree of co-operation amongst the various authorities through whose lands the merchants passed, on such matters as ‘keeping the roads free’—i.e. ensuring that the routes travelled by the merchants were kept safe against the dangers to which commercial caravans were vulnerable. This was a matter on which the merchants were particularly sensitive: ‘I hear that they freed the road. If they (really) freed the road, bring here my merchandise. Let me arise and go there’ (\textit{CCT} ii, 22–5, trans. Balkan (1957: 16)).

The routes travelled by the merchants provided a regular communication network throughout central Anatolia.\textsuperscript{68} In this and in other ways, the merchant system must have promoted closer and more regular contacts between the kingdoms within the regions where the colonies were established. Yet by bringing these kingdoms into closer contact, and by bringing into sharper focus the importance of territorial control from both a commercial as well as a political viewpoint, the Assyrian colony system helped create grounds for dispute amongst and within the kingdoms. These included conflicting claims over border territories, increasing inducements for a king to seek to expand his own territory.
at the expense of his neighbours, and the incentives for a vassal ruler to break away from his overlord and establish himself as an independent ruler in his own right.

By the end of the first phase of the colony period (represented archaeologically by level II at Kanesh), there is evidence of increasing disturbances and open conflict in the regions where the colonies were located. Thus troubles in the south forced the merchant Idi-Ishtar to postpone a visit to Wahsusana where he was to arrange for the dispatch of a consignment of copper held in storage there. He wrote to his colleague Ashur-nada with the news: ‘I have not gone to Wahsusana for there is revolt in the land of Burushattum and Wahsusana’ (KTHahn 1, 2–6).

The most dramatic evidence for conflict amongst the Anatolian kingdoms is provided by the destruction of the city of Nesa/Kanesh in the second half of the nineteenth century. Who or what was responsible for its destruction? We know from a text commonly called the Anitta inscription (discussed below) that the kingdom of Nesa was attacked, conquered, and looted by Uhna, the ruler of the northern kingdom of Zalpa, perhaps in collaboration with the king of Hatti. This conquest may explain the destruction of the city attested in the archaeological record. If so, we can only speculate on the reasons which had led to its attack and destruction. Nesa may have provoked hostilities by over-exploiting its position at the centre of the Assyrian merchant system, perhaps closing off, or threatening to close off, the routes leading to the more northerly Anatolian kingdoms.

At all events, with the destruction of the hub of the colony network, the Assyrians may have ceased their trading operations in Anatolia, or at least severely curtailed them, until the return of more stable conditions several decades later, when Nesa was resettled (level Ib). But in the intervening years another kingdom had come to prominence south of the Kızıl Irmak river, probably in the mountainous area to the south-east of Nesa—the kingdom of Mama.

### Tensions between Mama and Kanesh

Within a few years of the resettlement of Nesa/Kanesh, tensions began mounting between its king Inar and a man called Anum-hirbi, ruler of the large and wealthy kingdom of Mama. These tensions appear to
have culminated in an invasion of Mama’s territory by Inar. Subsequently peace was restored and a treaty concluded between the two kings. Yet the peace remained precarious and in the reign of Inar’s son and successor Warsama, hostilities flared once more. On this occasion the instigator was the ‘Man of Taisama’, one of Warsama’s vassal rulers, who had on his own initiative crossed into Mama and attacked and destroyed a number of its towns. Anum-hirbi wrote to the king of Kanesh complaining bitterly of his vassal’s conduct, and urging Warsama to keep him under control in the future:

Anum-hirbi, the king of Mama, speaks as follows: ‘Tell Warsama, the king of Kanesh: “You have written to me: ‘The Man of Taisama is my slave; I shall keep watch over him. But will you keep watch over the Man of Sibuha, your slave?’ Since the Man of Taisama is your dog, why does he quarrel with other princes? Does the Man of Sibuha, my dog, quarrel with other princes? Will a king of Taisama become a third king with us?

“When my enemy conquered me, the Man of Taisama invaded my country, and destroyed twelve of my cities, and carried away their cattle and sheep. He spoke as follows: ‘The king is dead, so I have taken my fowler’s snare.’ Instead of protecting my country and giving me heart, he not only burned up my country but created evil-smelling smoke.

‘“While your father Inar was laying siege for nine years to the city of Har-samna, did my people invade your land, and did they kill a single ox or sheep?”’ (kt g/t 35, 1–33, after Balkan (1957: 8))

Warsama agreed to keep his vassal ruler under control, but sought a similar assurance from Anum-hirbi with regard to the latter’s wayward vassal, the Man of Sibuha. Both kings seemed anxious to restore peaceful relations and to renew the former treaty, as Anum-hirbi’s letter indicates: ‘you wrote to me as follows: “Let us take an oath.” Is the former oath insufficient? Let your messenger come to me and let my messenger come regularly to you.’ (kt g/t 35, 49–55, trans. Balkan (1957: 8)).

In Warsama’s case, the main incentive for renewing diplomatic relations was probably to ensure that the normal communication routes between the two kingdoms would be reopened: ‘Today you wrote to me as follows: “Why do you not free the road for me?” I shall free the road.’ (kt g/t 35, 34–7, trans. Balkan (1957: 8)). Disruption of these routes must have had serious commercial implications for Nesa, particularly as far as the Assyrian trading operations were concerned.
Thus peace was probably restored between the two kingdoms—for the time being.

The Dynasty of Pithana

It may have been under the rule of Warsama’s father Inar that Nesa/Kanesh again rose to prominence, as attested by the remains of level Ib. But the Ib period seems to have been one of continuing instability. The conflicts and disputes to which Anum-hirbi refers could well have been responsible for a progressive fragmentation of the political and administrative structures of central Anatolia—the gradual breakdown of the older kingdoms into smaller units, considerably increasing the complexity of the Anatolian political scene and the potential for ongoing conflicts and disputes over borders and territorial rights. A broken text which appears to indicate a revolt of vassal communities against the king of Hattusa may indicate a similar process of fragmentation within the kingdom of Hatti.73

But then came a dramatic turn of events, one which was to alter quite profoundly the political scene in the region both within and south of the Kızıl Irmak basin:

The king of Kussara came down from the town in great force and took Nesa in the night by storm. He seized the king of Nesa, but inflicted no harm on the inhabitants of Nesa. Instead, he made them his mothers and fathers. (Anitta inscript. (CTH i) 5–9)

These lines come from the so-called Anitta inscription, a text preserved in fragmentary form in three copies,74 allegedly from an original carved on a stela set up in the gate of the king’s city.75 Although once thought to have been written in Old Assyrian, the original text was probably written in ‘Hittite’ (Nesite).76 However, the earliest surviving version of it is a copy (in Hittite) apparently made during the Hittite Old Kingdom some 150 years or more after the original.77

The inscription deals with the conquests in central Anatolia of two kings who were apparently members of a ruling dynasty based originally in a city called Kussara—Pithana and his son Anitta, the author of the text. The names of these kings are known also from several other early texts,78 and they can almost certainly be assigned to the second phase of the colony period.79 The city of Kussara probably lay to the south-east
of the Kızıl Irmak basin in the anti-Taurus region, on or near one of the main trade routes from Assyria and perhaps in the vicinity of the modern Şar (Comana Cappadociae).

A number of scholars have drawn attention to Pithana’s statement that on his conquest of Nesa, he did no harm to the inhabitants of the city but ‘made them his mothers and fathers’. This statement is unique in cuneiform literature. Is it purely symbolical, or does it have a more literal meaning? If taken literally, it might indicate actual ethnic links between the Kussaran dynasts and the predominantly Indo-European population of Nesa, or more generally close ethnic affinities between the populations of Nesa and Kussara. But this could well be reading more into the statement than is warranted. Its main intention may simply have been to convey the image of a benevolent ruler who was bent on winning the goodwill of those upon whom his rule had been imposed. He wished them to see themselves as his kinsfolk, rather than as the subjects of an alien despot. The image belongs to the language of diplomacy—or propaganda. It need not reflect literal truth.

We have no firm grounds for assuming that Pithana sought to identify himself as the champion of an Indo-European ethnic group, or that the conflicts in which he and his son Anitta engaged reflect a struggle for political and military supremacy between two ethnic groups, Hattian and Indo-European. We do not know from their names alone what the ethnic origins of Pithana and Anitta were. And by the early second millennium, after several or more centuries of Indo-European settlement in Anatolia and intermingling with other groups, consciousness of ethnic differences may have largely disappeared—at least in a socio-political sense. There was no doubt a continuing awareness of basic cultural differences between various population groups or sub-groups, particularly if they continued to speak different languages. But it is most unlikely that these differences led to competition and conflict between the Anatolian kingdoms in the colony period.

After Pithana’s conquest, Nesa became the new seat of the Kussaran dynasty. The discovery in 1954 of an inscribed dagger in the debris of a large building on the mound at Kültepe seemed to provide material confirmation of the establishment of Nesa as the Kussaran dynasty’s royal seat. The dagger bore the inscription Š.gal A-i-ta ru-ba-im ((the property of) the palace of Anitta, the King). Was the building where it
was discovered Anitta’s palace? On its own, the evidence provided by
the dagger may simply indicate that this was a regional residence of the
king. But when we consider it along with other written evidence, there
can be little doubt that the building on the mound was in fact the palace
of Anitta.

Almost certainly important strategic considerations provided the
incentive for Pithana’s conquest of Nesa, and the relocation of the seat
of his power there. With Nesa as their base, Pithana and Anitta were
well within military striking range of the Anatolian kingdoms lying
both within the Kızıl Irmak basin and south of it in the region later
known as the Lower Land. In view of the extensive military operations
which Anitta subsequently undertook both north and south of the Kızıl
Irmak, the conquest of Nesa may well have been the first step in a
campaign designed to bring the whole region beneath the sway of the
Kussaran dynasty.

A further incentive for Pithana’s conquest of Nesa was the fact that
the merchant colony attached to the city was the administrative and
distribution centre of the entire Assyrian colony network in Anatolia.
Of course the merchant colonies enjoyed a considerable degree of
independence in their commercial operations. But as we have seen,
they were none the less subject to the overall administrative and judicial
control of the local administrations in whose regions they lay. That
applied to the kārum at Kanesh as well. Jurisdiction over the headquar-
ters of the merchant network must have offered a number of significant
strategic advantages to the local ruler. An ambitious, enterprising, and
ruthless king might well seize upon and exploit these at the expense of
his neighbours. In this context we need do no more than recall that one
of the chief commodities imported by the Assyrians for distribution in
Anatolia was tin, essential in the production of bronze weaponry.

**The Empire Built by Anitta**

Pithana’s conquest of Nesa was the prelude to campaigns against the
kingdoms which lay to the north. His campaigns were continued by his
son Anitta, apparently with devastating success, from Zalpa (Zalpuwa)
in or near the Pontic zone, through the kingdom of Hatti to the
southern bend of the Kızıl Irmak. By the end of his first series of
campaigns, Anitta had succeeded in subduing all the lands which lay
within or near the Kızıl Irmak basin—from Zalpa in the far north to Ullamma in the south.

But his successes did not go unchallenged. Subsequently he was confronted with what appears to have been a military alliance of states stretching southwards from Zalpa—an alliance in which Piyusti, the king of Hatti, and Huzziya, the king of Zalpa, played leading roles. Anitta responded by attacking Zalpa, conquering it, and bringing its king Huzziya in captivity back to Nesa. He then placed the city of Hattus(a) under siege, and when its population was weakened by hunger, took it in a night assault, and destroyed it. Thereupon he declared its site accursed: ‘On its site I sowed weeds. May the Storm God strike down anyone who becomes king after me and resettles Hattusa’ (Anitta inscript. 48–51). We shall have occasion to recall these words.

Anitta now turned his attention southwards. His immediate military objective was the subjugation of the city of Salatiwara, which lay on a road connecting the kingdoms of Wahsusana and Burushattum. Two campaigns were needed to complete its conquest. In the first, Anitta defeated the troops who had marched from the city to meet him, and carried them off as prisoners to Nesa. Once back in Nesa, he took time out from his military enterprises to embark on an ambitious building programme, fortifying his city and erecting several temples where the spoils of battle were dedicated. He also marked the occasion by bringing a large and varied assortment of animals to the city—2 lions, 70 wild pigs, and 120 other beasts, including leopards, deer, and wild goats.

But once more Salatiwara rose against him. Once more Anitta took the field. Determined to end its resistance for all time, he stormed the city and put it to the torch. Large quantities of silver and gold were removed from the burning city, along with infantry forces and 40 teams of horse, either by the local king for safekeeping or by Anitta as the spoils of conquest.

In the final stage of his recorded campaigns, Anitta marched against the kingdom of Purushanda, called Burushattum in the merchant texts. We have noted that Purushanda figures in the ‘King of the Battle’ tradition in which the Akkadian king Sargon undertook a campaign to the region in response to an appeal from the merchants of the city; subsequently Purushanda may have become one of the westernmost territories of the empire of Sargon’s grandson Naram-Sin. But during
the colony period, and probably for some years prior to it, Purushanda ranked as one of the major independent kingdoms of central and eastern Anatolia. The importance of its status is clearly reflected in the title of its ruler—*rubā‘um rabi‘um* ‘Great King’, a title adopted by Anitta himself, and more imposing than that borne even by the ruler of Ashur, who was simply known as *rubā‘um* ‘King’. To judge from his title, the Great King of Purushanda was overlord of an extensive region, consisting of a number of communities, principalities, and petty kingdoms, which in effect made him the peer and potential rival of the Great King of Nesa. This no doubt was one of the chief incentives for the campaign which Anitta launched against him. But when Anitta entered his territory, the Purushandan king showed no enthusiasm for a showdown but instead came before his aggressor bearing gifts of submission:

> When I [—] went into battle, the Man of Purushanda brought gifts to me; he brought to me a throne of iron and a sceptre of iron as a gift. But when I returned to Nesa I took the Man of Purushanda with me. As soon as he enters the chamber, that man will sit before me on the right. (Anitta inscript. 73–9)

The gifts almost certainly signified a formal surrender of authority to Anitta, and an acknowledgement of him as the overlord of all territory formerly subject to Purushanda. Anitta took the Purushandan king back to Nesa, where he accorded him a privileged status, perhaps in part as a reward for his voluntary submission, and perhaps by way of acknowledging the high status he had but recently enjoyed. He may then have reinstated the Purushandan as a vassal ruler in the territories where he had formerly ruled as an independent monarch, or alternatively set him up as vassal ruler elsewhere in the territories now subject to Nesa. Both alternatives reflect later Hittite practice.

The establishment of the Kussaran dynasts in Nesa had dramatically altered the political landscape of the eastern half of Anatolia during the second phase of the Assyrian colony period. The conquests of Pithana and Anitta had resulted in an extensive unified political structure encompassing the whole of the Kızıl Irmak basin north to the Pontic region, and the entire region south of the Kızıl Irmak to Purushanda. Nesa was the focal point of this structure. The old kingdoms were either totally broken up (as in the case of Hatti) or ceased to exist as
independent entities and were placed under the immediate control of local rulers appointed by and subject to Anitta.

The Aftermath of Anitta’s Conquests

The supremacy which the Kussaran dynasty established over much of the eastern half of Anatolia proved to be very short lived. In probably less than a generation after Anitta’s conquests, the colonies had come to an end. Conflicts between the Anatolian kingdoms seem to have become much more frequent and much more widespread in the second phase of the colonies’ existence. The impact which this had on commercial activities and diplomatic intercourse between Assyrians and Anatolians may well be reflected in the greatly reduced number of tablets that have come to light from this phase. We have noted the merchants’ sensitivity to unsettled conditions in the areas where they traded. Ironically, the conquests of Pithana and Anitta which for a brief time had imposed a fragile unity over the region within and south of the Kızıl Irmak basin may have led ultimately to the disintegration of the Anatolian kingdoms and the end of the Assyrian merchant enterprises which had contributed much to the region’s prosperity.

Yet in spite of the increasingly turbulent political landscape, the period of the Assyrian colonies was arguably one of the most enlightened in the history of the ancient Near East. The merchant system as revealed by the tablets was one of considerable complexity and sophistication, and indeed foreshadowed a number of international trade and business practices of much more recent times. Most noteworthy, perhaps, was the spirit of international cooperation which the system reflected. With relatively few exceptions, relations between the Assyrians and the Anatolian communities and kingdoms with which they dealt appear to have been remarkably harmonious. Seldom before or after this period do we find evidence of such constructive and mutually beneficial interaction between peoples of the ancient Near Eastern world.

In the wake of the colony period, the geopolitical configuration of Anatolia was to change dramatically. From the ruins of Anitta’s empire, a new power was eventually to emerge, one which was to have a much more profound and lasting impact on the Anatolian landscape—the Late Bronze Age kingdom of the Hittites.
Territories and Early Rivals of Hatti

Reconstructing a Map of the Hittite World

The Hittite cuneiform texts and hieroglyphic inscriptions provide us with hundreds of place-names—the names of the countries, kingdoms, cities, rivers, and mountains which made up the Hittite world. Unfortunately, many of these names cannot yet be assigned to particular sites or regions. Some of the sites in question may have suffered total destruction in the upheavals at the end of the Bronze Age, others may lie buried beneath layers of sediment, or the foundations of towns and cities of later periods. And a number of Bronze Age sites that have been rediscovered and excavated have yielded no written records, nor any other information which might have indicated what they were called. In attempting to identify them, we have to rely largely on information provided by texts found elsewhere.

As part of the process of using this information to reconstruct a map of the Hittite world, some scholars have adopted what we might call a homonymic or (perhaps more accurately) a homophonic approach; that is, they assign Bronze Age place-names to sites or regions which had similar names in later periods. For example, it has long been argued that the country in south-western Anatolia called Lycia by the Greeks in the first millennium BC was part of the region called Lukka (or the Lukka Lands) in the Late Bronze Age. A number of the cities of Lycia had names of Bronze Age origin, such as Arına (the city which the Greeks called Xanthos), Pinara, Tlawa (Greek Tlos), Oenoanda, Kandyba. Since settlements with corresponding Bronze Age names—Awarna, Pina[ ], Dalawa, Wiyanawanda, Hinduwa—lay in or near the region of Lukka, it is tempting to regard them as earlier foundations on the sites of the later Lycian cities.
But this method of identification presents a number of problems. For example, it is sometimes difficult to decide whether an assumed etymological link between two similar-sounding names is genuine, or whether the similarity is superficial and purely coincidental—what has been called ‘kling-klang etymology’.\(^3\) Even if such a link can be firmly established, we also have to take account of the fact that two or more contemporary sites or regions often had the same name; we know of two Bronze Age Pahhuwas, two Zalpas, at least two Arinnas, several Wiyanawandas, and at least two Uras.\(^4\) In some instances, this duplication was probably due to population movements—groups of peoples shifting from one region to another and naming their new settlements after their old. Almost certainly this became an increasingly marked feature of the final decades of the Hittite kingdom and the period following its collapse. Thus even when a later city had a name with a demonstrably Bronze Age pedigree, this need not mean that it was also the site of a Bronze Age city of the same name.

In some cases homonyms, or homophones, may well contribute to the process of identifying Bronze Age sites, as (very likely) in the case of the Lycian cities. But they cannot be used as a primary means of establishing locations for the cities and regions of the Hittite kingdom. In undertaking this task, we must look to the texts for other types of information.

Of particular importance are texts which contain itineraries of a king’s religious pilgrimages to the cult centres of his realm,\(^5\) lists of staging posts on military campaigns, definitions of boundaries between neighbouring vassal states, or between Hittite subject territory and that of a foreign king, references to countries with a sea coast, references to topographical features like mountains or rivers. In theory, all such information helps us piece together a picture of the geopolitical configuration of the Hittite world. In practice, much of the data available to us can be interpreted in different ways and lead to different conclusions. One scholar has taken a somewhat jaundiced view of the whole process, cynically referring to it as ‘the guessing game known as Hittite geography’.\(^6\)

Admittedly, scholarship on the political geography of the Hittite world is still subject to many uncertainties. Even the most confidently stated proposals must remain speculative, if based purely on textual evidence, until confirmation is provided by the archaeologist’s spade.
Map 3. The world of the Hittites
But progress is steadily being made, thanks largely to continuing archaeological discoveries, including new text-finds, the decipherment of hitherto obscure rock inscriptions, and revised interpretations of information contained in a wide range of texts inscribed both on clay and on stone. As a result of the cumulative research carried out over many decades, we can provide precise or reasonably precise locations for a number of the cities, states, and regions which constituted the geopolitical landscape of the Hittite world, and at least approximate locations for many others.

Map 3 is an attempt to reconstruct the geography of the Hittite world, on the basis of information currently available to us. A number of the locations indicated on this map must be regarded as provisional, and may well require revision as new information comes to light.\(^7\)

**The Territories Comprising the Hittite Kingdom**

At the height of its power in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries, the Hittite kingdom incorporated large areas of Anatolia and northern Syria, from the Aegean seacoast in the west to the Euphrates river in the east. The kingdom consisted of four major components: (a) a ‘core territory’ in which lay the Hittite capital Hattusa and a number of regional administrative centres; (b) territories peripheral to the core, under the direct control of the king or his officials; (c) vassal states subject to the king but under the immediate authority of local rulers; (d) from the reign of Suppiluliuma I onwards, two viceregal kingdoms in northern Syria.

**The Core Territory of the Kingdom**

The core territory of Hatti lay in the northern half of central Anatolia, within the curve of the Kızıl İrmak river. As we have noted, in Greek and Roman times the river was known as the Halys. The Hittites called it the Marassantiya. We shall henceforth use its Hittite name. In the second millennium the region bounded by the river became the nucleus of the Hittite world—the homeland of the kingdom of Hatti.

Its chief city was Hattusa, near the modern village of Boğazköy (now commonly called Boğazkale), the administrative and ceremonial capital of the Hittite kingdom. Still imposing in its ruins, Hattusa once encompassed at its greatest extent an area of some 165 hectares, making
it one of the largest and most impressive of all ancient capitals. It consisted of two main parts, a ‘Lower’ and an ‘Upper’ city. The former, situated in the northern part of the capital, dates back to the Old Kingdom. Fortified by a wall, probably in the reign of the king Hantili II (discussed in Ch. 5), it was dominated by the royal acropolis, a large outcrop of rock known today as Büyükkale (‘Big Castle’). Here were located the palace and chief administrative buildings of the capital. To the north-west of the acropolis lay the city’s largest and most important temple, the temple of the Storm (Weather) God.

In the thirteenth century, the city underwent an extensive building programme, with the redevelopment of the palace complex on the acropolis and a massive expansion of the city to the south. The new area, comprising what is called the Upper City, more than doubled the size of the original city. In recent years, excavations at Hattusa have concentrated on this area. They have brought to light the remains of no less than 26 temples, in addition to the four unearthed in the Upper City in earlier excavations. These temples, which occupied a considerable part of the new area, serve to highlight what the excavators see as the sacred and ceremonial character of the royal capital. The Upper City

Figure 1. The acropolis of Hattusa (modern Büyükkale)
was enclosed by a wall, punctuated by towers at 20-metre intervals, which incorporated five gates, the most notable of which are the so-called Lion, ‘King’s’ and Sphinx Gates.11

A large local population was required for the capital’s labour force, and the wide range of support services necessary to ensure the maintenance of its administrative, religious, and ceremonial functions. Residential quarters partly within but probably mainly outside the city must have housed much of this population, including the city’s artisans and craftsmen. Future excavations may help determine where the bulk of Hattusa’s service population actually lived.

Outside the capital, the population of the homeland was distributed amongst a number of settlements, which included (a) regional centres under the authority of administrators or governors, appointees of the king, who were responsible for the administration and security of particular districts of the homeland; (b) within these districts, communities supervised by Councils of Elders, whose responsibilities seem to have been largely judicial and religious in nature, and who collaborated closely with the regional administrators;12 (c) holy cities (including Nerik, Arinna, Samuha, and Zippalanda), which were amongst the most important cult centres of the Hittite world, and the venues for a number of major religious festivals; (d) frontier settlements, which grew out of garrison posts and were extremely important to the security of the kingdom;13 (e) rural estates, which were in many cases given by the king to members of the Hittite nobility, in return for services rendered, particularly in the field of battle.14 Much of the personnel and livestock for these estates came from the spoils of military conquest.

Peripheral Territories of the Homeland

The Marassantiya river provided the homeland with an easily recognizable natural boundary, except in the north and the north-east where there was no clear line of demarcation between the homeland and the territories of its neighbours. But nowhere along its frontiers was the homeland provided with an effective natural barrier against enemy incursions. The Marassantiya is easily fordable along its entire 915-kilometre course, and presented no serious obstacle to invading forces. Within the homeland itself, there were few naturally defensible positions against a determined enemy. Indeed for significant periods of
Hittite history parts of the homeland, particularly in the north and north-east, were under enemy occupation.

The homeland’s vulnerability becomes clear when we consider the hostile and potentially hostile forces which were in striking distance of it. The Pontic zone to the north was inhabited by the Kaska tribes, a loose confederation of mountain kingdoms which posed a constant threat to Hittite territory, invading and occupying it several times and causing widespread devastation in the homeland. To the south-east were the Hurrians, who invaded the eastern frontiers of Hatti at least as early as the reign of Hattusili I (c.1650–1620), and continued to threaten Hittite territories and territorial interests both in Anatolia and Syria until the conquests of Suppiluliuma I in the fourteenth century. To the south-west lay the Arzawa lands—a group of countries which in the New Kingdom became vassal states of the Hittites. But Arzawan peoples were unreliable and frequently rebellious subjects, ready to exploit any opportunities that offered for breaking their ties with the Hittite king, establishing alliances with foreign kings, and invading the Hittite homeland from the south.

One of the important reasons for Hittite territorial expansion was to provide some measure of protection against foreign aggression, by establishing what amounted to buffer zones between the core territory of the kingdom and the countries or states which posed a direct threat to it. The buffer zones included both outlying areas within the Land of Hatti as well as countries which lay adjacent or relatively close to it. These zones played a crucial role in the defence of the homeland. They included:

1. A north-eastern zone, extending across the homeland north and north-east of Hattusa, from the lower course of the Marassantiya in the west through the region called the Upper Land in the north-east.

2. A south-eastern zone, extending from the easternmost territories of the homeland towards the Hurrian kingdom of Mitanni. In this region, the country of Isuwa occupied a position of considerable strategic importance in relation to both Hatti and Mitanni; during the New Kingdom it was attached first to one and then to the other of the two kingdoms.

3. A southern zone, extending south of the Marassantiya river to the country of Kizzuwadna in the Taurus and anti-Taurus region,
westwards through the region known as the Lower Land. Kizzuwadna’s political ties fluctuated between Hatti and Mitanni until its territory was annexed by the Hittites early in the New Kingdom. The Lower Land had been incorporated into the Land of Hatti early in the Old Kingdom. It provided an important buffer zone against threats to Hittite territory from the south-west, notably from the Arzawa lands.

While these zones were in effect extensions of the Hittite homeland, the amount of territory over which the Hittite king could claim to exercise authority varied markedly from one reign to another. Each of the peripheral territories presented its own particular set of problems, and a range of measures were taken by various Hittite kings in their attempts to find lasting solutions to these problems. In the north one of the chief policies was to protect the core territory of the homeland by repopulation programmes in areas which had been laid waste and in some cases occupied by Kaskan peoples. In the east and south-east Hittite kings attempted to offset the threat of Hurrian encroachment on their subject territories by both military and diplomatic operations in the states which occupied important strategic locations between Hittite and Hurrian spheres of influence. In the south and south-west the Lower Land assumed the character of a military zone for both defensive and offensive purposes; it was garrisoned with Hittite troops and placed under the direct authority of a military governor.17

Vassal States

Beyond the homeland and its peripheral territories, the Hittite kingdom incorporated at the height of its power a large number of vassal states extending over much of Anatolia and northern Syria. The vassal system was one of the fruits of Hittite military enterprise during the New Kingdom. It reached its full development with the conquests of Suppiluliuma I and Mursili II in the fourteenth century.

Vassal states remained under the control of their own local rulers. The obligations and benefits of vassalhood were carefully spelt out and regulated by treaties.18 In essence vassal treaties were contracts, not between two states, but between two people—the Hittite king and the vassal ruler. They were not bilateral agreements. Rather, they were imposed unilaterally by the king. Their terms and conditions were drawn up by the
former and accepted on oath by the latter, whose appointment was either
made or approved by the king. The individual nature of the contract was
emphasized by the fact that a new treaty had to be drawn up whenever a
new Hittite king or new vassal ruler came to power.

The treaty imposed certain military obligations on the vassal who was
in turn promised military assistance from the king, should the need
arise. A further obligation which the treaty sometimes stipulated for the
vassal was an annual payment of tribute—for example, 300 shekels of
gold, weighed according to the Hittite measure.¹⁹ The pact concluded
between overlord and vassal was often cemented by a marriage alliance
between the vassal and a princess of the Hittite royal family. In the event
of such a marriage, the treaty stipulated that the Hittite princess was to
hold supreme position over the other wives, or concubines, of the vassal;
and succession to the vassal throne had to pass down in the princess’s
line.

The vassal was obliged not only to swear allegiance to the reigning
king but also to pledge support to his legitimate successors. If the Hittite
throne were usurped by a pretender, the vassal was automatically freed
from his treaty obligations, except that he might be called upon to help
restore the legitimate king to his throne. In return for his allegiance and
the fulfilment of the obligations imposed by the treaty, the vassal was
guaranteed sovereignty in his kingdom, and also the sovereignty of his
legitimate successors in his direct family line.

In a few cases, local rulers bound by treaty to the Hittite king enjoyed
what was called kuirwana, sometimes translated as ‘protectorate’, status.
This applied to the kings of the Arzawa lands before their reduction to
vassal status, and to the kings of Kizzuwadna and Mitanni (the latter
after the Hittite conquest of Mitanni in the fourteenth century). In
theory they were independent rulers, allies rather than subjects of Hatti
and their position was superior to that of a vassal ruler, as acknowledged
ceremonially when they came to Hattusa to pay annual homage to the
Hittite king. But although they enjoyed certain privileges, such as
exemption from tribute, the right in some cases to annex territories
which they had conquered, and the right to bilateral treaties with the
Hittite king, they had little more freedom of action than the vassal
rulers. Above all they had no right to an independent foreign policy, and
all relations with other subjects or allies of Hatti, or with foreign
kingdoms, were strictly controlled by the Hittite king.²⁰
One of the chief purposes of the treaties was to isolate the vassal states politically and militarily from one another. Hence the clauses which forbade the vassal ruler to enter into independent relationships with foreign powers, or to have independent political or military dealings with the rulers of other vassal states. All such dealings had to be channelled through Hattusa. Obviously the Hittite king’s chief concern was to minimize, if not prevent absolutely, the possibility of anti-Hittite coalitions being formed—the greatest potential danger the Hittites faced in the west.

Hittite kings attached much importance to the matter of political fugitives. Not infrequently prominent political dissidents managed to escape their authority and resurface in a country beyond their direct control, appealing to the local ruler for permission to settle there. In almost all such cases their overlord peremptorily demanded their extradition, and if the local ruler refused, was prepared to go to war to ensure this.

How effective were the treaties in maintaining Hittite authority throughout the subject territories? The fact that Hittite kings were frequently plagued by treacherous behaviour from disloyal vassal rulers and by rebellions in vassal states which overthrew their pro-Hittite rulers may suggest that the treaties were very limited and short-lived in their effectiveness. Yet they were an extremely important instrument of Hittite influence and authority outside the homeland. They helped ensure at least temporary stability in a number of regions of the Hittite kingdom, while the king committed his resources to other regions which required more urgent and more direct attention. The stability which Suppiluliuma I had established in Syria through the network of Syrian vassal rulers and the creation of two viceregal kingdoms in the region (see below) left his son and (second) successor Mursili II largely free in the critical early years of his reign to devote his resources to the comprehensive conquest of the Arzawa lands. The vassal treaties which Mursili set up in the wake of these conquests must have contributed substantially to the high degree of stability in western Anatolia which characterized the rest of his reign.

Further, while there is much that is repetitive and formulaic in the treaties, on closer examination they often reveal careful tailoring to a particular set of circumstances and considerable political astuteness. Their historical preambles reflect the king’s (or his advisers’) close
understanding of local affairs, a sensitivity to particular problems in the region where the vassal state was located, and a detailed knowledge of the region’s history—coupled with a perception of how all these factors could best be turned to the Hittites’ advantage. Given the large and complex range of states with which the Hittite kings often had to deal simultaneously, this was no small achievement.

The Viceregal Kingdoms

Although the majority of Hittite subject states outside the homeland were ruled by vassals of local origin, in the fourteenth century Suppiluliuma I implemented a major administrative innovation in the Syrian region. Here he established two viceregal kingdoms, one at Aleppo, the other at Carchemish on the Euphrates. Two of his sons, Telipinu and Piyassili (subsequently called Sharri-Kushuh), were appointed to the viceregal seats. Henceforth these kingdoms remained under the direct control of members of the Hittite royal family and continued to be important centres of Hittite civilization for several centuries after the collapse of the central dynasty in Anatolia at the end of the Bronze Age. Tarhuntassa in southern Anatolia was for a brief period another (quasi-) viceregal kingdom. In the thirteenth century it was placed under the direct authority of a nephew of the Hittite king, whose appointment was recognized as equivalent in status to that of the viceroys in Aleppo and Carchemish (see Chs. 11 and 12).

Early Rivals of the Kingdom

From its early days the Hittite kingdom was confronted with challenges and threats from powerful enemies—so powerful that on more than one occasion it was brought to the verge of total extinction. We have already referred to the Kaska tribes from the Pontic zone who threatened, attacked, and sometimes occupied the northern territories of the homeland throughout the kingdom’s history. We have also referred to two other peoples who became major participants in this history—the Luwians in the west and south-west, and probably also in south-central Anatolia, and the Hurrians in the south-east. Luwians and Hurrians presented the Hittites, during the first three centuries of their kingdom, with some of their most formidable obstacles on their way to becoming the supreme political and military power in the Near East. Given that
their own history is so closely intertwined with that of the Hittites, it
may be useful at this point to summarize briefly their background and
development, their political organization, the location and extent of the
territories which they occupied or sought to control, and their interests
and aspirations which brought them into contact and conflict with the
Land of Hatti.

The Luwians

We have seen that by the early second millennium an Indo-European
group called the Luwians had occupied extensive areas of western
Anatolia. Indeed in the first half of the millennium, a large part of
western Anatolia was called Luwiya. However, the name seems to have
been used only in a broad ethno-geographical sense, with no strong
political connotations. By the middle of the millennium another name
had come into use for the region—Arzawa, though Luwiya and Arzawa
were by no means coterminous. During the Hittite New Kingdom the
name Arzawa embraced a number of Hittite vassal states known col-
lectively as the Arzawa Lands, which lay in western and south-western
Anatolia. The nucleus of these lands was a kingdom called Arzawa.
Scholars sometimes refer to it as Arzawa Minor, to distinguish it from
other parts of the Arzawa complex. Four other western kingdoms are
identified in various texts as members of this complex: Mira-Kuwaliya,
Seha River Land, Hapalla, and Wilusa. On several occasions during the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries,
confederacies from the whole Arzawa region seem to have been formed
for specific military purposes. It is possible that the king of Arzawa
Minor exercised from time to time a kind of *primus inter pares* role
amongst the various chiefs and rulers of the Arzawa lands. But there is
no indication that these lands ever formed a united, politically coherent
kingdom under the rule of a single king. None the less Arzawa consti-
tuted a major military threat to the Hittite kingdom, and in the
fourteenth century succeeded in mounting an extensive invasion of
Hittite territory south of the Marassantiya river. Indeed in these the
darkest days of the Hittite kingdom before its final collapse, Arzawa was
seen by Amenhotep III, pharaoh of Egypt, to be emerging as the
dominant power in the whole Anatolian region.

Although Arzawa was probably the largest and most populous region
of Luwian settlement in Anatolia, Luwian speakers spread far beyond
Map 4. The Near East in the Late Bronze Age
this region. The migrations which had led to their settlement in western Anatolia continued well into the second millennium. By the middle of the millennium, Luwian-speaking groups had occupied much of the southern coast of Anatolia, from the region later known as Lycia in the west to Cilicia and the Bronze Age country Kizzuwadna in the east.

One of the important Luwian sub-groups was the Lukka people. References to Lukka and the Lukka people figure prominently in our Bronze Age texts. From these texts we can conclude that the term Lukka, or Lukka lands, referred to a region extending from the western end of Pamphylia through Lycaonia, Pisidia, and Lycia (the later Greco-Roman names).

Lukka was never in any sense an organized political entity. We know of no kings of Lukka, no treaties of vassalhood between Lukka and the Hittite king, and no one person or city could act on behalf of Lukka as a whole. In other words, the term Lukka was used not in reference to a state with a clearly defined political organization, but rather to a conglomerate of independent communities, with close ethnic affinities and lying within a roughly definable geographical area. While it seems clear that there was a central Lukka region, a ‘Lukka homeland’, various elements of the Lukka population may have been widely scattered through southern and western Anatolia, and may in some cases have settled temporarily, or permanently, in states with formal political organizations. Singer’s description of the Lukka people as ‘the Habiru of Anatolia’ is very apt.

The Lukka people were sometime subjects of the Hittite king throughout the period of the Hittite Kingdom. But for much of this period, Hittite control over them was probably little more than nominal. This was due in part to the fact that they could not be dealt with as a single political or administrative entity, like the people of a vassal kingdom. But it must have been primarily due to the nature of the people themselves. The Hittite texts provide us with a picture of a difficult, fractious people, prone to rebellion against Hittite authority. They seem also to have been experienced seafarers who engaged in piratical raids on coastal cities in the eastern Mediterranean.

Almost certainly Bronze Age Lukka people were one of the most important ethnic components of the people who by the early first millennium had settled in the region in south-west Anatolia called Lycia by the Greeks and originally part of the Lukka Lands. The
Lycians, whose language is closely related to Bronze Age Luwian, figured prominently in Greek legendary tradition, where they were best known as the most important of Troy’s allies in the Trojan War.\textsuperscript{33}

\textit{The Hurrians}\textsuperscript{34}

The Hurrians represent one of the most dynamic social, cultural, and political forces to emerge in the Near East from the late third millennium onwards. In a broad ethno-linguistic sense, the term ‘Hurrian’ applied to a diverse range of population groups whose original homeland is uncertain. One view is that they came from the Kura-Araxes region in Transcaucasia. Another view, based largely on archaeological evidence, postulates a Hurrian homeland in eastern Anatolia during the third millennium.\textsuperscript{35} Irrespective of where their original homeland was, a common language, called Hurrian in the texts, and common onomastic features gave overall coherence to these groups—enabling us to identify the various regions where they subsequently settled or with which they came in contact. The impact which they had on these regions is reflected in the survival of various facets of Hurrian culture—notably a distinctive pantheon and body of religious tradition—long after the Hurrians themselves had ceased to be a significant political force in the Near East.

By the end of the sixteenth century, the array of small states which occupied northern Mesopotamia, where the Hurrian population was principally settled, were united into a single political entity. The process which brought this about is unknown to us. Some scholars have maintained that Indo-Aryans from the east (i.e. Indo-European groups who appeared in India during the second millennium) may have been a catalyst in the process, since the names of all known Mitannian kings are Indo-Aryan not Hurrian in origin, as are also the names of a number of the gods who figure in the Mitannian pantheon.\textsuperscript{36} Yet doubts persist about the supposed Indo-Aryan character of the Mitannian kingdom’s ruling élite,\textsuperscript{37} and for the moment the question of what precisely can be concluded from the presence of Indo-Aryan personal and divine names in Mitannian society remains unresolved.

Whatever their nature, the dynamics which created the union of Hurrian states provided the genesis of the powerful kingdom variously called Hurri, Mitanni, or Hanigalbat in Hittite texts. Its formidable military might seems to have depended much on the services of an élite class of chariot-warriors called \textit{maryannu}. The Egyptians and
Canaanites referred to the kingdom by its west Semitic name Naharina, or Naharima. Once formed, it rapidly extended its influence into northern Syria and eastern Anatolia, and for the next two centuries became Hatti’s chief rival for political and military supremacy in these regions. On several occasions, it seriously threatened the Hittite homeland itself.

The Hurrians made their first attested appearance in Anatolia as traders during the Assyrian colony period, as illustrated by Hurrian names in the colony texts. These names are, however, quite rare, which suggests that they reflect the activities of a small number of enterprising merchants of Hurrian origin rather than significant Hurrian settlement in the region where the colonies were established.

Northern Syria presents a different picture. The archives of Mari and Alalah in particular indicate extensive Hurrian settlement in the region during the early centuries of the second millennium, with the establishment of Hurrian colonies or enclaves at Mari, Alalah, and Ebla. Subsequently, persons with Hurrian names appeared in Aleppo, Carchemish, and Ugarit. Hurrian immigrants in search of work and land would have been attracted by the abundant opportunities offered by the northern Syrian states, which in turn had need of a stable, productive population in contrast to the fluctuating nomadic or semi-nomadic groups in evidence there. Already in the seventeenth century, when the Hittites conducted their first campaigns in the region, there was a substantial Hurrian presence in northern Syria. For example, approximately half of all the names attested in level VII of Alalah (the city destroyed by Hattusili I) were Hurrian.

The westward spread of Hurrian population groups was almost inevitably a forerunner to Hurrian (i.e. Mitannian) political and military expansion westward across the Euphrates. It was this which led ultimately to fierce competition with the kingdom of Hatti which in the same period sought to expand its influence through the same region. In the course of two centuries of conflict between Hatti and Mitanni, each side had its share of successes, each its share of disasters before one finally and irrevocably succumbed to the other.
Other Near Eastern Powers

The Hittites’ territorial interests and military enterprises in Syria brought them into contact, and sometimes conflict, with two other great kingdoms who sought to establish their control over the principalities and city-states of the region—the kingdom of Egypt, and after the collapse of Mitanni as an independent power the kingdom of Assyria. A third kingdom, Babylonia, was also enmeshed in the web of international relationships in the Near East during the Late Bronze Age; our records attest to frequent diplomatic communications between the rulers of the Babylonian Kassite dynasty and the other Great Kings of the Near East. But the Kassites who rose to pre-eminence in Babylonia in the period following the end of Hammurabi’s dynasty c.1595 apparently had no territorial ambitions west of the Euphrates.

There was yet another power whose rulers appear (temporarily) in the list of the Great Kings of the Late Bronze Age—the kingdom of Ahhiyawa. This kingdom figured prominently in the Hittites’ communications and conflicts with the countries of western Anatolia. It has given rise to one of the most frequently and hotly debated controversies in Late Bronze Age scholarship. Where was Ahhiyawa located? How important a role did it play in the history of the Near East? How extensive was its influence? What brought its presence in the region to an end?

In the 1920s the Swiss scholar Emil Forrer claimed that he had discovered Homeric Greeks in the Hittite texts, as reflected in numerous occurrences of the place-name Ahhiyawa in these texts. He argued that Ahhiyawa was the Hittite way of writing the Greek name Achaiwia, an archaic form of Achaia. And he noted that in the Homeric epics, the Greeks were frequently called Achaians. In historical times the name Achaia was associated with regions which in Homeric tradition were colonized by Achaians—for example, the northern Peloponnese. Since Forrer made his claims, scholars have continued to debate who the Ahhiyawans were and where their kingdom was located, with Ahhiyawa being variously proposed as an Anatolian kingdom, an island kingdom
off the Anatolian coast (for example, Rhodes or Cyprus), Thrace, or indeed a mainland Mycenaean Greek kingdom. Recently, however, an increasing number of scholars have come round to the view that the term Ahhiyawa must have been used in reference to the Mycenaean world, or at least to part of that world. The advocates of this view base their arguments on new readings and interpretations of the relevant Hittite texts, and on recent surveys of the material evidence for Mycenaean contacts with the Anatolian mainland.

While some scholars still have serious reservations about the Ahhiyawa–Mycenaean equation, or reject it, the circumstantial evidence in favour of it is proving increasingly persuasive. There is no doubt that Ahhiyawa was a significant Late Bronze Age power, whose king was accorded by the Hittite king Hattusili III a status equal to that of the other contemporary great Bronze Age rulers—the kings of Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria. Moreover Ahhiyawa appears to have had a substantial seagoing capacity, and to have been in close contact during the last two centuries of the Late Bronze Age with the countries of the eastern Mediterranean as well as with western Anatolia. It is in precisely this region, and in precisely this period, that we have abundant material evidence for Mycenaean activity. Further, we know from the archaeological record that the site on the western coast of Anatolia called Miletos in Greco-Roman times came under strong Mycenaean influence from the late fourteenth century onwards. Most scholars agree that Miletos is to be identified with the land called Milawata (Millawanda) in the Hittite texts. From these texts it is clear that Milawata had become, by the early thirteenth century, vassal territory of the king of Ahhiyawa, in precisely the same period that we see increasing Mycenaean influence on Miletos.

If the Ahhiyawa–Mycenaean equation is not valid, then we must accept that there were two discrete Late Bronze Age civilizations with remarkably similar names, making their presence felt in the same region and in the same period. One of them, Ahhiyawa, is attested by documentary evidence, but has left no identifiable trace in the archaeological record; the other, the Mycenaean civilization, has left abundant archaeological evidence but no identifiable trace in the documentary record. It is difficult to write this off as mere coincidence.

Ahhiyawans made their appearance on the Anatolian mainland at least by the early fourteenth century, when a military operation was
conducted on Anatolian soil by Attarassiya, the ‘Man of Ahhiya’\textsuperscript{51} with infantry and a force of 100 chariots. From this time on our evidence indicates increasing Ahhiyawan involvement in western Anatolian affairs, either directly or through local vassals or protégés of the Ahhiyawan king. This involvement reached its peak in the first half of the thirteenth century.

At no stage, however, did Ahhiyawan enterprise in Anatolia lead to permanent occupation of substantial portions of western Anatolian territory. Rather this enterprise probably reflected (on a small scale) the practice of other major Late Bronze Age rulers, notably the kings of Hatti and Egypt, who sought to expand and consolidate their influence in the Near East by establishing a network of vassal states under the immediate control of local rulers. The Ahhiyawan presence in western Anatolia inevitably caused tensions, and sometimes conflicts, with the Hittites whose subject territories extended into the same region. In the thirteenth century in particular, Ahhiyawan strategy was to support prominent dissidents or rebels against Hittite authority in the western Anatolian states, guarantee them, if need be, refuge from Hittite authority, and use them as agents for the extension of Ahhiyawan influence into adjacent Anatolian states.

Yet it seems that territorial expansion was not a major object or outcome of Ahhiyawan enterprise in Anatolia. Rather, the most likely intention of this enterprise was to gain access to resources which were in demand in the Greek mainland, and which could readily be supplied by western Anatolia. These may well have been resources which have left little or no trace in the archaeological record—like slaves, horses, and metals.\textsuperscript{52} From the Linear B tablets we know that western Anatolia was one of the regions from which labour was recruited for the Mycenaean palace work-forces.\textsuperscript{53} And the metal-bearing and horse-breeding areas of western Anatolia may well have provided the Ahhiyawan kings with major incentives for establishing and extending their influence in the region,\textsuperscript{54} primarily through local intermediaries.\textsuperscript{55}

The Ahhiyawa–Mycenaean equation, if accepted, has substantial implications for Mycenaean studies, since to date the Mycenaean world has failed to provide us with any historical sources of information beyond what can be gleaned from Homeric tradition and the Linear B tablets. Mycenaean scholars, by and large, find it difficult to accept the notion of a Mycenaean kingdom with significant political and military
involvement in the Near Eastern world. Certainly the equation poses many problems for Mycenaean scholarship. If Ahhiyawa was in fact a Mycenaean kingdom, where was the seat of its power? At Mycenae itself, the kingdom of Agamemnon in Homeric tradition? Or at one of the other important centres of the Mycenaean world? How extensive was the kingdom? Did it involve a confederation of Mycenaean states, under the leadership of a single ruler—perhaps a *primus inter pares* as in Homeric tradition? Were there shifts in the centre of power during the 200 years for which Ahhiyawa is attested in the Hittite texts? We cannot rule out the possibility of other major Mycenaean centres, like Orchomenos in Boeotia or Argos in the Peloponnese, as possible nuclei of Ahhiyawan power.  

We should in any case distinguish between uses of the term Ahhiyawa (*a*) as a general ethno-geographical designation (like the names Hurri and Luwiya in the Hittite texts) encompassing all areas of Mycenaean settlement, both in mainland Greece and overseas; (*b*) to designate the nucleus of the kingdom of the Ahhiyawan rulers who corresponded with the kings of Hatti; (*c*) to designate this kingdom in a broader sense, including the territories attached to it as political and military dependencies.

We shall return to these matters as we survey the ever-changing picture of the world of international relationships in the Late Bronze Age.
The Aftermath of the Assyrian Colony Period

An almost impenetrable veil hangs over the decades that followed the end of Anitta’s reign and the disappearance of the Assyrian merchant colonies. Written records cease, and archaeological information on the aftermath of the colony period is almost non-existent. Without such information, we can do no more than speculate on what brought the merchant operations to an end, and what followed in their wake.

We have witnessed, throughout the second phase of the colony period, the widespread conflicts which affected every area in Anatolia where the Assyrian merchants conducted their trading operations. Eventually the Nesa-based kingdom of Anitta collapsed, and Nesa itself probably fell victim to the conflicts, caused largely by the aggressive expansionist ambitions of its kings. Outside forces may also have been at work. The Kaska people who in later years repeatedly invaded the Hittite homeland perhaps now, for the first time, became active in the region, attacking Anatolian cities involved in trading activities with the Assyrian merchants, particularly in the north.¹ Hurrian groups from the south-east may also have disrupted the trading network, threatening and perhaps actually severing the long and hazardous routes between Assyria and Anatolia. Sensitive to unsettled conditions at the best of times, the Assyrian merchants must now have abandoned their colonies in Anatolia and withdrawn entirely from the region, never to return.

What impact did all this have on the large trading centres, the towns, the villages, and the populations with whom the merchants

¹
had conducted their business? The period following the end of the Assyrian colonies is one of darkness and silence. In James Mellaart's view, when a new ruling power finally emerged in central Anatolia what it inherited was 'no longer a prosperous country, but a scarred and ravaged land filled with the ruins of fire-blackened palaces'. The image thus created by Mellaart is perhaps a little too apocalyptic. But it may reflect some elements of the scenario in which the Hittite ruling dynasty first came to power, several decades or more after the destruction of the kingdom of Anitta. What is clear is that very few of the major Anatolian cities and states of the earlier part of the second millennium retained any importance in later years; some, like the settlement on the site now called Acem Höyük, may have been abandoned and never reoccupied.

When the veil finally begins to lift, it does so on a new era in the history and civilization of Anatolia, the so-called Late Bronze Age, the era in which Anatolia was dominated by the kingdom of the Hittites.

What were the origins of this kingdom? In attempting to answer this question, we should go back to the city of Kussara, whence arose the dynasty of Pithana and Anitta. Here, very likely, the foundations of the Hittite kingdom were established—a kingdom whose early rulers launched it on a course of military and political expansion which was to make it one of the supreme powers of the Near East in the final centuries of the Bronze Age.

Its first clearly attested king was a man called Hattusili. In his reign the earliest known documents of the Hittite kingdom were produced. But we know that the dynasty of which he was a member extended back at least two generations before him. For he tells us of a rebellion against his grandfather—the first known event in Hittite history.

**Early Hittite Records**

Our knowledge of Hattusili’s reign is derived from a number of documents, three of which are of particular importance. The first, discovered in 1957, records the king’s military achievements apparently over a six-year period and is commonly referred to as the *Annals*. Since Hattusili’s reign probably lasted some 30 years, the *Annals* records only a small segment of his military enterprises, and we have to supplement this
record as best we can with scraps of information from other sources. The extensive nature of his campaigns, conducted in many regions of both Anatolia and Syria, and the successes which they apparently achieved in such a short period, would be even more remarkable if they belonged to the early part of his reign, as most scholars assume.

But it has been argued that the text in its surviving form consists of excerpts from a much more comprehensive record covering the whole of the reign, from which the most important achievements were selected. If the Annals do in fact present us with a series of highlights of the whole reign, then their value as a source of historical information might be thought to be considerably enhanced. But such selectivity could also lead to much distortion of the record. Even if the Annals were restricted to a six-year period—and that is what a literal interpretation of the text clearly conveys—the campaigns which they record probably established a pattern of military enterprises which to a greater or lesser extent recurred throughout the reign.

The text of the Annals is a bilingual one, with versions in both Akkadian and Hittite cuneiform. Scholarly opinion is divided on whether the original was composed in Hittite and subsequently translated into Akkadian, or vice versa. The surviving copies of the text date to no earlier than the thirteenth century, some 400 years after the events to which they refer. The composition is of a well-known Old Hittite type: an extended historical narrative culminating in a particular triumph of the Hittite king.

The second major document of Hattusili’s reign is commonly referred to as the Testament. While the Annals are one of our chief sources of information on the military exploits of Hattusili, the Testament provides us with important details about the internal political affairs of the Hittite kingdom during his reign. It is in essence a proclamation issued by Hattusili before an assembled group of warriors and dignitaries announcing new arrangements the king has made for the succession, and his appointment of his grandson Mursili as heir to the throne. The proclamation was delivered to the assembly in the city of Kussara where the king, by now an old man, lay ill. It may in fact have been one of his final acts before his death.

Like the Annals, the Testament survives in both Hittite and Akkadian versions which are late copies of the original Old Kingdom document. There has again been some dispute over the question of whether the
Hittite or the Akkadian version came first. Although the Akkadian version was once thought to have been earlier,\(^{11}\) the surviving Hittite text preserves a number of features of the Old Hittite language,\(^{12}\) and it has been suggested that the Akkadian version was a later translation of the Hittite.\(^ {13} \) Another suggestion is that both versions were composed simultaneously.\(^ {14} \)

A third source of information on the reign of Hattusili, as well as other early Hittite kings, is a document commonly referred to as the *Proclamation* (or *Edict*) of the king Telipinu\(^ {15} \) who occupied the throne some hundred years and six reigns after Hattusili’s death. The lengthy historical preamble of this document recounts the early triumphs and the subsequent disasters of the Hittite monarchy up to the time of Telipinu’s accession, c.1525. Composed originally in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, the *Proclamation* survives only in late copies—a fragmentary Akkadian version and nine exemplars of a Hittite version.

By piecing together the information contained in these and other documents dating back to the Hittite Old Kingdom, we can begin to construct a picture of the first kings who held sway over the world of the Hittites.

**The First Labarna**

The *Proclamation of Telipinu* begins with the exploits of a king called Labarna:\(^ {16} \)

> Formerly Labarna was the Great King. Then were his sons, his brothers, his relations by marriage, his (blood) relations and his troops united. And the land was small. But on whatever campaign he went, he held the lands of the enemy in subjection by his might. He kept devastating the lands, and he deprived the lands of power; and he made them boundaries of the sea. But when he returned from the field, each of his sons went to the various lands (to govern them). Hupisna, Tuwanuwa, Nenassa, Landa, Zallara, Parsuhanta, Lusna—these (were the) lands they governed. The large towns were assigned (to them). \( \text{(*Telipinu Procl. §§1–4, i 2–12*)} \)

Here was a king who first came to power in what may have been one of a number of petty states and kingdoms which had survived, or emerged in the wake of, the collapse of the kingdom of Anitta. To begin with, the land ruled by Labarna was small. But a dramatic change in the political landscape was soon to take place. From the security of a
kingdom firmly united under his rule, Labarna embarked on a programme of military conquests which carried his troops ever further to the south. One country after another fell before their advance, until finally Labarna established himself as overlord of the entire region stretching south of the Marassantiya river to the Mediterranean Sea, and south-west to the Konya Plain. Labarna brought all the conquered territories firmly under his sway, and sent his sons to govern them.

So much we learn from the historical preamble to Telipinu’s Proclamation. Yet some scholars are sceptical. Can we really accept this Labarna, the possible founder of the royal Hittite dynasty, as an authentic historical figure? All the information we have about him comes from later sources. We have no texts from his reign, no explicit information about his relationship with his successors, or other members of the royal family, no other sources of information which might help confirm his place in Hittite history. The one document which does assign specific achievements to him—the Proclamation—uses almost identical wording to describe the achievements of his alleged successor Hattusili. Could it be that Labarna and Hattusili were one and the same person, that the composer of the Proclamation wrongly turned them into two? If so, how did the error arise? Hattusili himself adopted the name Labarna as a throne-name and, the argument goes, it is possible that Telipinu, who reigned 100 years later, was misled into assuming that the two names indicated two different persons.

This line of argument is not convincing. We know—as Telipinu obviously did—that Hattusili was not the first member of his dynasty to become king, that the tradition of a new king, or king-designate, assuming the name Labarna was already established by Hattusili’s reign, and that the tradition persisted after his reign. Labarna may well have been the personal name of the founder of the first Hittite dynasty, but the name was subsequently used as a title by later members of the dynasty—in much the same way as Caesar was regularly used as a title in the nomenclature of the Roman emperors. In these circumstances, the alleged error referred to above would assume a degree of ignorance of the Labarna tradition on Telipinu’s part which is inconceivable.

The similar wording used to describe the achievements of Labarna and Hattusili in the Proclamation is no great cause for concern, or suspicion. It is, in effect, a formulaic way of highlighting one of the main themes of the Proclamation—the close link between periods of
peace and stability within the kingdom and the kingdom’s growth and
development as a major military and political power. The link is made
even more emphatic by a description in almost identical terms of
the reign of Hattusili’s successor Mursili. As with Labarna and Hattusili,
the new king’s ‘sons, his brothers, his marriage relations, his (blood)
relations were united. He held the enemy land in subjection by his
might, and he deprived the lands of power; and he made them bound-
daries of the sea.’

There are no good reasons for doubting the historical reality of a king
Labarna, the king with whose achievements the Proclamation begins.
From a likely power base in Kussara, ancestral home of the dynasty of
Pithana and Anitta, this king made large his realm, extending his sway
by military conquest over much of eastern Anatolia, as far south as the
Mediterranean Sea. He was the first great warrior of the aggressive new
Hittite dynasty, serving as a model and source of inspiration for those
who would succeed to his throne.

But his relationship to his immediate successor in the Proclamation
remains uncertain. It is to this man, Hattusili, that we must now turn
our attention.

Rebellion in Sanahuitta

In his Testament, Hattusili recalls the rebellion against his grandfather:

Did not my grandfather’s sons set aside his words? He appointed(??) his son
Labarna in (the city of) Sanahuitta. But subsequently his servants and the great
men defied his word and placed Papahdilmah (on the throne). How many years
have passed and how many have escaped (their punishment)? Where are the
houses of the great men? Have they not perished? (Testament §20, iii 41–5)

The facts are brief and incomplete. Understandably so, for Hattusili
was simply referring to an episode which occurred before his reign
to point a moral, and to sound a warning. From the point of view
of those to whom the warning was directed, details were unnecessary.
The episode and its consequences must have been well known to the
king’s subjects. But from our point of view, this small snippet of
information raises many questions. Where does Sanahuitta fit into the
picture of the early development of the Hittite kingdom? What was the
position of Hattusili’s grandfather in the Hittite royal dynasty? What
significance is to be attached to the fact that his son was called Labarna? What action involving his son was he attempting to take in Sanahuitta? The statement which refers to this is open to different interpretations. Why did this action provoke rebellion? Who was Papahdilmah? In attempting to answer these questions, we can do no more than provide a very tentative reconstruction of the context in which the rebellion occurred.

To begin with Sanahuitta. This name was already known, in the form Sinahuttum, in a text from the colony period. The city probably lay to the north-east of Hattusa, and certainly within the homeland, in the vicinity of the garrison centres Hakpis (Hakmis) and Istahara. It thus provides further information on the extent of the Hittite kingdom before the reign of Hattusili. In addition to the territories won by Labarna in south-eastern Anatolia, the Hittites must also have controlled territories located a similar distance to the north of Kussara, at that time the centre of the Hittite kingdom. This may have been the result of a series of northern campaigns conducted by Labarna. There is no reference to such campaigns in the Proclamation. But if we can take at face value Telipinu’s claim that the Hittite land was ‘small’ before Labarna’s conquests, then it may be that the latter was also responsible for a northward as well as a southward expansion of Hittite territory.

Who was Hattusili’s grandfather? The passage cited above does not give his name or explicitly indicate his status. But there was no need for Hattusili to provide this information, for the grandfather was obviously a well-known figure, and had almost certainly been king. Very likely he was the original Labarna, founder of the Hittite dynasty. If so, then the record of the rebellion provides an interesting and very significant supplement to Telipinu’s account of his reign.

What role was the grandfather’s son Labarna intended to fill in Sanahuitta? Unfortunately this is not clear from the passage translated above. But the most likely conclusion is that the grandfather, king of Kussara, had attempted to establish his son Labarna as governor of the region in which Sanahuitta was located—an appointment which, for reasons unknown to us, proved highly unpopular. In fact it never took place. As a result of the uprising, which involved other members of the king’s own family, the king’s appointment was overturned, and Labarna was replaced by the rebels’ appointee, a man called Papahdilmah, perhaps one of the princes who had been ‘made disloyal’.
If all had gone according to his father’s plans, the young Labarna may have succeeded to the throne in Kussara after serving as a regional ruler in the north of the kingdom. His name suggests that he was his father’s chosen heir. But we do not know what happened to him after the rebellion. He may not have survived it. And the rebellion must have had the effect of splitting off part of the kingdom, with a rebel regime now installed in Sanahuita.

**Hattusili Becomes King**

This was the setting for Hattusili I’s accession to the Hittite throne c.1650. At the beginning of his *Annals*, Hattusili identified himself as: ‘The Great King Tabarna, Hattusili the Great King, King of the Land of Hatti, Man of Kussar(a). In the Land of Hatti he ruled as king, son of the brother of Tawananna’ (*Annals*, i 1–3). As the expression ‘Man of Kussar(a)’ suggests, Hattusili probably began his reign at Kussara, inheriting from his predecessor a kingdom which had been reduced by the rebellion in Sanahuita, but which still controlled, apparently, extensive territory to the south of Kussara. He also inherited the account to be settled with the rebel regime in the north.

But before attending to this, Hattusili took a major new step in his kingdom’s development. He established a new seat for the royal dynasty, on the site of Hattusa! Indeed he may have adopted the name Hattusili to mark this event. This at least is the generally accepted scenario for the resettlement of Hattusa following the curse placed upon it by Anitta. But some scholars have argued that already in the time of Hattusili’s father or grandfather, or even earlier, Hattusa had been rebuilt and established as the royal capital. Unfortunately our texts give no indication as to who precisely was responsible for its rebuilding, and it is of course quite possible that the site was resettled some time prior to its establishment and development as a new royal capital. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, I concur with the general view that Hattusili was responsible for locating the seat of the Hittite royal dynasty in Hattusa, while allowing that credit for this could conceivably be due to one of his predecessors. In any case the resettlement of Hattusa was clearly in defiance of Anitta’s curse—which according to some scholars indicates that its founder was not of the same dynasty as Pithana and Anitta. However, the site had certain natural
advantages which, irrespective of the new dynasty’s lineage, must have outweighed any consideration of Anitta’s curse. It was located in a naturally defensible position, one of the few such in central Anatolia, with its citadel on the large outcrop of rock now known as Büyükkale which was virtually impregnable from the north.\textsuperscript{37} Too, the region in which it lay had an abundant all-year-round supply of water, from seven springs, and at that time was thickly forested.\textsuperscript{38}

But from a strategic point of view, the new capital was badly situated.\textsuperscript{39} It was much further removed than Kussara from the Hittites’ southern subject territories and the routes into Syria. And it was close to the ill-defined and often shifting northern boundary of the kingdom. As we have noted, this put it within striking distance of the Kaska people and other hostile tribes in the region. Yet ‘history can show many examples of the siting of a capital city at the point of danger’.\textsuperscript{40}

Hattusili’s military objectives in northern Anatolia probably also had some bearing on his selection of Hattusa as the new royal seat. The first target of his campaigns in this region was Sanahuitta, now within easy range of the Hittite capital. In Hattusa the king’s troops were mustered. And from there the campaign against Sanahuitta was launched. But the success it achieved was a limited one: ‘He marched against Sanahuitta. He did not destroy it, but its land he did destroy. I left (my) troops in two places as a garrison. I gave whatever sheepfolds were (there) to (my) garrison troops’\textsuperscript{41} (\textit{Annals}, i 4–8).

Hattusili plundered the lands belonging to Sanahuitta, but the city itself remained intact. There was probably a good reason for this, to which we shall return. For the moment we must suppose that when Hattusili withdrew his troops from the territory of Sanahuitta, he had not succeeded in capturing the city or removing the rebel regime which had installed itself there during his grandfather’s reign. The rebels had yet to be called to account.

In the same year as his campaign against Sanahuitta, Hattusili marched against Zalpa, very likely the kingdom which figures in the Anitta inscription, in the far north near the mouth of the Marassantiya river.\textsuperscript{42} Thereupon I marched against Zalpa and destroyed it. I took possession of its gods and I gave three waggons to the Sun Goddess of Arinna. I gave one silver bull and one silver fist (rhyton) to the temple of the Storm God. The gods that were remaining I gave to the temple of Mezzulla.\textsuperscript{43} (\textit{Annals}, i 9–14)
In contrast to his campaign against Sanahuitta, Hattusili apparently succeeded in capturing, looting, and destroying the city. Even so, this proved no more than a temporary setback for Zalpa, for it was to figure in a number of later conflicts with the Hittites. Indeed, as we shall see, it reappeared later in Hattusili’s reign in a rebellion against his rule involving one of his sons.

Limited though they were in their long-term consequences, the campaigns against Sanahuitta and Zalpa seem to have established Hattusili’s authority in central Anatolia to the point where he could now look to more distant lands to conquer. In the following year, preparations were put in place for the most ambitious campaign yet undertaken by a Hittite army. Hattusili made ready to carry his battle standards into Syria.

The Hittites Invade Syria

The earlier territorial gains which the Hittites had made south of the Marassantiya river had already paved the way for their military enterprises in Syria. Control over the countries of south-eastern Anatolia provided them with access into Syria via several routes. One of these led through the pass later known as the Cilician Gates, and no doubt came to be used regularly by the Hittites for both commercial and military purposes. This may well have been the route now taken by Hattusili’s army in its march through southern Anatolia and across the Taurus mountains into Syria through the Syrian Gates (mod. Beilan Pass).

Hattusili must have been well aware that a Hittite military expedition into Syria posed far greater challenges than his campaigns in Anatolia, and entailed far greater risks. For the whole of the northern part of the region was controlled by the powerful kingdom of Yamhad. From its capital Aleppo (Halap, Halab, or Halpa in the Hittite texts), Yamhad had for two centuries dominated northern Syria through a network of vassal states and appanage kingdoms which stretched from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean coast. The archives from Alalah provide the names of a wide array of states and cities which were associated with Aleppo either as subjects or as allies—Alalah, Carchemish, Urshu, Hassu, Ugarit, Emar, Ebla, Tunip. Hittite military operations against any of the north Syrian states and principalities inevitably represented a threat to the kingdom of Aleppo itself.
There can be little doubt that Hattusili already had his sights set on the eventual conquest of Aleppo. But a direct challenge lay in the future. Hattusili was not yet ready to take on the military might of the most powerful kingdom in Syria. For the present, he limited the scope of his operations to a preliminary foray into the region, in preparation for more extensive military campaigns in later years. This first probing operation was probably intended to test the strength of enemy resistance in peripheral areas of the kingdom, and where possible to eliminate some of the sources of support on which it might call in subsequent contests with the Hittites.

After entering Syria via the passes in the Amanus range, Hattusili promptly identified his first military objective. Near the northernmost bend of the Orontes river, on the road linking Aleppo with the Mediterranean coast, lay the imposing fortified city of Alalah, modern Tell Aşana (Alalha in the Annals). It was against this city that Hattusili led his troops for their first military operation on Syrian soil. The result was an unqualified success. The troops of Alalah were routed, their city reduced to ruins.

At the time of the Hittite onslaught, Alalah was ruled by Ammitaqum, nominally the vassal of Yarim-Lim III who then occupied the throne of Aleppo. This information is provided by a tablet from Alalah VII mentioning Zukrasi, general of the king of Aleppo, as witness to an Alalah document in which Ammitaqum declared his will before Yarim-Lim. Zukrasi also figures in a Hittite text referring to a Hittite attack on Hassu(wa), very likely the same event recorded in Hattusili’s sixth campaign (see below). If so, then Ammitaqum and Hattusili may well have been contemporaries since Zukrasi, general of Yarim-Lim, appears in documents associated with both rulers. Thus we may conclude that Alalah VII, the city of Ammitaqum, was the city destroyed by Hattusili. But the Hittite conquest was achieved without any apparent intervention from Yarim-Lim. Why did he not come to the aid of his vassal state in its hour of need?

It is possible that Alalah took advantage of a dynastic dispute in Aleppo to establish its independence, and was thus reluctant to call upon its former overlord for support. If so, this could have been one of the factors which prompted Hattusili to attack Alalah, gambling that he could so without provoking a confrontation with Aleppo. It is still surprising that this blatant military intrusion into Syrian territory met
with no response from Aleppo, unless the rapidity of the Hittite advance and conquest had caught it unawares and left it insufficient time to mount a counter-attack. At all events, before encountering any challenge from Aleppo, Hattusili withdrew from Syria. For the present, he had tested his troops’ mettle on Syrian soil, and without committing them to further conflict in the region, he struck out on a north-easterly route which would eventually lead back to Hattusa.

But there were other military objectives to be accomplished on the way.

An Incompetent Siege Operation

Before returning to his capital, Hattusili attacked several cities in the region lying west of the Euphrates and north of Carchemish: ‘Subsequently I marched against Warshuwa. From Warshuwa I marched against Ikakali. From Ikakali I marched against Tashiniya. And I destroyed these lands. I took possession of their property and filled my house to the limit with it’ (Annals, 1 16–21).

Warshuwa, better known by its Akkadian name Urshu, figures in a later well-known legendary text, written primarily in Akkadian, which records a Hittite siege of the city. The siege is generally assigned to the reign of Hattusili, though we cannot be sure whether it belongs to this or to a later campaign which he conducted. It does, however, throw interesting light on one of the chronic deficiencies of the Hittite military machine—its ineffectiveness in siege warfare. And as a ‘literary’ text it provides an interesting complement to the military record of the Annals. The Hittite king expresses his fury at his officers’ ineptitude in conducting the siege of the city—a siege which according to the text lasted six months:

They broke the battering-ram. The king was angry and his face was grim: ‘They constantly bring me bad news; may the Storm God carry you away in a flood! . . . Be not idle! Make a battering-ram in the Hurrian manner and let it be brought into place. Hew a great battering-ram from the mountains of Hassu and let it be brought into place. Begin to heap up earth. When you have finished let every one take post. Only let the enemy give battle, then his plans will be confounded.’ . . . (Subsequently the king rebukes his general Santas for the inordinate delay in doing battle.) ‘Why have you not given battle? You stand on chariots of water, you are almost turned into water yourself(?) . . . You had
only to kneel before him and you would have killed him or at least frightened him. But as it is you have behaved like a woman.’ . . . Thus they answered him: ‘Eight times we will give battle. We will confound their schemes and destroy the city.’ The king answered, ‘Good!’

But while they did nothing to the city, many of the king’s servants were wounded so that many died. The king was angered and said: ‘Watch the roads. Observe who enters the city and who leaves the city. No one is to go out from the city to the enemy.’ . . . But a fugitive came out of the city and reported: ‘The subject of the king of Aleppo came in five times, the subject of Zuppa is dwelling in the city itself, the men of Zaruar go in and out, the subject of my Lord the Son of Teshub goes to and fro.’ . . . The king was furious. \( (KBo 11, obv. 13^{\prime} \text{-rev. 36, trans. Gurney (1990: 148–9)})^{53} \)

While the text is largely anecdotal in character, and replete with dramatic embellishments, it does provide a rather more graphic picture of a Hittite military operation than the terse, bald narrative of the historical texts. And indirectly it may provide a motive for the Hittite attack on Urshu. The failure of the Hittite siege to prevent passage to and from the beleaguered city by representatives of the king of Aleppo and the Hurrian king was a source of acute embarrassment to the king of Hatti, who had ordered all the roads leading to the city to be blocked. But the significant point is that some form of alliance apparently existed between Urshu, Aleppo, and the Hurrian kingdom. The last two were potential enemies of Hatti, and a pre-emptive strike against one or more of their allies might have been designed, perhaps as in the case of Alalah, to reduce their sources of military support in the event of future Hittite campaigns against them. Indeed Urshu was very likely a Hurrian state at the time of the early Hittite campaigns in the region.\(^{54}\)

Urshu eventually fell to the Hittites. But its conquest and destruction may well have provoked the Hurrians into retaliatory action the following year—with devastating consequences for Hattusili’s kingdom.

**Hattusili’s Arzawan Campaign**

In the year following his first Syrian campaign, Hattusili turned his attention to the south-west, where he undertook a campaign against the land of Arzawa—the earliest reference we have to Arzawa in the Hittite texts. At this time it was probably an ill-defined complex of territories
spread over much of western and south-western Anatolia. How far did Hattusili venture into this region, and what did he hope to achieve? The record in the *Annals*, confined to a single sentence, tells us little: ‘In the following year, I marched against Arzawa and took cattle and sheep’ (*Annals*, i 22–3).

The somewhat incidental nature of this statement may indicate that the expedition was little more than a raid into Arzawan territory. Cattle and sheep were taken as plunder, but there were apparently no conquests of any significance. Quite possibly the expedition had been provoked by Arzawa. As a result of the conquests of Labarna, Hittite subject territory must have extended close to, and may even have bordered on, the territory of Arzawa. That clearly provided scope for territorial disputes and cross-border raids—then as in later times. Perhaps one or more ‘border incidents’ escalated to the point where the Hittite king had to intervene in person, with a punitive expedition designed to give clear warning to the people of Arzawa to keep out of Hittite territory.

In later years Hattusili may have returned to Arzawa and carried out extensive campaigns in the region, if we can attribute to his reign the conquests in Arzawa referred to in a later document. And it is possible that by the end of his reign, at least part of Arzawan territory was under the control of a Hittite governor.

Rebellions in the Subject States

Whatever the intended scope of Hattusili’s first Arzawan campaign, it was cut short by a crisis which threatened the very survival of the Hittite kingdom: ‘In my rear the enemy of the city of the Hurrians entered my land, and all my lands made war against me. By now only the city of Hattusa, one city, remained’ (*Annals*, i 24–6).

This crisis was of a type which occurred repeatedly throughout Hittite history, exposing one of the kingdom’s chronic weaknesses. Campaigns conducted to the west and south-west which drew substantially on the kingdom’s military resources left the homeland dangerously exposed to attack from the north, the east and the south-east. On this occasion the Hurrians, taking advantage of the king’s absence, and perhaps in direct retaliation for the destruction of Urshu, invaded the homeland with devastating results. If we are to believe the record in the
Annals, the whole of the homeland was lost to Hattusili, with the exception only of the royal capital.57

It seems that the Hurrians promptly retreated on the return of the Hittite army. But their invasion had triggered off uprisings and defections throughout all the regions incorporated into the kingdom by the conquests of both Labarna and Hattusili. The response of Hattusili was prompt and vigorous. From his base in Hattusa, he first re-established his control over the region within the Marassantiya river boundary, and then set about the reconquest of the rebellious subject territories lying to the south.

The first city to return to the Hittite fold was Nenassa which lay just beyond the southernmost bend of the Marassantiya.58 On the approach of the Hittite army, it threw open its gates and surrendered without resistance. But the next city Ulma59 was not so easily won. Twice it came in battle against the king, and twice it was defeated. Such defiance could not be tolerated a third time—and a clear message had to be sent to the other rebel cities which continued their resistance. Hattusili ordered the total destruction of the city. Its site was sown with weeds, and all future settlement was banned.60

Only one more city refused submission—Sallahsuwa, also known from the Assyrian merchant texts, and very likely occupying a strategically important location near one of the main east–west routes linking northern Syria with Anatolia. It was promptly attacked and destroyed, bringing to an end all resistance in the south.

Hattusili’s policy towards rebel and enemy states was similar to that adopted by Anitta and followed by later Hittite kings. No punitive action was taken against a rebel or enemy city if it responded to an ultimatum from the king by throwing open its gates to him. But resistance, especially persistent resistance, met with the severest reprisals. Several demonstrations of this were sufficient inducement for the other rebels in the south to surrender without further opposition, leaving Hattusili free to return to Hattusa.

There were still rebels in the north to contend with. To these Hattusili turned his attention the following year. Once more he was obliged to take the field against Sanahuitta. His campaign into the region three years earlier had left the city intact, and presumably the rebel regime was still in power there. This situation could no longer be tolerated. The city had to be conquered and destroyed.
For six months Sanahuitta held out against the king’s forces. It was probably well fortified against enemy attack, which may explain why it had escaped destruction on Hattusili’s earlier campaign. The conquest of a heavily fortified city almost inevitably entailed a protracted and costly siege. After sizing up the costs and the risks involved, Hattusili may have decided on his first campaign into Sanahuitta’s territory to limit his operation to plundering the estates and farmlands surrounding the city. But the time had now come to commit himself fully to the conquest of Sanahuitta. After six months, the city fell—and no doubt with it the regime set up there in the reign of Hattusili’s grandfather. This act of rebellion was now, finally, avenged. Hattusili removed once and for all one of the chief sources of opposition to him in the region lying on the eastern periphery of the homeland. It was an event which he looked back to in later years with no small measure of satisfaction, as he issued to those assembled around his deathbed a warning of the consequences of rebellion: ‘How many years have passed and how many have escaped (their punishment)? Where are the houses of the great men (of Sanahuitta)? Have they not perished?’ (Testament §20, iii 44–5).

With the fall of Sanahuitta, resistance in other centres quickly crumbled. The city of Parmanna threw open its gates to the king, and other cities promptly followed suit. Alahha alone had the temerity to resist—and was destroyed. By the end of the fifth year of the Annals, Hattusili’s control over all his Anatolian territories lying both within and outside the Marassantiya boundary had been fully re-established. Once more he could turn his attention to Syria. But this time he planned a more extensive campaign in the region.

The Second Syrian Campaign

In the following year I marched against Zaruna and destroyed Zaruna. And I marched against Hassuwa and the men of Hassuwa came against me in battle. They were assisted by troops from Halpa (Aleppo). They came against me in battle and I overthrew them. Within a few days I crossed the river Puruna and I overcame Hassuwa like a lion with its claws. And [ ] when I overthrew it I heaped dust upon it and took possession of all its property and filled Hattusa with it. (Annals, KBo x 2 11–19, KBo x 1 35–6) I entered Zippasna, and I ascended Zippasna in the dead of night. I entered into battle with them and heaped dust upon them... Like a lion I gazed fiercely upon Hahha
(= Hahhu(m)) and destroyed Zippasna. I took possession of its gods and brought them to the temple of the Sun Goddess of Arinna. And I marched against Hahha and three times made battle within the gates. I destroyed Hahha and took possession of its property and carried it off to Hattusa. Two pairs of transport waggons were loaded with silver. *(Annals, KBo x 2 III 48 – III 12)*

The details are sketchy. The precise locations of the cities attacked by Hattusili are unknown and the identification of the Puruna river (Akkadian Puran) has led to much debate. But the overall picture is reasonably clear. After crossing the Taurus mountains, Hattusili began to march east towards the Euphrates, destroying the city of Zaruna* en route.* Other states in the region rallied against him. He was confronted by an army from the city of Hassuwa (which lay south of the Taurus and just west or east of the Euphrates) supported by troops from Aleppo, and defeated their combined forces in a battle fought at Mt. Atalur (Adalur). He then attacked and destroyed the cities of Hassuwa and Zippasna, entering the latter’s territory in the dead of night. Finally he marched against the city of Hahha/Hahhu(m) on the Euphrates which had made a futile attempt to come to the assistance of Zippasna. The city’s defences were breached, but within its gates the Hittites met with fierce resistance. Finally the city succumbed—but only after its troops had rallied three times against its attackers.

Hattusili showed no mercy to the vanquished. Mercy was a concession granted only to those who surrendered without resistance. The conquered cities were looted, and the spoils of conquest loaded onto wagons for transport back to Hattusa. When stripped of all their precious possessions, including the statues of their gods, Hassuwa and Hahha were set ablaze, and reduced to rubble. Then came the final *coup de grâce*—the humiliation and degradation of the local rulers. After witnessing the looting and destruction of their cities, the kings of Hassuwa and Hahha suffered the indignity of being harnessed to one of the wagons used to convey the spoils of their cities to Hattusa: ‘I the Great King Tabarna destroyed Hassuwa and Hahha and burned them down with fire and showed the smoke to the Storm God of Heaven. And I harnessed the king of Hassuwa and the king of Hahha to a transport wagon’ *(Annals, KBo x 2 III 37–42).*

The magnitude of the Hittite victories during this second Syrian campaign is highlighted by an event to which Hattusili attached great significance. His conquests in the Euphrates region involved a crossing
of the river itself—an achievement unprecedented in Hittite history. Indeed only the Akkadian ruler Sargon, who had crossed the river in the other direction some 700 years earlier, had accomplished such a feat before him. But Sargon had done so without the same devastating results:

No-one had crossed the (river) Mala (= Euphrates, Akkadian Purattu), but I the Great King Tabarna crossed it on foot, and my army crossed it [after me] (? ) on foot. Sarrugina (Sargon) (also) crossed it. But although he overthrew the troops of Hahha, he did nothing to Hahha (itself) and did not burn it down, nor did he show (?) the smoke to the Storm God of Heaven. (*Annals, KBo x 2 iii 29–40, after Güterbock (1964a: 2))

The comparison with Sargon is clearly justified, for Hattusili’s conquests extended over much of the same region west of the Euphrates conquered by Sargon many generations earlier. By the end of his sixth campaign, Hattusili had subdued almost the entire eastern half of Anatolia, from the Black Sea (in the region of Zalpa) to the Mediterranean, encompassing the Lower Land and perhaps also the territory later to become the kingdom of Kizzuwadna, and had led his troops to a series of victories through northern Syria across the Euphrates to the western fringes of Mesopotamia.

Indeed he may have penetrated even further into Mesopotamia. This is suggested by one of the most important Hittite texts to be published in recent years. It is a letter written in Akkadian by a Hittite king Labarna to a man called Tuniya, otherwise known as Tunip-Teshub, ruler of the kingdom of Tikunani. From historical references in the text, it is clear that the Labarna in question, author of the letter, is Hattusili I. His composition is the only letter so far known from the reign of Hattusili, and indeed has the distinction of being the sole survivor of the epistolary genre from the entire period of the Hittite Old Kingdom.

Addressing Tuniya as his servant, Hattusili calls upon his support for an attack upon the city of Hahhum (undoubtedly the same event which Hattusili records in his *Annals*):

To Tuniya, my servant, say: ‘Thus says Labarna, the Great King: “As my servant, be on my side, and I will protect you as my servant. Tikunan(i) is my city and you are my servant, and your country is my country, and thus truly I protect you. My road is open (i.e. the military campaign has started). So be a man in
relation to the king of Hahhum (i.e. stand up to him). Rip the morsel (from his mouth) like a dog. The large cattle that you will capture are yours. The small cattle that you will capture are also yours. Be a man before him! I from here and you from there (will attack him)!’’’ (Hattusili’s letter to Tuniya, 1–15, after Salvini (1996: 113)).

Tikunani was the name both of the kingdom over which Tuniya ruled and the city where his royal seat was established. It first appears some 150 years earlier, in the form Tigunanum, in letters which Ishme-Dagan, son of the Old Assyrian king Shamshi-Adad and viceroy at Ekallatum, sent to his brother Yasmah-Addu, the viceroy residing in Mari. Situated within striking distance of Hahhum, the kingdom of Tikunani probably lay somewhere between the upper Euphrates and upper Tigris rivers, with its capital perhaps close to or on the Tigris in the region of (mod.) Diyarbakır. If Hattusili’s letter indicates that its king did in fact become a Hittite vassal, it provides a very significant new dimension to what we know of Hattusili’s reign. Hattusili did not merely succeed in crossing the Euphrates and destroying one or more cities on its east bank. He actually became overlord of a substantial part of northern Mesopotamian territory — territory which perhaps stretched all the way to the banks of the Tigris. That would take us well beyond what we learn from the Annals of Hattusili’s military operations in Syria and across the Euphrates. By and large the Annals convey the impression that the Hittite campaigns in the region left nothing in their wake but a trail of plundered and sacked cities. And we have little indication from any other source that Hattusili made any attempt to consolidate his authority in the regions he conquered by establishing over them a more permanent form of control through the agency of local vassal rulers.

But opinion is divided on precisely what the link was between Hattusili and his correspondent. Can we be sure that the term ‘servant’ (the Sumerogram İR) which Hattusili used in addressing Tuniya does in fact indicate an overlord–vassal relationship? What was the basis on which Hattusili guaranteed protection for his ‘servant’? Clearly his letter was one of a number of communications which passed between himself and Tuniya, and clearly he had received positive responses from the man he called his servant as he prepared for his campaign against Hahhum. He now gave Tuniya further encouragement to support him: ‘Everything you need, write to me and I shall send it to you; also silver, also horses’ (Tuniya letter, 19–21, after Salvini (1996: 114)). Tuniya may have been
only too willing to oblige. For much of the Bronze Age relations between neighbouring kingdoms and city-states in Syria and Mesopotamia were volatile and frequently hostile. Tikunani and Hahhum with adjacent or near-adjacent borders were probably no exception. Tuniya could well have seen a temporary alliance with the Hittite king as very much to his advantage for as long as it took to destroy his neighbour, or at least to plunder his territory—one of the chief incentives which Hattusili offered to him. But permanent subjection to the Hittite king was another matter. As Miller has commented, to conclude that Tikunani was a Hittite vassal state would require that the Old Kingdom included, even before the attack on Hahhum, contiguous territory from the uppermost Tigris into Anatolia itself. It seems more likely that Hattusili paved the way for his campaign across the Euphrates by contracting some form of pro tem alliance with Tuniya, in which the latter accepted the role of junior partner and protégé of his more powerful ally until such time as the alliance’s objectives had been achieved.

This is a fairly conservative view of what we learn from the Tuniya letter. Perhaps justifiably conservative in this case—though we must not altogether close off our minds to more radical interpretations of the new material. As Dr Singer comments, the letter may well open new vistas in the study of Hittite involvement beyond the Euphrates, which clearly went far deeper than previously suspected.

We do not know what if any part Tuniya played in Hattusili’s military operations against Hahhum. The Annals make no reference to his participation in the conquest of the city, though in view of the cursory nature of this document, that may not be significant. It is possible that Hattusili also intended, and may even have carried out, further campaigns east of the Euphrates. A projected campaign against Nihriya has been suggested, on the basis of a reference to hostile action involving this city in the Tuniya letter (lines 16–18). But the context does not give a sufficiently clear indication of what precisely the nature of this action was.

**What did Hattusili Achieve by his Campaigns?**

In purely military terms Hattusili’s campaigns were, it seems, resoundingly successful. But they raise several fundamental questions. What was their purpose? What did they actually achieve? And at what cost?
The campaigns in Syria and Mesopotamia had brought about the destruction of a number of cities, and the accumulation of considerable spoils for the Land of Hatti. But unless the Tuniya letter leads us to a substantially revised view of the outcome of these campaigns, they appear not to have resulted in the establishment of permanent Hittite authority in the region. Attack, destroy, withdraw—that was the general pattern of the campaigns. The Hittites had neither the organizational capacity nor the human resources necessary to establish and maintain lasting control over territories they had conquered in Syria and across the Euphrates.81 Particularly while the kingdom of Aleppo remained unsubdued, the impact of their military successes in the region could be no more than transitory.

Why then did Hattusili bother with Syria and Mesopotamia at all, particularly when he had problems enough to deal with at home? His kingdom was prone to serious political upheavals (as we shall see below) and chronically vulnerable to invasion by enemies close to its frontiers. Protracted absences of the king and his troops on distant campaigns increased the dangers posed by both internal and external forces to the security of the kingdom. This gives added point to our question. The kingdoms of Syria and Mesopotamia posed no direct military threat to the Hittite homeland, nor indeed to any of the Hittites’ subject territories in Anatolia. Thus the campaigns west and east of the Euphrates can hardly be seen as defensive or pre-emptive in purpose. What then was their purpose?82

Strategic and economic considerations may have been part of the motivation for these campaigns. As one scholar has aptly pointed out, Syria lies at the crossroads of the Near East, and its ports and land routes provided access to a wide range of products from Egypt as well as Mesopotamia.83 The Hittites may have found that military force was the only effective means of gaining access to the international merchandise which found its way into Syrian markets, and of making secure the routes which supplied them with indispensable raw materials.84

Many of the cities attacked by Hattusili lay in important strategic locations on major routes linking Anatolia with Syria and Mesopotamia. Alalah, for example, was on or at least within striking distance of a route which led from south-eastern Anatolia through northern Syria eastwards to the Euphrates. To the north, Urshu lay in the vicinity of one of the main routes linking Assyria with Anatolia in the Assyrian
Given the role these routes must have played in trading enterprises from at least the time of the Assyrians’ merchant operations in both Syria and Anatolia, their economic and strategic importance is obvious.

We can only speculate on the nature of most of the international merchandise to which the Hittites sought access. But one commodity in particular must have been in heavy demand. During the colony period tin, used in the manufacture of bronze, was one of the two most important commodities imported along the trade routes from Mesopotamia into Anatolia. Indeed, the Assyrian merchants may well have been the sole suppliers of the metal, which perhaps came from sources in the mountains of Elam (modern Iran) to the Anatolian kingdoms. The severing of the Anatolian–Assyrian trade links at the end of the colony period would thus have cut off the tin supplies and brought bronze production on any significant scale in central Anatolia to an end.

The renewal of bronze production in the Late Bronze Age clearly implies renewed access to substantial sources of tin. For the Hittites, regular supplies of the metal were essential. In recent years Turkish archaeologists have claimed to have discovered several sites in Anatolia where tin could have been mined in antiquity. But the evidence is disputed, particularly by the scholar James Muhly, who has long maintained that we have yet to find evidence of workable tin deposits, at least on a significant scale, anywhere in Anatolia. We must still reckon with the likelihood that most if not all of the tin used by the Hittites came from further afield, though the possibility of Anatolian sources cannot be ruled out.

But if we exclude Anatolian sources of tin, we are left with very few feasible alternative sources which could have supplied the Hittites’ needs. And if we further exclude possible central European sources, then the supplies of the metal very likely came via the old trade routes from the south-east (see Ch. 2). If so, one of the objects of Hattusili’s south-eastern campaigns could have been to ensure safe passage for imports—particularly tin—into his kingdom along these routes. In order to maintain control over a kingdom which had by now assumed substantial proportions, it was essential that Hattusili have secure access to large quantities of tin, whose most important use was in the manufacture of bronze weaponry for his army. Perhaps the destruction of cities like Urshu was intended at least in part to remove potential or
actual threats to vital supply routes from Mesopotamia and Syria to the Hittite kingdom.

**The Ideology of Kingship**

While economic and strategic factors may have provided an incentive for Hattusili’s Syrian campaigns, there was, almost certainly, a much more powerful incentive underpinning these military adventures. Like all rulers of the great kingdoms of the Near East, the Hittite king was the supreme military commander of his people. And the ideology of kingship demanded that he demonstrate his fitness to rule by doing great military deeds, comparable with and where possible surpassing the achievements of his predecessors. ‘Military expansion became an ideology in its own right, a true sport of kings.’ For Hattusili, Syria and Mesopotamia provided a challenge never before undertaken by a Hittite king. His Anatolian conquests gave him military status and prestige equivalent to that of his predecessor Labarna. But by his Syrian and Mesopotamian campaigns he surpassed him. Above all, his crossing of the Euphrates, however great or little its long-term strategic value, was an act of considerable symbolic importance. He could now claim to be a leader whose achievements ranked him alongside the king preserved in tradition as the greatest of all known kings—the legendary Sargon. Indeed, he could go further and claim to be a warlord even more ruthless than Sargon. Sargon had crossed the Euphrates and left Hahha intact. Hattusili looted it and put it to the torch! The image he presents is that of a lion pouncing upon his prey and destroying it without mercy—an image of ruthless savagery against a persistently defiant enemy. It was an image which had already been used by Anitta. And it was to become a regular symbol of Hittite royal power, as illustrated in Fig. 2. Yet mercy and compassion also figured amongst the qualities of a king, as Hattusili demonstrated in his treatment of his enemy’s allegedly oppressed subjects:

I the Great King Tabarna took the hands of his (the enemy’s) slave girls from the handmills, and I took the hands of his (male) slaves from the sickles, and I freed them from the taxes and the corvée. I unloosed their belts (i.e. I unharnessed them), and I gave them over to My Lady, the Sun Goddess of Arinna. (*Annals, KBo* x 2 iii 15–20)
Figure 2. Lion Gate, Hattusa
Later kings also sought to represent themselves as conquerors who showed mercy to a submissive enemy, although it has been remarked that no other royal Annals casts its protagonist in the role of deliverer of oppressed subjects.94 Perhaps most importantly, the king held his position by divine right.95 He was the gods’ agent and representative on earth, who ruled his subjects and confounded his enemies on their behalf. And as the gods’ appointed deputy on earth, he was in theory inviolable:

When the king bows to the gods, the ‘anointed’ (priest) recites as follows: ‘May the Tabarna, the king, be dear to the gods! The land belongs to the Storm God alone. Heaven, earth, and the people belong to the Storm God alone. He has made the Labarna, the king, his administrator and given him the entire Land of Hatti.’ (IBoT 1.30 (CTH 537.1), obv. 2–5, after Beckman (1995b: 530)) To me, the king, the Sun God and the Storm God, have entrusted my country and my house (the palace), and I, the king, will protect my country and my house. (KUB xxix 1 (CTH 414) t 17–19)

Hattusili’s Later Campaigns

Following his triumphant crossing of the Euphrates Hattusili returned to Hattusa. For all that he may have boasted of his successes, he knew that they could have no lasting consequences while the kingdom of Aleppo remained the dominant power in Syria. He had first clashed with troops from Aleppo when they had come to the assistance of Hassuwa. But he had yet to put to the test the full might of Aleppo’s military resources. The preliminary moves had been made, but the main contest had not yet begun.

We have no more than passing references to the campaigns which Hattusili conducted in the later years of his reign. As we have noted, these may have included an extensive campaign against Arzawa. But without doubt it was Syria which provided the Hittites’ most important theatre of war for the remainder of Hattusili’s reign. Within this theatre, the conquest of Aleppo now became the king’s prime objective.

From a later document we learn that he returned to Syria and engaged the Aleppan king’s forces in battle, probably on repeated occasions. In the process he may have succeeded in substantially weakening the kingdom—if we can so interpret the enigmatic phrase ‘he caused (the days of) the kingdom (of Aleppo) to be full’.96 Yet ultimate
success was to elude him. On his death the capital of the kingdom remained intact. Indeed his death was perhaps linked in some way with a final conflict with Aleppo; for subsequently his grandson and successor Mursili set out against Aleppo on a campaign ‘to avenge his father’s blood’ (see Ch. 5).

The Assembly at Kussara

What was probably the final act of Hattusili’s life was played out in Kussara, ancestral home of the Hittite royal dynasty. Here the king, ailing and perhaps close to death, summoned an assembly of the most powerful political and military personages in the kingdom—the warriors of the panku and the LÚ.MÉŠ.DUGUD, high-ranking officials of the land. The assembly had been convened primarily to hear Hattusili’s announcement of new arrangements he had made for the royal succession.

Our chief source of information on this closing stage of the king’s reign is the document we have referred to as Hattusili’s Testament. From its last words, we learn that Kussara was the setting for the assembly convened by the king. No doubt he continued to maintain a royal residence in Kussara after the shift of the capital to Hattusa. Perhaps he sought to spend his final days there, in the city of his ancestors.

An Unruly Family

While in essence the Testament is an official Proclamation dealing with the royal succession, it provides important information about the various members of the king’s family and the events in which they were involved. It also gives us some interesting insights into the character of the king himself. The ruthless warlord of the Annals appears here as an old man, weary and disillusioned by the behaviour of members of his own family: ‘Until now no member of my family has obeyed my will’ (Testament, §19, iii 26).

Following the practice of his predecessor, the first Labarna, Hattusili had appointed his sons as governors of the territories incorporated by conquest into the kingdom. Yet the Hittite princes showed no greater inclination than Labarna’s sons to maintain their allegiance to their
father. We hear first of a rebellion in the city of Tappassanda (otherwise unknown) involving the king’s son Huzziya who had been appointed governor of the city. Huzziya had been persuaded by the inhabitants to rebel against his father on the grounds that Hattusili had failed to carry out a purifica-

tion of the ‘palaces’ of the city. Hattusili evidently crushed the rebellion and deposed his son. From another source we learn of a rebellion in the city of Zalpa involving Hakkarpili, another of Hattusili’s sons who had likewise been appointed as a local governor. The outcome of this rebellion is not known, but presumably Hattusili was again successful in crushing it and removing Hakkarpili from power.

More serious was a rebellion which broke out in Hattusa itself, one which apparently had widespread support from the Hittite nobility. Hattusili’s daughter (we do not know her name) was directly implicated:

The sons of Hatti stirred up hostility in Hattusa. Then they took my daughter, and since she had (male) offspring, they opposed me: ‘There is no son for your father’s throne. A servant will sit upon it. A servant will become king.’ Thereupon my daughter made Hattusa and the court disloyal; and the noblemen and my own courtiers opposed me. She incited the whole land to rebellion. . . . The sons of Hatti perished. (Testament §13, 11 68–77)

When the rebellion was finally crushed, the king’s daughter paid the penalty for her treachery. She was stripped of all her possessions and banished from the city.

Whatever had prompted the rebellions in the provinces, Hattusili’s sons may have had their own personal reasons for their involvement—reasons which had to do with the royal succession. Certainly this was a key issue in the rebellion in Hattusa. The right of Hattusili’s dynasty to retain the kingship was clearly not in dispute. On the contrary, the point at issue was the fear that Hattusili would appoint a successor who was not his lineal descendant. In fact he had named his nephew as his successor. Almost certainly he had done so only after the rebellions in which his sons were implicated. The disgrace of the Hittite princes had apparently left him without a son who was worthy of kingship. In any case his choice of successor met with widespread opposition amongst his subjects. This raises two fundamental questions. Who had the right to select the successor to the throne? On what basis was the selection made?
The Selection of a New King

Scholars have long debated whether the Hittite monarchy was in origin an elective one, with the choice of successor resting ultimately with members of the noble class.\textsuperscript{105} We have no firm evidence for an elective monarchy. But the conflicts in which contenders for the throne were repeatedly embroiled down to the reign of the king Telipinu (see Ch. 5) clearly indicate that the question of who had the right to choose the king’s successor, or succeed to the throne himself, was long in dispute. It has been suggested that the insecurity of the monarchy in early times was due to a conflict of will between the nobles with their ancient rights, and the king, who was striving to establish the principle of hereditary succession. However, Professor Gurney considered it more likely that the Hittite kings were in conflict with an ancient matrilineal system of succession.\textsuperscript{106}

A number of scholars have in fact attributed the problems over the royal succession to a fundamental clash between matrilineal and patrilineal principles of succession, the former being a vestige of pre-Indo-European society, the latter a characteristic of Indo-European newcomers.\textsuperscript{107} But the evidence on which this theory is based has little substance, and the case remains an extremely speculative one. There is nothing whatever to indicate that matrilineality was an issue in the disputes over the Hittite royal succession.\textsuperscript{108} Moreover while the parade of usurpers and pretenders to the throne may well have attempted to use their blood- or marriage-connections with previous kings to assert their own claims, none of these connections conform with any underlying principles of matrilineality. Indeed the intrigue and violence which accompanied so many of the royal successions indicate that considerations of precedent or tradition had very little to do with who actually succeeded in occupying the throne.\textsuperscript{109}

There were no formally stated regulations for determining the right of succession prior to the reign of Telipinu. Consequently from the very beginning of Hittite history, no king had any guarantee that his chosen successor would actually sit or remain upon the throne so long as there were rival claimants or ambitious pretenders ready to challenge his choice.
The king held his position by favour of the gods. But in spite of his claim to divine endorsement, his authority depended largely on the goodwill and support of a powerful landowning and military aristocracy. He gave his nobles land-grants\textsuperscript{110} and a share of war booty. In return they were obliged to swear allegiance to him, and to pledge him military assistance whenever they were called upon to do so. But as the Testament illustrates, they could prove dangerously unreliable and were ready to resort to rebellion if they disagreed with actions or decisions taken by the king. Military successes abroad were offset by rebellions and civil discord within the homeland, including the Hittite capital itself. Indeed the king’s protracted absences on campaigns outside the homeland may well have intensified unrest and faction disputes within it.

An Abomination to the Sight!

Perhaps it was only on his deathbed that Hattusili realized the full extent of the crisis which could face the kingdom on his death. His sons had rebelled against him and had been cast off; his choice of his nephew as his successor had provoked or contributed to rebellion in his own capital. And now his nephew had betrayed him. This was perhaps the cruellest blow. He had nurtured and watched over the young man, and bestowed favours upon him. No doubt this in itself had caused resentment among the more immediate members of the king’s family. Then he had elevated him to the status of heir to the throne, adopting him as his son and conferring upon him the royal title Tabarna. But he had been blind to his nephew’s faults—until finally came the realization that the young man was unfit to assume the role assigned to him: ‘This youth was an abomination to the sight(?); he shed no tears, he was without compassion; he was cold and pitiless’ (Testament §1, ii 5–7).

Hattusili had urged his nephew to try to win over his enemies, to work towards peace and unity within a kingdom which had been torn apart by rebellion and faction strife. To no avail. The influence of his own family, particularly his mother, outweighed that of the king:

He gave no heed to the word of the king; but to the word of his mother, that serpent,\textsuperscript{111} he did give heed. His brothers and sisters constantly brought hostile words to him, and he listened to their words . . . He has shown no consideration
for the will of the king. How then can he be well disposed towards Hattusa? His mother is a serpent. And it will come to pass that he will always give heed to the word of his mother, his brothers, and his sisters. And he will come forth to take revenge. To the warriors, the dignitaries and the servants who are appointed as the king’s people he will swear: ‘Behold. Because of the king they will die.’ And it will come to pass that he will destroy them. He will cause much bloodshed and have no qualms. (*Testament* §§2–4, π 9–25)

Inevitably, the nephew’s accession would once more plunge the kingdom into civil chaos. Hattusili could not allow that to happen: ‘My enemies abroad I have conquered with the sword(?), and I have brought peace and tranquillity to my land. It shall not happen that he will in the end plunge my land into turmoil!’ (*Testament* §5, π 27–9)

Hattusili summoned his nephew to his bedside. He repudiated his adoption, and by implication his appointment as successor to the throne. The enemies of his proclaimed heir had finally triumphed. Hattusili’s sister, the young Tabarna’s mother, reacted with a mixture of fury and fear: ‘His mother bellowed like an ox: “They have torn asunder the womb in the living body of me, a mighty ox. They have ruined him and you will kill him!” ’ (*Testament* §3, π 14–16)

But there had been enough bloodshed. The nephew was banished from the city, but his personal safety and wellbeing were guaranteed. He was provided with a small estate outside the capital, stocked with cattle and sheep. And he was promised that if his good conduct could be assured, he would be allowed to return to Hattusa. All this in the spirit of reconciliation which Hattusili was to urge upon every one of his subjects.

### A New Heir to the Throne

With his death close at hand, Hattusili could afford no delay in appointing another successor to the throne. It was for the purpose of announcing his new appointee that he had hastily convened the assembly in Kussara. Mursili, Hattusili’s grandson,\(^{112}\) was proclaimed king’s son and heir: ‘Behold. Mursili is (now) my son.\(^ {113}\) You must acknowledge him and place him (on the throne)’ (*Testament* §7, π 37–8).\(^ {114}\)

The assembly was not consulted on the choice of the new successor. Hattusili left no doubt that he regarded this as his own prerogative. He simply announced his decision to the gathering.\(^ {115}\) But he took consid-
erable pains to explain and justify what he had done. He had to convince those present of the wisdom and justice of his decision, and to enlist their support in ensuring that it was accepted. This support was of vital importance—especially since the new heir was still only a minor! The assembly was called upon to pledge their allegiance to Mursili. They must protect and nurture him, supervise his conduct while he was still a child, and guide him towards wisdom:

When a state of war develops or a rebellion oppresses the land, you, my servants and my lords, must support my son. . . . If you do take him to the field while he is still a youth, you must bring him back safe and sound. . . . No-one must say ‘The King will do in secret what he pleases, and I will justify his action whether it is right or not.’ Evil conduct must never be countenanced by you. But you, who already know my will and my wisdom, guide my son towards wisdom. (Testament §§7–10, II 39–57)

The group charged with this responsibility included the warriors of an organization called the panku. This term is basically an adjective meaning ‘all, entire’. In the context in which it is used here it apparently referred to some form of general assembly. We shall discuss below (Ch. 5) the question of its membership and the specific functions assigned to it by a later king. At least in Hattusili’s reign, it seems to have functioned primarily as a supervisory and judicial body, with particular responsibility for dealing with offences of a religious nature. The king himself was obliged to refer such offences to this body for judgment. Thus Hattusili instructed his new heir:

You will deal mercifully with my servants and nobles. If you see that one of them commits an offence, either before a god or by uttering any (sacrilegious) word, you must consult the panku. Even evil speech must be referred to the panku. (Testament §22, III 59–62)

Hattusili was in effect trying to shore up the foundations of the monarchy by establishing a close partnership between the king and the representatives of the most powerful elements in the kingdom. The first and most important task of the assembly convened at Kussara was to see the kingdom through the critical period between the death of the old king and the accession of the new. From then on it was to act as an advisory and supervisory body to the king, assisting him in the task of maintaining lasting unity and stability within the kingdom.
The Tawananna

One of the most influential positions in the Hittite kingdom was that of the Tawananna, a position always held by a female member of the royal family.\textsuperscript{118} The term appears very rarely in Hittite texts, and in fact it has recently been argued that it should be regarded not as an official title at all, but purely as a personal name.\textsuperscript{119} The discussion which follows takes the traditional line of treating Tawannana as a title, though very likely it was originally a personal name, like the title Labarna.\textsuperscript{120} Even in later times, it was on at least one occasion adopted as the personal name of the king’s chief consort,\textsuperscript{121} and the possibility that on other occasions it was also a personal name, or at best no more than a \textit{de facto} title, cannot be altogether dismissed.

The first known Tawananna was Hattusili’s aunt. Subsequently the title may have been conferred upon his sister or his daughter. But in later reigns the Tawananna seems to have gained her position by virtue of the fact that she was the king’s wife.\textsuperscript{122} Once she became Tawananna, she retained the title and the powers and privileges which it entailed for the rest of her life, even if she outlived her husband.

From its origins, the position may have had religious associations. The Tawananna figured prominently in rituals and religious ceremonies as the chief priestess of the kingdom, presiding over such ceremonies and performing other religious functions, sometimes in association with the king, sometimes on her own.\textsuperscript{123} Her priestly role may have provided the basis for the wider influence which she could exercise within the kingdom—sometimes, it seems, for subversive purposes. But in any case, she wielded considerable influence as mistress of the royal household, an influence no doubt increased by the king’s frequent absences on military campaigns, religious pilgrimages, and tours of inspection. Certain queens involved themselves in the kingdom’s internal political and judicial activities,\textsuperscript{124} as well as in external political affairs.\textsuperscript{125} Yet the Tawananna’s status and power were clearly anomalous in the male-oriented power structure of the Hittite kingdom, and as we shall see were never fully reconcilable with this structure.

The term Tawananna first appears in the introductory passage of Hattusili’s \textit{Annals}, where the king identified himself as ‘son of the brother of Tawananna’. This form of identification is unique in the
Hittite texts—and raises some interesting but as yet unanswerable questions. Why did Hattusili identify himself in this way, particularly since he made no reference to the king who preceded him? Who was the woman in question? What role did she play in the royal succession? What was her relationship with other members of the Hittite royal family? There is no demonstrable justification for attempting to use this reference to her as evidence of some form of matrilineal succession, or a vestige of a former matriarchal society. Nor can we assume that the identification indicates that Hattusili was his predecessor’s nephew, and thus his adopted son. The uniqueness of the identification may well reflect a unique set of circumstances leading to Hattusili’s succession.

Quite possibly these circumstances were connected with the rebellion in Sanahuitta against Hattusili’s grandfather and the rejection (and death?) of his son Labarna. Hattusili may have become king by default. But that is mere speculation. All we can conclude with reasonable certainty is that his relationship with the Tawananna in question—his aunt—provided, in his view at least, a legitimate basis for his own succession.

Apart from Hattusili’s aunt, we learn of another woman who held the title of Tawananna during Hattusili’s reign. Her apparent abuse of her position led the king to issue one of the most virulent royal decrees in Hittite literature:

In future let no-one speak the Tawananna’s name . . . Let no-one speak the names of her sons or her daughters. If any of the sons of Hatti speaks them they shall cut his throat and hang him in his gate. If among my subjects anyone speaks their names he shall no longer be my subject. They shall cut his throat and hang him in his gate. (KBo III 27 (CTH 5) 5–12)

Who was this Tawananna? What had she done to provoke such a violent reaction from the king? Was she the king’s wife Kaddusi? Of her we know nothing more than her name. More likely the woman in question was the king’s daughter, or his sister, mother of the deposed ‘young Tabarna’. Both had set themselves against the king. Both had the potential for plunging the kingdom into further turmoil. But the sister was perhaps the more dangerous, for she had sons and daughters who had plotted with her and had sworn to take revenge against their enemies. Significantly, the decree was directed not only against the Tawananna, but also against her sons and daughters. The king’s sister...
may well have been appointed Tawananna when Hattusili had declared her son as his successor. Very likely it was she and her family who were seen as the greatest threat to the security of the kingdom in the future. Better to strip them of all status, rank, and official recognition, to isolate them totally from all sources of support, to make even the mention of their names a capital offence!134

One other female member of the royal family figures in the Testament—Hastayar, who has been variously identified as the wife of Hattusili,135 his mother or favourite concubine,136 or one of his daughters.137 It was to her that the dying king’s final appeal was made:

The Great King, the Labarna, keeps speaking to Hastayar: ‘Do not forsake me!’ So that the king may not say thus to her, the palace officials say: ‘Look, she is interrogating the Old Women.’138 The king responds thus to them: ‘She is even now interrogating the soothsayers? . . . Do not then forsake me, do not! Interrogate me! I will give you my words as a sign. Wash me well! Protect me on your bosom from the earth.’ (Testament §23, III 64–73, after Melchert (1991: 183))139

In these closing words of the Testament, we may well have ‘a vivid eyewitness account of the Hittite king wrestling with his fear of death’.140

Some Crucial Questions

Hattusili had united under his rule a kingdom which covered much of the eastern half of Anatolia. He had also won great military triumphs in Syria and carried his battle standards across the Euphrates. Yet the ultimate military prize, the conquest of Aleppo, had eluded him. Without Aleppo, his victories in Syria and Mesopotamia were no more than ephemeral achievements. Further, these victories had been won at great cost to his own kingdom. The kingdom’s political organization was as yet unstable. To be sure, Hattusili’s family had been firmly established as the ruling dynasty in Hattusa. But the king himself had no effective means of ensuring unqualified loyalty and obedience from his subjects, including the members of his own family. Without doubt his regular absences on military campaigns exacerbated the political problems he faced at home, problems which led to faction strife, rebellion, and great loss of life and property. His own children had participated in
the rebellions against him, and had been banished in disgrace. So too his
nephew, to whom he had shown special favour, whom he had pro-
claimed his heir, but who had proved unworthy of kingship. Now, with
the repudiation of his nephew close to the end of his reign, the kingdom
was facing a crisis of major proportions.

All the king’s hopes now rested on his adolescent grandson Mursili,
his newly proclaimed heir to the throne. Would his nobles and warriors
respond to his wishes and accept, nurture, and give their allegiance to
the new boy-king? Would Mursili adhere to his grandfather’s instruc-
tions, maintain unity and peace within the kingdom, and complete the
old king’s unfinished business in Syria? The period immediately follow-
ing Hattusili’s death would be critical to the very survival of the
kingdom.
The Struggles for the Royal Succession: From Mursili I to Muwattalli I (c. 1620–1400)

Mursili Becomes King

‘Behold. Mursili is now my son. You must acknowledge him and place him on the throne.’ Thus spoke Hattusili to the gathering of warriors and dignitaries summoned shortly before his death. His appeals and warnings were apparently heeded. On his death, and in accordance with his wishes, his grandson and adopted son Mursili succeeded to the throne.

Initially the royal authority may have been exercised by a regent, a prince of the royal blood called Pimpira. But we cannot be sure of this. The texts which attest the existence of Pimpira are too fragmentary to indicate who precisely he was, or what role he played in the history of the Old Kingdom. In any case, whatever the immediate arrangements after Hattusili’s death the succession seems to have passed peacefully to the new king—in marked contrast with subsequent occupations of the Hittite throne.

Of the small number of surviving texts which refer to Mursili, the Proclamation of Telipinu tells us most about his reign. It speaks of harmony and unity within the Land of Hatti, at least during the first part of the reign, and the re-establishment of firm control over the regions beyond the homeland where Mursili’s predecessors had been overlords. The wording is almost identical to that already used twice in describing the reigns of Labarna and Hattusili. Perhaps intentionally, Mursili may well have been obliged to assert his authority by military force in territories which had already succumbed to his predecessors.
The political upheavals in the homeland towards the end of his grandfather’s reign had very likely placed continuing Hittite overlordship in these territories seriously at risk. Like many of his successors, the new king had to show himself equal to the task of maintaining and consolidating the achievements of those who had ascended the throne before him. Once again the *Proclamation* stresses the close link between internal stability and external military achievement.

Of particular importance was the need to re-establish Hittite control in south-eastern Anatolia, in the region of the later kingdom of Kizzuwadna. This was a crucial preliminary to further Hittite campaigns in Syria, since through the region passed the main routes from Anatolia into the territories belonging to the kingdom of Yamhad. The task accomplished, Mursili made ready to follow his grandfather’s footsteps through Syria to the Euphrates.

**To Aleppo and Beyond**

The record of Mursili’s Syrian enterprises is frustratingly brief—three lines in the *Proclamation*, and a couple of passing references elsewhere. But the successes he achieved firmly established his place among the great military leaders of the kingdom of Hatti.

His first major objective was the conquest of Aleppo, capital of the kingdom of Yamhad. Although this once powerful kingdom was probably much weakened by its conflicts with Hattusili, it still remained unsubdued at the end of his reign. With Mursili, the final reckoning was to come: ‘He (Mursili) set out against Aleppo to avenge his father’s blood. Hattusili had assigned Aleppo to his son (to deal with). And to him the king of Aleppo made atonement’ (*KBo* iii 57 (*CTH 11*) 10–15).

Revenge, and the obligation to complete his grandfather’s unfinished business, could well have provided the chief incentives for a fresh campaign against Aleppo. But there were other, broader considerations. Mursili could not hope to make any significant or lasting impact on the Syrian region while Aleppo remained unconquered. Nor could he safely bypass Aleppo in his advance to the Euphrates and his ultimate destination—Babylon. The risks involved in campaigning in the Euphrates region as far south as Babylon while leaving a still dangerous enemy in his rear were too great to be contemplated.
When the final test of strength came, Aleppo fell before the Hittite onslaught. Its conquest is tersely reported in the Proclamation: ‘He went to Aleppo, and he destroyed Aleppo and brought captives and possessions of Aleppo to Hattusa’ (Telipinu Procl. §9, 1 28–9).

With the destruction of its royal capital, the kingdom of Yamhad was at an end. Henceforth its very name disappears from our records. For Mursili, the way now lay open to the Euphrates—and Babylon. Again the record is terse. But the achievement it records was momentous: ‘Subsequently he marched to Babylon and he destroyed Babylon, and defeated the Hurrian troops, and brought captives and possessions of Babylon to Hattusa’ (Telipinu Procl. §§9–10, 1 29–31).

The journey from Aleppo to Babylon involved a march some 800 kilometres in extent, east to the Euphrates and then south along the river to Babylon—an enterprise at least comparable with, if not surpassing, the greatest undertakings of Hattusili.

Indeed, the conquest of Babylon marked the peak of Hittite military achievement in the history of the Old Kingdom. It also marked, very likely, the demise of the dynasty of Hammurabi, thus bringing to an end an illustrious era in Babylon’s history. A Babylonian chronicle of later date records that ‘In the time of Samsuditana, the Hittites marched against Akkad’ (Babylonian Chronicle 20, line 11, ed. Grayson (1975: 156)). Samsuditana was the last member of the Hammurabic line and the Hittite offensive must have taken place around the time of his death, dated to c.1595 on the basis of the so-called ‘Middle Chronology’. Admittedly the Hittite text makes no reference to Samsuditana, and the Babylonian text does not mention a specific Hittite king nor indicate that Babylon actually succumbed to the warriors of Hatti. Yet there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the report, from two independent sources, of a Hittite campaign against the city, and it has never been seriously suggested that these sources refer to separate Hittite campaigns. We can with some confidence attribute to Mursili not only the fall of Babylon but simultaneously the coup de grâce delivered to the once great dynasty of King Hammurabi.

The conquests of Aleppo and Babylon became firmly entrenched in Hittite military tradition, the earliest reference to them dating to the reign of Mursili’s successor Hantili. In a prayer of the conqueror’s later namesake Mursili II, their destruction was specifically mentioned amongst the major military triumphs of the early Hittite period:
For of old the Land of Hatti with the help of the Sun Goddess of Arinna used to rage against the surrounding lands like a lion. And moreover whatever (cities such as) Aleppo and Babylon it used to destroy, the possessions of every country, the silver, the gold and the gods—they used to place them before the Sun Goddess of Arinna. (*KUB* xxiv 3 + (*CTH* 376A) ii 44–8, trans. Gurney (1940: 31))

Yet beyond the actual military successes and the booty which flowed from them, it is difficult to see any long-term gains from Mursili’s conquests. The Babylonian expedition in particular raises some fundamental questions about its purpose and Mursili’s expectations of it. He could not have hoped to convert the entire region from Aleppo to Babylon into Hittite subject territory. The vastness of this region, its remoteness from the Hittite homeland, and the very limited capacity of the Hittites to exercise permanent control over conquered territories would have made such a prospect unthinkable. In any case, his conquest paved the way for the eventual establishment of a Kassite dynasty in Babylonia.

Conceivably, the Hittite expedition arose from an alliance between the Hittites and the Kassites, the incentive for the Hittites being the rich spoils of Babylon, and for the Kassites the prospect of creating a new ruling dynasty in Babylonia. A Hittite–Kassite alliance might also have helped offset the ever-present threat of Hurrian political and military expansion, both in Syria and Anatolia. Indeed the passage in the *Proclamation* which records the destruction of Aleppo and Babylon refers also to a Hittite conflict with the Hurrians. Thus the Babylonian expedition may have been undertaken by Mursili not only for booty, but also to gain future Kassite support, if it needed to be called upon, against the Hurrian menace in the region.

There may have been another, more personal, incentive for the enterprise. Hattusili had won renown as a great warrior whose exploits rivalled those of the legendary Akkadian king Sargon. To maintain this tradition, Mursili too had to perform great military deeds, at least equal to those of his illustrious grandfather. Aleppo and Babylon had been centres of the most powerful kingdoms in northern Syria and Mesopotamia since the Mari period (nineteenth and eighteenth centuries). By conquering them, Mursili demonstrated that he was not only a warrior in the mould of his grandfather, but also a worthy successor of the great kings of Syria and Mesopotamia. His military exploits may have had
at least as much to do with personal reputation and prestige as with any lasting political or strategic objectives.

The Hand of the Assassin

Mursili returned to Hattusa in triumph. He had re-established control over his kingdom’s Anatolian territories, he had destroyed the great kingdoms of Yamhad and Babylon, and he had brought back to his capital the rich spoils of his conquests. Yet military successes abroad did not guarantee his safety at home. Within a few years of his conquests of Aleppo and Babylon he was dead, the victim of an assassination plot.

The assassin was his brother-in-law Hantili, husband of his sister Harapsili. Hantili was aided and abetted by his son-in-law Zidanta: ‘And Zidanta conspired with Hantili, and they made a wicked plot. They murdered Mursili. They shed blood’ (Telipinu Procl. §11, 1 32–4). Does this provide another illustration of the dangers faced by a king who absented himself too long from the seat of his power? Perhaps so if Mursili was killed very soon after his return. What his assassination does illustrate is the ultimate failure of Hattusili’s attempt to ensure the security of his successor by the provisions he had made in his Testament. The succession was determined ultimately by whoever had the ambition, the ability, and the support to take the throne by force. Which is how Hantili became king.

The Reign of Hantili

The few scattered references we have to Hantili’s reign indicate that it was a relatively long and eventful one. For a time the new king seemed intent on maintaining Hittite influence in Syria. In the tradition of Hattusili and Mursili, he conducted military operations in the region, reaching Carchemish on the Euphrates. Very likely his campaign was directed against the Hurrians. How successful this campaign was remains unknown.

On his return journey to Hattusa, he came to the city of Tegarama, probably to be identified with the modern Gürün. Here, we are told, ‘The gods sought (revenge for) the bloodshed of Mursili’ (Telipinu Procl. §13, 1 42). What do these words mean? They do not, apparently, refer
to a disaster which befell the king himself, for he seems to have continued his journey to Hattusa without ill effects of any kind. What they probably indicate is the point in Hantili’s reign where a marked decline in the kingdom’s fortunes began to occur. From this time on, his reign was plagued with a series of disasters. Telipinu attributed these to divine vengeance, punishment for the criminal act which had put Hantili on the throne. Nemesis is a theme which surfaces repeatedly in the Proclamation in its account of the kings who had occupied the throne by force. It was an all-embracing vengeance, inflicted not only on the perpetrator of a crime, but on the whole land.

In the case of Hantili, the Hurrians were the first instrument of divine wrath. They apparently roamed through and plundered the Land of Hatti at will. But they were driven back across the frontiers before they captured Hattusa itself. On a later occasion Hattusa would not be so fortunate.

We then come to a curious episode in a much mutilated section of the text which refers to Hantili’s queen Harapsili and his two sons being taken to the city of Sugziya (perhaps to the east of Hatti in the Euphrates region). According to one interpretation of the surviving text fragments, they were taken to Sugziya by Hantili himself, and left there while presumably he continued his campaigns against the Hurrians in the region. If this interpretation is correct, then he evidently believed they would be safer there in his absence than at Hattusa. But a different reading of the fragments suggests that they had been deposited in this remote location by the Hurrians, who had captured them on their retreat from the homeland. In any case, Harapsili fell ill in Sugziya and died there. Foul play may well have been involved, for apparently her sons shared her fate. Those held responsible were eventually arrested and brought to justice.

Unlike his wife and his sons, Hantili survived the disasters of his reign and lived, apparently, to a ripe old age. He clearly intended the royal succession to continue in his own family line, and must have felt some confidence that it would—for he had a surviving son Piseni, who already had offspring of his own. But his plans for the succession were dashed, and he lived long enough to see his son and his grandsons murdered by the man who had helped him seize the throne from Mursili many years before—his son-in-law Zidanta.
'Now Bloodshed has Become Common'

As Hantili’s accomplice in the murder of Mursili, Zidanta may long have nurtured the hope that he would one day be king. But Hantili had planned otherwise, and it was only after eliminating the legitimate heir and his sons that Zidanta was able to achieve his ambition. We have no surviving documents which can with certainty be attributed to Zidanta’s reign.\textsuperscript{25} It may have been very short. Once again the gods demanded blood for his crime, this time using the king’s son Ammuna as the agent of their wrath. Ammuna assassinated his father and seized his throne.\textsuperscript{26}

Under Ammuna, the decline in the fortunes of Hatti continued. A drought which caused a serious depletion of the country’s crops and livestock may have contributed to this.\textsuperscript{27} In Telipinu’s view, this was yet another act of divine vengeance. The kingdom’s difficulties were exploited by a range of countries which now became openly hostile—Galmiya, Adaniya, Arzawiya, Sallapa, Parduwata, Ahula. Some of these are otherwise unknown, but all of them probably lay to the south or south-west of the homeland. Adaniya was located in the region which was to become the independent state of Kizzuwadna. Its loss very likely deprived the Hittites of their access to Syria via the Taurus mountain passes.\textsuperscript{28} Arzawiya can be identified with the country of Arzawa which lay in the south-west, and had already been in conflict with the Hittites in Hattusili’s reign. Sallapa probably lay south of the lower course of the Marassantiya river, either in the vicinity of Kayseri or further west towards the Salt Lake. Parduwata must have been situated in the same region.\textsuperscript{29}

The \textit{Proclamation} indicates numerous campaigns undertaken by Ammuna in his attempts to re-establish Hittite authority in the hostile countries. We may have a further reference to these campaigns in a very fragmentary text sometimes referred to as the ‘Ammuna Chronicle’\textsuperscript{30} which mentions a number of towns, including Tipiya to the north (in the heart of later Kaskan-controlled territory), Hapisna, Parduwata, and Hahha. The last of these, probably to be located on the east bank of the Euphrates, had already figured in the campaigns of Hattusili.

Ammuna seems to have applied himself vigorously to the task of holding his kingdom together, to judge from the large expanse of territory covered by his campaigns, from Arzawa in the south-west
to the Euphrates in the east. He may in fact have enjoyed some successes along the way, contrary to the impression given by Telipinu who presented his reign as a series of unmitigated disasters. But ultimately he failed in his attempts to reassert his authority over the rebellious subject states. By the end of his reign, the kingdom outside the homeland was close to disintegration. The loss of the subject territories in the south, the total severing of links with Syria (especially with the loss of cities like Adaniya) and the inroads of the Hurrians from the south-east and (perhaps already) the Kaskans from the north must not only have deprived the Hittites of most if not all of their subject territories outside the homeland, but also placed the homeland itself in serious jeopardy.

Ammuna’s death, apparently from natural causes, gave rise to a fresh contest for the succession—and further bloodshed:

When Ammuna also became god Zuru, the Chief of the Bodyguards, sent secretly in those days a member of his family, his son Tahirwaili, the Man of the Golden Spear. And he killed the family of Titti along with his sons. He also sent Taruhsu, the courier, and he killed Hantili, along with his sons. Now Huzziya became king. (Telipinu Procl. §§21–2, 11 4–9)

Titti and Hantili were probably sons of Ammuna, and their assassins the agents of Huzziya, the man who now seized the throne. The new king was related by marriage to Ammuna’s family. His eldest sister Istapariya was the wife of another of Ammuna’s sons, Telipinu. But the marriage link with Ammuna’s family was not enough to keep him on the throne as long as any of Ammuna’s sons remained alive. While Telipinu lived, Huzziya’s position would never be secure. Brother-in-law or not, Telipinu had to be eliminated. There was a plot against his life.

Fortunately for Telipinu, the plot was discovered in time for him to take effective action against it. The usurper had probably not long been on the throne when his intended victim staged a counter-coup, seizing the throne for himself and driving Huzziya and his five brothers into exile. That was punishment enough. Telipinu gave instructions that no further harm was to befall them. There would be no more bloodshed. He would put an end to the bloody reprisals which had become endemic among his predecessors.

That at least was his intention.
Telipinu’s Attempts to Regain the Lost Subject Territories

While the new king adopted a policy of clemency towards his opponents at home, exemplary action was required against enemies abroad. The territories lost by his predecessors had to be recovered. Immediately after his accession, he applied himself to the task of doing so.

First the south-east, where he undertook an expedition against Has-suwa, Zizzilippa, and Lawazantiya. These towns probably lay in the Euphrates region, north of Carchemish and close to the northern frontier of the recently created country of Kizzuwadna (see below). In this and the following campaigns Telipinu had some significant successes, and a number of the lost territories were regained. Indirectly we learn of some of these from a list of Hittite storage depots in various towns and regions which had been restored to Hittite control, including Samuha, Marista, Hurma, Sugziya, Purushanda, and the river Hulaya.

By the end of Telipinu’s reign the Marassantiya basin was again firmly under Hittite control, the Hittites once more commanded the region extending south of the Marassantiya through the Lower Land and perhaps as far as the Mediterranean sea, and in the south-east, Hittite authority once more reached the Euphrates.

There was, however, one former subject territory in south-east Anatolia which remained independent of Hittite control.

The Kingdom of Kizzuwadna

The name Kizzuwadna now surfaces for the first time in our records. But at least part of the territory which came to be called by this name was probably a separate political entity before then, with the name Ada-niya. Adaniya may previously have been incorporated into the Hittite kingdom, during Hattusili’s reign or even earlier. If so it had clearly broken its ties with Hatti by the reign of Ammuna, when it was listed as one of the hostile countries against which Ammuna campaigned without success. It was probably then that the independent kingdom of Kizzuwadna was established.

The leader of the country’s rebellion against the Hittites may have been a man called Pariyawatri. From a seal impression discovered at Tarsus we learn that he was the father of Isputahsu, contemporary of Telipinu and the first actually attested king of Kizzuwadna. The seal
bears the inscription ‘Ispuṭahsu, Great King, Son of Pariyawatri’.

Ispuṭahsu may have inherited his throne from his father, though as yet we have no evidence that Pariyawatri himself had ever been king.

Telipinu accepted the independent status of the newly established kingdom, and entered into negotiations with Ispuṭahsu. In so doing, he took a major new initiative—an initiative which established one of the most important foundations of future Hittite policy. He drew up with Ispuṭahsu a treaty of alliance.

This first known Hittite treaty is too fragmentary for us to determine what precisely its intentions were. But one of its main purposes may have been to formalize an agreement on territorial limits in the border region between Kizzuwadna and Hittite-controlled territory. The boundaries of Kizzuwadna seem to have fluctuated throughout the country’s history, depending on how successful its kings were in asserting their claims over territories in the border region. Telipinu’s expedition against Hassuwa, Lawazantiya and Zizzilippa had certainly brought him into this region. Indeed the last two of these towns are later attested as belonging to Kizzuwadna. The treaty may represent an attempt by Telipinu to secure his flank while his campaign was underway. Alternatively, one of its purposes may have been to confirm Hittite possession of these towns in the wake of the king’s conquests. Perhaps Ispuṭahsu was required to acknowledge the Hittite claim to them, probably in return for an assurance from Telipinu that he would recognize the independent status recently won by Kizzuwadna, within the territorial limits as now defined.

But why, after his successful campaign in the border region, did Telipinu stop short of an attempted conquest of the whole of Kizzuwadna? Was he forced to come to terms with its king because he lacked the ability to reassert control over it? Or were there other reasons?

The threat of more extensive Hittite military action in the region carried with it the danger of forcing Kizzuwadna into a Hurrian alliance. It has in fact been suggested that Kizzuwadna was created under Hurrian influence. The grounds for this suggestion are tenuous, but in any case a Hittite attack upon Kizzuwadna might well have been seen as a prelude to fresh Hittite campaigns in Syria, in regions where the Hurrians were taking a renewed interest (see below). The last thing Telipinu could have wanted at this stage was to provoke a renewal of conflict with the Hurrians.
Even without Hurrian intervention, the conquest and subsequent control of Kizzuwadna would have dangerously stretched Hatti’s resources—at a time when priority had to be given to ensuring the security of its homeland, along with the subject territories already regained, against further threats from external forces. In the southeast, a diplomatic alliance with Kizzuwadna might achieve this objective more effectively than military force, and at far less cost.

There was another consideration. An aggressive expansionist policy, or the renewal of conflict with a major foreign power would almost certainly have meant a commitment to protracted and costly military campaigns far from the homeland—at a time when much had still to be done to restore and maintain stability within it. The reigns of Telipinu’s predecessors, particularly Hattusili and Mursili, had amply demonstrated the risks a king faced by spending too long away from the seat of his power.

On this point Telipinu’s policy seems clear. On the one hand he did what he could to make the territories he had recovered as secure as possible against future enemy attack. On the other hand, he applied himself to the task of ensuring that the homeland would never again fall prey to the internal political upheavals which had in the past, he believed, brought it along with the rest of the kingdom to the verge of total destruction.

The Bloodshed Continues

The task was no easy one. The bloodshed which had been a marked feature of the reigns of his predecessors seems to have continued during at least the first part of Telipinu’s own reign. In spite of his instructions, the deposed king Huzziya and his five brothers were secretly murdered. The murderer, a man called Tanuwa, was subsequently brought to justice, along with Tahurwaili and Taruhsu, the assassins who had helped pave the way for Huzziya’s accession. All three were convicted and sentenced to death by the panku. But Telipinu commuted the sentence to one of banishment. This act of clemency may have been a sincere attempt on his part to demonstrate a clear break with the past—supplanting the law of blood vengeance and survival of the fittest with a process of justice that was merciful and restrained, and designed to set an example for his own and future generations.
But if this was deliberate policy on his part, then in the short term it had little apparent effect—and perhaps in at least one case an unfortunate consequence. Tahurwaili, one of the assassins whose life was spared by the king, may have been the man who re-emerged on the political scene after Telipinu’s death and seized the throne from the legitimate heir (see below).

Moreover, Telipinu’s efforts to spare the lives of others failed to save members of his own family. From the *Proclamation*, we learn of the deaths of his wife Istapariya, and later his son Ammuna. The context in which their deaths are reported leaves little doubt that they too were the victims of assassination. Their assassins are unknown to us. But their deaths may have been the catalyst for the action which Telipinu now took to regularize the system of royal succession, and to protect henceforth all members of the royal family. His earnest hope was that this would end once and for all the family feuds, the dynastic disputes, and the bloodshed that had characterized the reign of every Hittite king from the time of Hattusili’s grandfather.

**Rules for the Succession**

The *Proclamation* was originally addressed to a *tuliya*, apparently a general word for a Hittite assembly. In this case the assembly consisted of the members of the *panku*, specially convened by Telipinu to hear the arrangements he had made for the succession, and to assume responsibility for the protection and control of members of the royal family. It is clear that in making these arrangements the king was acting unilaterally. He had convened the assembly merely to hear his decisions, in much the same way as Hattusili had summoned the assembly at Kussara to inform it of his grandson’s appointment as heir to the throne.

The inheritance of royal power was now firmly established on the basis of direct patrilineal succession. Only in the event that a king left no male heirs of suitable status could the husband of a daughter succeed to the throne:

Let a prince, a son of the first rank, become king. If there is no prince of the first rank, let him who is a son of the second rank become king. But if there is no prince, no heir, let them take an *antityant*-husband for her who is a daughter of the first rank, and let him become king. (*Telipinu Procl.* §28, 11 36–9)
The establishment of the succession in one family line was not in itself a radically new development. Even if a system of elective kingship had once applied, it had effectively been discarded from at least as early as the reign of Hattusili. But it had not been replaced by any formal means of determining which male member of the king’s family would succeed to the throne. The king’s successor was decided by the king himself, who might change his mind. More frequently, the throne was occupied by a usurper. Telipinu’s chief intention was to remove any possibility of rival claims or random selection in the succession. In so doing he severely curtailed any free choice a future king could exercise in the appointment of his successor. The king still had some freedom, since he was not bound to appoint the eldest of the eligible candidates. Moreover, the new regulations were designed to provide some guarantee of his personal safety and that of his heir, as well as the safety of other members of the royal family. In theory they eliminated the possibility of any future contest or dispute amongst self-promoting candidates for the succession.

In the first instance, the succession was to pass to a son of the first rank—that is, a son of the king’s chief wife who was probably in most cases the Tawananna. If she had no sons, then the succession would pass to a son of the second rank—presumably a son of the so-called esertu wife, a woman inferior in status to the chief wife though still of free birth. Any male offspring of the king by women of lesser status were by implication ruled ineligible for the succession. In the event of neither the chief nor the secondary wife of the king having sons—or at least one or more sons who survived their father’s death—the succession would pass to a son-in-law, husband of the daughter of the king’s chief wife. The son-in-law having become a member of his wife’s family would be formally adopted as his father-in-law’s son. This ensured his eligibility to succeed to the throne.

Following his statement of the succession regulations, Telipinu made clear the purpose of the lengthy historical preamble to the Proclamation, and to whom it was addressed:

Henceforth whoever becomes king and plans injury for a brother or sister, you are his panku, and must speak frankly to him: ‘Read this deed of bloodshed in the tablet. Bloodshed was once common in Hattusa, and the Gods exacted (retribution) from the royal family.’ (Telipinu Procl. §30, t 46–9)
The record of past events must serve as a constant reminder of the disastrous consequences of ignoring or defying these provisions. But a mere reminder would not be sufficient to ensure adherence to the regulations. They had to be enforced. Formal disciplinary controls were instituted which would if necessary extend even to members of the royal family. Indeed the king himself may have been liable to the death penalty if he shed the blood of members of his own family. Admittedly we cannot be altogether sure of this, since it depends on the interpretation of a much disputed passage in the Proclamation. But it is clear that henceforth no member of the royal family should escape legal retribution for crimes he or she committed—particularly crimes which violated or threatened to undermine the regulations for the succession.

The responsibility for enforcement was assigned to the assembly of the panku. We should now give further consideration to the nature and composition of this body, and the powers which it exercised.

The Panku in Telipinu’s Reign

The panku had already exercised important judicial functions during the reign of Hattusili. But these may have fallen largely into abeyance during the reigns of his successors. There is no further reference to a panku prior to Telipinu’s reign, and certainly no indication that such a body was able to exercise any form of control in the recurring conflicts for the succession. Under Telipinu the panku re-emerged as an important institution—one to which precise responsibilities were given.

Its actual composition has been the subject of much discussion. The general view is that it was some form of aristocratic body. But this has been challenged on the grounds that it was ‘hardly a social class, let alone a high one, but rather simply “totality of those present on a given occasion” ’. A passage in the Proclamation appears to support this:

And now from this day on in Hattusa, you, the Palace Servants, the Bodyguard, the Men of the Golden Spear, the Cup-Bearers, the Table-Men, the Cooks, the Heralds, the Stableboys, the Captains of the Thousand, bear this fact in mind. Let Tanuwa, Tahirwaili, and Taruhsu be a sign for you. If anyone does evil hereafter, . . . whether low-placed or high-placed, have him brought before you as panku, and devour him with your teeth! (Telipinu Procl. §33, ll 66–73)
The persons making up the *panku* for the purpose defined here apparently consisted of the personnel of the royal court, including officials highly placed in the palace administration as well as less exalted members of the palace staff. But the *panku* may not have been a fixed or permanent body with regular responsibilities. More likely, it was an *ad hoc* assembly convened only in special circumstances. Its composition probably varied, depending on the situations which it was convened to deal with. In this case Telipinu had defined a specific group of officials and functionaries who were to form a *panku* in order to deal with a specific category of criminal offence. The group was given little discretion in the exercise of its judicial functions. Clearly defined procedures had to be followed. For those found guilty of offences which fell within its jurisdiction, the death penalty was prescribed. But justice had to be seen to be done: ‘They must not kill him in secret, in the manner of Zuruwa, Tahurwaili, and Taruhsu’ (*Telipinu Procl.* §31, ii 52–3).

The offender alone should suffer for his crime. No harm was to be inflicted on any other member of his family. His property was to be neither destroyed nor confiscated: ‘And now, when any prince commits an offence, he must atone even with his head. But do no harm to his house or his son. It is not right to give away the persons or the property of the princes’ (*Telipinu Procl.* §32, ii 59–61).

The point is emphasized several times in the *Proclamation*. No member of a prince’s family was to be held accountable for crimes for which the prince alone was responsible. A self-evident principle of justice, perhaps. Yet we know that on other occasions an offender’s children could expect to share their father’s fate, as a later king, Mursili II, had cause to remind the (adopted) son of a disgraced vassal:

> Are you not aware, Kupanta-Kurunta, that if in Hatti someone commits the offence of insurrection, the son of this man even if innocent shares in his father’s guilt? And that his father’s house and land are taken from him and either given to someone else or seized for the palace? (Mursili II: Kupanta-Kurunta Treaty (*CTH* 68), Friedrich (1926: 114–15 §7), Beckman (1999: 75 §7))

In the interests of the stability of the royal court, if not the whole kingdom, Telipinu stipulated that a royal offender’s family and property had to be protected against such action. Failure to provide this protection might well have had devastating consequences for an entire branch
of the royal family. It might also have encouraged the fabrication of charges against a prince by members of a rival branch, if a successful prosecution led to the confiscation and redistribution of his property and the disgrace of his children. Telipinu was determined to let nothing jeopardize his attempts to eliminate family feuds and faction strife within the royal court. Given the history of conflict amongst rival groups at the most exalted levels of Hittite society, all possible incentives for the renewal of such conflict had to be removed.

It is clear that the *Proclamation* was not concerned merely with the formalization of the rules of succession. Of equal importance were the regulations which bore directly on the power and authority of the king and the *panku*, and the safeguards which were designed to ensure the stability of the monarchy. The powers of future kings would be considerably circumscribed by the provisions of the *Proclamation*. It gave them little freedom in their choice of successor, it imposed a number of limitations on their judicial powers, and it rendered them liable to disciplinary authority by the *panku* for acts of violence committed against members of their own family. But while the king’s authority was to be limited in these ways, his position and personal safety were, in theory, made more secure by the powers assigned to the *panku*, which was charged primarily with the responsibility of ensuring his and his family’s safety, and of safeguarding the rights of succession.

**Telipinu’s Successors**

Telipinu’s reign offered prospects of a new era of order and harmony within the homeland, and a renewal of Hittite influence and authority beyond it. Yet the provisions made in the *Proclamation* had little apparent effect in the decades following his death—a period lasting perhaps for a century, sometimes arbitrarily called the Middle Kingdom. This period witnessed a succession of poorly attested rulers, some of whom found their way to the throne by the path of intrigue and usurpation—and were removed from it in the same way.

We know nothing about the end of Telipinu’s reign, though he died apparently without leaving male issue. His only known son Ammuna had predeceased him. But he was survived by a daughter Harapseki, and a man called Alluwamna, who was probably Harapseki’s husband and therefore Telipinu’s son-in-law. In the absence of a prince of the royal
blood, and in accordance with the recently formulated principles of succession, Alluwamna was the rightful heir to the throne.

Yet as events were soon to prove, the careful provisions Telipinu made for the succession gave no adequate safeguard for the security of the royal line. Alluwamna probably did succeed his father-in-law. But beyond several fragmentary texts which refer to him and his appearance in the royal offering-lists and land-grant documents, nothing more is known of this king. Indeed he may not have been on the throne very long before it was seized from him by an interloper called Tahurwaili.

This name does not appear amongst those of other kings in the royal offering lists—very likely a deliberate omission from these lists. But Tahurwaili’s success in establishing himself as king is made clear by a tablet fragment discovered in 1963 and a seal impression discovered in 1969. Both confirm Tahurwaili’s kingly status; the latter bears the inscription: ‘Seal of the Tabarna Tarhurwaili, Great King. Whoever alters his word shall die.’

Who was this Tahurwaili? What claim, if any, could he make to the throne? He may have been the man who has already figured in the Proclamation as the assassin sent to murder the family of Titti prior to the accession of Huzziya. We recall that the sentence of death passed on him by the panku had been commuted by Telipinu to one of banishment. If this was in fact the Tahurwaili who succeeded in becoming Great King, then Telipinu’s act of clemency was clearly ill-advised. For whatever Tahurwaili’s immediate motives in assassinating members of the royal family, his ultimate goal may have been to secure the throne, sooner or later, for himself. While he lived he remained a threat to Telipinu’s family line and the provisions made for the royal succession.

The threat appears to have become reality. Tahurwaili’s seizure of power, in defiance of the recent succession provisions, opened up the prospect of renewed struggles for the throne. The political stability which Telipinu had sought to leave as his principal legacy to the Hittite kingdom apparently crumbled within a generation of his death.

But beyond the homeland, Telipinu’s policies seem to have had a more lasting effect, at least as far as relations with Kizzuwadna were concerned. Here Tahurwaili renewed the alliance which Telipinu had established with Isputahsu by drawing up a parity treaty with Isputahsu’s successor Eheya. This in fact is the only piece of information that has so far come to light about Tahurwaili’s reign.
We also have very meagre information about the next three kings who appear in the offering lists—Hantili, Zidanta (Zidanza), and Huzziya. These were the namesakes of kings who reigned before Telipinu, a fact which has led some scholars to suggest that the names were mistakenly duplicated in the lists.\textsuperscript{71} But the existence of later kings with these names is now beyond doubt.\textsuperscript{72}

During the reign of Hantili, son(?) of Alluwamna,\textsuperscript{73} the Kaska people from the Pontic zone made their first recorded appearance in Hittite history. Near the northern frontiers of the homeland they captured the holy city of Nerik, which probably lay in the vicinity of the Pontic region.\textsuperscript{74} It was to be 200 years before the Hittites finally regained control of it.\textsuperscript{75} Also in the north, the city of Tiliura was apparently abandoned to the northerners.\textsuperscript{76} In response to the pressures now being exerted on the homeland from the hostile forces outside it, Hantili claimed to have undertaken the fortification of Hattusa,\textsuperscript{77} along with other cities in the area. It was an admission that the very core of the kingdom was vulnerable to enemy attack.

On the diplomatic front, Hantili may have continued the policy of friendship with Kizzuwadna. This possibility arises from a fragmentary Akkadian version of a treaty drawn up between a Hittite king whose name is lost and a Kizzuwadnan king called Paddatissu.\textsuperscript{78} The latter probably succeeded Eheya (Tahurwaili’s treaty-partner) on the throne of Kizzuwadna.\textsuperscript{79} In that event, his treaty-partner was one of Tahurwaili’s immediate successors. Hantili is a possible candidate. The document indicates what we know from later treaties was a potential source of conflict between the two kingdoms—movements of semi-nomadic communities in the border region across territorial boundaries:

\begin{quote}
If a community of the Great King, with its women, its belongings, its cattle, its sheep and goats, moves and enters into Kizzuwadna, Paddatissu shall seize and give them back to the Great King. And if a community of Paddatissu, with its women, its belongings, its cattle, its sheep and goats moves and enters into Hatti, the Great King shall seize and give them back to Paddatissu. \textit{(KUB xxxiv 1 (CTH 26) 17–20, trans. Liverani (2001: 66–7))}
\end{quote}

Little can be gleaned from the surviving portion of the treaty about its overall nature and scope. But one of its concerns seems to have been to define clearly, or redefine, the borders between Hatti and Kizzuwadna,
as in Telipinu’s treaty with Isputahsu, and to control population and stock movements within the border region.

Hantili’s successor Zidanta was yet another king who maintained close diplomatic relations with Kizzuwadna. We have some fragments of the treaty which he drew up with Pilliya (Pelliya), who then occupied the Kizzuwadnan throne. The treaty indicates that there had been conflict between Hatti and Kizzuwadna, which involved the capture or destruction of a number of towns on each side. Very likely these towns were located in the troublesome border region between the two countries. At the best of times it must have been difficult for either side to control this region, or effectively patrol it. The earlier treaty with Paddatissu had referred to problems caused by cross-border movements of semi-nomadic groups with their livestock. Subsequently these problems may have intensified, exacerbating the tensions between the two kingdoms.

**A Hitherto Unknown King**

The land-grant documents discovered during the excavation of Temple 8 at Hattusa in 1984 included one which bore the impression of the royal seal of the king Zidanta, another that of a king called NIR.GAL—in Hittite, Muwattalli. The latter document is of particular interest to Hittite scholars, for it has brought to light a hitherto unknown occupant of the Hittite throne. The typology, language, and find-spot of the document and seal impression make it clear that Muwattalli was a contemporary of Zidanta, and also of Zidanta’s successor Huzziya.

The name Muwattalli is attested in a number of texts which had previously been assigned to one or more members of the families of later kings, and most notably to the well known thirteenth-century king of that name. It is now clear that some of these texts should be assigned to the king named in the land-grant document. Of special note is a text which refers to the murder of Huzziya by Muwattalli. We can now conclude that the murdered man was the king Huzziya II, successor of Zidanta, and that his murderer Muwattalli seized the throne in his place.

In his entourage the new king included two men, Kantuzzili and Himuili, who may have been the sons of his victim (see Ch. 6). If so, he apparently sought a reconciliation with the rest of Huzziya’s family, not
only sparing the lives of his sons, and his wife Summiri, but also bestowing high office upon the sons.\textsuperscript{85} Unfortunately for Muwatalli, this generous (if politically motivated) gesture failed ultimately to achieve the reconciliation he had hoped for. His reign ended as it had begun. With an assassination—this time his own, at the hands of Kantuzzili and Himuili.\textsuperscript{86} Whatever their motive or provocation, the assassins’ action led to another serious political crisis within Hatti. Once again rival factions emerged, once again the kingdom was to be plunged into internecine conflict over the royal succession.

But before turning to the events which followed the death of Muwatalli, we should review some of the developments taking place elsewhere in the Near East, especially those which were to have a direct impact on the future course of Hittite history.

\textbf{The Wider Near Eastern Scene}

In the period between Telipinu and Muwatalli, the Hittites’ position \textit{vis-à-vis} contemporary independent powers seems to have remained relatively stable. There is no indication that Telipinu’s successors sustained any major losses of the territories which he had recovered—a point worthy of note since conflicts over the succession which had in the past seriously weakened the kingdom continued at least spasmodically in the decades following Telipinu’s death. It is possible that these conflicts were less frequent and less intense than in the past. But we have no chronicle of events for the period, like that in the preamble to Telipinu’s \textit{Proclamation}, and are therefore arguing largely from silence.

Of course Hittite influence in the Near East had diminished significantly from what it had been in the days of Hattusili and Mursili. Neither Telipinu nor his successors had the ambition, or apparently felt the need, to conduct campaigns on the scale of their two great predecessors. Without the enormous commitment of resources which such enterprises involved, it must have been easier for Telipinu’s successors to maintain control over subject territories which lay closer to the homeland—in spite of any distractions caused by internal political disputes. And in regions which were strategically important to Hatti but outside its control, diplomacy rather than military force could be used to ensure that its interests were protected.
Kizzuwadna was one of these regions, probably the most important one in this period. As we have seen, the alliance which Telipinu had established with Kizzuwadna through his treaty with Isputahsu was renewed by several of his successors. One of the ostensible purposes of the treaties was to resolve problems within the border zone between the two kingdoms. But they must also have had a wider significance—to be seen within the context of the rising power of Mitanni to the south-east.

*The Expanding Kingdom of Mitanni*  
While Aleppo held sway over much of northern Syria, the Hurrian states had apparently been content to acknowledge its sovereignty in the region and to establish diplomatic relations with it. No doubt the *entente* was prompted by the threat posed to the territorial interests of both by the Hittite campaigns in Syria across to the Euphrates. Hattusili and his successor Mursili had both engaged in conflict with the Hurrians as well as with Aleppo during these campaigns. But the final conquest of Aleppo, begun by Hattusili and completed by Mursili, left a power vacuum in northern Syria. Fortunately for the Hurrians, the political upheavals in Hatti following Mursili’s assassination prevented the Hittites from capitalizing on their military successes—enabling the emerging Hurrian confederation, the kingdom of Mitanni, to fill the vacuum which these successes had created. Prospects for doing so were no doubt enhanced by the fact that Hurrians had already settled in substantial numbers in many parts of the region.

But Mitannian enterprise in Syria was countered by Egyptian interest and enterprise in the same region. This was first manifested in the campaigns of the pharaoh Tuthmosis I (accession c.1493), the third ruler of the eighteenth Dynasty. Shortly after his accession, Tuthmosis conducted an expedition to Syria which resulted in the conquest of Palestine. Subsequently he carried Egyptian arms to the Euphrates, where he apparently erected a victory stele. But his immediate successors made little or no attempt to consolidate on his military successes. In fact there was a notable shrinkage of Egyptian influence in Syria during Queen Hatshepsut’s reign (c.1479–1458). Hatshepsut abandoned most of Tuthmosis’ conquests in Syria, retaining only the southern part of Palestine. This no doubt prompted the first major westward expansion of Mitannian power, in the reign of the king Parrattarna (second half of the fifteenth century).
Parrattarna’s first main objective in Syria was to establish his sovereignty over the territories controlled by the kingdom of Aleppo. After its capture and destruction by Mursili, Aleppo itself had been rebuilt and had once more regained its independence. It had maintained this under a series of kings—Sarra-el, Abba-el, and Ilim-ilimma—and in fact expanded its territory to include a number of nearby states, notably Niya (Nii), Ama’u (Amae), and Mukish. But after the death of Ilim-ilimma, a rebellion had broken out in the kingdom. This led to the flight of Ilim-ilimma’s son Idrimi to the small kingdom of Emar on the Euphrates.

His flight is recorded in the inscription on his famous statue, discovered by Sir Leonard Woolley in 1939. Idrimi clearly saw himself as his father’s rightful successor, and the rebellion which compelled him to take to his heels may have been associated with dynastic disputes within his own family, perhaps not unlike those which occurred in Hatti during the reign of Hattusili. At all events, the Mitannian king Parrattarna took advantage of the situation—and may indeed have helped incite the rebellion—to establish his overlordship over the entire former kingdom of Aleppo. Seven years in exile brought Idrimi to realize that if he was ever to claim his throne, he had to accept the reality of Mitannian sovereignty over the kingdom from which he had fled. He thus sought a reconciliation with Parrattarna. Agreement was reached, a treaty was drawn up, and Idrimi was installed as one of Parrattarna’s vassal rulers. But his kingdom was reduced to only the western parts of the former kingdom of Aleppo (Niya, Ama’u, and Mukish), with its royal seat located at Alalah. The remainder of the territories comprising the old kingdom were granted virtual autonomous status by the Mitannian king.

Once established on his vassal throne, Idrimi demonstrated his value as an agent of Mitannian interests by attacking and conquering seven towns lying within the south-eastern periphery of Hittite subject territory. His conquests brought him close to the borders of Kizzuwadna, and may have led to the treaty which he drew up with the Kizzuwadnan king Pilliya. Since the treaty was signed under the authority of Parrattarna, both Pilliya and Idrimi were tributaries of the Mitannian king at the time.

Yet Pilliya had also concluded a treaty with the Hittite king Zidanta. A simultaneous alliance with Hatti and Mitanni would have been out of
the question. Hence Kizzuwadna must have switched sides, presumably some time after Pilliya's accord with the Hittites. The switch was probably dictated by political reality. With an aggressive Mitannian vassal campaigning near the frontiers of his kingdom, Pilliya may have had no choice other than to exchange his Hittite alliance for one with the Mitannian king and his vassal. It was a question of weighing up who posed the greater and more immediate threat to his kingdom—a hostile Mitanni or an alienated Hatti.

His dilemma was one later faced by a number of local rulers, particularly in Syria, who found themselves caught up in the contests between the major powers in the region. With which of these powers should they align themselves? Which offered the better prospects for the security of their own position and the security of their kingdom? More often than not overlordship of one or other of the major powers was forced upon them. As far as Kizzuwadna was concerned, this was neither the first nor the last time its king decided or was forced to change sides. Whether on this occasion he did so while Zidanta still occupied the Hittite throne or some time after this remains unknown. At all events, Idrimi's treaty with Pilliya and his destruction of the Hittite border towns had ominous implications for Hatti. Mitanni would not long rest content with the territories it had won in Syria. Its sights must now have been set on expansion further to the north-west. Inevitably, this posed a major threat to Hatti and its subject territories in eastern Anatolia.

Renewed Egyptian Campaigns in Syria

Mitannian imperialist ambitions were for a time held in check by the resurgence of Egyptian military enterprise under the pharaoh Tuthmosis III (c.1479–1425). Tuthmosis's clear intention was to establish a permanent Egyptian presence in Syria, by laying the foundations of a pro-Egyptian local administration in the region. In his first campaign (c.1458), the pharaoh defeated a coalition of Syrian forces at Megiddo, led by the king of Kadesh. He then set his sights in subsequent campaigns on the conquest of Mitannian subject territories in Syria. In the process he reached and crossed the Euphrates river, thus emulating the achievement of Hattusili (and Sargon before him).

Several kingdoms acknowledged the new Egyptian overlord of Syria by seeking diplomatic relations with him and sending him gifts and
tribute—notably Assyria, Babylon, and perhaps most significantly Hatti. Their overtures to Tuthmosis were perhaps designed to forestall any ambitions he may have entertained against their own territory. But more likely they reacted with no little enthusiasm to Egyptian military enterprise which effectively put a halt, at least temporarily, to the militaristic ambitions of their powerful neighbour Mitanni—ambitions which posed a much more serious threat to their own kingdoms than Egypt.

Zidanta may have been the Hittite king who sent tributary gifts to Tuthmosis on his return from his Syrian campaign in his 33rd year. Eight years later, the gesture was repeated by the same king, or his successor. Quite possibly Hittite–Egyptian relations were further strengthened by a formal pact between the two kingdoms, which included an agreement to transfer persons from the Hittite city of Kurustama in the north-east of Anatolia to Egyptian subject territory in Syria. This possibility arises from a document commonly known as the Kurustama treaty, and referred to in two later texts. While the date of the document is not certain—it could belong to a later period—some form of Hittite–Egyptian pact or alliance may well have been concluded at this time. It has been suggested that the transfer may have involved the dispatch of a military corps as part of the alliance between Hatti and Egypt; the troops thus dispatched were probably recruited to the Egyptian army as mercenaries, a well-known phenomenon throughout the history of Egypt.

There were obvious advantages for the Hittites in formalizing diplomatic relations with Egypt. Of course it is unlikely that Egypt ever posed a serious threat to Hittite territory in Anatolia, except on its very periphery. The pharaoh’s military campaigns had already taken him far from his homeland. He would have difficulty enough in maintaining control over the territories he had already conquered without entertaining any prospects of extending his conquests even further. And there was always the threat that a resurgent Mitanni might seek to win back from him at least some of its lost subject states. On the other hand, the Hittites’ main concern was to ensure the security of their existing territories in Anatolia, particularly against the threat of Mitannian aggression. In the absence of any major conflict of territorial interests between Hatti and Egypt, an alliance against the third party Mitanni could well have been to the advantage of both.
But successful as Tuthmosis’ campaigns were in purely military terms, they did not lead to significant permanent Egyptian control within the regions where they were conducted. Indeed his seventeenth and final campaign was essentially an attempt to put down a rebellion by the towns Tunip and Kadesh in central Syria.\textsuperscript{113} This rebellion almost certainly had the support of Mitanni which, under the rule of its vigorous and enterprising king Saushtatar I, was soon to reach the peak of its power and influence in the Near East. As the Hittite king Hattusili had discovered before Tuthmosis, and many military conquerors after him, it was much easier to win military victories than to maintain permanent control over the territories conquered, especially if these were far removed from the conqueror’s home base. As subsequent events were to demonstrate, the Egyptian military successes against Mitanni were no more than a temporary setback for a kingdom whose star was still rising.
A New Era Begins: From Tudhaliya I/II to Tudhaliya III (c.1400–1350)

The First Tudhaliya

The assassination of Muwattalli was the final episode in the history of the period we have called the Hittite Old Kingdom. The reign of his successor, a man called Tudhaliya, marked what was effectively the beginning of a new era in Hittite history. It was an era in which the Hittites embarked once more on a series of military enterprises far from their homeland in both Syria and western Anatolia—enterprises which brought them into direct conflict with other Late Bronze Age kingdoms and led ultimately to the establishment of a Hittite ‘empire’. To this second period of Hittite history we have given the name ‘New Kingdom’.¹

It had an inauspicious start. Like the first recorded event of the Old Kingdom, it began with a rebellion—over the question of the succession. There were those who sought vengeance for the blood of the last king. Muwattalli had fallen victim to a palace conspiracy involving at least two highly placed court officials, Kantuzzili and Himuili, who may have been the sons of Muwattalli’s predecessor Huzziya.² The ultimate intention of the conspirators was almost certainly to place Tudhaliya on the throne. But their actions did not have universal support. Forces loyal to the former king gathered under the leadership of Muwa, Muwattalli’s Chief of the Bodyguards (gal mešedi),³ probably the highest-ranking official of Muwattalli, and perhaps his son. Backed by an army of infantry and chariotry and with Hurrian support, Muwa took the field against the forces of Kantuzzili and Tudhaliya. Once again we see a kingdom divided against itself. But only briefly. Muwa and his Hurrian allies were defeated, decisively, and Tudhaliya’s occupancy of the Hittite throne was secured:
The infantry and chariotry of Muwa and the infantry and chariotry of the Hurrians took the field against Kantuzzili . . . Kantuzzili and I, the king, defeated the army of Muwa and the Hurrians. The enemy army died en masse. (KUB xxiii 16 (CTH 211.6) iii 4–9)\(^4\)

We have no clear information on the position this new king held in the kingdom before his accession. Nor do we know what part, if any, he played in the events which led to the death of Muwattalli, except that he was their chief beneficiary. I had earlier suggested that he was the son of Himuili, one of Muwattalli’s assassins.\(^5\) However a seal impression recently published by Professor Otten names a Great King Tudhaliya as ‘son of Kantuzili’. Though Otten remains cautious, we can very likely now confirm that the first Tudhaliya’s father was indeed one of the assassins of his predecessor—but Kantuzzili and not Himuili.\(^6\) In either case, if Tudhaliya was the son of one of Muwattalli’s assassins and if the assassins were sons of the former king Huzziya, then Tudhaliya’s accession marked the restoration of kingship to the family in whose hands it lay before it was seized by Muwattalli. Hence Muwattalli’s reign would have been no more than a brief interlude in the history of a royal dynasty whose tenure of power continued with little interruption throughout the periods of both the Old and the New Kingdoms.\(^7\)

**How Many Early New Kingdom Rulers?**

Before embarking with Tudhaliya on his career as king of the Hittites, we must briefly touch upon one of the most complex and vexatious problems in Hittite history. What was the line of succession of the early New Kingdom rulers? Beginning with the first Tudhaliya, how many kings were there before the accession of Suppiluliuma I? This is a particular case where the absence of a reliable king-list is keenly felt by scholars. There are a wide range of uncertainties and possibilities, and much scholarly literature has been devoted to the problem. But it has yet to be resolved. All we can say for certain is that the first Tudhaliya preceded Suppiluliuma by three generations. But opinions differ markedly on the number of kings who occupied the throne in the intervening period. For example, should the events of the early New Kingdom which are associated with the name Tudhaliya be assigned to one or
two kings so called? The matter is further complicated by the possibility of several co-regencies in this period.

Further evidence will need to be produced before we are likely to get a solution to the problem which will satisfy all scholars. For the present and for the purposes of this book it seems best to assume a minimum number of kings—those whose existence is beyond doubt—and to assign all the recorded events of this period to their reigns. Thus we will assume that there was only one early New Kingdom ruler called Tudhaliya, on the understanding that the assumption may well be invalidated by new evidence. To allow for this possibility, and to preserve the conventional numbering of the later kings called Tudhaliya, we will refer to the first king so named as Tudhaliya I/II.

**Tudhaliya Goes West**

As soon as his occupancy of the throne was secure, Tudhaliya applied himself vigorously to the task of reasserting Hatti’s status as a major international power in the Near East. It was a formidable task. Hatti had ceased to have any effective influence in Syria since Mursili I’s campaigns in the region. And by now northern Syria was firmly under the control of the Mitannian king Saushtatar I. At least one of the Hittites’ major routes into Syria had been cut off by Kizzuwadna’s alliance with Mitanni, and the loss of Hittite subject towns in the border area.

But before looking to the recovery of lost Hittite territory in the south-east or to a new expedition into Syria, Tudhaliya had to turn his attention in the opposite direction. In western Anatolia a dangerous situation was developing which ultimately threatened Hittite subject territories bordering on the homeland in the south. No major military enterprises in Syria could be contemplated until the dangers from the west had been effectively dealt with.

During the Old Kingdom, the Hittites had limited involvement in western Anatolian affairs. Indeed, their only attested activity in the west occurred during Hattusili I’s reign. Under Tudhaliya, however, Hittite armies undertook a series of extensive campaigns in the region. There were important strategic reasons for doing so. Individually, the western countries lacked the resources to make any significant inroads into Hittite territory. But they were prone to the formation of military
confederacies. And when the Arzawa lands became involved, the west could eventually pose as serious a threat to Hatti as the Hurrians in the south-east and the Kaskans in the north.\(^9\) Within this context, Tudhaliya’s western campaigns were perhaps largely pre-emptive in nature, designed to break up newly forming confederacies in the region or to pacify or intimidate states which were seen as a threat to Hatti before the threat reached dangerous proportions.\(^{10}\)

At the time of Tudhaliya’s accession the forces in the west may already have been rallying for a major onslaught on the southern territories belonging to the Hittite kingdom.\(^{11}\) Predictably, Arzawa figured prominently amongst the western countries, which had very likely come together under Arzawan leadership. But in Tudhaliya, they faced a formidable opponent. The king led his troops in a series of devastating military campaigns in the territories of his enemies. Countries belonging to the Arzawa Lands were amongst the prime targets of these campaigns—Arzawa Minor, Seha River Land, Hapalla. But alongside them were a number of other western countries and cities—Sariyana, Uliwanda, Parsuhalda in the first campaign, and subsequently the Limiya River Land, and the Lands of Apkuisa, Pariyana, Arinna, Wallarima, Halatarsa. All crumbled before the Hittite onslaught.

In the aftermath of conquest, Tudhaliya attempted to eliminate, or at least minimize, the risk of further hostilities in the region by transporting back to Hattusa from the conquered lands large numbers of infantry and chariotry, including 500 teams of horse. This is the earliest known example in Hittite history of a practice regularly adopted by later Hittite kings.

Much of our information about these and other Anatolian campaigns in which Tudhaliya engaged derives from the remains of the king’s *Annals*.\(^{12}\) They refer to four successive campaigns conducted by Tudhaliya, beginning with the conquest of the Arzawa Lands. This conquest, far from pacifying the west, merely served to provoke it to further action. Indeed, the dust of the Arzawa campaign had barely settled before Tudhaliya was confronted with a major new threat in the west. On this occasion, twenty-two countries banded together to form an anti-Hittite military alliance:

But when I turned back to Hattusa, then against me these lands declared war: [jugga, Kispuwa, Unaliya, [ ]] Dura, Halluwa, Huwallusiya, Karakisa,
Dunda, Adadura, Parista, [ ], [ ]waa, Warsiya, Kuruppiya, [ ]luissa (or Lusa), Alatra(?), Mount Pahurina, Pasuhalta, [ ], Wilusiya, Taruisa. [These lands] with their warriors assembled themselves . . . . . . . . . . . . and drew up their army opposite me. (Annals, obv. 13’–21’, after Garstang and Gurney (1959: 121–2) )

Tudhaliya attacked the assembled enemy forces in a night assault:

I, Tudhaliya, brought up my forces at night, and surrounded the army of the enemy. The gods handed their army over to me, the Sun Goddess of Arinna, the Storm God of Heaven, the Protective Genius of Hatti, Zababa, Ishtar, Sin, Lelwani. I defeated the army of the enemy and entered their country. And from whatever country an army had come out to battle, the gods went before me, and the countries which I have mentioned, which declared war, the gods delivered them to me. All these countries I carried off. The conquered population, oxen, sheep, the possessions of the land, I brought away to Hattusa. Now when I had destroyed the Land of Assuwa, I came back home to Hattusa. And as booty 10,000 foot-soldiers and 600 teams of horses for chariots together with the ‘lords of the bridle’ I brought to Hattusa, and I settled them in Hattusa. (Annals, obv. 22’–36’, after Garstang and Gurney (1959: 122) )

From Tudhaliya’s reference to the destruction of the Land of Assuwa, apparently a collective term embracing all the abovementioned countries, the enemy coalition is commonly referred to as the Assuwan Confederacy. The group of states making up the Confederacy probably lay in the far west of Anatolia, covering at least part of the Aegean coast. A number of scholars believe that Assuwa is the origin of the Greco-Roman name Asia, drawing attention to the fact that the Roman province of Asia was originally centred in this region. If the first name in the list, [ ]ugga, can be restored as [L]ugga (= Lukka), then the Confederacy may well have extended as far south as the region of Classical Lycia, part of the homeland of the Bronze Age Lukka people. Attention has also frequently been drawn to the last two names in the list—Wilusiya and Taruisa—with the suggestion that these are the Hittite forms of the Greek names (W)ilios (Ilion) and Troia (Troy). This will be further discussed in Chapter 14.

There is another possible reference to Taruisa on a silver bowl of unknown origin, now housed in the Museum of Anatolian Civilizations in Ankara. The bowl bears two Luwian hieroglyphic inscriptions, one of which records the conquest of a place called Tarwiza by a king...
Tudhaliya. It is tempting to link this event with the conquest of Taruisa (and other western countries) in Tudhaliya’s Annals. This would, however, make the inscription by far the earliest of all known hieroglyphic inscriptions apart from those appearing on seals—if the Annals have been correctly assigned to the first king called Tudhaliya.

In an effort to ensure that the countries constituting the Confederacy would pose no further threat to Hittite interests, Tudhaliya took from the region 10,000 infantry and 600 teams of horse along with the élite chariot contingent, the so-called ‘lords of the bridle’, bringing them to Hattusa for resettlement. Their numbers included a man called Piyama-Kurunta, perhaps the leader of the Confederacy, along with other members of his family, including his son(?) Kukkulli and another relative called Malaziti. Tudhaliya assigned Piyama-Kurunta and Malaziti to the service of the Storm God. But Kukkulli, we are told, he ‘took into vassalage and released’. Whatever the specific meaning of these words, Kukkulli responded by stirring up a rebellion amongst his fellow-countrymen—the 10,000 infantry and 600 charioteers transported from Assuwa to Hatti. The rebellion was crushed and Kukkulli himself was killed. Where did this happen? One suggestion is that Tudhaliya had actually restored Kukkulli to his own homeland as a vassal ruler. But this is not clear from the text. If Tudhaliya had so acted, we would have to assume that he had also sent back home the other Assuwan transportees, who now under Kukkulli’s leadership rose up against their Hittite overlord for a second time, forcing him to conduct yet another campaign to the west. More likely, Tudhaliya installed Kukkulli as a vassal ruler elsewhere in the Hittite kingdom, perhaps on or near one of the homeland’s frontiers, with his fellow-transportees assigned to him as a defence force to guard the region. This would reflect a practice adopted by later kings in relocating prisoners-of-war. Kukkulli would thus have mounted his rebellion from a new fiefdom, probably nowhere near his original homeland.

The battle spoils from Tudhaliya’s Assuwan campaign may have included the bronze longsword which was discovered in 1991 near the Lion Gate at Hattusa. The inscription on the sword, dated on stylistic grounds to around the period in which Tudhaliya reigned, indicates that it was one of a number of such weapons dedicated by Tudhaliya to the Storm God after a victory over Assuwa: ‘As Tudhaliya the Great King shattered the Assuwan country, he dedicated these swords to the Storm
God, his lord.\textsuperscript{22} This reference to Assuwa in the inscription, and the likelihood that the sword was produced in a western Anatolian/Aegean workshop,\textsuperscript{23} may well indicate that it was part of the booty from the Assuwan campaign.\textsuperscript{24}

**Threats from the East and the North**

Tudhaliya’s triumphs in the west were short-lived, and were in fact achieved at considerable cost. The concentration of Hittite forces in the west left the homeland dangerously exposed to enemies inhabiting the regions close to its northern and eastern frontiers. The Kaska tribes from the Pontic region were quick to take advantage of the situation: ‘Now while I, Tudhaliya, the Great King, was fighting in the Land of Assuwa, behind my back Kaskan troops took up arms, and they came into the Land of Hatti, and devastated the country’ (Annals, rev. 9’–12’, trans. Garstang and Gurney (1959: 122)).

The crisis on this occasion was promptly dealt with by Tudhaliya on his return to Hattusa. He first drove the enemy from the homeland, then pursued them into their own territory where he defeated their combined forces, following this up in the next campaigning season with further extensive conquests in the Kaska lands. The Kaska problem was one which would continue to surface throughout Tudhaliya’s reign, and that of his successor Arnuwanda, and indeed through the reigns of many later occupants of the Hittite throne.\textsuperscript{25}

For the present, a year’s respite from battle enabled Tudhaliya and his forces to regather their strength to deal with yet another major threat to Hatti—this time on the eastern frontier. Here lay the kingdom of Isuwa, between the easternmost territories of the homeland and the kingdom of Mitanni, in the region of the modern Turkish province of Elazığ.\textsuperscript{26} It occupied a position of considerable strategic importance in the context of the power struggle between Hatti and Mitanni, and its allegiance fluctuated between the two of them.

Earlier in Tudhaliya’s reign, it had apparently taken up arms against Hatti with the support of the Mitannian king.\textsuperscript{27} Tudhaliya had succeeded in crushing the rebellion, and presumably re-established Hittite control over Isuwa. But a number of the rebels had escaped his authority by seeking refuge in Mitanni. He sent a demand to the Mitannian king for their extradition. The demand was refused:
The people of Isuwa fled before My Sun and descended to the Land of Hurri. I, My Sun, sent word to the Hurrian: ‘Extradite my subjects!’ But the Hurrian sent word back to My Sun as follows: ‘No! Those cities had previously, in the days of my grandfather, come to the Land of Hurri and had settled there. It is true they later went back to the Land of Hatti as refugees. But now, finally, the cattle have chosen their stable, they have definitely come to my country.’ So the Hurrian did not extradite my subjects to me, My Sun. (KB 15 (CTH 41) 10–20, after Goetze (1940: 37))

Subsequently, Hurrian troops invaded, sacked, and plundered the country of Isuwa, no doubt targeting cities and areas that had remained loyal to Hatti. Tudhaliya had been powerless to prevent them, for he had committed his forces to a military campaign elsewhere, probably in the north or the west. It was only now, perhaps, after his conquests in western Anatolia and in the Kaska lands, that he could turn his attention back to Isuwa. As far as we can judge from the fragmentary passage in his Annals which records his campaign in Isuwa, he succeeded in restoring Hittite control over the region. But only temporarily. Isuwa was to continue to be one of the most fractious subject territories, and remained firmly pro-Mitannian in its loyalties. It was later to join the onslaught on Hittite territory which brought the kingdom close to total destruction.

Tudhaliya’s Isuwan campaigns had failed to bring any lasting security to the region. The eastern frontiers of the homeland remained dangerously vulnerable to invasion by Mitanni and its allies.

**Tudhaliya’s Co-regent**

At least some of Tudhaliya’s Anatolian campaigns were conducted jointly with the man who was to succeed him on the throne, Arnuwanda, the first of three kings of that name. Already in Tudhaliya’s reign Arnuwanda was referred to as ‘Great King’, which must mean that Tudhaliya made him his co-regent. Both textual evidence and seal impressions represent Arnuwanda as the son of Tudhaliya. He was also the husband of Asmunikal, who we learn from another seal impression was the daughter of Tudhaliya and his wife Nikkalmati. This has raised some scholarly eyebrows, since brother-sister marriages were strictly forbidden in the Hittite world. The most logical explanation is that Tudhaliya adopted his daughter’s husband as his son, prior to
making him his co-regent and eventual successor to the throne. Provision had clearly been made in the *Proclamation* of Telipinu for a king's son-in-law to succeed him on the throne.

Arnuwanda proved a loyal and effective comrade-in-arms to the ageing king, and no doubt played a major role in the latter’s military triumphs. We learn something of this role from the remaining fragments of his own *Annals*. Very likely they deal with much the same events as Tudhaliya’s *Annals*, and provide rather more detailed information about the campaigns against Arzawa. For example, we learn from Arnuwanda’s *Annals* of action taken against Kupanta-Kurunta, called ‘the Man of Arzawa’, very likely the chief leader of the western coalition, his defeat by the Hittites, and his escape from their clutches. The Hittites were to have good reason to regret their failure to capture him! This comes to light within the context of the activities of Madduwatta—one of the most cunning and apparently one of the most unscrupulous of all Hittite vassals.

**The Exploits of Madduwatta**

Our chief source of information on the career of Madduwatta is a document commonly referred to as the *Indictment of Madduwatta*. Originally dated to the period of Tudhaliya IV and his son Arnuwanda III towards the end of the New Kingdom, this is one of several texts which have been reassigned to the first two kings of these names (see Appendix 1). Thus the activities of Madduwatta which were once thought to reflect the weakness and ineffectiveness of Hittite authority in western Anatolia not long before the kingdom’s final collapse should now be seen as reflecting difficulties experienced by the first two kings of the New Kingdom in asserting their authority in the west two centuries earlier.

The *Indictment* is in the form of a letter written by Tudhaliya’s co-regent and successor Arnuwanda. Madduwatta, the letter’s addressee, had fled from his own country with his family and a retinue of troops and chariots, apparently because of a dispute with Attarssiya (Attarissiya), identified in the letter as ‘Man of Ahhiya’. This is the earliest reference we have to Ahhiya(wa) in the Hittite texts. The status of this Man of Ahhiya is unclear, but the designation suggests that he was an individual Ahhiyawan who had established a base in western Anatolia.
rather than an officially recognized king (lugal) of the Land of Ahhiyawa. He had at his disposal a small army of infantry and 100 chariots, probably of Anatolian origin.

Madduwatta's own country of origin is not made clear, although almost certainly it lay in western Anatolia. Wherever its location, Madduwatta was obviously a man of some importance, to judge from the substantial retinue which accompanied him into exile (wives, children, troops, and chariots are mentioned), and also from the efforts Attarssiya made to seek him out and take vengeance upon him. He escaped the clutches of Attarssiya, and sought and was granted refuge with Tudhaliya.

Tudhaliya first proposed to install him as a vassal ruler in the mountain land of Hariyati, which apparently lay close to the Hittite frontier in the west or south-west. But Madduwatta declined the offer, and was set up instead in the mountain land of Zippasla. There can be little doubt that the location for the new fiefdom was chosen by Tudhaliya for a specific purpose, probably strategic in nature. The readiness with which Tudhaliya compromised on an alternative location may indicate that both were to be found in the same general area. It is none the less an interesting indication of the bargaining power which Madduwatta apparently possessed. In fact we learn later in the text that Tudhaliya also handed over to his new vassal additional territory known as the Siyanta River Land, which probably became an extension to his original fiefdom. The additional territory may have been a subsequent concession made to Madduwatta in an attempt to curb his territorial ambitions elsewhere.

Initially Madduwatta's installation as a Hittite vassal must have seemed a wise move. It presented Tudhaliya with the opportunity of establishing a new vassal state on the periphery of Hittite subject territory and in the vicinity of the Arzawa lands with a ready-made nucleus of a population, including troops and chariotry. The new vassal had no political or personal ties with the countries in the region. He could reasonably be expected to maintain his allegiance to his Hittite overlord who had made him his protégé and bestowed substantial favours upon him. Further, Tudhaliya probably increased the military forces under his command, to ensure adequate defence of the new vassal territory.
In return, Madduwatta’s vassal status entailed a number of obligations to his liege lord, particularly military obligations:

Whoever is an enemy to the father of My Sun and to the Land of Hatti is also to be an enemy to you, Madduwatta. And as I, the father of My Sun, will fight resolutely against him, you must also fight him resolutely, Madduwatta, and your troops likewise. (Indictment §6, obv. 28–30)

Madduwatta was also obliged to hand over to the king anyone guilty of seditious talk or conduct:

Whoever speaks an evil word before you, whether someone speaks a word of enmity before you, or someone abuses the kings and princes—that person you must not conceal. Send word to My Sun and seize the man, and send him to the father of My Sun. (Indictment §7, obv. 37–9)

Similar obligations were regularly stipulated by later Hittite kings in the treaties which they drew up with their vassal rulers.

But it soon became clear that Madduwatta had ambitions of his own, which were not consistent with the terms of his appointment and which led him time and again to violate his oath of allegiance to his overlord. He seemed intent on carving out for himself a kingdom of western Anatolian states, at least some of which appear to have been nominally subject to Hatti. Arnuwanda’s letter protests vigorously about the wayward vassal’s conduct—his treachery, his abuse of power, his flagrant defiance of the terms of his agreement—both in Tudhaliya’s reign and subsequently in the author’s own reign.

Probably not long after his installation as a vassal ruler, Madduwatta committed his first ‘offence’ by invading the territory of Arzawa, then ruled by Kupanta-Kurunta. He could claim that he was justified in doing so because Kupanta-Kurunta was, after all, a declared enemy of the Hittites. But his action was in direct violation of his agreement with Tudhaliya, as Arnuwanda pointed out:

You, Madduwatta, violated the oath with the father of My Sun. The father of My Sun had given you the mountain land Zippasla to dwell in, and he put you under divine oath as follows: ‘I have given you the mountain land Zippasla. Now you must dwell here. Further, you must occupy no other land.’ And Madduwatta took the whole land, and together with his own troops raised forces in large numbers, and marched against Kupanta-Kurunta to do battle. (Indictment §8, obv. 42–5)
In taking this action, against the express orders of his overlord, Madduwatta seriously miscalculated the strength of the opposition. His expedition against Arzawa ended in disaster. His army was destroyed, his territory was invaded and occupied by Kupanta-Kurunta, and he was forced to flee for his life. This might well have brought his career to an ignominious end. But then Tudhaliya displayed the remarkable forbearance which was to characterize all his and his son’s dealings with Madduwatta. Hittite troops now came to the rescue, driving Kupanta-Kurunta back to his own land and taking substantial booty from him.46 Tudhaliya restored Madduwatta to his vassal throne, and made him a present of the spoils of battle. Thus the wayward vassal emerged from the affair with his status intact, and indeed considerably better off than he had any right to expect. At least that is Arnuwanda’s interpretation of the course of events. Admittedly Hittite kings were noted for, and indeed sometimes prided themselves on, their apparent leniency towards recalcitrant subject rulers. But the actual rewarding of a vassal for defiance of his overlord’s explicit instructions is without parallel.

There really does seem to be more to this episode than is immediately evident. We should remember that the letter to Madduwatta was written in retrospect when Arnuwanda, with the wisdom of hindsight, could see the vassal’s initial attack on Arzawa as a calculated prelude to later events, when it had become clear that Madduwatta’s intention was to carve out a kingdom of his own in western Anatolia. Thus the action that Tudhaliya might first have regarded as no more than over-zealousness on the part of a newly installed vassal took on a more ominous colour in the light of the vassal’s subsequent conduct.

Further, at the time of Madduwatta’s attack Arzawa posed a continuing threat to the security of Hittite-controlled territory. Kupanta-Kurunta’s counter-attack provided Tudhaliya with the opportunity and the excuse for inflictng a resounding defeat on the Arzawan forces—allegedly for violating his subject territory. The very fact that he actually strengthened Madduwatta’s position after the repulse of the Arzawan forces suggests a measure of tacit approval for the action which his vassal had taken, albeit without his consent. But we should note that in spite of the defeat which the Hittite army inflicted on Kupanta-Kurunta, Tudhaliya made no attempt to occupy or annex his country. Indeed it is
clear from the events subsequently reported in the letter that Arzawa retained its independence.

Tudhaliya had a further cause for complaint. Madduwatta had been all too eager to lead his forces against the king of Arzawa. But he failed to take any action at all in support of the Hittite forces when his old enemy Attarssiya invaded Hittite territory with the prime object of capturing him and killing him:

Subsequently Attarssiya, the Man of Ahhiya, came and plotted to kill you, Madduwatta. But when the father of My Sun heard of this, he dispatched Kisnapili, troops, and chariots to do battle against Attarssiya. And you, Madduwatta, offered no resistance to Attarssiya, and fled before him. (Indictment §12, obv. 60–2)

Attarssiya’s troops were repulsed by the Hittite commander Kisnapili, although a Hittite officer Zidanza was killed in the conflict. Once more Madduwatta was restored to his vassal throne, in spite of his failure to make any attempt to defend his own territory.

Tudhaliya must now have realized that his vassal could not be relied upon to honour his obligations in the region where he had been installed. For it seems that Kisnapili and his troops were ordered to remain there, probably with the intention of exercising some degree of vigilance and control over the region, and keeping a close eye on Madduwatta. The vassal ruler was clearly embarrassed by the Hittite presence. So he contrived to remove it.

An opportunity presented itself when two cities, Dalawa and Hinduwa, which were at least nominally subject to the Hittite king, decided to rebel. Madduwatta dispatched a letter to Kisnapili suggesting that he and the Hittite commander lead a two-pronged attack on the rebellious cities; Madduwatta himself would attack Dalawa, and Kisnapili Hinduwa, thus preventing the rebels from joining forces. The vassal’s treachery soon became apparent. He marched his troops to Dalawa, but instead of attacking the Dalawans, he persuaded them to join forces with him, then link up with the people of Hinduwa for a combined attack on Kisnapili’s army. Unaware of this, Kisnapili led his troops against Hinduwa. His army was ambushed by Madduwatta, joined by troops from Dalawa, and the Hittite commander and his assistant Partahulla were killed.
Amazingly, Tudhaliya seems not to have retaliated, which encouraged Madduwatta to take yet another step in violation of his allegiance to his overlord. He now concluded a peace with his erstwhile enemy the Arzawan Kupanta-Kurunta. The peace was consolidated when Madduwatta offered his daughter to Kupanta-Kurunta in marriage. Yet once more the renegade vassal had breached the oath he had sworn to Tudhaliya. Yet once more Tudhaliya protested. Madduwatta replied that the proposed marriage was simply a trick; it would enable him to get his hands on the Arzawan and then kill him. Was the Hittite king prepared to trust his duplicitous subject, yet again? Unfortunately we do not know what response Tudhaliya made because the text disappears at this point. The end of the obverse side of the tablet and the beginning of the reverse are lost.

Yet when the text resumes, we find Tudhaliya apparently making further concessions to Madduwatta and drawing up a fresh agreement with him. Perhaps he accepted the claim that the alliance with Arzawa was merely a means to an end—a means of gaining Kupanta-Kurunta’s confidence and then disposing of him. If so, he may have tolerated this further violation by Madduwatta of his terms of vassalhood in the hope that it would result in the removal of one of the Hittites’ most formidable enemies in the west without any direct involvement from Hattusa. We should be careful not to be taken in too readily by the ostensibly plaintive, self-righteous tone that characterizes much of Hittite diplomatic correspondence. Many of the Hittite kings were well skilled in the art of Realpolitik—a quality which may be obscured by the bland, moralizing tone of their written communications.

On the other hand, the Hittites faced in Madduwatta an expert in the art of political manipulation. While the vassal ruler had clearly given the impression that his negotiations with Kupanta-Kurunta were intended to serve Hittite interests, his ulterior motive became evident when he gained control of Arzawa, probably through a combination of force and diplomacy, and added it to his own expanding kingdom. He could still reckon on avoiding military action against him by the Hittite king. Even if Tudhaliya was becoming increasingly alarmed at the turn events were taking near the south-western frontiers of his kingdom, Madduwatta still maintained at least the token image of a local ruler who acknowledged Hittite overlordship.
Even so, with every additional step he took, he risked pushing the Hittite king beyond the limits of tolerance. He came very close to doing so in his actions over Hapalla. The kingdom of Hapalla, one of the countries belonging to the Arzawa complex, became openly hostile to Hatti, and Madduwatta whose kingdom lay close by was called upon to pacify it on behalf of the Hittite king, now Arnuwanda. After some initial delay, Madduwatta launched an attack on Hapalla. He conquered it and added it to his own kingdom, following up his success with military conquests in the Lukka lands. On his return from these lands, he set his sights on the Land of Pitassa, where he succeeded in winning the elders away from their Hittite allegiance.

By these actions Madduwatta was now making serious inroads into the south-western territories of the Hittite kingdom. A military showdown seemed close at hand. Arnuwanda dispatched an envoy to Madduwatta, demanding the return of the conquered lands: ‘The Land of Hapalla is a land belonging to My Sun. Why have you taken it? Give it back to me now!’ (Indictment §29, rev. 56). Madduwatta agreed to return Hapalla, but refused to relinquish his other conquests, or to hand back to the king political refugees from Hittite authority.

Finally, with much of south-western Anatolia under his control, he turned his attention to Alasiya, the island of Cyprus (or part thereof). He launched an expedition against the island, presumably using ships provided by the Lukka communities which had recently come under his control. The Lukka people had a substantial seagoing capacity, and in later times we hear of raids by Lukka ships on the coasts of both Alasiya and Egypt. The Alasiyan campaign seems to have been conducted in collaboration with Attarssiya, Madduwatta’s longstanding enemy. A reconciliation must have taken place—probably after Madduwatta had achieved the status of an important and quasi-independent ruler in western Anatolia. Attarssiya might well have decided that such a man was now worth collaborating with!

With the apparent assistance of Attarssiya, Madduwatta conquered Alasiya. There was the predictable storm of protest from Hattusa—and a disarming response from Madduwatta:

‘The Land of Alasiya is a Land of My Sun (wrote Arnuwanda) and brings him tribute. Why have you taken it?’ But Madduwatta spoke thus: ‘When Attar-(i)ssiya and the Man of Piggaya were raiding the Land of Alasiya, I often raided
it too. But the father of My Sun did not subsequently write to me, the father of My Sun never signified to me: ‘The Land of Alasiya is mine. Acknowledge it as this!’ If now My Sun demands back the prisoners taken from Alasiya, I will give them back to him. (Indictment §36, rev. 85–9)

Hittite Policy Towards the West

While we must allow for a fair amount of bias and personal axe-grinding on the part of its author, the so-called Indictment of Madduwatta provides us with a number of important insights into the state of affairs in western Anatolia during the reigns of Tudhaliya and Arnuwanda. In the aftermath of his military conquests in the west, Tudhaliya made little attempt to establish political control over the region. Most of the western Anatolian countries retained their independence, with the apparent exception of Hapalla, which lay close to the Hittite Lower Land, and a number of communities which seem to have had the status of token Hittite subjects. Rather than commit Hittite expeditionary forces to continuing and ultimately inconclusive campaigns in the west, at the expense of adequate defence of the northern and eastern frontiers of the homeland, Tudhaliya’s policy was to strengthen and extend the frontier region which lay between the western Anatolian countries and the homeland’s south-western boundaries. The installation of Madduwatta in the newly created vassal state of Zippasla-Siyanta River Land was probably an important element in this policy.

We should be careful not to confuse the Hittites’ reluctance to engage more directly in western Anatolian affairs, as illustrated repeatedly in the Madduwatta letter, with weakness and ineffectuality. Their concern in the west was limited almost entirely to the protection of the south-western frontiers, with as little involvement and expenditure of resources as possible. On this understanding they could well have found it politically expedient to connive at, and in some cases tacitly approve, the activities of an enterprising vassal ruler in the frontier zone, even conceding to him territories which may have had a minimal attachment, but no great strategic or material importance, to Hatti.

In assessing the events recorded in the Indictment, we must remember that the document is written entirely from the Hittite viewpoint. One of its clear intentions was to represent its author and his father as committed to the maintenance of peace and stability, of order and right
conduct, in the regions to which their influence extended. Yet in contrasting their own conduct with that of Madduwatta, the document unintentionally and to some extent misleadingly shows them up in a poor light—two apparently weak and gullible kings who were constantly deceived and outmanoeuvred by a clever and unscrupulous vassal. It is this which has led one scholar to comment that under Arnuwanda Hittite power in the west did not count for anything. Yet Madduwatta was probably not so treacherous as the letter makes out, nor his overlords so indulgent or so inept. There are innumerable instances in history where a ruler officially protests violations of agreements, unprovoked aggression by a second party against a third, while quietly condoning and perhaps even supporting such action if it is in his interests to do so.

Madduwatta had quite blatantly ignored the oath he had sworn to Tudhaliya to stay within the limits of the territories assigned to him. Either that or he believed that the agreement he had made with his Hittite overlord gave him some freedom to pursue his own territorial ambitions in the west, despite Arnuwanda’s claims to the contrary, provided he did not violate territory claimed by the Hittites. In cases where this was in dispute, he seemed ready to hand back territories he had conquered if the Hittite king declared sovereignty over them, as in the case of Hapalla, and probably also Alasiya. He did however retain his hold upon territories over which the Hittites could make no justifiable claim. Thus Madduwatta may have been less treacherous and Machiavellian than his Hittite overlords would lead us to believe. His actions may in part at least reflect some ambiguities in the agreement he made with them as to what initiatives he could exercise without reference to Hattusa. Perhaps in the light of this experience later kings made sure that the rights and powers of vassal rulers were very clearly stated, and very clearly circumscribed, in the treaties they drew up with them.

The early New Kingdom rulers took a pragmatic view of Hittite involvement in western Anatolia. The region consisted of a large, heterogeneous complex of states and communities which differed markedly in their size, general character, and political organization. Even if the Hittites had sufficient resources to establish direct control over at least the most important states in the west without placing the homeland at risk from the enemies lying to the north and the south-east of its frontiers, they still lacked the administrative capabilities necessary for
organizing such a large unwieldy complex into a coherent manageable administrative structure. Given this, and the extent of Hittite involvement in the regions lying to the north, east, and south-east of the homeland, it is likely that in the early New Kingdom the Hittites intentionally confined their involvement in western Anatolian affairs to occasional military operations in the region. These were undertaken only in response to perceived military threats to Hittite territory. The most Tudhaliya could expect from his western conquests was that they would keep the region in a subdued state for long enough periods to enable him to concentrate his military resources in other regions more important to the interests of his kingdom.

Developments in Syria

The end of Tuthmosis III’s Syrian campaigns and Hittite preoccupation with affairs in Anatolia provided a clear opportunity for the kingdom of Mitanni, now ruled by Saushtatar I, to reassert its control over the countries of northern Syria. But before it embarked upon this task, there had to be a reckoning with Assyria. Apprehensive of the growing territorial ambitions of its powerful neighbour, Assyria had established diplomatic relations with Egypt. By so doing it had become an enemy of Mitanni. With the threat of a direct offensive by Egyptian forces against Mitannian territory now virtually at an end, Saushtatar felt confident enough to launch an invasion into Assyria. He struck at the Assyrian capital Ashur, sacking and looting the city. Amongst the booty was a door of silver and gold, which he carried back as a trophy for his palace in Washshuganni, the capital of his kingdom. With Mitannian overlordship firmly established over Assyria, Saushtatar then crossed the Euphrates, and swept all before him as he advanced to the Mediterranean coast. Mitannian overlordship was once more established over the north Syrian states where Saushtatar’s predecessor Parrattarna had held sway. Alalah at that time (Alalah IV) was ruled by Niqmepa, son of Idrimi, and incorporated the former royal capital of Aleppo.

Once these territories were firmly under Mitannian control, Saushtatar could turn his attention to the regions lying to the south. It may be that at this time he established an alliance with the king of Kadesh, forming a kind of Mitanni–Kadesh axis, with the latter controlling
Syrian territory south of Alalah. The scene was now set for a Hittite–Mitannian conflict in a Syrian theatre of war.

The Sunashshura Treaty

If a Hittite challenge to Mitannian overlordship in Syria was to have any chance of success, Tudhaliya had first to reach a settlement with Kizzuwadna. As in the past control of Kizzuwadna, or at least a guarantee of benevolent neutrality from its king, was essential to the success of further Hittite campaigns in Syria—to ensure the unimpeded passage for a Hittite expeditionary force through Kizzuwadnan territory into Syria, and once it had arrived there freedom from the risk of being harassed in its rear by a pro-Mitannian state in south-east Anatolia. This, very likely, provided the context of the treaty, surviving in fragmentary Akkadian and Hittite versions, which Tudhaliya drew up with the Kizzuwadnan king Sunashshura.

From the introduction to the Akkadian version of the treaty we learn that in the days of the Hittite king’s grandfather Kizzuwadna was on the side of Hatti; but subsequently it was lost to the Hittites and reverted to an alliance with Mitanni. Now it had again returned to the Hittite fold, in spite of the protests from the Mitannian king. Tudhaliya boasted this fact in the treaty, depicting himself as Kizzuwadna’s liberator from Mitannian despotism:

Now the people of the Land of Kizzuwadna are Hittite cattle and chose their stable. From the Hurrian they separated and shifted allegiance to My Sun. The Hurrian offended against the Land of Hatti, but against the Land of Kizzuwadna he offended particularly. The Land of Kizzuwadna rejoices very much indeed over its liberation. Now the Land of Hatti and the Land of Kizzuwadna are free from their obligations. Now I, My Sun, have restored the Land of Kizzuwadna to its independence. (KBo i 5 i 30–7, after Goetze (1940: 39))

From this time on, Kizzuwadna was to remain firmly attached to Hatti. Indeed, at some undetermined point following the treaty, it was annexed to Hittite territory and placed under direct Hittite rule. This may in fact have happened while Tudhaliya still occupied the throne. At all events with Tudhaliya’s conclusion of an alliance with Sunashshura, the way to Syria now lay open before him.
Return to Syria

Details of the Hittites’ new Syrian enterprise are sketchy. But it seems that Tudhaliya sought to follow in the footsteps of Hattusili I and Mursili I by making Aleppo his prime objective. This information comes from the historical preamble of a treaty drawn up more than a century later by the Hittite king Muwattalli II with Talmi-Sharruma, vassal ruler of Aleppo:66

Formerly, the kings of the Land of Aleppo possessed the great kingship. But Hattusili (I), the Great King, the king of the Land of Hatti made full (the days of) their kingdom.67 After Hattusili, the king of the Land of Hatti, Mursili, the Great King, grandson of Hattusili, the Great King, destroyed the kingship of the Land of Aleppo and the Land of Aleppo. When Tudhaliya, the Great King, occupied the royal throne, the king of the Land of Aleppo made peace with him. (KBo i 6, obv. 11–16)

This last statement makes it clear that under Tudhaliya the Hittites had once more become a major force in Near Eastern affairs, and a serious threat to Mitannian overlordship in Syria. The position of the man called king of Aleppo68 was an unenviable one. Caught in the contest between two major powers for the domination of Syria, his allegiance to one would almost certainly mean reprisals from the other. Which way should he turn? He first made peace with Hatti. But then, no doubt through pressure from the Mitannian king Saushtatar, he switched his allegiance back to Mitanni (called Hanigalbat in the text). Reprisals from Hatti quickly followed:

The king of the Land of Aleppo turned and made peace with the king of Hanigalbat. Because of this, he (Tudhaliya) destroyed the king of Hanigalbat and the king of Aleppo together with their lands, and he razed the city of Aleppo. (KBo i 6, obv. 16–18, after Na’am (1980: 36) )

If we can accept this statement at face value, Tudhaliya’s military achievement was far-reaching indeed, for it included not only the conquest of Aleppo, but extended also to the conquest of Mitanni. But almost certainly the extent of the Hittite success, particularly against Mitanni, has been exaggerated. In spite of its alleged destruction, the kingdom of Mitanni continued to exercise overlordship in northern Syria for many years to come.69
There follows a rather confused and repetitious passage which refers to the transfer on two occasions of towns and districts from the kingdom of Aleppo to the neighbouring kingdoms of Nuhashshi and Ashtata. Presumably these towns and districts lay within the border regions which the kingdom of Aleppo shared with Nuhashshi to the south, and with Ashtata which lay on the west bank of the Euphrates. Nuhashshi and Ashtata had apparently first appealed to the king of Mitanni to reassign to them the territories they had requested. He had done so by way of punitive action against Aleppo for an ‘offence’ it had committed against him. Subsequently, we are told, the people of Aleppo likewise committed an offence against a man called Hattusili, identified as king of Hatti. We shall say a little more about him below. Once again the people of Ashtata and Nuhashshi appealed, this time to Hattusili, requesting that towns and districts belonging to Aleppo be transferred to them. Once again their request was granted. If the disputed territories were the same in both cases, then presumably Aleppo had reacquired them, only to lose them again when the second appeal was made to Hattusili.

We shall not attempt to sort out here all the details of what actually happened. But we might refer briefly to the king called Hattusili, to whom Ashtata and Nuhashshi had addressed their appeals. Scholars have long debated the identity and historicity of this king, who has been described as ‘the most phantomatic of all the dubious Hittite kings’, ‘an extraordinarily elusive character’. He apparently did not appear in the royal offering-lists, nor is his existence firmly attested in any other sources. Various attempts have been made to explain the reference to him in the ‘Aleppo treaty’. Most of them can be rejected. We do have references to a Hattusili who was a member of the royal court at this time, and who may have been the same man as the Hattusili who held the prestigious office of gal geštin (Chief of the Wine Stewards) and served as a military commander in the Kaska region. But as yet we lack conclusive proof that any of these references are to a king of that name. Even if there were such a king, he may have reigned only very briefly, perhaps only as a co-regent of Arnuwanda after the latter’s accession as sole ruler? If so, then the events associated with him in the Aleppo treaty must have occurred some time after Tudaliya’s death.

But all this is speculative. Additional evidence will need to be produced before further light can be shed on this problem.
Arnuwanda’s Sole Rule

On his death, Tudhaliya left in the hands of his co-regent Arnuwanda a vast expanse of subject territory stretching from south-western Anatolia to upper Mesopotamia. Yet the power structure which Tudhaliya had built up remained a fragile one. In the south-west Madduwatta had demonstrated the comparative ease with which an ambitious vassal could defy his Hittite overlords, exposing time and again the tenuous nature of Hittite authority in the region—a tenuousness which we have suggested may have been due very largely to deliberate Hittite policy. In the south-east, Tudhaliya’s military successes against Mitanni and Aleppo amounted to little more than an opening move in the protracted struggle between Hatti and Mitanni for the domination of Syria. And in the north, the agreements concluded with the Kaska peoples were at best short-term expedients which could not be relied upon to give lasting security to the northern parts of the kingdom.

Indeed several prayers uttered in the names of Arnuwanda and his queen Asmunikal vividly illustrate the deteriorating situation in the north where a number of Hittite cult centres were destroyed by the Kaska people:

In the Land of Nerik, in Hursama, in the Land of Kastama, in the Land of Serisa, in the Land of Himuwa, in the Land of Taggasta, in the Land of Kammama (etc.)—the temples which you, the gods, possessed in these lands the Kaskans sacked them. They smashed the images of you, the gods. They plundered silver and gold, rhyta and cups of silver and gold, and of copper, your implements of bronze and your garments; they shared out these things amongst themselves. They scattered the priests and the holy priests, the mothers-of-god, the anointed, the musicians, the singers, the cooks, the bakers, the ploughmen and the gardeners and made them their slaves. . . Thus it has come about that in those lands no-one invokes the names of you, the gods, any more; no-one presents to you the sacrifices due to you daily, monthly, and annually; no-one celebrates your festivals and pageants. (Extracts from CTH 375, after Goetze in Pritchard (1969: 399) )

Arnuwanda made what efforts he could to stabilize the most vulnerable parts of his realm. In the north, these efforts included the drawing up of a series of treaties or agreements with the Kaska people, and pacts with military commanders stationed in the regions of Kinnara,
Kalasma, Kissiya, and Sappa who swore to maintain the security of their regions. In the south, treaties were concluded with the city of Ura on the Cilician coast, and with military colonists from the city of Ismerikka in Kizzuwadna. All these texts point to a climate of growing unrest and disorder in the territories around the homeland, and the need for strong and comprehensive measures to combat this.

Faced with such problems, Arnuwanda seems to have made numerous attempts to assert the image of a strong ruler who would not tolerate defiance of his authority. A specific example is provided by the action he took against Mita, a Hittite vassal of the city of Pahhuwa situated near the upper Euphrates. Mita had married the daughter of a declared enemy of Arnuwanda, a man called Usapa: ‘And he came back to Pahhuwa and violated the oaths . . . and even against My Sun and against the Land of Hatti he offended . . . and he took the daughter of the enemy Usapa for his wife’ (KUB xxiii 72 (+) (CTH 146) obv. 14–16, after Gurney (1948: 34)).

Further acts of disloyalty followed. These could not safely be ignored. Exemplary action was called for. Arnuwanda promptly convened an assembly of delegates from Pahhuwa, Suhma, the Land of H[urri], Maltiya, Pittiyarik. He outlined Mita’s misdeeds to the delegates, and then informed them that he had sent an ultimatum to the city of Pahhuwa, demanding Mita’s extradition along with his family and all his goods, and holding that city responsible for the future good behaviour of its citizens. Should Pahhuwa fail to abide by this ultimatum, the cities represented at the assembly were instructed through their delegates to take immediate punitive action, until such time as the Hittite army arrived:

And on the day when you hear a word of disloyalty among the people of Pahhuwa, on that day you must march [to Pahhuwa(?)] and smite Pahhuwa, chastise it thoroughly, until My Sun’s army arrives. Stain your hands immediately with the blood of the people of Pahhuwa! Whoever does not stain his hands with the blood of the people of Pahhuwa—I, My Sun, shall not march directly against Pahhuwa(?), but against that man I will proceed immediately, (and) I will straightway kill him, and so I will march on to battle against Pahhuwa. (KUB xxiii 72 (+) rev. 27–31, trans. Gurney (1948: 37))

The document which records Mita’s misdeeds bears some similarity to the Indictment of Madduwatta. In the absence of any known
outcome, positive or otherwise, one wonders whether Arnuwanda’s action on this occasion proved any more successful. It may well be that Mita’s disloyalty was encouraged by Mitanni, now determined to assert vigorously its claim to be the supreme political and military power in the Near East.

**Mitanni and Egypt Come to Terms**

We do not know what became of the Mitannian king Saushtatar following Tudhaliya’s conquests in Syria. But an independent Mitannian kingdom certainly continued to exist, even if part of its territory was for a time subject to Hittite rule. With Arnuwanda diverted by the formidable task of trying to maintain his authority in his subject territories, the time was opportune for Mitanni to emerge once more, phoenix-like, from the ashes of its defeat. A new Mitannian king Artatama had now occupied the throne, the successor and probably the son of Saushtatar. Under his leadership, Mitanni sought to regain what it had ignominiously lost to the Hittites, and to stake once again its claim to sovereignty over its former subject states in Syria.

But there were dangers in moving too quickly. Hatti was far from a spent force in the region, particularly while Kizzuwadna still lay under its control. Egypt might also prove problematical. Although its influence in Syria had declined substantially since the campaigns of Tuthmosis III, it retained an active interest in the region, as illustrated by a campaign in Syria during Tuthmosis IV’s reign. And Mitanni and Egypt were still enemies. Artatama could not risk the prospect of war on two fronts—with the Hittites in the west and the Egyptians in the south. But an alliance with Egypt was a possibility if an agreement could be negotiated with the pharaoh over a division of territories in Syria. This might satisfy the territorial ambitions of both powers, as well as providing the basis of an alliance against a future threat to either of them from Hatti.

Artatama made overtures along these lines initially to Tuthmosis IV’s father and predecessor Amenhotep II. A period of diplomatic parleying began, with much toing and froing of envoys from either side. It continued without resolution into the early years of Tuthmosis’ reign. The Egyptians haggled, apparently, over the terms of a formal peace, and came up with alternative conditions to those proposed by Artatama.
No doubt they were suspicious of the Mitannian king’s ultimate intentions. Perhaps as a test of his good faith, they requested that as part of a final agreement he send his daughter to Egypt to become the wife of the new pharaoh. For reasons unknown to us, Artatama was reluctant to agree to the request. It was only after it had been made seven times that he finally consented:

When [ ], the father of Nimmureya, wrote to Artatama, my grandfather, he asked for the daughter of my grandfather, the sister of my father. He wrote five, six times, but Artatama did not give her. When he wrote to my grandfather seven times, then only under such pressure did he give her. (Letter from Tushratta to Akhenaten, EA 29: 16 ff., trans. Moran (1992: 93))

The marriage alliance paved the way for a formal treaty. A common frontier in Syria was established, which conceded to Egypt control of Kadesh along with the coastal states of Amurru and Ugarit. All territory beyond in northern Syria was conceded to Mitanni. For the time being this treaty effectively ended any prospect of further Hittite intervention in the Syrian region.

Crisis in the Homeland

This was the situation confronting the new king Tudhaliya III, son of Arnuwanda and Asmunikal, and the tuhkanti (crown prince or heir designate) during his father’s reign. But as events were to prove, the Mitannian–Egyptian alliance in Syria which blocked the reassertion of Hittite authority in the region was the least of the new king’s worries. Far more serious were the problems in Anatolia, which ultimately presented the kingdom with the gravest crisis it was to face before its final collapse some two centuries later.

The Kaska peoples were at the forefront of these problems. The letters which passed between the Hittite king and his officials in Tapikka (mod. Maşat) make clear how vulnerable the northern frontier was to incursions by these peoples. ‘In two places the enemy has crossed the frontiers in great numbers’, the Tapikka-based official Adadbeli informed the king (HKM 46: 3–4). Sometimes the incursions were carried out for the purpose of plundering the Hittites’ precious foodlands. Thus the official Piseni wrote from the frontier town of Kasepura: ‘The enemy marched in great numbers in the night, in one
place 600 enemy, in another place 400 enemy, and harvested the grain’ (*HKM* 25: 6–10). The king responded to such dispatches without delay, issuing instructions to his local governors and commanders about the counter-measures they should take, and stressing the need for them to exercise the utmost vigilance at all times. Those who failed to act promptly on his orders were threatened with the severest penalties—including death and mutilation: ‘Say to Kassu and Zilapiya: “As soon as this letter reaches you, come with all haste before My Sun. If not, (my men) will come to you and blind you on the spot!” ’ (*HKM* 16).

It was all to no avail. At some undetermined time during Tudhaliya’s reign, enemies swept through the peripheral subject territories of the Hittite kingdom, and invaded and sacked the homeland. Hattusa itself was captured, and burned to the ground. We learn of this crisis from the historical preamble to a decree of the thirteenth century king Hattusili III:

In earlier days the Hatti lands were sacked by its enemies. The Kaskan enemy came and sacked the Hatti lands and he made Nenassa his frontier. From the Lower Land95 came the Arzawan enemy, and he too sacked the Hatti lands, and he made Tuwanuwa and Uda his frontier. From afar, the Arawannan enemy came and sacked the whole of the Land of Gassiya. From afar, the Azzian enemy came and sacked all the Upper Lands and he made Samuha his frontier. The Isuwan enemy came and sacked the Land of Tegarama. From afar, the Artanan enemy came, and he too sacked the Hatti lands. And he made Kizzuwadna, the city, his frontier. And Hattusa, the city, was burned down. (*KBo* vi 28 (CTH 88) obv. 6–15, after Goetze (1940, 21–2))

The impression this text gives is of a systematic and comprehensive destruction of the Hittite homeland. This would seem to indicate some degree of co-ordination between the invading forces. But it is hard to imagine how such co-ordination could have been organized, given the distances separating the forces involved and their widely disparate character. More likely, a massive invasion from one direction, perhaps initially by the Kaska people, led to a hasty concentration of Hittite forces in this region, which exposed the homeland to a further invasion from a different direction. The Kaskans swept through the homeland from the north as far as Nenassa on the southern bend of the Maras- santiya river, and were no doubt responsible for the destruction of Hattusa. In the south-west forces from Arzawa, which had almost
certainly been building their strength even before the end of Arnuwanda's reign, were poised to invade the southern frontiers of Hittite territory, choosing the time when defence of this area was at its weakest. They swept through the Hittite Lower Land, and established their frontier at Tuwanuwa (Class. Tyana) and Uda (Hyde).

To judge from our text, the homeland was thoroughly devastated by the enemy invaders, and left in total ruin. But if this were literally true, there would have been virtually nothing left of the kingdom at all. We know that this could not have been so, for the king and the royal court survived, along with a sufficient fighting force to begin the task of winning back the lost territories within a few years of the kingdom's darkest days. Very likely our text has telescoped the events it records, giving the impression that a series of incursions which may have taken place over a period of years were in fact a massive simultaneous onslaught on the homeland from all directions. As the invading forces gathered, there was sufficient time for Tudhaliya to make plans for the abandonment of the capital and the re-establishment of his court in a location that provided at least temporary safe haven. Unfortunately no record of this event has survived. But it must have involved a logistical operation of major proportions, performed under conditions of great duress and danger.

Where did the king and his retinue go? The city of Samuha, an important cult centre located probably on the upper course of the Marassantiya river, was subsequently used as the Hittite base of operations in the reconquest of Anatolia. Was this where Tudhaliya set up his royal court after abandoning Hattusa? Samuha lay outside the main invasion path of the Kaska people in their advance through the homeland, although it too seems to have been captured by enemy forces from the country of Azzi. It may, however, have been the first major city to be recaptured by the Hittites, thus providing a temporary home for the royal court and a base for the regrouping of the Hittite army.

But for the time being, with the Hittite kingdom close to total collapse, Arzawa seemed likely to emerge as the new overlord in Anatolia. Indeed this was the perception of the pharaoh Amenhotep III, son and successor of Tuthmosis IV, who made diplomatic overtures to the Arzawan king Tarhundaradu. From two letters in the Amarna archive, we learn that Amenhotep had approached Tarhundaradu seeking a daughter of his in marriage, as a basis for an alliance between Egypt
and Arzawa. Clearly, he believed that the Hittites were a force now spent, remarking to Tarhundaradu: ‘I have heard that everything is finished, and that the country Hattusa is paralysed’ (EA 31: 26–7, after Haas in Moran (1992: 101)). The time seemed opportune for Amenhotep to establish peace with the Arzawan king, no doubt with the hope that this would further bolster Egypt’s position as a major power in the Near East.

But the approach to Tarhundaradu was premature. The Arzawan king failed, or made no attempt, to capitalize on the Arzawan military successes by asserting a claim over the former homeland territories of the Hittite kingdom. It would have been no easy task. He had established control up to the northern frontiers of the Lower Land, which brought him within striking distance of the Hittite homeland. But the homeland had already been occupied by the invaders from the Kaska region. No doubt they would have opposed any attempt by Tarhundaradu to stake his own claim to the occupied territories north of the Marassantiya.

Perhaps too the speed and the determination with which Tudhaliya set about regaining these territories took all the enemy forces by surprise.

**Tudhaliya Fights Back**

Fragmentary episodes of the Hittite reconquest of Anatolia are preserved for us in a document commonly known as the *Deeds of Suppiluliuma*. It is a record of the military exploits of Tudhaliya’s son and successor Suppiluliuma I, composed by Suppiluliuma’s own son and second successor Mursili II. The account begins before Suppiluliuma’s accession with details of his father’s campaigns in the northern and north-eastern regions of Anatolia. Samuha provided the base for the Hittite military operations, which began with attacks against the enemies of Kaska and Azzi-Hayasa.

From Samuha, Tudhaliya embarked on the monumental task of winning back his kingdom from the enemy forces which had occupied his land, destroyed his capital, and virtually driven him into exile. That he was ultimately successful in doing so was a military achievement which must rank alongside those of his greatest predecessors—Hattusili, Mursili, and his namesake Tudhaliya. Not only did his victories re-establish Hittite control over the homeland and the subject territories
lost to the Hittites; they also helped lay the foundations for the profound changes which were to occur in the political landscape of the Near East in the reign of his son and successor Suppiluliuma. Indeed we know from the Deeds that for many years before his accession, Suppiluliuma was his father’s chief adviser, partner, and comrade-in-arms in the campaigns of reconquest. And while we should take nothing from Tudhaliya’s own achievement, it was undoubtedly his partnership with his son, who was to prove the most brilliant of all Hittite military leaders, that helped ensure his ultimate success.

Fragmentary passages in the Deeds provide glimpses of the campaigns of reconquest. From Samuha, the Hittites launched repeated attacks on the Kaskan tribes, inflicting heavy casualties and bringing back many prisoners to their base. This was but the start of the Hittite recovery. Kaskan military strength had now been sufficiently weakened, or so Tudhaliya believed, for the Hittites to direct their operations against enemies in other regions. To the west of the homeland lay the countries of Kassiya and the Hulana River Land. These former subject territories of the Hittite kingdom had been occupied by troops from Arawanna during the general onslaught, and subsequently suffered repeated attacks by the countries of Masa and Kammala. Punitive action was swift and effective. Under the joint leadership of Tudhaliya and Suppiluliuma, the Hittite army ‘liberated’ the beleaguered countries, then invaded and laid waste the territory of their aggressors. But Tudhaliya had little time to savour his victory, for once again there was a massing of Kaskan forces in the north, and once again the Hittites had to win back through force of arms territories they had but recently secured.

Accounts had also to be settled with another enemy in the region. To the north-east of the homeland lay the kingdom of Azzi-Hayasa, whose forces had joined in the attacks on Hittite territory, ravaging the Upper Land (which as we have seen was an eastward extension of the Land of Hatti between the upper course of the Marassantiya and the Euphrates) and advancing as far as Samuha. As the tide turned in the Hittites’ favour, Suppiluliuma had led an expeditionary force against the enemy. They fled before him, and for a time avoided battle. But finally a Hittite army under the joint leadership of Tudhaliya and Suppiluliuma invaded Azzi-Hayasa and forced a showdown with its king Karanni (or Lanni) near the city of Kummaha. The passage recording the outcome of this battle is missing. But almost certainly the Hittite campaign
resulted in the conquest of Azzi-Hayasa, for subsequently Suppiluliuma established it as a Hittite vassal state, drawing up a treaty with Hukkana, its current ruler, and now linked to the Hittite royal family by his marriage with Suppiluliuma’s sister. In accordance with the terms of this treaty, the Hayasans were obliged to return to Suppiluliuma all Hittite subjects who had come into their territory, and also to hand back the border territory which Suppiluliuma claimed belonged to the Land of Hatti.

One major enemy remained, the most dangerous of all the Hittites’ opponents in Anatolia. The time had now come to deal with this enemy. Suppiluliuma sought the privilege of doing so: ‘Thus (spoke) my father to my grandfather: “Oh my lord! (?) Against the Arzawan enemy send me!” So my grandfather sent my father (?) against the Arzawan enemy’ (DS p. 68, frag. 14, 38’–40’, after Gu¨terbock).

Prior to this, a successful Hittite attack had already been launched against the city of Sallapa, which lay at the junction of the main routes leading from Hatti and Syria into Arzawan territory. Its destruction could well have served an important strategic purpose—to deprive the enemy forces of a base for marshalling additional troops from the Arzawa Lands against the threat of a Hittite counter-attack. Suppiluliuma’s main objective now was to dislodge the enemy from the Lower Land, whose frontier lay close to the southern border of the Hittite homeland. Formerly Hittite subject territory, it was now under Arzawan occupation. So long as this occupation remained unchallenged, the homeland would never be secure.

In what may have been Suppiluliuma’s first major clash with the Arzawan enemy in the Lower Land, ‘The gods helped my father: the Sun Goddess of Arinna, the Storm God of Hatti, the Storm God of the Army, and Ishtar of the Battle-Field, (so that) my father slew the Arzawan enemy . . . . . and the enemy troops died in multitude’ (DS p. 68, frag. 14, 43’–5’, Trans. Güterbock.). The rhetoric of this passage probably disguises the strength of enemy resistance encountered by Suppiluliuma. For this was but one episode in a series of conflicts between Hittite and Arzawan forces in the region. The enemy were firmly entrenched there, and military operations against them may well have continued into Suppiluliuma’s own reign. As one group was defeated, others rose up and joined forces against the Hittite counter-offensive. We learn from the Deeds of clashes with the enemy around the city of Tuwanuwa, on the
region’s northernmost limits. The recapture of the city provided Suppiluliuma with a marshalling base for his troops and chariots.\textsuperscript{109} This perhaps paved the way for further attacks on the occupation forces, and their final expulsion from the entire region.

Even so, the Arzawans continued to threaten Hittite interests in the peripheral areas of the kingdom. This is illustrated by the activities of an Arzawan leader called Anzapahhaddu who refused a demand from Suppiluliuma for the return of Hittite subjects who had sought refuge with him. Suppiluliuma responded by sending an army into Arzawan territory under the command of Himuili to settle the matter by force of arms. Himuili suffered a humiliating defeat, and Suppiluliuma was obliged to take the field in person to enforce his demand.\textsuperscript{110}

To prevent further Arzawan aggression against Hittite subject territory, Suppiluliuma (perhaps at a later stage in his own reign) installed one of his ablest military commanders Hannutti as governor of the Lower Land:

My father sent forth Hannutti, the Marshall, to the Lower Land, giving him troops and charioteers. When Hannutti had arrived in the Lower Land and the inhabitants of Lalanda saw him, they became frightened and made peace. And they became again subjects of the Land of Hatti. \textit{(KUB xix 22 (CTH 40 vi.52b), 4–8, after Houwink ten Cate (1966: 28–9))}\textsuperscript{111}

When Hannutti had firmly reasserted Hittite authority in the region, he used it as a base for conducting military operations against neighbouring hostile lands, notably the Arzawan state of Hapalla:

However, Hannutti, the Marshall, went to the Land of Hapalla and attacked the Land of Hapalla. He burned down the Land of Hapalla, and removed it together with the population, the cattle and the sheep and brought them to Hattusa. \textit{(KUB xix 22, 8–11, after Houwink ten Cate (1966: 28–9))}\textsuperscript{111}

In spite of the Hittite successes, Arzawa still had substantial military resources at its disposal, and the support of other western states hostile to the Hittites. With these it would remain a constant threat to the security of the Hittite kingdom until such time as it could be completely subdued by force of arms. We are told that Suppiluliuma took twenty years to re-establish Hittite control in Anatolia.\textsuperscript{112} A significant portion of this period was almost certainly devoted to campaigns in the west against the Arzawa Lands—campaigns which began in his father’s reign, and continued sporadically through much of his own reign.
A Kingdom Regained

From what survives of the *Deeds*, it is difficult to determine whether any overall plan or strategy underpinned the operations which led to the Hittite reconquest of the lost territories. Were the campaigns conducted essentially on an *ad hoc* basis, as opportunities presented themselves? Or was a systematic programme of reconquest mapped out for the recovery of the kingdom? Perhaps we can detect some elements of a basic strategy in the disconnected fragments. Attention seems to have focussed initially on the recovery of lost territories in the outlying districts of the kingdom, and on pursuing and attacking on their home ground the enemies who had occupied these districts. So long as enemy strength remained undiminished, a major drive by the Hittites to liberate their homeland posed serious risks. With their capital in ruins and with hostile groups still occupying much of the region, attempts to recover central areas of the homeland would have been highly vulnerable to a fresh wave of enemy onslaughts from all directions. The alternative was to drive the enemy out of the peripheral states formerly subject to the Hittite kingdom, carry the battle to him in his own territory, destroy his armies and devastate his lands. In this way his capacity for counter-attacks and renewed aggression would be substantially reduced, if not eliminated. And that would be the time for a concerted Hittite drive to recover the entire homeland, to flush out and expel the enemy groups still occupying it, as a prelude to the task of resettling and rebuilding the core territory of the Hittite world.

At what stage did the reoccupation and reconstruction of the homeland begin? Presumably it was some time after the regions lying to the north, north-east, and west had been reduced to a suitably pacific state. Suppiluliuma’s subsequent campaigns against the forces occupying the Lower Land could hardly have been undertaken if much of the intervening territory between this region and the Hittite base in Samuha still lay in enemy hands. It is likely, then, that the process of reoccupation was already underway at the time Suppiluliuma began his southern campaigns. With the expulsion of the enemy from the Lower Land, the rebuilding of the Hittite kingdom could proceed with relatively little threat of outside interference—at least in the short term.

If master plan there was behind the programme of recovery of the Hittite kingdom, there is little doubt that Suppiluliuma was one of its
principal architects. Indeed his father in the final years of his reign must have relied increasingly on his advice as well as on his skills in the field. The long years of almost incessant campaigning took their toll on the ageing king. Yet almost to the end of his life, and in spite of repeated bouts of illness which confined him to his bed in Samuha, Tudhaliya led his forces in person against his enemies.

Though the letters which Tudhaliya exchanged with his officials in Tapikka make a welcome contribution to our knowledge about this king and his reign, he still remains for us a relatively obscure figure. Indeed, Tudhaliya’s great-grandson Hattusili III, in recalling the devastation of the Hittite kingdom in the dark days of Tudhaliya III’s reign, attributes the campaigns of reconquest which restored the kingdom’s supremacy in Anatolia solely to his son Suppiluliuma. But however much the Hittites’ success in winning back the kingdom was due to the son, its survival, after it could so easily have disappeared entirely from the pages of history, must have been due in very large measure to the father—perhaps one of the most courageous and most determined, if one of the least known, kings of the Hittites.
Suppiluliuma Seizes the Throne

In spite of his close partnership with his father, and in spite of the role he had played in the restoration of the kingdom, Suppiluliuma was not intended for the mantle of kingship after his father’s death. The heir to the throne was another, presumably older, son called Tudhaliya the Younger. Initially, Suppiluliuma pledged his support for the new king, and the chief dignitaries of the land followed suit. Suppiluliuma’s son Mursili refers in a prayer to the oath of allegiance sworn to him:

As Tudhaliya the Younger was the master of the Land of Hatti, the princes of Hattusa, the lords, the commanders of the thousands, the officers, [the subalterns/corporals?], the entire infantry and chariotry swore allegiance to him, and my father also swore allegiance to him. (Mursili II’s 1st Plague Prayer, KUB xiv 14 (+) (CTH 378.1) obv. 13–15)

But Suppiluliuma may well have felt aggrieved, after all he had done for the kingdom, at being relegated to a position of subordination to his brother. He had ambitions of his own which were incompatible with this. A conflict broke out between the brothers and their respective supporters. It ended in bloodshed:

But when my father wronged Tudhaliya, all the princes, the noblemen, the commanders of the thousands, and the officers of Hatti went over to my father. The deities by whom the oath was sworn seized Tudhaliya and they killed Tudhaliya. Furthermore they killed those of his brothers who stood by him. (1st Plague Prayer, obv. 16–19, trans. Singer (2002a: 61–2))

Tudhaliya’s murder paved the way for Suppiluliuma to seize the throne. The circumstances of his doing so are not altogether clear.
But Mursili had no doubt that the fate which finally befell Suppiluliuma and his supporters many years later, and indeed the sufferings of the entire land of Hatti, were directly attributable to divine wrath for the action taken against Tudhaliya:

But now you, o gods, have eventually taken vengeance on my father for this affair of Tudhaliya the Younger. My father [died(?)] because of the blood of Tudhaliya, and the princes, the noblemen, the commanders of the thousands, and the officers who went over to my father, they also died because of that affair. This same affair also came upon the Land of Hatti, and the population of the Land of Hatti began to perish because of this affair. (1st Plague Prayer, obv. 33–7, trans. Singer (2002a: 62))

Opening Moves in the Conflict with Mitanni

We have no record of Suppiluliuma’s accession since the passage in the Deeds where this was reported is missing. His reign overlapped with that of Amenhotep III in Egypt, though the latter was in his last years and may by this time have been sharing the pharaonic throne with his
son Amenhotep IV (soon to rename himself Akhenaten). For the time being Suppiluliuma maintained cordial relations with Egypt. It was important for him to avoid hostilities with this kingdom, at that time an ally of Mitanni, at least until he had dealt with more immediate obstacles to the restoration of Hittite authority in the territories lying to the south-east of the homeland.

To begin with, he applied himself vigorously to two major enterprises still to be undertaken before the reconquest of the lost Hittite territories could be regarded as complete. To the east and south-east of the Lower Land lay the kingdom of Kizzuwadna, which had been sacked and occupied by the enemy of the Land of Armatana. Further to the north, Tegarama, somewhere between Kummanni and the Upper Land and on the main route between Hattusa and Carchemish, had fallen to the enemy of the Land of Isuwa. Fragmentary passages in the Deeds may refer to the Hittite attacks on Armatana and Isuwa in reprisal for their invasion and occupation of Hittite subject territory. Unfortunately the mutilated state of the text deprives us of details of these attacks or their outcomes. But both countries were subject allies of Mitanni.

An invasion of Isuwa meant an expedition across the Euphrates river and close to the heartland of the Mitannian kingdom. During the period of their reconquests of their Anatolian territories, the Hittites had avoided hostilities with Mitanni. Now, by marching against Isuwa, Suppiluliuma could hardly fail to bring the two kingdoms into direct conflict. Far from shrinking from such a conflict, Suppiluliuma may have welcomed it. Almost certainly he had long nursed the ambition of confronting and destroying once and for all the Hittites’ chief rival for the domination of the Near East. Now that Hittite supremacy had been all but re-established throughout Anatolia, the time for a military showdown with Mitanni was at hand.

The political situation in Mitanni may also have prompted Suppiluliuma to make his move at this time. Artatama I had been succeeded on the Mitannian throne by his son Shuttarna II, perhaps the king responsible for re-establishing Mitannian control over the Land of Isuwa. He may also have incited the Isuwan attack on Hittite territory during Tudhaliya III’s reign. But on Shuttarna’s death, dynastic rivalries broke out in the kingdom. The king’s son and successor Artashumara was assassinated by a military officer Utkhi, and replaced on the throne by his younger brother Tushratta.
Tushratta’s elevation to the kingship did not go unchallenged. There was another claimant to the throne, a second Artatama whose name suggests that he too was a member of the Mitannian royal family (there was a lawsuit pending between them before the gods). Since, apparently, Artatama commanded the loyalty of a significant element of the Mitannian population, and was actually styled as ‘king’, he posed a serious threat to the young Tushratta and to the stability of his kingdom. The Hittites themselves had learnt from bitter experience the vulnerability to outside forces of a kingdom split by internal dissension. What better time than now for the Hittite king to capitalize on the political situation within Mitanni? What better time to lead his forces against a Mitannian ally lying on the very borders of the heartland of the Mitannian kingdom?

Yet initially Suppiluliuma seems to have underestimated the opposition. In a letter written to the pharaoh Amenhotep III Tushratta claimed to have won a victory over his Hittite opponent, and stated that he was sending part of the spoils of victory to the pharaoh:

When the enemy came to my country, Teshub My Lord delivered him into my power, and I conquered him. There was no-one who returned to his country. I am sending to you with the present letter one chariot, two horses, one male and one female servant, as part of the booty of the Land of Hatti. (EA 17: 30–8)

The victory claimed by Tushratta may have occurred during a Hittite expedition across the Euphrates in an abortive attempt to regain control of Isuwa. If so, it would have given Suppiluliuma clear warning that he was dealing with a still powerful and dangerous enemy. But humiliating though his defeat must have been, it was no more than a temporary setback—and Tushratta may well have exaggerated the extent of his victory. In any case Suppiluliuma had learnt a salutary lesson: there should be no further venture into his enemy’s territory until he had carefully prepared the way in advance—diplomatically as well as militarily. This he undertook to do. As Professor Houwink ten Cate aptly comments: ‘all sources available on Suppiluliuma’s tactics concur in offering us a clear picture of a very capable military commander who carefully planned his attacks beforehand with intricate diplomatic moves and dealings’.

As part of his preparation for a major onslaught on Tushratta’s kingdom and its subject territories and allies, Suppiluliuma sought to
isolate his opponent from all major sources of support by a series of diplomatic alliances. Thus he negotiated a treaty with Artatama. Although the treaty itself has not survived, it was almost certainly drawn up as a pact between equals, in which Suppiluliuma recognized Artatama as ‘Great King’ and the rightful claimant to the Mitannian throne. The treaty presumably required at least benevolent neutrality from Artatama in the Hittites’ forthcoming conflict with Tushratta, in return for an undertaking by Suppiluliuma to support Artatama’s accession to the Mitannian throne when Tushratta had been defeated and driven from it.

As we have noted, Suppiluliuma was also intent on keeping Egypt out of the conflict. Although its influence in Syria seems to have diminished in Akhenaten’s reign, Egypt still remained overlord of a number of kingdoms of southern Syria and all of Palestine. And an Egyptian–Mitannian alliance still remained in force. Moreover, from various letters in the Amarna correspondence it is clear that Akhenaten kept himself closely informed of political and military developments in the region. Suppiluliuma therefore took some pains to minimize any risk of Egyptian involvement in his conflict with Mitanni by cultivating diplomatic relations with the pharaoh. Even so, he may not have been able to resist entirely the temptation to interfere in his royal brother’s domains whenever a suitable opportunity presented itself. From time to time the pharaoh received complaints from his local vassals about alleged Hittite subversive activities and military intervention in a number of his Syro-Palestinian states—sometimes, it seems, in response to overtures from the rulers of these states. None the less, these alleged activities seem not to have seriously jeopardized the general state of peace between Hatti and Egypt, at least not until the very end of Akhenaten’s reign, and in a letter which he wrote probably to Akhenaten’s immediate successor Smenkhkare, Suppiluliuma claimed a warm relationship with Akhenaten:

Neither my messengers whom I had sent to your father, nor the request which your father had made in these terms: ‘Let us establish between ourselves nothing but the friendliest of relations’—I have not refused these. All that your father said to me, I did absolutely everything. And my own request, that I made to your father, he never refused it; he gave me absolutely everything. (EA 41: 7–13, after Moran (1992: 114)
But Suppiluliuma’s relationship with Akhenaten may not have been as close or as cordial as he would have his correspondent believe. Indeed, it is possible that the pharaoh was in the process of preparing a major campaign against the Hittites just before he died.\(^{19}\) None the less, Suppiluliuma made at least a show of maintaining friendship with his Egyptian royal brother, consistent with an overall strategy of cultivating good relations with foreign powers on whose support Tushratta might call in the forthcoming conflict with Hatti.

This perhaps was the chief motive for the marriage alliance which Suppiluliuma contracted with the Kassite ruling family in Babylon.

### Suppiluliuma’s Family

Seals and inscriptions associate three queens with Suppiluliuma during his reign—Daduhepa, Henti, and Tawananna in that order.\(^{20}\) The first of these, Daduhepa, was Suppiluliuma’s mother, wife of his father Tudhaliya.\(^ {21}\) She must therefore have outlived her husband and retained her status as queen after his death, in the standard Tawananna tradition.

On her death, her place as reigning queen was taken by Suppiluliuma’s first (known) wife Henti. Henti’s status is indicated in a decree appointing Suppiluliuma’s son Telipinu priest in Kizzuwadna.\(^ {22}\) But her enjoyment of this status was short-lived, for within a few years of her husband’s accession she disappeared from the scene, and Suppiluliuma took a new wife and queen, the daughter of the king of Babylon.\(^ {23}\) The new queen apparently assumed the name Tawananna as a personal name after her marriage, alongside her original name.\(^ {24}\)

Tawananna is associated with her husband on a number of seal impressions. These include several which belong within the context of Suppiluliuma’s alliance with the Ugaritic king Niqmaddu II,\(^ {25}\) an alliance which can be dated to Suppiluliuma’s ‘First’ or ‘One-year’ Syrian war (discussed below).\(^ {26}\) At this time Burnaburiash II was ruler of Babylon, and therefore Tawananna’s father. It may well be that the marriage alliance with the Kassite ruling family was strategically motivated—to ensure at least benevolent neutrality if not active support from Babylon while Suppiluliuma was campaigning against Mitanni.\(^ {27}\)

What of the queen Henti? Her fate remains a mystery. But just possibly it is referred to in a fragmentary text from the reign of Suppiluliuma’s son Mursili II, which makes mention in consecutive
lines of the king’s father, his mother, and a banishment to the land of Ahhiyawa.\textsuperscript{28} Since much of the right-hand side of the tablet on which the text appears is missing, we cannot draw any firm conclusions about its overall content. But if a commonly accepted interpretation of the text is correct, it provides an explanation for what happened to Henti: she had been banished by her husband.\textsuperscript{29} The prospects of an important strategic marriage alliance with the ruling dynasty of Babylon may have provided incentive enough for him to remove her from the scene. As Suppiluliuma had demonstrated by his treachery against his brother, rightful heir to the Hittite throne, he was quite prepared to deal ruthlessly with members of his family who stood in the way of the achievement of his objectives.

Whatever the reasons for Henti’s sudden disappearance from our records, she had left Suppiluliuma with one of the most important mainstays of his reign—for she was almost certainly the mother of all his sons. We know of five sons—Arnuwanda, Telipinu, Piyassili (later Sharri-Kushuh), Zannanza,\textsuperscript{30} and Mursili. With the possible exception of Mursili, these sons had all reached manhood during their father’s reign, and had provided him with consistently loyal and able support.

Arnuwanda, probably the eldest, was the crown prince. From early in his father’s reign he had been the designated heir to the throne. His status is first indicated in the decree which formalized the appointment of his brother Telipinu, second son of Suppiluliuma, as priest in Kizzuwadna. The decree was issued in the name of Suppiluliuma, the queen Henti, Arnuwanda as crown prince, and Suppiluliuma’s brother Zida, the Chief of the Bodyguards.\textsuperscript{31} By this time Kizzuwadna had lost its independent status and was now under direct Hittite rule. Telipinu is also referred to in several other documents as ‘the priest’ or ‘the great priest’.\textsuperscript{32} But his role in the kingdom was not confined to religious duties. He had important political and military responsibilities as well. The terms of his appointment in Kizzuwadna were similar in several respects to those imposed by treaty upon vassal rulers of the kingdom. Like them he was obliged to have the same friends and the same enemies as the Hittite king, and to denounce those guilty of acting or speaking against him. Given that Telipinu’s appointment was made only a short time before Suppiluliuma led his forces into Syria, it was almost certainly connected with the king’s political and military preparations for his first major campaign against Mitanni.\textsuperscript{33}
Within a few years, perhaps no more than four or five, of his occupation of the Hittite throne, Suppiluliuma’s preparations were complete. He now embarked on what was to be the most momentous undertaking of his career. The magnitude of his task can hardly be overestimated. Not only was he preparing to take on the military might of the Mitannian king on the latter’s own territory, but in order to establish his supremacy in Syria he had also to confront a formidable coalition of enemy forces mustered from the kingdoms of the region. So long as these kingdoms could call on the support of their Mitannian overlord, a Hittite campaign against them could well end in failure. A direct, all-out attack on the heartland of the Mitannian kingdom had to be the first priority.

Unfortunately the section of the Deeds which records this undertaking is entirely lost to us, with the possible exception of one small fragment. But a reasonably detailed account is preserved in two other documents. The Hittite campaign was apparently triggered by two events in particular: Tushratta’s attack on the Syrian country of Nuhashshi, where a man called Sharrupshi had declared allegiance to Suppiluliuma, and a further anti-Hittite uprising in the Land of Isuwa.

After dispatching an expeditionary force to Nuhashshi to support Sharrupshi (see below), Suppiluliuma led the main Hittite army across the Euphrates, conquered the Land of Isuwa to the border of the kingdom of Alshe, and then struck south into Mitannian territory, occupying and plundering its capital Washshuganni. Unprepared for the speed and ferocity of the Hittite advance, Tushratta could offer no effective resistance. He had no option but to flee the capital, with whatever troops he could muster, before it fell to the Hittites.

Suppiluliuma then turned westwards, recrossing the Euphrates. In a series of lightning conquests, he reduced all the local kingdoms subject to Mitanni from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean coast—Aleppo, Mukish, Niya, Arahtu, Qatna, and Nuhashshi—as far south as Aba (Apina, Upi, the region incorporating Damascus) which lay in the border region of Egyptian territory. Only the Mitannian stronghold Carchemish on the Euphrates remained unsubdued. The rulers of the conquered states were deposed and transported along with their families to Hattusa.
Amongst the states which fell victim to the Hittite onslaught was one which Suppiluliuma had intended to leave unmolested—Kadesh on the Orontes river. Formerly an ally of Mitanni, the Land of Kadesh had been forced to accept Egyptian sovereignty during the campaigns of Tuthmosis III; a coalition of Syrian forces led by the kings of Kadesh
and Megiddo had been decisively defeated by Tuthmosis on his first campaign, and in a subsequent campaign Kadesh itself had fallen to the Egyptians. This might have proved a source of ongoing tension and conflict between Egypt and Mitanni. But by the terms of the accord reached between the two kingdoms during Tuthmosis IV’s reign, Kadesh was officially recognized as subject to Egyptian overlordship while still, it seems, providing a possible focus of Mitannian influence and support in the region.

Nevertheless, true to his policy of avoiding conflict with Egypt, Suppiluliuma had intended to bypass Kadesh. But he was provoked into action by its king Shuttarna (Shutatarra) who led his troops against him. Suppiluliuma was quick to retaliate. The Kadesh force was defeated, and its king and leading citizens, along with the king’s son Aitakkama, were led off in captivity. Although this must have put some strain on Hittite–Egyptian relations, there was no apparent immediate reaction from Egypt. Suppiluliuma subsequently allowed Aitakkama to return to Kadesh, where he occupied his father’s throne, and probably formalized his status as a Hittite vassal by drawing up a treaty with him (though no record of this has survived). Aitakkama used his Hittite backing both to establish regional alliances with other rulers, notably Aziru, king of Amurru, and to extend his own territory. So long as it suited his purposes, he remained loyal to his Hittite allegiance. But the loss of Kadesh rankled in the Egyptian mind, and some years later, in the reign of the pharaoh Tutankhamun, the Egyptians tried to recapture it (see below).

It was with no little satisfaction that Suppiluliuma recounted all that he achieved within the space of a single campaign:

Because of the hostility of Tushratta, the king, I plundered all these lands in a single year, and conveyed them to the Land of Hatti. I incorporated them into my territory from Mount Niblani and from the opposite bank of the Euphrates. (Suppiluliuma: Shattiwaza Treaty, PD no. 1 (CTH 51) 14–15, obv. 45–7)

The Kingdom of Ugarit

Suppiluliuma’s successes were not achieved purely by force of arms. Even in the midst of his Syrian campaign, he sought to strengthen his position by diplomatic alliances. Thus, perhaps while he was in the
Land of Aleppo, he made overtures to Niqmaddu II, the king of Ugarit, to join him in an alliance against the kings of Mukish and Nuhashshi.48

An alliance with Ugarit had much to offer. Ugarit was endowed with many natural advantages. With its thickly wooded mountains, it was a valuable timber-producing region, and its rich, fertile steppes and plains were excellent for grazing purposes and for the production of a wide range of goods, including grain, wine, oil, and flax. It was also the centre of thriving manufacturing industries, where the arts of bronzesmiths and goldsmiths flourished and a wide range of linen and woollen goods were produced for export. Its 50-kilometre-long coastline contained four or more seaports, making it an important link between the Mediterranean world and the lands stretching to the Euphrates and beyond. And through its territory passed some of the major land-routes of Syria, north through Mukish to Anatolia and east through Aleppo to Mesopotamia. With its rich natural resources, its commercial prosperity, and above all its important strategic location, it inevitably attracted the keen interest of the major Near Eastern powers. The substantial tribute payable by Ugarit, as recorded in its treaties with Hatti, indicates that it became the richest of the Hittite vassal states in north Syria. Its possession very likely provided the Hittite kingdom with an important source of revenue.49

We know little of the history of Ugarit before the beginning of the Amarna archive. In fact one of the letters in the archive, EA 45, is the earliest document we have from Ugarit. In this letter the Ugaritic king Ammistamru I declared his allegiance to the pharaoh, either Amenhotep III, or Akhenaten in the first years of his reign. Several other letters from Ammistamru were perhaps also intended to assure the pharaoh of his loyalty50—particularly if at this time Suppiluliuma was attempting to win him over to the Hittite side.51 In any case Ammistamru must have died shortly afterwards, and Suppiluliuma made (renewed?) attempts to establish an alliance with Ugarit by his overtures to the new king Niqmaddu. No doubt he had in mind the long-term advantages of such an alliance. But for the moment his chief concern was to establish a military partnership against the enemy of Mukish and Nuhashshi between his own forces, perhaps now based in Aleppo, and the forces of Ugarit which lay south and west (respectively) of the two enemy states.
In pursuit of an alliance with Ugarit, Suppiluliuma wrote to Niqmaddu in the most courtly and persuasive terms. His letter is an excellent example of the diplomatic skills which the Hittite brought to bear in persuading a potential ally to join his side:

Although the Land of Nuhashshi and the Land of Mukish are my enemies, you, Niqmaddu, do not fear them, have confidence in yourself! Just as formerly your ancestors were friends and not enemies of the Land of Hatti, now you, Niqmaddu, be the enemy of my enemy and the friend of my friend… Be faithful, o Niqmaddu, to the alliance of friendship with the Land of Hatti, and you will see then how the Great King deals with the kings of Nuhashshi and the king of Mukish who abandoned the alliance of friendship with the Land of Hatti and became the enemies of the Great King their master. If then all these kings launch an attack on your country, do not be afraid, Niqmaddu, but immediately send one of your messengers to me. But if you, Niqmaddu, attack first with your armies the troops of Nuhashshi or Mukish, let no-one take them from your hands. And if it happens that for want of troops from Nuhashshi, troops from Mukish come to your land as fugitives, let no-one take them from your hands. If it happens that certain towns within your borders become hostile to you and you engage in combat with them and defeat them, in the future let no-one take them from your hands. (RS 17.132 = PRU IV, 35–7, Dossier II A 1)

The offer was tempting. Niqmaddu was presented with the double incentive of guaranteed protection by the Hittite king in the event of an attack upon his territory, and the prospect of retaining any territory he conquered in the course of conflict with the enemy kingdoms. But the letter also contained a subtle threat of the consequences of refusing an alliance with the Hittite king. Niqmaddu was faced with a dilemma. By refusing the overtures of the other Syrian kingdoms to join their alliance, he was also putting himself at risk. He must have carefully weighed up the consequences of both options, before finally deciding to go with Suppiluliuma.

As expected, his decision met with prompt reprisals from the coalition of local kingdoms whose overtures he had rejected. His kingdom was invaded and plundered. But when he appealed to his Hittite overlord, the latter honoured the terms of the alliance, sent an expeditionary force to drive the enemy from his kingdom, and restored to him the booty which they had taken. Further benefits from the new alliance were to be bestowed upon Niqmaddu, with little apparent
effort on his part. After his conquest of Mukish and Niya, Suppiluliuma transferred substantial portions of their territory to the kingdom of Ugarit—which may have led to an almost fourfold increase in its own territory.  

The Nuhashshi Lands

The Nuhashshi lands occupied a region stretching west of the Euphrates to the Orontes river, between Hamath and Aleppo. The name Nuhashshi figures in the Mari and Alalah VII archives, but seems not to have designated a coherent political entity prior to the period of Suppiluliuma’s campaigns in Syria. At the time of the Syrian war, Nuhashshi was at least nominally subject to Mitannian overlordship. The texts refer to the ‘kings of Nuhashshi’, suggesting that the Nuhashshi region was made up of several principalities, each with its own ruler of whom one may have been a kind of primus inter pares.

We have noted that prior to the Syrian war, and no doubt as part of his preparation for this war, Suppiluliuma had won the allegiance of a king(?) of Nuhashshi called Sharrupshi. This was clearly contrary to any claims of allegiance the Mitannian king may have had on him, and Tushratta was quick to seek revenge. But it seems that Suppiluliuma had been as quick to respond when he received an appeal for assistance from Sharrupshi:

When the king of the Land of Mitanni plotted to kill Sharrupshi, thereupon the king of the Land of Mitanni along with his elite troops and his chariots invaded the Land of Nuhashshi. And when he had attacked it, thereupon Sharrupshi sent his messenger to the king of the Land of Hatti: ‘I am the servant of the king of the Land of Hatti. Rescue me now!’ And I, My Sun, sent warriors and horse to his support, and they drove out the king of the Land of Mitanni along with his troops and his chariots from the Land of Nuhashshi. (Suppiluliuma: Tette Treaty, PD no. 3 (CTH 53) 58–9, i 2–11)

Subsequently, however, Sharrupshi appears to have broken his allegiance with Hatti. In the course of his devastating sweep through the Syrian principalities, Suppiluliuma launched an attack on Nuhashshi and captured all its territory. This time he was certainly not responding to an appeal for assistance from Sharrupshi. In fact it seems that on hearing of the Hittite king’s approach, Sharrupshi promptly took to his heels—a clear indication that his erstwhile overlord and liberator was
now his enemy! The fugitive managed to escape Hittite custody. But he
did so alone. His mother, his brothers, and his children were all seized
and transported back to Hatti. Suppiluliuma now appointed Takib-
sharri, perhaps a former subject of Sharrupshi—and one who had had
the good sense to stay in favour with Hatti—to the kingship of Ukulzat,
one of the cities of Nuhashshi. Whatever had caused the dramatic
turnabout in the relations between Suppiluliuma and Sharrupshi re-
mains a mystery. But as Suppiluliuma’s communications with the
Ugaritic king Niqmaddu make clear, there was strong opposition to
the Hittites in the Nuhashshi lands, and one of the kings of these lands,
Addu-nirari, was specifically identified as amongst the enemies of Hatti
who had attacked the kingdom of Ugarit. Perhaps Sharrupshi came
under considerable pressure from his own countrymen, as well as from
his counterparts in the neighbouring states, to join forces with them
against Hatti. And perhaps, unlike Niqmaddu who remained firm in his
Hittite allegiance, he succumbed to such pressure, mistakenly believing
that the real and present danger from his neighbours and fellow-coun-
trymen if he stuck to his alliance with Hatti outweighed the prospects of
retaliation from Suppiluliuma if he abandoned it.

The Kingdom of Amurru

At the time of Suppiluliuma’s Syrian campaigns, Amurru was one of the
most prominent of the local territories. It also proved one of the most
troublesome, both to its neighbours and to the major powers who
sought to establish their dominance over it.

The name Amurru first appears in texts of the third and early second
millennium as a geographical term, referring to a broad expanse of
territory covering much of the region of modern Syria and extending
westwards from Mesopotamia towards the Mediterranean coast. How-
ever from the time of the Mari and Alalah archives, the term came to be
used of a more restricted region of central and southern Syria. Subse-
sequently, with the expansion of Egyptian military power in Syria under
Tuthmosis III, it was incorporated into Egyptian subject territory, as a
(relatively) clearly defined geopolitical unit extending between the
Orontes river and the central Levantine coast.

Semi-nomadism seems to have been a traditional feature of the
population groups associated with Amurru. Prominent amongst these
groups were the Habiru who roamed the mountains and forests of the region. With their numbers swelled by criminals, fugitives, refugees, marauding mercenaries, and social outcasts, they posed a constant threat not only to merchants and other travellers, but also to the more settled communities of the region. Left to their own resources, they were highly disruptive of social and political order and stability. But a leader who had the skills and the enterprise to organize and unite them would have a very formidable force at his disposal.

From the Amarna correspondence we know that in the fourteenth century such a leader did emerge, a man of unknown origin called Abdi-Ashirta. Banding groups of Habiru from the highland regions into a powerful fighting force under his command, Abdi-Ashirta embarked on a series of conquests which brought the whole of Amurru under his sway. This caused no little consternation amongst Amurru’s neighbours.

To the south of Amurru lay the kingdom of Gubla (Byblos), whose king Rib-Hadda viewed the Amurrite’s progress with increasing alarm. Urgent letters were dispatched to the pharaoh (Amenhotep III?), reporting the conquest of one Amurrite city after another by Abdi-Ashirta and the Habiru, and the slaughter of their leaders:

Let the king give heed to the words of his servant: ‘The Habiru killed Aduna, the king of Irqata, but there was no-one who said anything to Abdi-Ashirta, and so they go on taking territory for themselves. Miya, the ruler of Arashni, seized Ardata, and just now the men of Ammiya have killed their lord. I am afraid!’ (EA 75: 21–34, trans. Moran (1992: 145))

After taking Shigata for himself, Abdi-Ashirta said to the men of Ammiya: ‘Kill your leader, and then you will be like us and at peace.’ They were won over, following his message, and they are like the Habiru. (EA 74: 23–30, trans. Moran (1992: 143))

To the north the city of Sumur (= mod. Tell Kazel?), one of Egypt’s three major strongholds in the region, also fell to Abdi-Ashirta. The other two were Ullaza (Ullassa) and Tunip. All three had succumbed to Egypt during Tuthmosis III’s Syrian campaigns. Abdi-Ashirta was perhaps encouraged by the withdrawal of the Egyptian commissioner Pahannate to occupy Sumur. The cities lay in Egyptian subject territory, for Amurru was the northernmost of Egypt’s possessions in Syria. Surely the pharaoh would not tolerate these blatant acts of aggression against his own territory. But Rib-Hadda’s protests and appeals fell on deaf ears. He was politically outmanoeuvred by his
Amurrite rival. The latter also wrote to the pharaoh, representing himself as the protector of Egyptian interests in Amurru, and seeking to have himself recognized as deputy to the Egyptian governor of the region:

Look, there is Pahannate, my commissioner. May the king, the Sun, ask him if I do not guard Sumur and Ullassa. When my commissioner is on a mission of the king, the Sun, then I am the one who guards the harvest of the grain of Sumur and all the lands for the king, my Sun, my Lord. May the king, my Lord, know me and entrust me to the charge of Pahannate, my commissioner. (EA 60: 19–32, trans. Moran (1992: 132))

Abdi-Ashirta had correctly calculated that the pharaoh had no wish to embroil Egyptian troops in further conflicts in Syria if they could be avoided, and would be only too willing to accept his protestations of loyalty. The support Abdi-Ashirta sought from Egypt was no doubt also assured by the threat of Hittite intervention in Amurru. If the pharaoh refused to accommodate him, Abdi-Ashirta might well throw his lot in with the Hittites. In the face of such considerations, Rib-Hadda's record of unwavering loyalty to his Egyptian overlord carried little weight when he appealed for action against Abdi-Ashirta.

His worst fears were soon to be realized. Emboldened by his military and political successes, and confident that there was little risk of Egyptian intervention, Abdi-Ashirta now turned his attention to the Land of Gubla. In desperation, and no doubt with a sense of utter frustration, Rib-Hadda wrote once more to the pharaoh:

So now Abdi-Ashirta has written to the troops: ‘Assemble in the temple of Ninurta, and then let us fall upon Gubla. Look, there is no-one that will save it from us. Then let us drive out the mayors from the country that the entire country be joined to the Habiru... Should even so the king come out, the entire country will be against him, and what will he do to us?’ Accordingly, they have made an alliance among themselves and, accordingly, I am very, very afraid, since in fact there is no-one who will save me from them. Like a bird in a trap so I am in Gubla. Why have you neglected your country? I have written like this to the palace, but you do not heed my words. (EA 74: 30–50, trans. Moran (1992: 143))

Again, apparently, there was no response from the pharaoh. Appeals by Rib-Hadda to his southern neighbours, Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre, also went unanswered. One by one the cities of the highlands and the coast
fell to Abdi-Ashirta and the Habiru. Soon only two towns and the royal
capital remained to the king. But just when the fall of the capital
seemed imminent, it was saved—by the timely arrival in the region of
an Egyptian expeditionary force which seized Abdi-Ashirta and placed
him in custody.

This may well have brought the Amurrite’s career to an abrupt and
unceremonious end. But mystery surrounds his ultimate fate. In a letter
probably written by Rib-Hadda to Akhenaten, we may have a reference
to his death. According to one interpretation, the letter states (without
Moran (1992: 174)). An alternative interpretation reads: ‘They will
defeat Abdi-Ashirta.’ In either case the precise details of the renegade’s
end remain unknown. Was he assassinated by dissidents amongst his
own countrymen, or by officers of the pharaoh acting on their own
initiative? Did he die of natural causes after a serious illness? Or was
he in fact taken to Egypt by the Egyptian task force which reoccupied
Sumur? The likelihood is that he did in fact overstep the limits of
Egyptian patience, and that the pharaoh did finally respond to Rib-
Hadda’s appeals, and ordered the reassertion of Egyptian control over
the territories occupied by Abdi-Ashirta—and the permanent removal
of Abdi-Ashirta from the scene.

But whatever the manner of his removal, Abdi-Ashirta’s death pro-
vided no more than a very temporary respite from the problems which
Amurru caused both to Egypt and to its own neighbours, especially
Gubla. Shortly after his death, he was succeeded by his son Aziru—who
proved no less of a threat to his neighbours than his father had been, and
even more politically astute than his father in the international political
arena.

Aziru is one of the best documented and undoubtedly one of the
most colourful personalities of Late Bronze Age Syria. Fifteen of his
letters to the pharaoh have survived, and there are numerous references
to him in other letters in the Amarna archive and a range of other
documents. But abundant though this material is, it leaves us with many
unresolved problems, particularly relating to the chronology of important
events in Aziru’s career.

Aziru must have come to power around the time Suppilululiuma was
preparing for his first major thrust into Syria. Given Amurru’s proximity
to the expanding sphere of Hittite influence, the situation might well be
exploited by an astute local ruler seeking to play one of the major powers off against the other.

The respite Rib-Hadda gained from the death of Abdi-Ashirta proved extremely short-lived. If anything the luckless king of Gubla found in his successor an even more formidable and ruthless opponent. Cities like Iqrata, Ambi, Shigata, and Ardata, previously captured by Abdi-Ashirta, had scarcely been ‘liberated’ before they were again occupied, by the forces of the new Amurrite leader and his brothers. For a while Sumur, reinforced by Egyptian troops, held out against Aziru. Once again Rib-Hadda sent a stream of letters to the pharaoh, stressing how desperate the situation was and begging for reinforcements. If the pharaoh failed to act, then Sumur would certainly fall. Yet again there appears to have been no response from the pharaoh. In the struggle to defend the city the Egyptian commissioner was killed, and in the face of the Amurrite siege, there was large-scale evacuation of the city’s inhabitants.

Yet Aziru also made representations to the pharaoh. Far from being an enemy of Egypt, he was the pharaoh’s loyal subject, he claimed. His wish was but to serve the pharaoh, and to protect his territories against his enemies. And his attempts to do so were being frustrated by the Egyptian officials in Sumur who refused him entrance to the city:

My Lord, from the very first, I have wanted (to enter) the service of the king, my Lord, but the magnates of Sumur do not permit me. Now of dereliction of duty or the slightest thing against the king I am innocent. The king, my Lord, knows (who the real) rebels (are). And whatever the request of the king, my Lord, I will grant it. (EA 157, 9–19, trans. Moran (1992: 243))

Aziru went on to refer to Hittite aggression against him, and asked for Egyptian troops and chariots in support of his efforts to defend Egyptian territory against the Hittites. But in spite of all his protestations of loyalty, his complaints against the local Egyptian officials and his request for assistance against the Hittites conveyed a very clear warning: should the pharaoh prove unco-operative, he might have no alternative but to join the Hittite king and hand over to him the territories he had conquered.

Akhenaten had on his hands a dilemma of major proportions. Suppiluliuma had apparently sought to assure him of his wish to maintain friendly relations with Egypt and his intention to respect
Egyptian subject territory in Syria. And the pharaoh can hardly have wanted to provoke a conflict with him. But the scales were very delicately balanced. To respond to Rib-Hadda’s requests for action against Aziru would almost certainly have driven the latter into the Hittite camp. Yet to refuse support to Rib-Hadda meant virtually surrendering to Aziru whatever territory he managed to acquire for himself by force of arms. To go even further and strengthen Aziru’s hand by sending him reinforcements would exacerbate the crisis in his subject territories; further, use of these forces against the Hittite king might well be construed as an open declaration of war.

Perhaps if the pharaoh met Aziru face to face the dilemma could be resolved. And perhaps it was at this point in his career that Aziru went to Egypt. Very likely he did so in response to the pharaoh’s command. The visit would have enabled Akhenaten to make his own personal assessment of his self-proclaimed loyal subject, to judge for himself what was to be believed from the myriad conflicting reports he had received about him. It would also have provided the opportunity to spell out to Aziru in person the terms on which he would be granted formal Egyptian endorsement of his position in Amurru. Aziru could hardly have been unaware of the risks involved in putting himself directly in the pharaoh’s hands. And as an astute political strategist, he must have carefully weighed up the consequences of either complying with or defying the pharaoh’s command. His conclusion was that at this stage he had more to gain by complying. And so he did, while no doubt in his own mind keeping open the question of where his future allegiance would lie.91

Yet he may not have reckoned on the length of time that the pharaoh would keep him in Egypt—it was at least a year. Indeed there were rumours that he would never leave Egypt, that his son Duppi-Teshub had sold him to the pharaoh for gold. This information is revealed to us in a letter written to Akhenaten probably by Duppi-Teshub, urging the pharaoh to allow his father to return home immediately;92 his continued absence was placing the kingdom of Amurru at serious risk from hostile neighbours. This was reinforced in a letter to Aziru from his brother(?) Baaluya and his son(?) Beti-ilu,93 with the alarming news that Hittite troops under the command of Lupakki had captured cities in the territory of Amka (Amki).94 There was an even more alarming report, yet to be confirmed, that a further force of 90,000 (sic) Hittite infantry under the command of Zitana had arrived in the country of Nuhash-
The news was grave, and seemed to point to an imminent and massive Hittite-led offensive against Amurru, from both north (Nuhashshi) and south (Amka).

These circumstances may well have persuaded the pharaoh to allow Aziru to return to his homeland without further delay, to rally his forces for the defence of his kingdom. It was not only the Amurrite kingdom that was at stake. By invading Amka the Hittites had violated Egyptian subject territory, and might well mount a more comprehensive challenge to Egyptian territorial possessions in Syria, if their depredations proceeded without check.

We do not know what agreements were reached between Akhenaten and Aziru while the latter was in Egypt. But Aziru’s return to Syria allegedly to protect Egyptian interests there must reflect clear assurances by the Amurrite king that he would remain firm in his loyalty to the pharaoh. Akhenaten’s options were very limited. By detaining Aziru in Egypt, he faced the almost certain loss of Amurru and other Egyptian territories in Syria to the Hittites. By releasing Aziru, he could do little more than hope that Aziru would honour any undertakings he had given to defend Egyptian interests in Syria. The risks were great—but there really was no viable alternative.

For a short time after his return, Aziru apparently maintained a show of allegiance to his Egyptian overlord by continuing a dispute with Niqmaddu II, king of Ugarit and now a Hittite vassal, begun during his absence by his deputy Baaluya. But a settlement was reached between the two rulers, and in the same period Aziru began building an alliance with Aitakkama of Kadesh (EA 151: 69–73), another state which was now firmly in the Hittite camp.

In Gubla, Rib-Hadda’s position was becoming increasingly desperate as Aziru grew ever stronger and more threatening. Stubbornly refusing the urgings of his own family that he come to terms with the Amurrite, Rib-Hadda went to Beirut with the intention of seeking an alliance with, or at least the support of, its ruler Ammunira. Ammunira gave him a sympathetic hearing, but was apparently unwilling or unable to provide him with any tangible assistance. Rib-Hadda left Beirut empty-handed. Worse was to follow. On returning to his capital, he found that a coup had taken place, that his throne had been seized by his younger brother Ilirabih. Exiled from his own city, he went back to Beirut for temporary refuge with Ammunira while seeking support from Egypt for
restoration to his throne. In spite of promises from Egypt, the requested support never materialized, and Rib-Hadda had to resort to the ignominious alternative of throwing himself on the mercy of his mortal enemy Aziru. The latter’s response, recorded in one of Akhenaten’s letters, has been differently interpreted. According to the traditional view, Aziru promptly handed his suppliant over to the rulers of Sidon (‘you gave him to (some) mayors’—thus Moran), where he had finally taken up residence in exile and it was almost certainly at their hands that he met his death. However, the relevant words in the letter have more recently been interpreted to mean that Aziru responded positively to the suppliant by giving him a mayoral appointment (‘you gave (appointed) him for mayoralty.’) So we are left with two alternatives—a cruel and unceremonious end for the ex-king of Byblos at the hands of the Sidonian mayors, or submission to his arch-enemy and a relatively comfortable sinecure to see out his days!

Either way Akhenaten responded angrily to the news of Aziru’s action. Even before this he was becoming increasingly concerned at his delinquent vassal’s conduct and had summoned him to Egypt for a second meeting. But the latter in letters both to the pharaoh and to his officials had put off the visit with the excuse that the Hittite king was in Nuhashshi and an invasion of Amurru was feared. It soon became clear that this was largely a pretext on Aziru’s part—to gain time for strengthening his own position in the region, while avoiding outright defiance of his overlord’s command. Doubtless he was pondering on how he could best turn the highly unstable political scene in Syria to his own advantage, and was now seriously considering whether his interests would best be served by switching his allegiance to the Hittite king.

Akhenaten clearly suspected this. The reports he received from his other vassals in the region were deeply worrying: Aziru had seized cities in Qatna, and was collaborating both with Zimredda of Sidon, and Aitakkama of Kadesh. This latter collaboration in particular must have alarmed the pharaoh, for Aitakkama had been placed on the throne of Kadesh as a Hittite vassal and was a declared enemy of Egypt. With a scarcely veiled accusation of outright treachery, Akhenaten now issued a peremptory demand that Aziru or his son now appear before him:

Now the king has heard as follows: ‘You are at peace with the ruler of Qidsa (Kadesh). The two of you take food and strong drink together.’ And it is true.
Why do you act so? Why are you at peace with a ruler with whom the king is fighting? ... But if you perform your service for the king, your Lord, what is there that the king will not do for you? If for any reason whatsoever you prefer to do evil, and if you plot evil, treacherous things, then you, together with your entire family, shall die by the axe of the king ... And when you wrote, saying, ‘May the king, my Lord, give me leave this year, and then I will go next year to the king, my Lord. If this is impossible, I will send my son in my place’—the king, your Lord, let you off this year, in accordance with what you said. Come yourself (now), or send your son, and you will see the king at whose sight all lands live. (EA 162, 22 ff., trans. Moran (1992: 249))

This final demand of the pharaoh was refused, or more likely simply ignored. Aziru must now have openly declared his allegiance to Hatti. After previously communicating with the Hittite king on a number of occasions, he formalized his relationship with Suppiluliuma by drawing up a treaty of vassalhood with him.107 Confident in the protection of the Hittite king, and with the consolidation of his position through regional alliances, with local rulers like Niqmaddu and Aitakkama, Aziru could safely set aside his former overlord. He remained faithful to his new Hittite overlord until his death.

Suppiluliuma Consolidates his Syrian Conquests

The Hittite conquests in the one-year Syrian campaign, and the events which followed in the aftermath of this campaign resulted in the establishment of a network of Hittite vassal states extending through almost the entire region of Syria north of Damascus. Niqmaddu II had pledged his allegiance to Suppiluliuma at Alalah, and had been installed as vassal ruler on the throne of the kingdom of Ugarit. Tette had been installed as vassal ruler of Nuhashshi.108 Kadesh was removed from the Egyptian orbit and became a Hittite vassal state when Suppiluliuma put Aitakkama on its throne. Aziru had eventually thrown his lot in with Suppiluliuma and brought the kingdom of Amurru into the Hittite fold. And both Aitakkama and Aziru used their status as Hittite vassals to extend their own territories at the expense of neighbouring states who remained faithful to their Egyptian allegiance. Protests and appeals by these states to the pharaoh apparently went unanswered, as in the case of Abi-Milki of Tyre, Akizzzi of Qatna, and most notably as we have have seen, Rib-Hadda of Gubla. Thus Qatna whose ruler at that time, a man
called Akizzi, held firm to his Egyptian allegiance, fell victim to Aitak-kama,\textsuperscript{109} who had both Hittite support and the support of Aziru.

But Suppiluliuma could not yet claim total victory. Tushratta still eluded him. And there was still one Mitannian stronghold to be conquered—Carchemish on the Euphrates. While the Mitannian king and a major centre of Mitannian power remained beyond his grasp, Suppiluliuma’s conquests were incomplete. In what is commonly referred to as the Second Syrian War, or Hurrian War, Suppiluliuma launched a series of military operations, over a period of some six years,\textsuperscript{110} which resulted in the final subjugation of Mitanni and the consolidation of Hittite control over Syrian territory north of Damascus.

Akhenaten had died some ten years before this war, and with the abandonment of his capital Amarna within three to four years of his death, the Amarna archive came to an end. Thus we lose one of our chief sources of information on developments in Syria. Unfortunately the section of the \textit{Deeds} covering the period after Akhenaten’s death is too fragmentary for any significant information to be gained from it. We do know, however, that by the year immediately preceding the Second Syrian War Suppiluliuma was back in Anatolia, engaged in further operations in the Kaska region.\textsuperscript{111} Military operations in Syria were left in the hands of deputies, notably his son Telipinu.

We have seen that Telipinu was originally appointed by Suppiluliuma as ‘priest’ in Kizzuwadna—though with powers and responsibilities which went considerably beyond a priestly role. Subsequently his father appointed him as king (\textit{lugal}) of the Land of Aleppo.\textsuperscript{112} In contrast to the other kingdoms in Syria the throne of Aleppo was not reoccupied by a local ruler after the Hittite conquest. Suppiluliuma had decided to establish direct rule over it by appointing his son as his viceroy there—an appointment which presumably meant that Telipinu relinquished his post in Kizzuwadna.\textsuperscript{113}

The Hittite king’s departure from Syria prompted one final attempt by the forces of Tushratta to reassert Mitannian power west of the Euphrates. Hostilities flared up in the Euphrates region around the territory of the Mitannian stronghold Carchemish. But the Hittite prince Telipinu, if he had already been installed as viceroy in Aleppo, was well placed to meet any fresh challenge from across the Euphrates—which may indeed have been one of the main reasons for his appointment. He now moved swiftly to deal with the situation. Leading an
expedition against the enemy forces, he subdued the countries of Arziya and Carchemish—though not the city of Carchemish—and established a winter camp in the town of Murmuriga.114

But at this point he was summoned from the region for a meeting with his father, leaving behind a Hittite garrison of 600 troops115 and chariotry under the command of Lupakki. The situation in Syria remained unstable. The city of Carchemish had yet to be taken, and Mitannian troops invaded the Euphrates region and laid siege to the Hittite garrison at Murmuriga.

The meeting between Suppiluliuma and his son took place in Uda in the Lower Land, where Suppiluliuma was celebrating religious festivals. The chief purpose of the meeting was probably to provide the king with first-hand information on the current military situation in Syria, particularly in the region of Carchemish, to assess whether his own return was warranted.116 With the absence of both the king and his son from Syria, Hittite control in the region came under increasing pressure. The Hittite garrison at Murmuriga was in danger of falling to the Mitannian besieging force. At the same time the Egyptian pharaoh, now Tutankhamun, sensing a weakening of the Hittites’ grasp on the subject territories they had taken from Egypt, and seeking to regain some of Egypt’s prestige and influence in the region, launched an attack on Kadesh.117

The danger of a renewed and strengthened alliance between the weakened though still unconquered Mitannian king and a pharaoh who sought to restore Egypt’s lost power in Syria might well have assumed major proportions. Decisive action, taken by the king in person, was essential. As soon as the winter had passed, Suppiluliuma began his march into Syria. He paused at Tegarama, where after reviewing his troops and chariotry he sent ahead of him an army under the command of his son, the crown prince Arnuwanda, and his brother Zida, the Chief of the Bodyguards. Their military successes paved the way for Suppiluliuma’s own arrival in the region, to undertake the last remaining task that would complete the total destruction of the Mitannian empire—the conquest of the city of Carchemish.

As he was preparing to lay siege to the city, he also sought to settle a score with Egypt. In spite of his apparent attempts to maintain peaceful relations with the pharaoh, the Egyptians had attacked Kadesh, which the Hittites now claimed as their own territory. This allegedly
unprovoked act of aggression had infuriated Suppiluliuma. Now that Egypt’s Mitannian ally was close to total collapse, retaliatory action could be taken. A detachment of troops was dispatched under the command of Lupakki and Tarhunta-zalma for a tit-for-tat attack against the Egyptian subject state Amka. As Suppiluliuma was later to say to the Egyptian envoy Hani:

I myself was [ ] friendly, but you, you suddenly did me evil. You came(?) and attacked the man of Kadesh whom I had taken away(?) from the king of the Land of Hurri. When I heard this, I became angry, and I sent forth my own troops and chariots and the lords. So they came and attacked your territory, the Land of Amka. (DS p. 97, frag. 28 e3 iv 1–8, after Güterbock)

But was this sufficient to satisfy the Hittite king’s wrath? The Egyptians might well have feared that once the destruction of Mitanni was complete, the full force of Hittite military might would be turned their way. To make matters worse, the Egyptian monarchy was suddenly plunged into crisis. It was this which gave rise to one of the most extraordinary, and one of the most puzzling, episodes in the history of the ancient Near East.

‘Such a Thing has Never Happened to me in my Whole Life!’

As Suppiluliuma prepared for his final onslaught on Carchemish, he received word that a messenger had arrived from Egypt, with an urgent letter from the Egyptian queen. With some surprise, he listened as the letter was read to him. It began with a simple statement. ‘My husband is dead.’ Then followed an extraordinary request. Surprise turned quickly to amazement as the Hittite king realized the full implications of what the queen was asking of him. ‘Such a thing has never happened to me in my whole life!’, he exclaimed. He hastily convened a council of his nobles, seeking their reaction and advice. Could the queen be trusted? Was she attempting to deceive them? A decision was made to send the royal chamberlain Hattusa-ziti to Egypt. The king’s instructions to him were clear: ‘Go and bring me back the truth!’

The queen’s request as recorded in the Deeds was baldly stated: ‘I have no son. But they say that you have many sons. If you would give me one of your sons, he would become my husband. I will never take a servant of mine and make him my husband!’ (DS p. 94, frag. 28 a iii 11–15).
The pharaoh whose sudden death had led to this request is called Niphururiya (Nibhururiya) in the Deeds. This is a precise rendering in cuneiform of Tutankhamun’s prenomen Nebkheperure.121 Although a number of scholars have attempted to equate the pharaoh in question with Akhenaten,122 the case for Tutankhamun remains by far the stronger one.123

The widow of the pharaoh is called Dahamunzu in the Deeds. The name simply means ‘the wife of the king’.124 But we know from Egyptian records that this was the queen Ankhesenpaaten (after the resoration of the Theban gods, she was called Ankhesenamun).125 She was the third eldest of Akhenaten’s and Nefertiti’s six daughters. At the time of her husband’s death she was probably twenty-one or twenty-two years’ old, three years or so older than Tutankhamun. This was the woman whose request to Suppiluliuma had aroused such surprise and suspicion. Hostilities had recently flared between the two kingdoms. They were now virtually on a war footing. Yet within a matter of a few weeks the Egyptian queen had asked for a marriage alliance! Leaving aside the context in which this request was made, it was certainly not uncommon for such alliances to be arranged between Near Eastern rulers. The difference here was that Tutankhamun’s widow was not merely offering a marriage alliance. She was offering, to a foreign prince, her kingdom’s throne! Little wonder that Suppiluliuma decided to send his chamberlain Hattusa-ziti to Egypt to determine the sincerity of the queen’s request before he acceded to it.126

In the meantime, Suppiluliuma turned his attention back to the siege of Carchemish:

He had besieged it for seven days, and on the eighth day he fought a battle against it for one day and took(?) it in a terrific battle. When he had conquered the city—since my father feared the gods—on the upper citadel he let no-one into the presence(?) of (the deity) [Kubaba (?)] and of (the deity) LAMMA, and he did not rush close to any one of the temples . . . But from the lower town he removed the inhabitants, silver, gold, and bronze utensils and carried them to Hattusa. (DS p. 95, frag. 28 a iii 28–41)

When the city finally fell, Suppiluliuma installed his son Piyassili, who now adopted the Hurrian throne-name Sharri-Kushuh, as viceroy in the Land of Carchemish.127
It was about this time that Tushratta finally met his end. He had avoided capture by the Hittites, and his whereabouts remained unknown. But reports were received that he had fallen victim to a group of assassins, which included his own son Shattiwaza. Suppiluliuma could now begin his homeward trek to Hattusa, confident that all his main objectives in his conflict with Mitanni had been accomplished.

By appointing his sons as viceroys in Syria—Telipinu in Aleppo and Sharri-Kushuh in Carchemish—he had taken the unprecedented step of imposing direct Hittite rule over subject territories beyond the homeland. He had good reason for doing so. The destruction of the Mitannian empire had been achieved. But Egypt remained a constant threat to Hittite interests in Syria and might well try to win back its lost territories. Assyria, now released from Mitannian bondage, was also beginning to loom menacingly on the horizon. When we add to this the fluctuating loyalties of the local Syrian kingdoms and the inherently volatile relationships between them, it must have been very clear to Suppiluliuma that his hold on the region would remain tenuous without a permanent strong Hittite presence to enforce it. It was only after completing his arrangements for viceregal rule in Carchemish as well as in Aleppo that he felt he could leave Syria, with reasonable hopes for a lasting *pax Hethitica* in the region.

Once back in Hattusa, he awaited the return of his envoy Hattusa-ziti from Egypt.

### An Aborted Marriage Alliance

The following spring, as soon as the winter snows had begun to thaw, Hattusa-ziti returned to the Hittite court. He was accompanied by one of the queen’s special envoys, a man called Hani. The meeting with Suppiluliuma took place in the pillared audience chamber of the Hittite palace. Here Hattusa-ziti presented his king with a furious letter from the Egyptian queen:

> Why did you say ‘they deceive me’ in that way? Had I a son, would I have written about my own and my country’s shame to a foreign land? You did not believe me, and you even spoke thus to me! He who was my husband is dead. I have no son! Never shall I take a servant of mine and make him my husband! I have written to no other country. Only to you I have written. They say you have
many sons; so give me one son of yours. To me he will be husband. In Egypt he will be king! (DS pp. 96–7, frag. 28 a iii 50–a iv 12.)

As Suppiluliuma listened to the letter being read to him, his own anger mounted. What right had the Egyptians to complain? Had he not good reason to suspect their intentions? Had they not recently made a treacherous, unprovoked attack on Kadesh, and suffered the consequences when Amka was attacked in retaliation? Fear and further treachery were the motives underlying the Egyptian queen’s approach. That at least was Suppiluliuma’s conclusion: ‘When they (the Hittite expeditionary force) attacked Amka, which is your country, you probably were afraid; and (therefore) you keep asking me for a son of mine (as if it were my) duty. He will in some way become a hostage. You will not make him king!’ (DS p. 97, frag. 28 e3 iv 8–12).

The signs for a successful outcome to the queen’s mission were decidedly unfavourable. But then it was the turn of the Egyptian envoy Hani to speak. Hani’s name occurs a number of times within the context of Egyptian diplomatic missions. He was well known as an experienced and highly accomplished representative of the Egyptian court. His approach to Suppiluliuma was conciliatory—and ingratiating:

Oh my Lord! This is our country’s shame! If we had a son of the king at all, would we have come to a foreign country and kept asking for a lord for ourselves? Niphururiya who was our lord is dead. He has no son. Our Lord’s wife is solitary. We are seeking a son of our Lord (i.e. Suppiluliuma) for the kingship in Egypt. And for the woman, our Lady, we seek him as her husband! Furthermore, we went to no other country, only here did we come! Now, oh our Lord, give us a son of yours! (DS pp. 97–8, frag. 28 e3 iv 13–25)

The king was finally won over: ‘Since my father was kindhearted, he complied with the word of the woman, and concerned himself with the matter of (supplying her with) a son’ (DS p. 97, frag. 28 a iv 13–15).

Suppiluliuma had already made arrangements for three of his five sons. His eldest son Arnuwanda was crown prince. His next two sons, Telipinu and Sharri-Kushuh, had been appointed viceroys in Syria. His youngest son Mursili was still only a child, or young adolescent. That left only the fourth son—a young man called Zannanza. It was Zannanza who now set off for Egypt to marry the Egyptian queen.

If the reason Mursili gives for the decision his father finally made is true—a concession made to the young widowed queen out of the
kindness of his heart—then it was an extraordinary act of gallantry on Suppiluliuma’s part. We can be justifiably sceptical. Throughout his career Suppiluliuma had proved himself a shrewd political operator as well as an able military commander. Skilful diplomacy could often achieve important political objectives—at far less cost than force of arms. Undoubtedly Suppiluliuma found great attraction in the prospect of one of his sons becoming king of Egypt. In this way he could extend Hittite power and influence a far greater distance than he could hitherto have dreamed of—without one drop of Hittite blood being spilt. And at one diplomatic stroke he could put an end to any future threat Egypt might pose to Hittite territory in Syria. But his son’s safety was his paramount concern. It was only after being convinced that Zannanza would come to no harm that he dispatched him to Egypt.

Zannanza began the journey. Back in Hattusa, Suppiluliuma waited anxiously for news of his son’s safe arrival in Egypt. Several weeks passed. Then a messenger arrived at the Hittite court. Zannanza was dead. He had been killed on the journey to Egypt.

Who was responsible? His father had no doubts about this. When the news of Zannanza’s death was broken to him, Suppiluliuma’s grief and fury knew no bounds. He held the Egyptians directly responsible for the crime: ‘When my father heard of the murder of Zannanza, he began to lament for Zannanza, and to the gods he spoke thus: “Oh Gods! I did no evil, yet the people of Egypt did this to me! They also attacked the frontier of my country!”’ (DS p. 108, frag. 31, 7’–11’).

Vengeance was inevitable. For the Egyptians, the crisis caused by Tutankhamun’s death, the last king of the eighteenth dynasty, was serious enough in itself. They were now faced as well with the threat of all-out war with Hatti. It was imperative that a new king be installed on the throne without further delay.

The man who now became pharaoh is depicted on one of the walls of Tutankhamun’s tomb, performing the final ceremonies before the tomb was sealed. His name was Ay. Suspicion inevitably falls on him as the person most likely to have ordered the murder of the Hittite prince. Though not of royal blood himself, it is possible that he was related by marriage to the royal family. He had been one of Akhenaten’s closest and most trusted advisers, and continued to exercise a strong influence in the Egyptian court throughout the reign of Tutankhamun. On
Tutankhamun’s death, he might well have seen himself as the rightful successor to the Egyptian throne. It is scarcely surprising that Suppiluliuma—and posterity—should blame Ay for the Hittite prince’s death. But he was probably innocent of the crime.

From the fragmentary remains of a letter written by Suppiluliuma to the new pharaoh, it is clear that Ay denied all responsibility for Zannanza’s death. Yet Suppiluliuma was bent on vengeance. Anticipating Hittite military retaliation, the new pharaoh warned Suppiluliuma of the strength of his own forces. He none the less hoped that Suppiluliuma would accept his declaration of innocence, and earnestly sought to establish friendly relations with him. To no avail. Suppiluliuma rejected Ay’s attempt at reconciliation, and prepared to avenge his son’s death. On his orders, a Hittite army under the command of the crown prince Arnuwanda crossed the Egyptian frontiers in southern Syria and launched a vigorous attack on the cities in the region. Many thousands of prisoners-of-war were taken, and transported back to the Hittite homeland.

The sequel to this has an ironic twist. The prisoners brought with them a plague, which for the next twenty years ravaged the kingdom and decimated its population (see Ch. 8).

The death of the Hittite prince still remains a mystery. It presents us with one of the intriguing ‘what ifs’ of history. What if Zannanza had in fact reached Egypt and ascended the Egyptian throne? Would this have been the beginning of a powerful Egyptian–Hittite alliance which might have changed the course of history? The answer is almost certainly not. Whatever the causes of the prince’s death, there were undoubtedly powerful forces in Egypt opposed to the alliance. Even had Zannanza survived his journey to Egypt and actually ascended Egypt’s throne, he would almost certainly have been little more than a nonentity for as long as his wife managed to cling to power. We must bear in mind that Ankhensenamun’s bid for a Hittite prince as husband was a last desperate ploy by the last survivor of a dynasty already in its death throes. The proposed marriage alliance was doomed from the outset.

One clear outcome of Zannanza’s death was an intensification of the enmity between Hatti and Egypt. This was to culminate, some fifty years later, in a showdown at Kadesh.
Problems on the Eastern Flank

For the remaining years of his reign, Suppiluliuma had pressing problems to deal with on the eastern flank of his empire. The destruction of the Mitannian kingdom had left a political vacuum east of the Euphrates, which the newly liberated Assyrian kingdom, then under the rule of Ashur-uballit, was hastening to fill. The kingdom of Mitanni was despoiled by troops from both Assyria and the kingdom of Alshe. Its treasures were carried off to Assyria, its charioteers to Alshe where they suffered death by impalement. The northern part of the former Mitannian kingdom was now divided between Assyria and Alshe.\(^\text{133}\)

The throne of what was still left of the old kingdom was occupied by Tushratta’s son Shattiwaza. This was a cause for further inter-dynastic disputes. Suppiluliuma had almost certainly promised to support Artatama as the rightful king of Mitanni when he drew up his treaty with him before the First Syrian war. If so, he apparently reneged on his promise after Tushratta’s downfall. The succession had passed to Tushratta’s son. This provoked a bitter reaction from Artatama’s son Shuttarna III. If Tushratta was a usurper, then his son had no right to the throne. A struggle ensued, which ended with Shattiwaza being forced to abandon the throne and flee for his life, first to Babylonia and then to Hatti where he sought Suppiluliuma’s assistance in reinstating him.

Contrary to any previous agreement he had made with Artatama, Suppiluliuma may have subsequently promised to back Shattiwaza in the succession stakes. The murder of his father Tushratta, along with an undertaking that Shattiwaza would rule what was left of his father’s kingdom as an ally of the Hittite king, was probably the price the Mitannian prince was called upon to pay for this backing.\(^\text{134}\) But Shattiwaza had been overthrown, and the new regime which replaced him must have been decidedly hostile to the regime in Hattusa. For Suppiluliuma the situation was intolerable, particularly with the Assyrian threat to the region looming ever larger. Indeed the new Mitannian king Shuttarna had probably aligned himself with Assyria, ingratiating himself with its king by sending him rich gifts including booty which the former Mitannian king Saushtatar I had seized from Ashur.\(^\text{135}\) If the remainder of the Mitannian kingdom were to be established firmly within the Assyrian orbit, the Hittites’ subject territories west of the
Euphrates, and particularly the viceregal kingdom of Carchemish, would be at grave risk.

Suppiluliuma decided to act. After consolidating an alliance with Shattiwaza by marrying one of his daughters to him, he sent the Mitannian prince to Carchemish to prepare for a joint campaign across the Euphrates with the viceroy Sharri-Kushuh—with the object of re-establishing Shattiwaza on the Mitannian throne:

Having supported by my hand Shattiwaza, son of Tushratta the king, I will let him sit upon his father’s throne. And in order that the Land of Mitanni—which is a great country—be not destroyed, I, the Great King, King of Hatti, will let the Mitanni country live. (Suppiluliuma: Shattiwaza Treaty, PD no. 1 (CTH 51) 18–19, obv. 56–8, trans. Liverani (2001: 43))

Irrite and Harran fell before the army of the Hittite and Mitannian princes, who finally led their troops in triumph into the Mitannian capital, with much rejoicing from the local populace. Enemy resistance seems to have been minimal. Apart from some minor skirmishing with the invaders, the Assyrian king Ashur-uballit decided to avoid becoming embroiled in a major conflict with the Hittites—for the time being.

**The Boundaries are Redrawn**

Following the military success won by Sharri-Kushuh and Shattiwaza, Suppiluliuma drew up a treaty with Shattiwaza, now restored to the Mitannian throne, which bound him in a close alliance with his military partner, the viceroy of Carchemish. But the kingdom ruled by Shattiwaza was but a pale shadow of the kingdom over which his father had held sway. Though Suppiluliuma may have sought to play down its greatly diminished status, it was now much reduced in size, and was little more than a puppet state of the Hittite king. By contrast, the list of countries detailed in the new boundary provisions in the treaty indicates a significant expansion of the kingdom of Carchemish both east and west of the Euphrates:

I, the Great King, the King of Hatti, I conquered the Mitanni lands. In the time of the king’s son Shattiwaza, I conquered them, in the time of Tushratta I conquered them. I established the Euphrates river in my rear and Mount Niblani as my boundaries. All the cities of the Land of Ashtata on this bank:
Murmuriga, Sipri, Mazuwati, Surun, these cities in the district of [ ] I allotted to my son Piyassili. All the cities of the Land of Ashtata on the other bank, which are located in the Land of Mitanni: Igal [ ], Ahuna and Terqa, these cities of the Land of Ashtata, since the king’s son Piyassili together with the king’s son Shattiwaza crossed the Euphrates and entered Irrite, all these cities on the other bank that Piyassili took, let him keep them; they belong to Piyassili. (Suppiluliuma: Shattiwaza Treaty, PD no. 1, 22–5, rev. 14–21, trans. Liverani (2001: 48))

The territory to the east served as a frontier defence zone against Assyrian encroachment across the Euphrates. West of the Euphrates, the kingdom extended to the borders of Mukish. Almost certainly it also absorbed part of the territory formerly belonging to the Nuhashshi lands.140 Southwards along the Euphrates, the kingdom incorporated territory formerly belonging to the kingdom of Ashtata.141 To Sharri-Kushuh fell the daunting task of governing this large and inherently unstable conglomeration of subject territories.142

Within the region of Ashtata, a new city was built under Hittite direction and inaugurated by Suppiluliuma’s son Mursili II.143 This was the city of Emar, uncovered by the French in excavations during the period 1972 to 1976 at the site of Tell Meskene Khadime on the right bank of the middle Euphrates, in what is now commonly referred to as the ‘Big Bend’ of the Euphrates.144 The name Emar was already well known from earlier references in the Mari archives and other contemporary documents.145 In the early second millennium it was evidently a prosperous centre involved in the economic and commercial activities of Mesopotamia and northern Syria. However, the ‘Hittite city’ was a new foundation which has revealed no trace of earlier settlement. Presumably the site of old Emar lay somewhere close by, where it still awaits discovery.146 The new kingdom of Emar extended along the Euphrates to the borders of Carchemish on the north and Aleppo on the west.147

Texts from the new city make clear that Emar was subject to Hittite control from the fourteenth to the early twelfth centuries, under the immediate jurisdiction of the viceroy at Carchemish.148 But although the Hittites were actively involved in the daily affairs of the kingdom, administrative responsibilities were divided between the Hittite viceroy and a local ruler. The latter was supported by a council of elders. This group, based apparently on a clan system, seems to have exercised an important consultative role, which in effect considerably circumscribed
the powers of the local ruler. Hence at Emar political negotiations between the Hittite viceroy and the local authorities were probably more complex than in the case of other vassal states where the Hittite king or viceroy dealt directly and in most cases exclusively with the vassal king.  

While the Hittites seem to have taken no part in the economic activities of Emar, they did involve themselves directly in the administration of justice, even down to a very mundane and routine level. Thus the Hittite king received an appeal from a local priest involved in a dispute with the garrison commander over property and taxes, and made a judgment in favour of the priest:

Thus (speaks) My Sun: Say to Alziyamuwa: ‘Look, this Zu-Ba’al, a priest, man of Ashtata, has prostrated himself before me (in these terms): “The house of my parent AN-damali, and the vineyard, Alziyamuwa is taking from me and giving it to Palluwa. As for the šabban, I never before paid it. But now they have imposed upon me the šabban and the luzzi, and I have to pay them.” ’ His Majesty ruled as follows: ‘The house and the vineyard must not be taken from him! As for the šabban which he has never before paid, why have you imposed the šabban and luzzi upon him now? But what he used to pay in the past, he should still keep paying. And no-one should oppress him!’ (MšK 73.1097 = Laroche (1982: no. 1))

The Roles of the Viceroys

There may well have been marked differences between the roles and functions of the viceroys Sharri-Kushuh and Telipinu whom Suppiluliuma appointed in Syria. By virtue of his appointment in Carchemish, and the powers and responsibilities which this appointment entailed, Sharri-Kushuh seems to have played the more influential and more active role in Syrian affairs, and was perhaps generally regarded as the chief representative of Hittite interests in the region. The territories assigned to him on his appointment must have meant that his kingdom reached the very boundaries of the kingdom of Aleppo, which apparently had not been extended on Telipinu’s appointment beyond the limits of the former vassal state.

Telipinu on the other hand is conspicuously absent from the record of political and military activities in Syria after his brother’s appointment in Carchemish. While he clearly did have a military role in Syria prior to
the Second Syrian War, this role was apparently taken over by, or reassigned to, Sharri-Kushuh at the end of the first year of the war. From this time onwards Telipinu took no further part, as far as we can determine, in the political or military affairs of the region as a whole. He may, however, have exercised important religious and judicial responsibilities throughout the Syrian region, by deputizing for his father in the fulfilment of religious responsibilities in his capacity as ‘Great Priest’, and by performing viceregal judicial responsibilities, which included the arbitration of disputes between local vassal rulers.

Thus in the broad context of Hittite authority in Syria, Telipinu’s role as Great Priest in the chief religious centre of the region, and as arbiter of disputes between neighbouring vassal states, complemented Sharri-Kushuh’s predominantly military role in the region. In the religious, judicial, and military functions assigned to them, the viceroys in Carchemish and Aleppo exercised in Syria the three most important functions of the Hittite king himself within the Hittite realm as a whole.

**Suppiluliuma’s Legacy**

Some six years after his capture of Carchemish, Suppiluliuma died, probably a victim of the plague brought by Egyptian prisoners-of-war to Hatti. He is generally regarded as the greatest of all Hittite kings, and his reputation is in many respects well merited. He had brought the kingdom of Hatti from the brink of annihilation to become the most powerful kingdom of the Near Eastern world. He had achieved the destruction of the Mitannian empire, which had long been the greatest threat to Hittite expansion in Syria, and a major threat to the security of Hittite territories within Anatolia, including the homeland itself.

Yet his achievements need some qualification. In the last years of his reign, Assyria was rapidly replacing Mitanni as a major threat to Hittite territory west of the Euphrates—a threat which was to pose an ever-increasing problem to the king’s successors. Tensions between Hatti and Egypt remained high, and with the emergence of a strong new Egyptian dynasty, it would be only a matter of time before serious conflict erupted over the subject territories in Syria. In the west, the Arzawa lands had only temporarily been pacified. And the widespread uprisings throughout Anatolia which followed shortly after the king’s death demonstrated how tenuous Suppiluliuma’s control had been over the territories which
he held in subjection. The problems faced by the Hittite kingdom were exacerbated by the plague which had carried off the king and continued to ravage the homeland for many years. Further, the king left his immediate successors with a major problem to deal with in the royal household itself—his wife, the Babylonian princess Tawananna.
A Young King Proves his Worth: The Reign of Mursili II (c.1321–1295)

The Brief Reign of Arnuwanda II

In spite of the mounting external pressures faced by the kingdom of Hatti at the time of Suppiluliuma’s death, the prospects for maintaining control over the territories won or regained during his reign appeared reasonably promising. The responsibility for governing the kingdom lay primarily in the hands of the king’s three eldest sons, to each of whom Suppiluliuma had allocated specific roles and spheres of authority. All were experienced in administering the affairs of the kingdom, and all had proved capable and successful military commanders. In this respect at least Suppiluliuma had made good provision for the security of his kingdom after his death.

In Hattusa the succession passed to the crown prince Arnuwanda. Although we know little about his career, it is clear that he came to the throne as an experienced military commander, widely respected by his kingdom’s subjects and enemies alike. In Syria the permanent presence of the viceroys Sharri-Kushuh and Telipinu was an important deterrent against Assyrian and Egyptian encroachment on Hittite subject territory in the region, and served also to keep the Syrian vassal states under control.

In the regions closer to the homeland, the situation was more volatile. To the west and south-west, the Arzawa lands remained hostile, and a constant threat to Hittite subject territories adjacent to them. However, the appointment of the veteran commander Hannutti as governor of the Lower Land had ensured that for the time being there was no fresh outbreak of aggression from this region. Of more immediate concern were the threats confronting the Hittites from the Kaska zone and neighbouring territories. Already before the end of Suppiluliuma’s
reign, Kaskan aggression against Hittite territory which had continued sporadically throughout the reign was gathering fresh momentum, due to the king’s preoccupation with affairs in Syria:

Furthermore since my father was in Hurrian territory, as long as he fought with the Hurrian countries and stayed there, many enemies were levied from behind, from Kaska, and they oppressed the Land of Hatti and part they destroyed and part they even occupied and held in possession. (Comprehensive Annals, AM 152–3, trans. Houwink ten Cate (1967: 49–50))

Serious though the situation was, it was not yet out of control. But then an unexpected turn of events precipitated a crisis which once more imperilled the very existence of the Hittite kingdom. Not long after his accession Arnuwanda fell ill, probably another victim of the plague which had carried off his father. News that the new king was ailing, probably terminally ill, spread rapidly, encouraging widespread enemy attacks on Hittite territory. Hannutti, the governor of the Lower Land, was ordered to leave his post, and proceed north without delay. He promptly obeyed, and headed for Ishupitta in the Kaska zone—but died shortly after his arrival. His death must have been a tragic blow to Arnuwanda’s hopes of restoring control in the northern regions. The crisis intensified. With the loss of one of its most able commanders, Hatti was now faced with rapidly escalating enemy action and rebellion.

This was the situation confronting Suppiluliuma’s youngest son Mursili, when on the death of his brother Arnuwanda, perhaps no more than eighteen months after his accession, the mantle of kingship was suddenly thrust upon him.

The ‘Child’ Upon the Throne

The reaction of Hatti’s enemies to the news of Mursili’s accession was one of undisguised contempt:

When my brother Arnuwanda became a god, the enemy lands who had not yet made war, these enemy lands also made war. And the neighbouring enemy lands spoke as follows: ‘His father, who was king of the Land of Hatti and a Hero-King, held sway over the enemy lands. And he became a god. But his son who sat upon his father’s throne and was previously a great warrior fell ill, and he also became a god. Yet he who has recently sat upon his father’s throne is a
child. He will not preserve the Land of Hatti and the territory of the Hatti lands.’ (Ten-Year Annals, AM 16–21)

‘You are a child; you know nothing and instil no fear in me. Your land is now in ruins, and your infantry and chariotry are few. Against your infantry, I have many infantry; against your chariotry I have many chariotry. Your father had many infantry and chariotry. But you, who are a child, how can you match him?’ (Comprehensive Annals, AM 18–21)

A young and inexperienced king, perhaps. But almost certainly not a child when he mounted the throne. He must already have reached an age when he was capable of ruling in his own right. Had this not been the case, then other arrangements, if only temporary, would undoubtedly have been made to ensure the stability of the monarchy. There were, after all, two surviving elder brothers of Mursili, the viceroys of Carchemish and Aleppo, who would surely have seen to it that the kingdom did not collapse for want of a credible successor to the throne.

The young king was probably in his early twenties at the time of his accession. But exaggerated statements about his youth and inexperience were worth recording, for in retrospect they would make the achievements of the early years of his reign seem all the greater. Undoubtedly his first years on the throne were very critical ones. He clearly needed the advice and support of his older brothers, particularly Sharri-Kushuh, with whom he seems to have collaborated closely up to the time of the latter’s death nine years later. But the credit for restoring Hittite authority throughout Anatolia was due very largely to the young king himself. In response to the crisis confronting him on his accession, he acted with exemplary promptness and vigour, in a series of intensive campaigns of pacification and reconquest.

The Critical Early Years of Mursili’s Reign

The Annals of Mursili provide us with a record of the military campaigns conducted throughout the king’s reign. They appear in two series: (1) a summary account, inscribed on a single tablet, of Mursili’s personal military achievements during the first ten years of his reign; (2) a detailed account, inscribed on many tablets, of Hittite campaigns incorporating the first ten years of the reign, but extending over a period of some twenty-seven years and including a record of the exploits of the
king’s military commanders. Unfortunately much of this latter series is now lost. We shall refer to each series respectively as the Ten-Year Annals and the Comprehensive Annals.⁸

Punitive campaigns against the Kaska people occupied the first two years of Mursili’s reign. When the young king felt confident that he had effectively, if only temporarily, relieved the pressures on the homeland’s northern frontiers, he turned his attention to the west. Here Hittite interests were being seriously threatened by the aggressive activities of Uhhaziti, king of Arzawa Minor, the nucleus of the Arzawa complex. From his capital Apasa, located almost certainly on the site of the later Ephesos,⁹ Uhhaziti was attempting to win, or to force, Hittite subject states in the region away from their allegiance, apparently in collaboration with the king of Ahhiyawa. The latter probably controlled a group of islands in the eastern Aegean, close to the Anatolian mainland, which could serve as a place of refuge for fugitives from Hittite authority, as well as a base for the extension of Ahhiyawan influence on the mainland.¹⁰ Uhhaziti had also formed an alliance with other Arzawan kings in the region—an alliance which if left unchallenged might ultimately pose as serious a threat to Hatti as the Arzawan drive towards the homeland prior to Suppiluliuma’s accession.

At the beginning of Mursili’s third year Milawata (Millawanda) (Class. Miletos), a Hittite subject state on the Aegean coast, allied itself with Ahhiyawa. The alliance, very likely engineered or facilitated by Uhhaziti, provided the trigger for direct Hittite action in the west:

But when it was spring, because Uhhaziti joined the side of the king of the Land of Ahhiyawa, and the Land of Millawanda had gone over to the king of the Land of Ahhiyawa . . . I sent forth Gulla and Malaziti and troops and chariots; and they destroyed the Land of Millawanda. (Comprehensive Annals, AM 36–7)¹¹

Successful though the Hittite expeditionary force appears to have been on this particular mission, it failed to deter Uhhaziti from further provoking Mursili by providing asylum for refugees from Hittite authority. A demand from Mursili that he return them was refused. This in itself was tantamount to a declaration of war on Hatti. The time had come for a decisive showdown:

I sent a messenger to Uhhaziti, and I wrote thus: ‘When I asked for the return of my subjects who went over to you, you did not give them back to me. You
treated me like a child, you despised me. Now, let us do battle, and the Storm God, My Lord, will make judgement on our dispute!’ (Ten-Year Annals, AM 46–7)

Under Mursili’s personal command, a Hittite army set out from the homeland for a major campaign in the west, aimed primarily at settling the Arzawan problem once and for all. At Sallapa, Mursili was joined by his brother Sharri-Kushuh with a contingent from Syria. The combined Hittite forces now advanced into Arzawan territory.

They had divine support on their side—or so Mursili claimed:

When I marched forth and when I reached Mount Lawasa, My Lord, the mighty Storm God, revealed to me his divine power. He unleashed a thunderbolt (?) and my army saw the thunderbolt and the Land of Arzawa saw it. The thunderbolt proceeded and struck the Land of Arzawa and struck Apasa, the city of Uhhaziti, and brought Uhhaziti to his knees, and he fell ill. Since Uhhaziti fell ill, he did not therefore come against me in battle. He sent forth his son Piyama-Kurunta along with infantry and chariotry against me. Piyama-Kurunta confronted me in battle at the river Astarpa in Walma, and I, My Sun, did battle with him. And My Lady, the Sun-Goddess of Arinna, and My Lord, the mighty Storm God and Mezzulla and all the gods supported me. I defeated Piyama-Kurunta, son of Uhhaziti, together with his infantry and chariotry, and I struck him down. I pursued him again and went across into the Land of Arzawa, and went into Apasa, the city of Uhhaziti. Uhhaziti offered me no resistance, but fled before me and went across the sea to the islands; and there he remained. However the whole Land of Arzawa fled. (Ten-Year Annals, AM 46–53)

There remained two Arzawan strongholds to be captured before the conquest of Uhhaziti’s kingdom was complete: Mount Arinnanda and the city of Puranda, where some of the refugees who had sought asylum from Hittite authority had gathered. Others had fled with Uhhaziti ‘to the islands’, probably the group of islands in the Aegean which were then under Ahhiyawan sovereignty. Arinnanda was blockaded by Mursili’s troops, and its occupants starved into surrender:

I, My Sun, went to Mount Arinnanda. This mountain is very steep and extends out into the sea. It is also very high, difficult of access, and rocky, and it is impossible for horses to advance up it. The transportees held it en masse and the infantry were above en masse. Since it was impossible for horses to advance up the mountain, I, My Sun, went before the army on foot and went up Mount Arinnanda on foot. I beleaguered the transportees with hunger and thirst. And
under pressure of hunger and thirst, they came down and fell at my feet: ‘Our Lord, do not destroy us. Our Lord, take us into subjection, and lead us up to Hattusa.’ (Comprehensive Annals, AM 54–7)

The other stronghold Puranda remained unconquered at the end of the campaigning season. After withdrawing to the Astarpa river where he set up a winter camp, Mursili returned to Arzawa the following year, laid siege to Puranda and captured it. His conquest of Uhhaziti’s kingdom was now quickly completed. Uhhaziti had died in exile, and only one of his sons, Tapalazunawali, had returned to his father’s kingdom to attempt to defend it. But with the fall of Puranda, Arzawan resistance was at an end. Tapalazanuwali alone managed to escape. His fate remains uncertain, though he may have sought refuge with the Ahhiyawan king, who handed him over to Mursili.

Mursili had another score to settle. Before returning to Hattusa, he set out on a punitive expedition against one of the other states in the Arzawa complex, the Seha River Land, whose king Manapa-Tarhunda had formed an alliance with Uhhaziti. Manapa-Tarhunda panicked when he received news of the Hittite king’s approach, fresh from the victory over Uhhaziti’s kingdom and bent on further vengeance. He had no alternative but to throw himself on the king’s mercy: ‘Manapa-Tarhunda sent a messenger to me and wrote to me as follows: “My Lord, do not kill me! Take me into subjection, my Lord. The people who have fled to me, I will hand over to my Lord.” ’ (Comprehensive Annals, AM 68–9)

Mursili remained unmoved. Manapa-Tarhunda had forfeited all right to merciful treatment. The son of the previous king Muwavalwi, he had once been forced to flee his country because of a dispute with two of his brothers who had sought to kill him, and had found refuge in the country of Karkisa. Mursili had intervened on the refugee’s behalf, demanding of the people of Karkisa that they protect him. Subsequently when one of the brothers, Ura-Tarhunda, had violated his oath, Manapa-Tarhunda was restored to his country with Hittite support and placed on the throne. But he had proved disloyal, as Mursili reminded him:

Once when your brothers expelled you from your land, I recommended you to the people of Karkisa and also rewarded the people of Karkisa on your behalf. In spite of that you did not come to my side, and you joined sides with my enemy
Intent on revenge, Mursili was about to attack the kingdom of his treacherous vassal when something happened which caused him to have a change of heart:

I would certainly have marched against him and destroyed him utterly, but he sent forth his mother to meet me. She came and fell at my knees and spoke to me as follows: ‘My Lord, do not destroy us. Take us, my Lord, into subjection.’ And since a woman came to meet me and fell at my knees, I gave way to the woman and thereupon I did not march to the Seha River Land. And I took Manapa-Tarhunda and the Seha River Land into subjection. (Comprehensive Annals, AM 70–3)

The episode seems to represent a remarkable last-minute change of heart by Mursili. A signal example of Hittite chivalry and gallantry? That may well have been the impression Mursili wanted to create—a display of mercy in response to the old woman’s appeal, an act of magnanimity towards her renegade son. This was very much in the nature of Hittite royal diplomacy—to make a show of merciful and generous conduct in situations where it was little deserved. But the outward gesture may have had a strong underlying practical motive. Hittite kings were often ready to accept last-minute surrenders by recalcitrant vassal rulers and other protégés, to avoid unnecessary commitment of troops to a military campaign or a protracted siege. Mursili and his troops had already spent two years away from the homeland campaigning in Arzawa. Rather than committing himself to further campaigning in the region, the king decided to exploit the diplomatic advantages offered by the occasion. His willingness to accept a last-minute surrender, when his army was apparently on the verge of conquest, could be presented as a noble and magnanimous gesture. Hittite kings regularly took the view that a subject state was more likely to remain submissive under a contrite vassal than if it had been crushed into submission and needed a continuing Hittite presence to ensure it remained that way.

Manapa-Tarhunda was accepted into Hittite vassalage and a treaty was drawn up with him. So too the other Arzawan states, Hapalla and Mira, were quick to acknowledge Hittite overlordship. Targasnalli was reinstated as vassal ruler of Hapalla, and a man called Mashuiliuwa was
appointed ruler of Mira. We shall have more to say about him below. Thus within four years of his accession, Mursili accomplished a feat which had eluded his father Suppiluliuma after many years of campaigning in Anatolia—the final conquest and subjugation of all the lands making up the Arzawa complex.

What became of the kingdom of Uhhaziti, the nucleus of the Arzawan complex? Nothing more is heard of this kingdom. It had long posed a serious threat to Hittite interests in Anatolia, it had allied itself with foreign powers hostile to Hatti, and it had almost certainly led the forces which had brought the Hittite kingdom close to extinction in the reign of Mursili’s grandfather. There is a strong possibility that Mursili removed any further threat it might pose to Hittite interests in the region by destroying it totally, evacuating its population and dividing its territory amongst the other vassal states in the region.\(^{29}\) He states that after he conquered the kingdom, he transported from it no less than 65,000 (or 66,000) of its inhabitants to the homeland.\(^{30}\) If this figure is correct, then the kingdom must have been almost entirely depopulated.\(^{31}\) Indeed in the texts following Mursili’s Arzawan conquests, there is no further clearly identifiable reference to the kingdom once ruled by Uhhaziti.\(^{32}\) Mursili sought to maintain control over other states in the region which he had conquered or which had submitted to his overlordship through a network of vassal treaties.\(^{33}\)

**Campaigns in the North\(^{34}\)**

With Hittite authority firmly established in the west and south-west, Mursili was again obliged to turn his attention to the regions lying to the north and north-east of the homeland. Once more, the northern frontiers of the homeland, and the subject territories beyond, were imperilled by fresh outbreaks of aggression from Kaska. The prolonged absence of the king in the Arzawa lands was no doubt the incentive for these. Mursili responded swiftly. In the year after his return from Arzawa, the fifth year of his reign, he attacked the Kaskan forces from the mountain land of Asharpaya, who had cut the route to Pala, and laid waste their territory. In the same year he invaded and conquered the Land of Arawanna.\(^{35}\)

The following year savage reprisals were carried out against the Kaskans from the Land of Ziharriya who, the king claimed, had
attacked Hattusa. If such an attack did in fact take place, it underlines the chronic vulnerability of the Hittite capital to enemy action from the north, even at a time when the security of the homeland had apparently been firmly re-established. But Mursili may have exaggerated the danger to Hattusa in order to justify the ruthless retaliatory measures which he took. The Kaska land was attacked and conquered, its population slaughtered, and its city put to the torch.

The security of Hittite territories bordering the homeland to the north-east, particularly the region called the Upper Land, remained a constant problem. Prior to Mursili’s campaigns against Kaska, a Kaskan tribal chief called Pihhuniya from the Land of Tapiya had captured the Upper Land and incorporated it into Kaskan territory. Pihhuniya’s conflict with the Hittites is recorded at some length in the *Annals*. Mursili tells us that he was unlike other Kaskan leaders: ‘Pihhuniya did not rule in the Kaskan manner. But suddenly, where in the Kaskan town the rule of a single man was not (customary), Pihhuniya ruled in the manner of a king’ (*Ten-Year Annals, AM* 88–9). This made him a formidable and very dangerous opponent. The Kaskans caused problems enough as disunited groups. But if amongst them there arose a leader with aspirations to kingly status, and with the ability to weld the fragmented groups into a single united fighting force, they could well prove invincible. It was essential that Pihhuniya be dealt a decisive blow before this happened.

Mursili was determined to force the issue. He demanded that Pihhuniya hand back the Hittite subjects who had come under his control. The demand was dismissed with contempt: ‘I will give nothing back to you. Even if you come to fight me, I will not fight in any way on my land. I will meet you in your land and will join battle in your land’ (*Ten-Year Annals, AM* 90–1). Whether this was mere bravado or a genuine belief in his ability to match military strength with the Hittite king, Pihhuniya eventually paid the penalty for his defiance. He was defeated in battle, his land was ravaged, and he was forced into a humiliating surrender and taken back to Hattusa in captivity.

The restoration of Hittite authority in the Upper Land was short-lived. Two years later, in Mursili’s ninth year, it was again invaded, this time by troops from Hayasa. But for the present, the main theatre of action shifted to the south-east. Here there were escalating problems which required urgent attention.
Rebellion in Syria

Early in Mursili’s seventh year, trouble once more flared in Syria. Unfortunately there are large gaps in the Annals for the early part of this year. We learn of a rebellion in the Nuhashshi lands, but have only fragmentary information about the events which led up to it. It may, however, be possible to fill some of the gaps from another document, which deals with a communication between Mursili and a local ruler Abiradda, king of Barga, over a town called Yaruwatta in the border region between the Nuhashshi lands and the kingdom of Barga. From this we can attempt to reconstruct some of the events which led up to the Nuhashshi rebellion:

Mursili received word that Tette, whom his father Suppiluliuma had installed as king in the Nuhashshi lands, had rebelled, along with a lesser king in the region called en-urta. Apparently Kadesh was also involved in the rebellion. The uprisings in Syria presented Mursili with a serious dilemma. It was essential that they be dealt with promptly, but the king was still preoccupied with affairs in Anatolia. In the interests of the security of the homeland, he could not afford to cut short his campaigns in the north and divert his forces to Syria to deal with the rebellion there.

But the rebellion could perhaps be dealt with in another way. Mursili’s intelligence sources revealed that support for Tette’s action within his own family was far from secure. This could be exploited. In addition, the rebellion had brought en-urta into conflict with Abiradda, who ruled the neighbouring land of Barga as a loyal Hittite vassal. Abiradda had lost Yaruwatta, one of his cities in the border region, to Tette’s grandfather Sharrupshi, probably through the intervention of the Mitannian king Shuttarna II, and now made overtures to Mursili for its return. Negotiations were conducted secretly with Tette’s brother Shummittara, perhaps by the viceroy Sharri-Kushuh on Mursili’s behalf. Shummittara was urged to depose Tette, either killing him or holding him prisoner until he could be handed over to the Hittites. The incentive for Shummittara was that he could then assume the vassal throne for himself, and be acknowledged by Mursili as the legitimate ruler, provided he declared allegiance to him. He would also be allowed to keep the border town of Yaruwatta.
Shumittara was persuaded, and the coup took place. Tette was deposed, and taken into custody by his brother. That left only en-urta to be dealt with. The scale of the crisis now considerably reduced, Mursili took time out from his northern campaigns for a brief expedition into Syria, probably the first Syrian campaign in which he was directly involved. en-urta was defeated, and his kingdom handed over to Abiradda, who was no doubt still smarting over his failure to get back Yaruwatta. The acquisition of en-urta’s kingdom would have been more than adequate compensation. Mursili also used the opportunity to draw up a pact between Abiradda and the new regime in Nuhashshi, to ensure that there would be no further hostilities between the two kingdoms. While in Syria, he may also have re-established Hittite control over Kadesh.41

Surprisingly, Mursili did not take custody of the rebel Nuhashshi king Tette during his Syrian operations. His failure to do so was soon to have unfortunate consequences. Probably within a short time of the Hittite king’s departure from Syria, Tette staged a counter-coup and regained his throne.42 Unfortunately for the Hittites, the counter-coup took place before Mursili had troops available to prevent it. And when rebellion broke out afresh under Tette’s leadership, the crisis was intensified by the arrival of an expeditionary force from Egypt to support the rebels.

The responsibility for crushing the rebellion fell upon the viceroy Sharri-Kushuh. Mursili was too heavily involved in his northern campaigns to make a second expedition into Syria, and could do no more than send an expeditionary force under the commander Kantuzzili to support his brother. Even with this support, and particularly in view of the reinforcements which the rebel king had received from Egypt, Sharri-Kushuh had serious concerns about the adequacy of his resources to deal with the rebellion. It was probably in this context that he sought to establish against Tette a military alliance with Niqmaddu II, the king of Ugarit:

The king of Nuhashshi being at war with me, I instructed Niqmaddu thus: ‘If, Niqmaddu, you go to war against Tette, and before I arrive in Nuhashshi you take the initiative and attack the country of Tette—whatever Niqmaddu takes from Nuhashshi by his own force of arms, or whoever come as fugitives into his country, he will have nothing to return to Tette should Tette reclaim his subjects in the days that follow. But if Niqmaddu does not go to war with Tette and does
not perform the things I have said, the proposition contained in this tablet will be rescinded.’ (RS 17.334 (PRU IV, 54–5) 1–19)"

It is possible that Niqmaddu, who appears to have remained consistently loyal to his alliance with the Hittites after the treaty drawn up with him by Suppiluliuma at the time of the First Syrian War, died before the agreement could be implemented, or was replaced by his son Arhalba who pursued an independent policy and engaged in diplomatic contacts with the pharaoh Horemheb. Irrespective of this, the combined Hittite forces succeeded in driving the Egyptians from the region. Mursili himself had indicated his readiness to advance to meet the Egyptian force. But on reaching Ziluna he received word that the Egyptians had been defeated, and had returned to their homeland. Once again Mursili diverted his attention northwards, to the Upper Land and the Kaska zone.

In spite of the success of the combined Hittite operation against the troops from Egypt, there is no indication that Sharri-Kushuh and Kantuzzili succeeded at this time in crushing the rebellion in Nuhashshi. Even if they did, within two years the rebellion had broken out afresh.

**War on Three Fronts**

To the north-east of the homeland, Mursili was confronted in his seventh year with further problems in the kingdom of Azzi-Hayasa, previously reduced to vassal status by his grandfather Tudhalia III. It was currently under the rule of Anniya, who had advanced upon and attacked the Land of Dankuwa, and transported its population back to his kingdom. Mursili marched to the borders of the kingdom and wrote to Anniya demanding the return of his subjects. When Anniya refused, Mursili immediately attacked the border fortress of Ura. His campaigns against Azzi-Hayasa may well have continued through the eighth year of his reign, for which the record is all but lost. It is clear, however, that before he could complete the reconquest and pacification of the country other events intervened, some of grave moment.

By the beginning of Mursili’s ninth year, Anniya was still unsubdued, and continued to defy the Hittite king’s demands for the return of his subjects. And trouble erupted in the Land of Pala, when the city of
Wasumana broke away from it. Nuwanza was sent to assist Pala’s governor Hudupiyanza (Hutupiyanza) with its recapture.\textsuperscript{48}

Mursili himself took time off from campaigning, in order to go to Kummanni, the most important cult centre in Kizzuwadna, and attend as a matter of urgency to the festival of the goddess Hepat, a task neglected by his father:

When I went to the Land of Kummanni—my father had promised the festival of adoration to the (goddess) Hepat of Kummanni, but he had not yet performed it for her. Thus it became urgent for me. Therefore I went to Kizzuwadna and spoke as follows: ‘I have come to make restitution for my father’s default(?). Be gracious to me, to my wife, my son, my house, my country and to the [ ] Hepat of Kummanni, My Lady.’ (\textit{KUB} xiv 4 (\textit{CTH} 70) iii 23 ff., trans. Goetze (1940: 10))\textsuperscript{49}

He also used the opportunity to arrange a meeting with his brother Sharri-Kushuh, who had been summoned from Carchemish. Generally regarded as one of the most pious of all the Hittite kings, Mursili had apparently postponed pressing military operations in order to celebrate the festival of Hepat. But the meeting with Sharri-Kushuh was probably at least as important a reason for the journey to Kummanni,\textsuperscript{50} which was located approximately halfway between Hatti and the viceregal kingdom at Carchemish.

Although we have no information on the purpose of the meeting, there were urgent matters to be discussed by the two brothers, particularly with regard to developments in Syria. The Nuhashshi problem had still to be resolved, Assyria was becoming an increasing threat, and Egypt under Horemheb might seek to renew its territorial ambitions in the region. Further, it is likely that Mursili’s other surviving brother Telipinu had recently died, leaving vacant the viceregal seat in Aleppo. A successor was available in the person of Telipinu’s son Talmi-Sharrumma. But no doubt Mursili wished to discuss his appointment with Sharri-Kushuh, and call upon him to provide support to the fledgling viceroy in the early days of his reign. Given the volatile situation in the nearby Nuhashshi lands, it was imperative to demonstrate that the death of the old viceroy in no way weakened continuity of Hittite control in the region. There was also a serious family matter on which Mursili may well have wanted his brother’s advice (see below, \S \textit{The King’s Stepmother}).
But then came a tragic and presumably quite unexpected blow for the king. While at Kummanni Sharri-Kushu suddenly became ill and died.\(^{51}\) Mursili had yet another crisis on his hands. The death of both Syrian viceroys, within probably no more than a few months of each other, placed Hittite control in Syria in serious jeopardy. Once again the Nuhashshi lands rose in revolt. But the troubles were not confined to Nuhashshi. In Kadesh, Aitakkama who had been installed as vassal ruler by Suppiluliuma also seized the opportunity to break ties with Hatti. Even more serious, the news of Sharri-Kushu’s death prompted the Assyrians to invade and occupy the kingdom of Carchemish.\(^{52}\) At the same time to the north-east of the homeland, the king of Azzi-Hayasa launched a counter-offensive, invading once more the Upper Land, destroying the Land of Istitina and placing the city of Kannuwara under siege.\(^{53}\)

Faced with conducting campaigns in three regions simultaneously, Mursili again displayed the decisive action which had characterized the first years of his reign. He dispatched his general Kurunta to deal with the rebellion of the Syrian vassals. He sent another of his generals, the experienced and able Nuwanza, to expel the Azzi-Hayasan enemy from the Upper Land. And the king himself set out for Ashtata on the Euphrates to make preparations for driving the Assyrians from Carchemish.

Nuwanza had already figured in campaigns in Mursili’s second year when he was sent with an army to Kadesh to provide reinforcements for Sharri-Kushu against the threat of an invasion from Assyria.\(^{54}\) The campaign in the Upper Land could safely be left in his hands. But he delayed for some time before taking any action, insisting that the augurs and soothsayers had to be consulted first. No doubt irritated by the news of the delay, and the reason for it, Mursili took the omens himself, and sent word to Nuwanza assuring him that he could proceed.\(^{55}\) When he finally did so, he inflicted a resounding defeat on the occupation forces and restored the Upper Land to Hittite control. As far as we can determine, the Upper Land remained firmly in Hittite hands for the rest of Mursili’s reign, under the immediate authority of a local governor appointed by the king.

But the campaigning season had come to an end before the Hittites could follow up their success by invading and reconquering Azzi-Hayasa itself. This was a task which Mursili effectively completed in his tenth
year, although its formal submission did not take place until the following year. The failure to complete the reconquest in the ninth year may have been due partly to Nuwanza’s delay in taking action against the occupation forces in the Upper Land. But it may also have been due to a serious family crisis which needed the king’s urgent attention (see below, § The King’s Stepmother).

The campaigns in Syria were more decisive. Kurunta crushed the rebellion in Nuhashshi and ravaged its territory, and re-established Hittite control over Kadesh. This was facilitated by the assassination of Aitakkama by his son Niqmaddu:

Aitakkama was king of Kadesh and Niqmaddu was his eldest son. As he saw that they were besieged and short of grain, Niqmaddu killed his father Aitakkama. Thereafter Niqmaddu and the Land of Kadesh turned to my side again and submitted to me. (Comprehensive Annals, AM 112–13, after Liverani (2001: 92))

Kurunta subsequently brought the assassin to Mursili at Carchemish. Mursili found himself in a dilemma. By eliminating the traitorous vassal Aitakkama, Niqmaddu had done him a favour. Yet in so doing he was guilty of the act of parricide, a crime which the conscience-plagued Hittite king found abhorrent. He could hardly reward the prince for this crime, and at first angrily rejected him: ‘Under these circumstances, I did not accept Niqmaddu into vassalage. Since they had violated the oath, I said to them: “Let the gods of the oath carry out the curse: let son kill father, let brother kill brother, let everyone extinguish his own flesh!” ’ (reference as above). Nevertheless political considerations finally prevailed over moral scruples, and Niqmaddu was eventually formally installed on his father’s throne.

Mursili himself succeeded in regaining from the Assyrians control of the kingdom of Carchemish. Before leaving Syria, he installed Sharri-Kushuh’s son Shahurunuwa on the throne of Carchemish, and then proceeded to the investiture of Telipinu’s son Talmi-Sharrumma as king of Aleppo. He further consolidated Hittite control in Syria by replacing Arhalba on the throne of Ugarit, after a reign of probably no more than two years, by his younger brother Niqmepe and drawing up a treaty with him. By the terms of this treaty the territory of Ugarit, which had been considerably expanded under the terms of Suppiluliuma’s treaty with Niqmaddu, was now reduced to two-thirds of its former
size, with a substantial portion of it, including the kingdom of Siyannu, now being assigned to the territory of the viceroy of Carchemish. But the boundary fixed by Suppiluliuma between Ugarit and Mukish was confirmed.

Mursili’s personal Annals cease with the end of the tenth year of his reign. The king could be well satisfied with what he had achieved in these years. He had been confronted, and had dealt successfully with, two major crises in these years. The first was at the very beginning of his reign, following the sudden death of Arnuwanda, when there was widespread rebellion amongst the subject states and a major threat of attack on the homeland by the enemy lands. The second was in his ninth year, when both his remaining brothers Telipinu and Sharri-Kushuh died, which led to a fresh outbreak of rebellion in Kadesh and the Nuhashshi lands, supported by an expeditionary force from Egypt, and prompted the Assyrian invasion and occupation of the kingdom of Carchemish. In both cases Mursili, supported by able commanders, responded promptly and decisively. Campaigns to the north and north-east successfully countered the mounting aggression from the Kaska lands, already evident in the last years of Suppiluliuma’s reign, and eventually reduced once more to vassal status the hostile and aggressive kingdom of Azzi-Hayasa. Campaigns in the west and southwest resulted in the conquest and reduction to vassal status of the Arzawa lands. And campaigns in Syria firmly re-established control over the rebellious vassals in the region, and for the time being held in check the rapidly rising power of Assyria.

Plague!

Mursili’s achievement is the more remarkable when we consider other major problems which he faced during his first ten years on the throne. One of these was a virulent plague which broke out in the last years of Suppiluliuma’s reign and swept the Hittite land, decimating its population and continuing well into Mursili’s reign. A graphic account of the plague and its effects appears in a series of prayers by Mursili, in which the king remonstrates with the gods for punishing his land so severely, warns them that the kingdom is becoming a prey to the enemy forces which surround it, and desperately seeks reasons for the divine wrath.
What is this, o gods, that you have done? A plague you have let into the land. The Land of Hatti, all of it, is dying; so no-one prepares sacrificial loaves and libations for you. The ploughmen who used to work the fields of the god are dead... To mankind, our wisdom has been lost, and whatever we do right comes to nothing. O gods, whatever sin you behold, either let a prophet rise and declare it, or let the Old Women or the priests learn about it, or let ordinary people see it in a dream! O gods, take pity again on the Land of Hatti! On the one hand it is afflicted with a plague, on the other hand it is afflicted with hostility. The protectorates beyond the frontier, (namely) the Land of Mitanni and the Land of Arzawa, each one has rebelled... Moreover those countries which belong to the Land of Hatti, (namely) the Land of Kaska, also the Land of Arawanna, the Land of Kalasma, the Land of Lukka, the Land of Pitassa—these lands have also renounced the Sun Goddess of Arinna... Now all the surrounding countries have begun to attack the Land of Hatti. Let it again become a matter of concern to the Sun Goddess of Arinna! O God, bring not your name into disrepute! (Mursili’s Prayer to the Sun Goddess, KUB xxiv 3 (+) (CTH 376) ii 3'-53', after Goetze in Pritchard (1969: 396))

Determination of the cause of divine wrath was essential before suitable propitiation could be made. In this case, through a lengthy process of oracular consultation, Mursili identified offences committed by his father as the source of the gods’ wrath—neglect of a sacrifice for the river Mala (Euphrates), and on two occasions the violation of an oath. The first violation occurred when Suppiluliuma broke his oath of allegiance to his brother Tudhaliya the Younger by seizing his throne. On the second occasion, Suppiluliuma had allegedly violated a treaty with Egypt, the so-called Kurustama treaty (referred to in Ch. 5), by twice attacking the Land of Amka, on the frontier of Egyptian subject territory in Syria. Suppiluliuma might well have disputed at least the second of these alleged offences, on the grounds that he was simply retaliating against unprovoked aggression from Egypt. But the responsibility now lay with his son for bringing the plague to an end. When all other measures had failed, Mursili was not disposed to debate the legalities of his father’s actions, in seeking to appease his divine overlords. He himself had no part in these actions. But he fully accepted that sons should bear the responsibility for offences committed by their fathers.

At all events, he had no doubt that the plague was the instrument of divine wrath, and once the causes of this wrath had been ascertained the appropriate propitiation rites were performed. Whether the plague now came speedily to an end—or by that time had almost run its course—
remains unknown. It was, however, but one of the unfortunate legacies Mursili inherited from his father.

The King’s Stepmother

We have referred above to Suppiluliuma’s marriage, around the time of the First Syrian War, to the Babylonian princess who assumed the name Tawananna as a personal name. As the years went by, this second wife of Suppiluliuma, stepmother of his sons, seems to have played an increasingly prominent role in the political affairs of the kingdom. We have noted her name appearing alongside that of her husband on seals impressed on documents involving diplomatic negotiations with Niqmaddu II, king of Ugarit. She also became a powerful figure in the royal household, probably increasingly so in Suppiluliuma’s later years. Her domineering behaviour, her extravagance, and her introduction of undesirable foreign customs into the kingdom went apparently unchecked by her husband. Her conduct was a cause of deep concern to her stepsons. But no action was taken, or else complaints to the king fell on deaf ears.

Even after Suppiluliuma’s death, she continued to dominate the royal household, and to engage in conduct which outraged the new king Arnuwanda. But still no action was taken against her. She was, after all, the reigning queen, with all the powers and privileges that her office carried with it, an office which in the traditional Tawananna mould would continue throughout her lifetime—even if she outlived her husband.

Mursili refers to the remarkable forbearance which he and his brother displayed towards her:

But when my father became a god, Arnuwanda, my brother, and I did no harm to Tawananna, nor in any way humiliated her. As she governed the house of the king and the Land of Hatti in the lifetime of my father, likewise in the lifetime of my brother she governed them. And when my brother became a god, I did no evil to Tawananna, nor in any way humiliated her. As she governed the house of the king and the Land of Hatti in the lifetime of my father and of my brother, likewise then she governed them. And the customs which in the lifetime of her husband [were dear to her heart?] and the things which in the lifetime of her husband were forbidden to her, [to these I made no changes?]. (KBo xiv 4 (CTH 70) i 5–13)”

"A Young King Proves his Worth"
She allegedly stripped the palace of its treasures to lavish on her favourites, or on those whose support she sought. And her position as šiwanzianni-priestess with its powers of allocating sacrifices, votive offerings, perhaps even temple lands, allowed her considerable control over assets of the state cult:

Do you gods not see how she has turned the entire house of my father into the 'stone house' (mausoleum) of the Tutelary God (the god Lamma) and the 'stone house' of the God? Some things she brought in from the Land of Shanbara (i.e. Babylon). Others in Hatti [ ] to the populace she handed over(?). She left nothing... My father’s house she destroyed. (KUB xiv 4 II 3–12, after Hoffner (1983: 191))

Initially Mursili refrained from taking action against his stepmother. Indeed the association of his name with hers on a number of seal impressions indicates that for a time he fully acknowledged her formal status as the reigning queen. But tensions within the royal household ran high. There was, apparently, little Mursili could do. His lengthy absences from the capital on military campaigns must have substantially reduced his ability to act as a restraining influence on Tawananna’s conduct. This was to have tragic personal consequences for him.

He was married to the princess Gassulawiya. Her name is associated with his on a conventional seal impression and on the recently discovered impressions of the cruciform seal naming Mursili and Gassulawiya as the seal owners and listing a number of the king’s ancestors. Mursili was devoted to his wife, and became deeply alarmed when she was struck down by a mysterious illness. At first the illness was attributed to the goddess Lelwani (an underworld deity), as punishment for the princess’s alleged neglect of her cult. In an ancient prayer adapted for the present occasion an appeal was made to the goddess, protesting Gassulawiya’s innocence and begging that she be restored to health. But prayers were to no avail, and Gassulawiya died in her husband’s ninth year. In his grief, Mursili now turned upon his stepmother, convinced that she was guilty of his wife’s death, and that she had brought it about by black magic. Ironically the stepmother seems to have been the person who had uttered the prayer for Gassulawiya’s health. While this may seem surprising in view of the way Tawananna was depicted by her stepson, she may simply have been performing a duty expected of her as reigning queen. Indeed if she
were guilty of contriving the princess’ death, she would hardly have drawn suspicion upon herself by withholding her priestly services at this time.  

Mursili had no doubt that his stepmother had caused his wife’s death. His sense of devastating loss, and his bitterness against the woman who had allegedly been responsible, are clearly revealed in his prayers:

My punishment is the death of my wife. Has this become any better? Because she killed her, throughout the days of life my soul goes down to the dark netherworld on her account. For me it has been unbearable(??). She has bereaved(?) me. Do you gods not recognize who really has been punished?  \(KBo\ iv\ 8\ (CTH\ 71)\ \Pi\ 24–6,\ \Pi\ 1–4,\ \text{after Hoffner}\ (1983:\ 188))\n
Oracular consultation convinced Mursili of the queen’s guilt, and indicated the appropriate action for him to take. The gods determined that Tawananna had committed a capital offence. The oracle sanctioned her removal from office and execution by her stepson.  

But in spite of his stepmother’s long catalogue of offences, in spite of the alleged murder of his wife, Mursili shrank from inflicting the extreme penalty upon her. It may well be that one of the purposes of his meeting with his brother Sharri-Kushuh in Kummanni was to discuss what action should be taken against the queen. Under the circumstances, it was milder than she might have feared. She was put on trial, deposed from office, and banished from the palace. But her life was spared:

I did not execute her, but I deposed her from the office of šiwanzanni-priestess. And because it was determined by oracle that she should be removed from office, I removed her from office, and I gave her a place of residence. Nothing is lacking to her desire. She has food and drink. Everything stands at her disposal. Nothing is lacking to her. She is alive. She beholds the sun of heaven with her eyes. And she eats bread as one of life.  

Mine is only this one punishment: I punished her with this one thing, that I sent her down from the palace: I deposed her from the gods in the office of šiwanzanni-priestess. Mine is only this one punishment.  \(KBo\ iv\ 8\ \Pi\ 9–20,\ \text{after Hoffner}\ (1983:\ 188))\n
Of the queen’s guilt there can be little doubt. She had motive enough for contriving Gassulawiya’s death. Already Gassulawiya’s name was linked with that of her husband on royal seals where she bore the title ‘Great Queen’. It seems extraordinary that such seals should have been
produced while Tawananna still lived and held the office of reigning queen. Such an act might well lead her to suspect that her days in this office were numbered, that she would soon be completely supplanted by her stepson’s wife.\textsuperscript{88} She would not let this happen. But by murdering Gassulawiya she precipitated her downfall, provoking the king into taking action which, he believed, was long overdue.

The decision not to execute her must have been made only after long and careful consideration. While she lived, she was a constant threat to the security of the royal household, particularly if she had the support of those upon whom she had lavished favours. Yet Mursili could not bring himself to kill a member of his own family, even if the oracles had advised and authorized it. He had seen the consequences of his father’s seizure of the throne after the assassination of its rightful incumbent, his uncle Tudhaliya the Younger. This act had been identified as one of the reasons for the plague inflicted by divine wrath upon the kingdom. He may well have been loath to bring divine retribution upon his land yet again by a further royal execution, whatever the justification for it. Indeed in a prayer to the Sun Goddess, Mursili’s son Hattusili later questioned the legality of even deposing the queen, and pointed out that he himself was in no way involved:

When the case against Tawananna, your servant, took place in the palace, when my father curtailed the power of Tawananna, the queen, though she were a servant of the deity, you, o goddess, my Lady, were the only one who knew in your soul if the curtailing of the queen’s power was in accordance with your will or if it was not... As for me, I was in no way involved in this affair.\textsuperscript{89} (Prayer of Hattusili III and Puduhepa to the Sun Goddess of Arinna, \textit{KUB} xiv 7 + \textit{KUB} xxi 19 (\textit{CTH} 383) i 20–9, after Singer (2002a: 98))\textsuperscript{90}

**Mursili’s Last Wife**

Some time after Gassulawiya’s death Mursili married again, on this occasion a woman perhaps of Hurrian origin called Danuhepa (Tanuhepa). Unfortunately the surviving texts from Mursili’s reign are completely silent about her. Which is the more remarkable since from his \textit{Annals} and his prayers we have more information about this king’s family and personal circumstances than we have about any other Hittite king—apart from his youngest son Hattusili.
The evidence for a wife called Danuhepa comes entirely from a handful of seal impressions in which the names Danuhepa and Mursili appear together. Sealings also link the name Danuhepa with Mursili’s first two successors on the throne, his son Muwattalli and his grandson Urhi-Teshub. This has led to some debate among scholars. How many Danuhepas were there—one or two? The question is complicated by the fact that Urhi-Teshub also assumed the name Mursili as a throne-name on his accession. Thus we have a Mursili III. There is no doubt that at least some of the Mursili–Danuhepa sealings belong to the reign of Urhi-Teshub/Mursili III. Should all such sealings be assigned to his reign? If so, we would no longer have any evidence that his grandfather Mursili II had a wife called Danuhepa.

Yet on stylistic grounds it seems that the sealings bearing the name Danuhepa should be split into two groups—those belonging to the reign of Mursili II, and those to the reign of his grandson Urhi-Teshub/Mursili III. If so, then either Mursili II’s last wife was still alive in the reign of his grandson, or else there was a second Danuhepa, wife of Mursili II’s son and successor Muwattalli. Those who discount the suggested stylistic division of Danuhepa’s sealings, propose a third alternative: there was only one Danuhepa, but she was the wife of Muwattalli. Opinion still fluctuates between these alternatives. Most scholars, however, favour the option of one Danuhepa, wife of Mursili II, who remained alive and active during the reigns of Muwattalli and Urhi-Teshub/Mursili III (and may even have survived into the reign of Hattusili III). This is the line I shall take here, while acknowledging that the question is still not finally resolved.

We have noted that Danuhepa’s supposed links with Mursili II are confined to a few seal impressions. This may indicate that the king married her only a short time before the end of his reign. However, Hattusili’s and Puduhepa’s prayer to the Sun Goddess (referred to just above) informs us that Danuhepa had sons, presumably by Mursili. To have produced these sons, she must have married the king several or more years before his death. Given that she remained alive and active during the reigns of at least the first two of his successors, her career would thus have extended over a period of some thirty years. As was the case with Mursili’s stepmother, it was a career which became embroiled in scandal. We shall return to this below.
In the twelfth year of his reign, Mursili received word of a fresh outbreak of rebellion in Arzawa. The ringleader on this occasion was a man called É.GAL.PAP. His status and origin are unknown to us, although he may have been a person of some eminence of the Land of Masa.

Trading on the Hittite king’s preoccupation with affairs in the north-eastern and south-eastern regions of his kingdom, É.GAL.PAP saw an opportunity for setting himself up as the leader of a new anti-Hittite movement in the west. The rebellion was reported to Mursili by Mashuiluwa, the vassal ruler of the Arzawan kingdom Mira-Kuwa-liya, who had to this point remained true to his Hittite allegiance. But subsequently Mashuiluwa quarrelled with his overlord, broke his Hittite allegiance, incited the land of Pitassa to rebellion against the king, and joined forces with É.GAL.PAP. Mursili learned from an outsider of the rebellious activities of these two men.

The Hittite response was a measured one. With the situation in Syria still potentially volatile, and with the Kaska tribes in the north still far from subdued, Mursili had no wish to become embroiled in a further series of campaigns in the west. The mounting crisis there might yet be resolved without the need for military conflict, if pressure were brought to bear on Mashuiluwa to return to his Hittite allegiance. Mursili took personal command of a Hittite expedition to the region, in the hope that as his forces approached Mashuiluwa’s kingdom, the rebel vassal could be intimidated into submission. But the ploy failed: ‘When I reached Sallapa, I wrote to Mashuiluwa: “Come here to me!” But because Mashuiluwa was aware of his offence, he refused me, My Sun, and he fled before me and went over to the Land of Masa’ (Mursili: Kupanta-Kurunta Treaty §5).

There had been other occasions when Masa had provided refuge for rebellious Hittite vassals. It could no longer be allowed to do so with impunity. Mursili pursued his wayward vassal into the territory of Masa where he carried out a campaign of reprisal. This was followed by an ultimatum delivered to the rest of the people of Masa:

Mashuiluwa was my liegeman; and he quarrelled with me and stirred up my subjects against me, and would have begun conflict with me. Now he has fled before me, and see, he has come to you. Now seize him and hand him over to
me! If you do not seize him and hand him over to me, I will come and destroy you along with your land. (Mursili: Kupanta-Kurunta Treaty §6)

The people of Masa bowed to the ultimatum. They were aware that dignitaries from the land of Mira had already disassociated themselves from Mashuiluwa’s actions, appearing in person before Mursili, protesting their innocence, reaffirming their loyalty, and requesting that Mashuiluwa be replaced on the vassal throne by his adopted son. Mashuiluwa had now become a dangerous liability. The nobles of Masa withdrew their protection from him, and demanded that he give himself up to his Hittite overlord. When he refused, they seized him and handed him over to Mursili, who removed him to Hattusa. Here he was assigned a place of residence, and held as a virtual hostage to ensure the loyalty of the man now appointed vassal ruler in his place.

The man in question was Kupanta-Kurunta, Mashuiluwa’s nephew and son of his brother. Suppiluliuma had given his daughter Muwatti in marriage to Mashuiluwa. But the union had proved childless, and Mashuiluwa had on his accession asked permission of Mursili to adopt his nephew as son and heir to the vassal throne. The request was granted: ‘And I gave you, Kupanta-Kurunta, to Mashuiluwa, in place of a son. Then I placed the Land of Mira and the Land of Kuwaliya under oath to Mashuiluwa, to Muwatti, and also to you, Kupanta-Kurunta’ (Mursili: Kupanta-Kurunta Treaty §4).

But Mashuiluwa’s rebellion had raised a serious question about the succession. In Hittite custom, if not in law, a son could be held responsible, and pay the penalty for, the sins of his father:

Do you not know, Kupanta-Kurunta, that if in Hattusa anyone commits the offence of insurrection, and that even if the son whose father is guilty is not also guilty, nevertheless the house of his father is taken from him, and either given to someone else or seized for the palace? And because your father Mashuiluwa was guilty, and you, Kupanta-Kurunta, were Mashuiluwa’s son, even if you had not been guilty too, I, My Sun, could have cast you out at that very time, if it had ever occurred to My Sun to do you harm. Even now I could have taken your father’s house and land from you. I could have given them to someone else and made another ruler for the land. (Mursili: Kupanta-Kurunta Treaty §7)

But Mursili was conscious of the support that Kupanta-Kurunta enjoyed amongst the nobles of Mira, who in disassociating themselves from Mashuiluwa’s treachery had asked that Kupanta-Kurunta be
appointed king in his place. By implication, this seemed to clear Kupanta-Kurunta of any involvement in his adoptive father’s rebellious activities. Mursili himself was convinced of the young man’s innocence. In any case, there appeared to be no viable alternative to his appointment. Thus Kupanta-Kurunta became the next king of Mira. Mursili’s decision to appoint him was no doubt dictated by sound political considerations. But in the treaty which he drew up with his new vassal he represented it as an act of royal grace and favour:

Because Mashuiluwa, your father, offended against My Sun, and you, Kupanta-Kurunta, were the son of Mashuiluwa, although you were in no way guilty, I, My Sun, could none the less have rejected you if My Sun were disposed to show disfavour to you, and could have taken from you the house of your father and the land, and given it to another, and could have made another ruler in the land. But now because My Sun is not disposed to disfavour you, I have not rejected you and taken from you the house of your father and the land, and have not made another ruler in the land; and I have given back to you the house of your father and the land, and have made you ruler in the land. (Mursili: Kupanta-Kurunta Treaty §§21–2)

He also united Kupanta-Kurunta under one oath with two other rulers in Arzawa—Manapa-Tarhunda, king of the Seha River Land, and Targasnalli, king of Hapalla.

We hear of no further rebellion or unrest amongst the vassal states in western Anatolia for the remainder of Mursili’s reign, which occupied another fifteen years or so. This may well be indicative of the success which the king achieved in imposing firm control over the region. It must certainly rank as the most significant of Mursili’s contributions to the development and consolidation of the kingdom he had inherited from his father. This is the more remarkable when we reflect that it was achieved within the first twelve years of Mursili’s reign, at a time when the king had also to deal with a number of crises in Syria, which seriously threatened the loss of many if not all of the territories secured by the intensive campaigns and diplomatic manoeuvrings of his father.

To the North Once More

But problems to the north of the Hittite homeland remained unresolved. Much of the second half of Mursili’s reign was devoted to further campaigns in this region, directed mainly against the Kaska enemy.
These campaigns generally resulted in short-term military successes. Indeed in his nineteenth year Mursili claims to have gone further afield than any other Hittite king, in his conquest of the lands of Takkuwahina and Tahantattipa, and in his twenty-second year to have been the first king since Telipinu to reach the land of Hatenuwa, which he conquered.

Further, he could claim with some satisfaction a decisive result from a campaign which he undertook in his twenty-first year to the Land of Tummana. Here his chief opponent was Pitaggatalli, who had first come to light towards the end of Suppiluliuma’s reign when he mobilized his forces against Suppiluliuma during the latter’s campaigns in the region. In spite of the positive way in which Mursili’s reports them in the Deeds, Suppiluliuma’s campaigns in Tummana clearly had no lasting impact. It was not until the showdown with Mursili, some twenty years later, that Pitaggatalli was finally and decisively defeated. His base Sapidduwa was captured, along with his military forces. Pitaggatalli alone, apparently, eluded the Hittite king by taking to the hills.

But successes in some areas were matched by setbacks in others. Thus in his twenty-second year, Mursili was confronted with a rebellion in the land of Kalasma, which refused to provide him with troops. This seems to have caused him particular distress, for the land had a history of continuous loyalty to the Hittite crown from the time of his grandfather Tudhaliya, and had maintained its loyalty up to this point in Mursili’s reign. Mursili was unable to deal with the rebellion in person as he had wished, since he was overladen with booty from the Tummana campaign, and sent his general Nuwanza to resolve it by force of arms. In spite of Nuwanza’s initial success, unrest continued to smoulder in the region, and several years later rebellion broke out afresh when the Kalasman Aparru attacked the (presumably neighbouring) Hittite subject state of Sappa. Although Aparru was defeated and had to flee for his life, it took a further campaign by Hutupiyanza (whom we have previously met as the governor of Pala) the following year before Kalasma was fully restored to Hittite control.

In spite of his catalogue of successful campaigns and conquests to the north of the homeland, it is doubtful whether Mursili’s overall accomplishments in this region were any more substantial or lasting than those
of his father. He certainly failed to achieve the degree of authority which he had imposed on the western Anatolian territories. But such an achievement was well nigh impossible. Continuing Kaskan aggression while constituting a major threat to Hittite security in its own right, must also have had a continuing destabilizing effect on the Hittites’ northern subject states. There was little that the Hittites could do about this on a long-term basis. Reduction of the Kaska tribes, in any comprehensive way, to the status of Hittite subjects was not a prospect which could be seriously entertained. In the absence of any clear, coherent political structure amongst the Kaska peoples, of a kind which characterized, for example, the Arzawa lands, the Hittites had no firm foundation on which to attempt to build a vassal state system in the Kaska region in the wake of conquest. To ensure the security of their northernmost territories, there seemed no feasible alternative to constant campaigning against the Kaska tribes, accepting that such campaigns would at best result in only very limited periods of peace.

A greater measure of security could perhaps be achieved by repopulating with Hittite subjects some of the peripheral territories which had been largely abandoned since the Kaskan invasions in the reign of Hantili II. Such repopulation might at least create a buffer zone against enemy encroachment on the homeland. Mursili made some preliminary efforts along these lines, for example by partially resettling the city of Tiliura on the border of Kaskan territory. Tiliura had been abandoned since Hantili II’s reign. But it was not until the reign of Mursili’s son Muwattalli II that full resettlement was achieved (see Ch. 10).

Mursili was also the first king to attempt to regain possession of the holy city of Nerik which had been seized by the Kaskans during the Old Kingdom. A journey which he made to Nerik to celebrate the festival of the Storm God and to liberate the countryside from the Kaska enemy was no doubt hailed as an event of great symbolical importance. For the first time in almost 300 years a Hittite king had now reclaimed, and worshipped in, one of the holiest of Hittite cities. Yet the event had little more than token significance. Mursili failed to resettle the city with his own subjects, and it was not until the reign of his grandson Urhi-Teshub that the Hittites could claim that Nerik had been fully restored to them.
Transportation

In the aftermath of conquest, Mursili regularly followed a practice which had been instituted at least as early as the reign of the first Tudhaliya—the transportation of large numbers of persons from the conquered territories for resettlement in the Hittite homeland or other regions of the kingdom. It was a practice also adopted by the rulers of the Assyrian New Kingdom. Rough parallels can be found in a number of later civilizations as well. But nowhere else did it operate as extensively as in the Hittite world. Under Mursili in particular transportation followed almost invariably in the wake of a successful military operation. Given the number of campaigns in which he engaged throughout his reign of almost thirty years, and the number of transportees involved, running to hundreds in the smaller communities and many thousands in the larger states, the logistical problems associated with the transportation system and the resettlement of the transportees in the homeland must have been enormous.

Transportation served important practical purposes. On the one hand, it helped reinforce the effectiveness of a treaty drawn up with the ruler of a conquered, or reconquered, territory; it served to diminish the threat of future anti-Hittite activities in the region by removing a large part of the population and placing the remainder under a loyal vassal. Almost certainly a significant component of the transportees were the able-bodied men of a conquered state. On the other hand, resettlement in Hatti helped restock both the military and the agricultural personnel of the homeland—an important consideration, given the substantial drain on Hittite manpower caused by year after year of military campaigns, and the apparently serious depletion of the Hittite population by the ravages of the plague.

We might well wonder how the Hittites coped with this constant influx of new settlers into their homeland—large, disparate, hostile groups of conquered peoples forced to leave their countries against their will. Yet we have no evidence that the transportees caused any major social or political problems when resettled in Hatti, apart from one instance recorded in the Annals of Tudhaliya I/II. The new arrivals were apparently assimilated into the Hittite system quickly enough to avoid such problems. The fact that they were rarely
mentioned outside military contexts might in itself be an indication of their rapid and peaceful integration into the population of their conquerors.  

How did this integration occur? After they had been selected for transportation, the transportees were usually divided into two categories—those the king claimed for his own service, and those allocated to his military officers. Transportees in the second category were frequently accompanied by livestock from the conquered state. In this case at least they probably covered a broad cross-section of the local population—men, women, and children; and for the most part they were probably settled on the estates owned by the aristocracy to whom they were assigned as war booty.

The transportees assigned to the service of the king became in effect his own property, and could be disposed of as he saw fit. Very likely a large number of the men of military age became part of the king’s own militia, whose duties included the garrisoning of frontier posts. Other transportees were assigned to temple duty in various cult centres within Hatti. Others served as a labour force, for example on a farm that had been abandoned by its tenant, or on various state works projects. Transportees may also have been used to populate or repopulate sparsely inhabited or abandoned settlements situated in peripheral areas of the homeland—particularly in the reigns of Mursili’s successors (see Ch. 10). They could also be used as a medium of exchange for the recovery of Hittite subjects held by enemy countries as hostages or prisoners-of-war.

The actual removal of the transportees to the homeland, along with wives, children, and livestock, must often have proved a long, difficult, and laborious operation, especially when their home country was hundreds of kilometres from their place of resettlement. And transportees sometimes escaped from their conquerors during the journey and sought refuge in neighbouring regions. Hittite kings took strong measures to discourage the practice. Explicit extradition clauses were written into the treaties demanding that local rulers promptly hand back any fugitives from Hittite authority who had sought refuge with them. Failure to do so was likely to meet with military retaliation, as happened when Uhhaziti refused to hand over to Mursili the Hittite transportees who had escaped to his land and sought his protection. A rebellious vassal or hostile independent ruler who suddenly found his population
swelled by large numbers of able-bodied, disaffected Hittite subjects could become an even greater threat to the stability of Hittite-controlled territory in the region.

The King’s Speech Affliction

In the course of a journey to Til-Kunnu, Mursili suffered the first symptoms of an affliction, allegedly induced by the shock of a thunderstorm, which affected his speech. Initially he was alarmed, but gradually came to terms with the affliction. Or so he thought. It continued to prey on his mind, and eventually to figure in his dreams. What had he done to warrant it? Which god had inflicted it upon him? During one of his dreams, the illness suddenly increased in severity:

Thus speaks My Sun Mursili, the Great King: ‘I travelled to Til-Kunnu... A storm burst forth and the Storm God thundered terrifyingly. I was afraid. Speech withered in my mouth, and my speech came forth somewhat haltingly. I neglected this plight entirely. But as the years followed one another, the cause of my plight began to appear in my dreams. And in my sleep the god’s hand fell upon me, and my mouth went sideways. I consulted the oracles, and the Storm God of Manuzziya was ascertained (as responsible for my plight). (CTH 486, obv. 1–10)

As far as we can determine from the expression ‘my mouth went sideways’, the king appears to have suffered a minor stroke, which caused partial speech paralysis. We do not know when this affliction occurred. It is possible that it was induced by cumulative stress associated with a number of factors—not only the stress of years of constant warfare, sometimes on several fronts simultaneously, but also the king’s despair and frustration over the plague which had decimated the Hittite population, and perhaps above all the emotional strain caused by the crises in his own family. All these may well have taken a heavy toll upon his health, leading to a medical condition which characteristically he attributed to divine origin.

In order to appease the god identified as the cause of the affliction, the king sought oracular advice, and was instructed on the appropriate ritual to be performed. The ritual involved sending a ‘substitute ox’ along with various paraphernalia (including the garments he had worn on the day the symptoms of the disease first appeared) to the temple of
the Storm God in Kummanni. Here the ox and the accompanying items were to be burned as an offering to the Storm God.

We do not know whether the ritual was followed by any improvement in the king’s condition. But whatever the actual cause of the affliction, the treatment prescribed, which was consonant with the king’s belief in the divine origin of such afflictions and the efficacy of appropriate divine appeasement, may have brought about at least a partial (psychologically induced?) cure. No other surviving text makes any reference to the affliction. The whole episode is a curious one, and the affliction appears not to have affected, at least in any recognizable way, the king’s ability to provide sound military and political leadership in the years following the first onset of the disease. But it adds another interesting personal dimension to the record of Mursili’s reign.

By the end of this reign, Mursili had effectively answered his critics who had so contemptuously dismissed him on his accession as a mere child, with none of the qualities of his illustrious father. But his years on the throne took their personal toll, both physically and emotionally. In the field of battle he could be no less ruthless than his father had been. But there are many texts which reveal him as a man blessed—or afflicted—with a strong sense of conscience. The ‘sins of his father’ weighed heavily upon him, and he sought to do all he could to gain absolution for them as he saw the plague, which he had no doubt was due to divine wrath, take increasingly greater toll of his subjects. And he must long have wrestled with the problem of what to do with his stepmother before finally taking action. In spite of her offences she was the legitimate reigning queen. No doubt he continued to agonize over the decision he made to strip her of all power. His military records reveal him as a determined and sometimes ruthless warlord, in the traditional royal warrior mould. But his prayers and appeals to the gods show him as a humane and sensitive man who sought always to act in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and what he perceived to be the divine will.

Through the traumas of his personal life, and the intimate glimpses which he provides into his feelings and emotions, we can understand and relate more readily to this king than we can to any of his predecessors or successors who held sway over the world of the Hittites.
The Showdown with Egypt:  
The Reign of Muwattalli II  
(c.1295–1272)

The Re-Emergence of Egypt

On his death, Mursili left to his son and successor Muwattalli a relatively stable kingdom. In the west, the vassal network which Mursili had established appears to have remained submissive to Hittite overlordship during the last half of his reign. In the north, repeated campaigns in the Kaska region had provided temporary respite from the constant threat of Kaskan incursions, and the rebellious vassals had been firmly restored to their Hittite allegiance. In the south-east, control over the vassal kingdoms established by Suppliluliuma had been maintained, in spite of the increasing menace of Assyria. And after the crises in Mursili’s ninth year, precipitated by the deaths of the viceroys Telipinu and Sharri-Kushuh, the viceregal kingdoms of Carchemish and Aleppo remained securely under Hittite control.

But further to the south a major new threat was building, in the land of the Nile. In the aftermath of the Amarna period and the end of the eighteenth Dynasty, there had been no serious challenge from Egypt to Hittite overlordship in Syria. Although still holding some territories in southern Syria, particularly military establishments in Palestine (for example, Beth-Shan), Egypt could no longer claim more than token influence in the region as a whole. But the tensions between Hatti and Egypt had persisted. They were now to take a turn for the worse. After some four years on the throne, Tutankhamun’s successor Ay died, and was replaced by Horemheb¹ whose reign paved the way for the beginning of the nineteenth Dynasty. A powerful new era was dawning in Egyptian history.
Under Horemheb, Egyptian military activity had begun afresh in Syria when an expeditionary force was sent to the region to support the rebellion against Hittite rule in the Nuhashshi lands during Mursili’s ninth year. On this occasion, the invading force was repulsed. But the very fact of Egyptian intrusion into territory claimed by the Hittites made it clear that Egypt had by no means relinquished its political and military interests in Syria. It was only a matter of time before it would once more pursue these interests with determination and vigour.

Contrary to popular opinion, Horemheb himself seems to have made little impact on the international scene. Rather, he devoted himself to a programme of reunification and reconstruction within his own kingdom, in the process rooting out the administrative corruption and abuse of bureaucratic power which had apparently become rife in Akhenaten’s reign. In so doing, he prepared the ground for the early rulers of the nineteenth Dynasty, when Egypt emerged as the Hittites’ most serious contender for political and military supremacy in Syria.

**Repopulation Programmes in the North**

Probably from the very beginning of his reign Muwattalli realized that he would soon be forced into a major contest with Egypt, particularly over the Syrian kingdoms which had formerly been subject to the pharaoh. Successful defence against a determined challenge from Egypt would necessitate a substantial concentration of Hittite military resources in Syria. The Syrian viceroys could not on their own be expected to muster sufficient resources to deal effectively with such a challenge.

Yet Muwattalli knew all too well from the experience of his predecessors the dangers of diverting to Syria Hittite troops who would otherwise be used for the defence of the homeland, particularly against threats from the north. The series of campaigns which his father had conducted throughout his reign and particularly towards its end may have provided some temporary easing of the pressures on the homeland’s northern and eastern frontiers. But in their long-term effects, they were likely to prove no more conclusive than the campaigns Suppiluliuma, or indeed any of his predecessors, had conducted in the region.
The clear lesson to be learned from this experience was that no matter how frequently and how intensively the Hittites campaigned against the Kaska lands, they would never succeed in permanently subjugating these lands or in establishing any form of lasting control over them. The only alternative was to strengthen the outlying areas of the homeland which were most prone to enemy attack and occupation and provided a route to the very heart of the Hittite kingdom. As we have noted, the siting of the Hittite capital close to enemy territory to the north and north-east made it chronically vulnerable to attack from these regions.

The major incursions into Hittite territory prior to Suppiluliuma’s reign had resulted in the loss of almost the entire region extending across the Marassantiya basin north and north-east of Hattusa, from the lower course of the Marassantiya in the west towards the Euphrates in the south-east (although much of this region may have been in enemy hands even earlier). Foreign invasion or encroachment had led to large numbers of the Hittite subject populations dispersing or resettling in areas still under the protection of the Hittite king. However, Suppiluliuma’s campaigns against the Kaskans had succeeded in reducing the enemy presence in this region and forcing their evacuation of some of the settlements which they had occupied. In the wake of their retreat, Suppiluliuma instituted a policy of repopulating the settlements with their original inhabitants after fortifying these settlements against future enemy attack.\(^4\)

Like his father, Mursili followed up his military successes with some attempts to repopulate settlements abandoned or partly abandoned as a result of the Kaskan incursions.\(^5\) But the military conquests and the sporadic repopulation programmes carried out by Suppiluliuma and Mursili failed to provide a lasting solution to the Kaska problem, and Muwattalli was again faced with Kaskan invasions in the territories to the north and north-east of Hattusa. Before he could commit to Syria the forces necessary to counter the resurgence of Egyptian military power in the region, he had first to put in place more effective arrangements for the protection of the homeland, and above all, the royal capital.

What he did was to formulate and implement a plan of astonishing boldness—one totally without precedent in the history of the Hittite kingdom. We shall return to this below. But for the moment, we must once more turn our attention westwards.
After almost two decades of relative peace, a dangerous situation was again beginning to develop in the west. This was due largely to a man who was to prove one of the most provocative, and one of the most elusive, of the Hittites’ enemies—a man of uncertain origins called Piyamaradu; he may have been a renegade Hittite of high birth or a rebellious Arzawan prince. Piyamaradu had apparently fallen out of favour with the Hittite king, presumably for nurturing ambitions beyond his station in life. He began building his own power base amongst the Hittites’ western subject territories—probably with the support of, perhaps in alliance with, the king of Ahhiyawa. He consolidated his links with Ahhiyawa by marrying his daughter to Atpa, the Ahhiyawan vassal ruler of the Land of Milawata (Millawanda).

We have noted that Milawata had previously belonged to Hatti, and that in the third year of Mursili II’s reign Hittite control had been re-established over it when it had attempted to form an alliance with Ahhiyawa. But subsequently, perhaps during Muwattalli’s reign, Milawata had become subject to Ahhiyawa. It is possible that Muwattalli had agreed to relinquish the vassal kingdom, which had by now assumed a predominantly Mycenaean character, in the hope that this would satisfy Ahhiyawan territorial ambitions on the Anatolian mainland, and in return, perhaps, for a guarantee from the Ahhiyawan king of cooperation in maintaining general stability within the region. This was particularly important now that the Hittites needed to focus their attention increasingly on developments in Syria.

The ceding of Milawata to Ahhiyawa may have occurred within the context of a more general agreement reflected in a fragmentary text which lists a number of Anatolian states and their boundaries. The surviving portion of the text refers to Tarhuntassa, Mira, and Ahhiyawa. Since the text indicates boundaries, it probably defined the limits of Ahhiyawan-controlled territory in Anatolia. This suggests some form of pact or understanding, if not a formal treaty, between the Hittite king and his Ahhiyawan counterpart. At all events, relations between Ahhiyawa and Hatti seem for a time to have been peaceful, even amicable.

We know frustratingly little about the career of Piyamaradu, one of the most notorious ‘villains’ of Hittite history, since the majority of texts
which refer to him are fragmentary and open to different interpretations. But from what we can piece together, it appears that he sought to create a kingdom of his own out of the Hittites’ vassal states in the west. In the early years of Muwattalli’s reign he may have gained temporary control of the Land of Wilusa, which lay in the north-west of Anatolia, in the region later known as the Troad (see Ch. 14). We do not know whether his activities in the region had the support of the people of Wilusa; the fact that Muwattalli subsequently referred to Wilusa as one of the most consistently loyal of the Hittites’ western vassal states suggests he did not—if we can accept Muwattalli’s statement at face value. At all events, it seems that the only opposition he encountered at this time was from the veteran Manapa-Tarhunda, vassal ruler since the beginning of Mursili’s reign of the nearby Seha River Land.

We recall that Manapa-Tarhunda had disgraced himself not long after his appointment by breaking his allegiance with Mursili II and forming an alliance with the king of Ahhiyawa. But Mursili had forced his surrender, accepted his assurances of future loyalty, and reconfirmed his appointment. From that time on Manapa-Tarhunda apparently remained faithful to his Hittite allegiance. In keeping with this allegiance, and perhaps out of concern for the threat Piyamaradu might pose to his own kingdom, he seems to have made an attempt to drive Piyamaradu out of the region. But without success. Piyamaradu inflicted a humiliating defeat on him, and followed this up by attacking what was apparently one of his dependent territories, the island of Lazpa (Lesbos).

Muwattalli must have received news of these events with considerable alarm. With his commitment to increasing the security of the northern frontiers of his kingdom, and his concerns about the growing threat posed by Egypt to his Syrian territories, he could ill afford to commit resources to a military campaign in the far west. Yet failure to respond to the provocative actions of Piyamaradu could well lead to an escalation of anti-Hittite activities in the region. Given the clear interest of Ahhiyawa in extending its own influence in western Anatolia, an exemplary show of force was imperative. This task Muwattalli assigned to a Hittite expeditionary force under the command of Gassu, with the prime objective of restoring Hittite control over Wilusa, and very likely putting an end to Piyamaradu’s activities in the region.
Reinforced by a contingent from Mira-Kuwaliya under the command of Kupanta-Kurunta, who had been ruler of the vassal state since the twelfth year of Mursili’s reign, Gassu advanced to the Seha River Land on his way to Wilusa. No doubt he counted on additional support from Manapa-Tarhunda. But the latter, who had already experienced a drubbing from Piyamaradu, suddenly fell ill—or so he pleaded in a letter to Muwattalli apologizing for his inability to join the Hittite expeditionary force: ‘I, however, have fallen ill. I am seriously ill, I am laid low by illness!’ (KUB xix 5 (CTH 191) + KBo xix 79 5–6).

The outcome of the Hittite expedition is not recorded in our surviving texts. But from the subsequent renewal of Hittite control over Wilusa, it is clear that the Hittites succeeded, temporarily, in curbing insurrectionist activities in the region. Unfortunately for them, Piyamaradu himself eluded their grasp, probably withdrawing to the protection of the king of Ahhiyawa as he did on later occasions, and was thus able to continue his anti-Hittite activities once the Hittite army had departed.

Some time following the Hittite campaign in the west, Muwattalli drew up a treaty with Alaksandu, the duly acknowledged occupant of the Wilusan throne. Muwattalli stressed in the treaty the outstanding loyalty displayed by Wilusa in the past, particularly by its king Kukkunni, and the obligations of its current ruler both to act as watchdog of Hittite interests in the west and to provide reinforcements in the event that a Hittite army again campaigned in the region:

And if you hear in advance about some evil plan to revolt, and either a man of the Seha River Land or a man of Arzawa carries out the revolt . . . . but you do not write about it to My Sun but somehow ignore (the actions of) these men, and think as follows: ‘Let this evil take place,’ you will violate the oath. . . . Your regulation concerning the army and chariotry shall be established as follows: If I, My Sun, go on campaign from that land—either from the city of Karkisa, the city of Masa, the city of Lukka, or the city of Warsiyalla, then you too must go on campaign with me, together with infantry and chariotry. Or if I send some nobleman to go on campaign from this land, then you must go on campaign with him also. (Muwattalli: Alaksandu Treaty §§8, 11 = A 117 75 ff., after Beckman (1999: 89–90))

At the time the treaty was concluded, Muwattalli knew that he would soon be calling on all his available military resources to defend his territories in Syria. The various arrangements and provisions contained
in the treaty probably reflect his efforts to ensure the stability of his western territories at this time with as little direct Hittite involvement as possible. Wilusa could play an important role in this regard. In addition, the king expected his vassal to provide troops for his campaigns in Syria. Egypt might not be the only enemy he had to contend with in the region:

But from Hatti, these are the military obligations for you: The Kings who are the equals of My Sun—the king of Egypt, the king of Babylonia, the king of Hanigalbat, or the king of Assyria—if anyone in this group comes in battle, or if domestically anyone carries out a revolt against My Sun, and I, My Sun, write to you for infantry and chariotry, then send infantry and chariotry to my aid immediately. (Muwattalli: Alaksandu Treaty §11, after Beckman (1999: 90))

Manapa-Tarhunda may still have occupied the throne of the Seha River Land at the time the treaty with Alaksandu was drawn up. But he was becoming an increasing liability to his overlord, particularly at a time when it was essential to ensure strong and stable leadership amongst the vassal rulers in the west as the Hittites prepared for their campaigns in Syria. This probably prompted Muwattalli’s decision to depose the old vassal and banish him from his kingdom, appointing his son Masturi in his place. Presumably the latter had given promise of being a more reliable and effective agent of Hittite influence in the west than his aged and ailing father.

When he felt confident that this influence had been firmly re-established, Muwattalli began final preparations for his confrontation with Egypt.

**The Rise of Egypt’s Nineteenth Dynasty**

During Horemheb’s reign, a youth called Pramesse from an undistinguished noble family in the north-eastern part of the Egyptian Delta rose to prominence through a succession of increasingly important military posts, and was eventually appointed as the pharaoh’s vizier. His advancement was almost certainly due to Horemheb’s direct patronage. Himself childless, the pharaoh had recognized the promise shown by the young Pramesse and had probably spent some years grooming him as his successor. On his death c.1295, Pramesse ascended the throne of Egypt as Ramesses I. His accession marked the beginning
of Egypt’s Nineteenth Dynasty, one of the most famous dynasties in the history of pharaonic Egypt.

Its founder had little time to fulfil the expectations held of him, for his reign lasted little more than a year. But before he died, he had made his son Seti I co-regent. This second pharaoh of the new dynasty was responsible for launching Egypt on an aggressive new programme of military expansion. From the very beginning of his reign, Seti applied himself to the task of regaining the status his kingdom had once enjoyed as a major international political and military power. (In so doing, he sought to emulate the achievements of his most illustrious predecessors, looking to Tuthmosis III in particular as his source of inspiration.) Restoration of Egyptian prestige and authority in Syria was essential to the achievement of this task.

A graphic though now fragmentary record of how he set about it is provided by the battle scenes from his reign, carved in two groups east and west of the central doorway of the Hypostyle Hall at Karnak. To begin with, he dealt with rebellious groups in the regions in Syria still subject, if only nominally, to Egyptian authority. A successful campaign in his first regnal year against the Shosu bedouins in Canaan was followed by a campaign in Palestine which led to the defeat and submission of a coalition of local rulers. Once Egyptian authority had been firmly reasserted in these regions, Seti prepared for a more ambitious undertaking—the reconquest of the kingdoms of Kadesh and Amurru.

As we have seen, these kingdoms had in the past fluctuated in their allegiance between Egypt and Hatti. Although they had been Hittite vassals since the latter part of Suppiluliuma’s reign, Egypt had never accepted the legitimacy of Hittite control over them. But there had been little it could do to reassert its own claims—until now. A pharaoh had emerged who had the determination, the ability, and the resources to win them back.

As Seti’s war monument at Karnak records, both Kadesh and Amurru fell to the pharaoh. His success had wider implications. The attack on Hittite subject territory amounted to a declaration of war against Hatti itself and clearly posed a serious challenge to continued Hittite supremacy in the whole of Syria. Muwattalli could not afford to let this challenge go unanswered. Direct conflict between the two kingdoms now seemed inevitable.
But a year or more elapsed before the conflict took place, probably because of Muwattalli’s preoccupation with affairs in Anatolia. If so, Seti had chosen his time well, re-establishing his hold over the southern Syrian kingdoms and depriving the Hittite king of two of his vassal states before he could muster sufficient troops in Syria for a counter-offensive. It was fortunate for Seti that the Hittites did not retaliate promptly, for he had to postpone further military operations in Syria for a year or so in order to undertake a campaign closer to home against the Libyans.23

With the successful completion of this campaign he returned to Syria, prepared for a direct test of strength with the Hittites in defence of the vassal states he had taken from them. Even if they had been willing to concede him these states, his territorial ambitions in Syria would not have been satisfied. In the tradition of Tuthmosis III, he undoubtedly sought to extend his conquests further afield. He had to be stopped now.

The confrontation between the armies of Hatti and Egypt probably took place in the region of Kadesh, a region which a few years later was to figure as the arena for the most famous of all clashes between Hittite and Egyptian forces. An account of the present confrontation, and its alleged outcome, appears on Seti’s war monument at Karnak:

... mighty Bull, [ready]-horned, [mighty]-hearted, smiting the Asiatics, beating down the Hittites, slaying their chiefs, overthrown in their blood, charging among them like a tongue of fire, making them as that which is not... Chiefs of the countries that knew not Egypt, whom his Majesty brought as living captives... The victor returns, when he has devastated the countries. He has smitten the land of Hatti, causing the cowardly rebels to cease. (Extracts from Seti’s war monument, trans. Breasted (1906: iii 72–3 §§144, 148))24

As far as we can distinguish the facts amongst the bombast, it appears that the battle honours went decisively to Seti, who took a substantial number of Hittite prisoners back to Egypt.25 Kadesh and Amurru probably remained under his control for the rest of his reign. This effectively made him overlord of the whole of southern Syria.

For the moment, Muwattalli had little choice but to accept the territorial gains made by Seti, and to acknowledge that political and military supremacy in Syria had now to be shared with Egypt. It is possible that this was ratified in a treaty between the two kings.26 If a treaty was in fact concluded at this time, it no doubt specified a demarcation of territory between the kingdoms and an obligation on
the part of each king to respect the boundaries as defined; the territories within the region from Kadesh southwards and the coastal strip as far as the northern limits of the kingdom of Amurru were probably acknowledged as being under Egyptian sovereignty, with the territories north of Kadesh confirmed as Hittite.

Whatever agreement, if any, was reached between the two kings, Muwattalli had no qualms about breaking it once he had assembled sufficient military resources in Syria to do so. But for the few remaining years of Seti’s reign, an uneasy peace seems to have prevailed between Hatti and Egypt. This gave Muwattalli the respite he needed to implement some radical changes within his kingdom.

### The Shift of the Royal Seat to Tarhuntassa

Probably during the middle years of his reign, Muwattalli transferred the seat of Hittite power from Hattusa to a city called Tarhuntassa located in the region later known as Cilicia. A record of this momentous change has been left us by Muwattalli’s brother, the man who later ascended the throne as Hattusili III:

When, however, my brother Muwattalli at the command of his (patron) deity went down to the Lower Land, leaving the city of Hattusa, he took the gods and the ancestral spirits of Hatti . . . and he brought them down to the city of Tarhuntassa and made it his place of residence. (Apology of Hattusili (CTH 81)§6, i 75–ii 1–2, §8, ii 52–3)

That this was no mere temporary relocation, for military or other reasons, is indicated by the wholesale removal of the state deities to the new site. Muwattalli intended the move to be a permanent one. Now, probably, he assumed the title ‘Great King of Tarhuntassa’.

The transfer of the capital may well have met with strong opposition from many of the king’s subjects. For all the weaknesses of its location, Hattusa had been the centre, if not the original ancestral home, of Hittite power from the early days of the Old Kingdom. Muwattalli’s predecessors had fought vigorously to protect it, and to regain it when it had fallen into enemy hands. It was the spiritual as well as the material symbol of the might of the Hittite kingdom, the location of the great Temple of the Storm God, and the temples of many other deities. It was indisputably the greatest city of the Hittite world, and had become
virtually synonymous with Hittite power—not only to the Hittites themselves, but to their vassal kings, many of whom came annually to the city to pay homage to their Hittite overlord.

Yet this royal city was now being abandoned by its king for a new location several hundred kilometres to the south, and at that time apparently insignificant and largely unknown. Indeed we have no certain references to Tarhuntassa before the royal seat was established there. The practical reasons for the transfer must have been very strong indeed to outweigh arguments for maintaining the royal seat at Hattusa. Even so there were those who remained unconvinced. Many years later Hattusili III still questioned the wisdom of his brother’s action. In a prayer to the Sun Goddess he stressed that he had no part in it:

Whether [the transfer of the gods] was in accordance with your wishes or whether it was not in accordance with your wishes, you, My Lady, are the one who knew that in your divine soul. But I was not involved in the order to transfer the gods. For me it was a matter of coercion, (while) he (i.e. Muwattalli) was my master. But the transfer of the gods was not in accordance with my wishes and I was concerned about that order. And the silver and gold of all the gods, to which god he gave the silver and gold of each of them, in that decision, too, I was not in any way involved. (KUB xiv 7 (CTH 383) i 3’–15’, after Houwink ten Cate (1974a: 125–6))

Political and military developments in Syria may well have been an important factor in the action taken by Muwattalli. And once taken, he held firm to it. Tarhuntassa provided him with a much more geographically convenient base than the old Hittite capital for launching his campaign into Syria. Further, the massive diversion of the kingdom’s military resources to Syria for the confrontation with Egypt would leave the old capital dangerously exposed to the enemies in the northern regions—the Kaska enemy above all. It would make better sense, so Muwattalli may have reasoned, to re-establish the permanent administrative and spiritual centre of the kingdom in a new location far removed from the menace of the northern enemies.

What became of Hattusa? Although it was to suffer a substantial decline in status, the king certainly had no intention of abandoning it entirely. On his departure from the city he placed it under the immediate authority of a man called Mittannamuwa. The latter had been a
distinguished functionary in Mursili’s reign, rising to the rank of ‘Great Scribe’ (gal dub.sar), a post now conferred upon his son Purandamuwa. But while Mittannamuwu became the administrator of Hattusa itself, did Muwattalli place the city and the region within which it lay under the overall jurisdiction of his brother Hattusili? This is suggested by two royal prayers from Hattusili’s own reign. But the evidence is not clear cut, and Singer believes it most unlikely that Muwattalli on the verge of his radical reform would risk leaving the old capital in the hands of his ambitious brother.

At all events there is no doubt that from very early in Muwattalli’s reign, Hattusili had exercised considerable power within the Hittite kingdom. Shortly after his accession, Muwattalli had conferred upon his brother the highly prestigious position of gal mezedi, Chief of the Royal Bodyguards. He also assigned to him a number of important military commands, and appointed him governor of the Upper Land. The appointment meant displacing the current governor Armatarhunda, who protested vigorously at his removal from office (see Ch. 10). But it was to prove critically important to the maintenance of Hittite authority in the north while Muwattalli prepared for his conflict with Egypt.

There was a need for other measures to ensure that the region would remain secure. Many of the old Hittite settlements located within it now had only a sparse population, or were inhabited by Kaska settlers, or were abandoned ghost towns. Muwattalli assigned the whole region to Hattusili, with the particular brief of repopulating abandoned or sparsely populated settlements, and establishing a Hittite population in areas where there was already a substantial Kaskan presence. Hattusili became in effect the ruler of a buffer kingdom which included the countries of Ishupitta, Marista, Hissashapa, Katapa, Hanhana, Darahna, Hattena, Durmitta, Pala, Tummanma, Gassiya, Sappa, and the Hulana River Land. In broad terms the territory incorporating these countries must have extended from Classical Paphlagonia across the northern half of the Marassantiya basin to the region of (mod.) Sivas or beyond in the south-east.

Muwattalli also conferred upon his brother the status of king (lugal) in the Land of Hakpis(sa) (Hakmis(sa)). The location of the city of Hakpis was strategically important, for it lay on the route from Hattusa to the holy city of Nerik and thence into Kaskan territory. It also served
as an important administrative centre, in effect a royal capital from which Hattusili ruled the northern region as a whole.\textsuperscript{40} We shall consider below some of the measures taken by Hattusili to repopulate the ‘empty countries’ (\textit{kur.kur}^\text{MEŠ} \textit{dannatta}) in the north and to reassert Hittite control throughout this region.

What is clear is that Muwattalli’s decision to shift his capital to Tarhuntassa had the effect of virtually partitioning the Hittite kingdom, with the northern part of the kingdom, including much of the homeland, now directly ruled by Hattusili. This was to have some major political repercussions, not to become fully evident until after Muwattalli’s death. For the present, it enabled Muwattalli to concentrate his efforts on his forthcoming confrontation with Egypt. Following the death of his old adversary Seti I, an ambitious and enterprising new pharaoh had now ascended the throne—Seti’s son Ramesses II.

\textbf{Preparations for the Conflict}

From his early years Ramesses had been prepared by his father for the succession, and probably in his mid-teens was officially designated as prince-regent. On Seti’s death in 1279,\textsuperscript{41} Ramesses ascended the throne as Ramesses II. The first three years of his reign were taken up largely with internal affairs. But by the summer of his fourth year, he was ready to follow up his father’s successes in Syria with a fresh reassertion of Egyptian authority in the region.

The Syrian campaign which he conducted in 1275 paved the way for a more extensive campaign the following year. Much of the territory through which he passed in his first campaign was already firmly under Egyptian control, including Canaan and the cities of Tyre and Byblos. It is possible that the kingdom of Amurru which Seti had wrested from Hittite control had by this time been regained by the Hittites, and if so Ramesses may have been obliged to reconquer it. But more likely it had remained with Egypt since its conquest by Seti.\textsuperscript{42} If so, Ramesses’ expedition in his fourth year was probably little more than a probing exercise, which provided the opportunity for confirming the loyalty of Egyptian vassals in the region, ensuring their support in the forthcoming confrontation with Hatti, and gaining direct knowledge of the terrain where the contest would take place.
By the summer of Ramesses’ fifth year, preparations in Egypt were complete for a return to Syria and a decisive test of strength between the two great military powers of the day. Ramesses’ prime object was to destroy Hittite power in Syria, and to restore Egypt fully to the pre-eminent position it had enjoyed in the days of Tuthmosis III.

At the time of this campaign, the dividing line between Hittite- and Egyptian-controlled territory in Syria was a vaguely defined frontier in the region of Kadesh, which lay on the Orontes river. We have noted this kingdom’s fluctuating loyalties through several centuries as it changed sides from one major power to another. It had recently fallen to Seti, along with Amurru. However, it must have reverted to Hittite control, perhaps in the first year of Ramesses’ reign, for it was clearly on the Hittite side at the time of Ramesses’ second Syrian campaign.43

The Battle of Kadesh (1274)

The contest which finally took place between the armies of Hatti and Egypt in the vicinity of the city of Kadesh is recorded on the walls of five Egyptian temples: the Ramesseum (Ramesses’ temple near the Valley of the Kings), and the temples at Karnak, Luxor, Abydos, and Abu Simbel. The record generally appears in two versions on the temple walls: the lengthy ‘Poem’ or ‘Literary Record’, and a shorter version, the so-called ‘Report’ or ‘Bulletin’, which is closely associated with one of the reliefs which depict episodes from the campaign. Both versions deal not only with the battle itself, but also with events leading up to it, including the progress of the Egyptian forces from the time of their departure from Egypt. Unfortunately we do not have a Hittite account of the battle, and obviously have to allow for bias, distortion, and exaggeration in what we learn from the Egyptian account. None the less this account provides us with one of the most detailed records of all ancient battles, and enables us to reconstruct a reasonably complete picture of what actually happened in the days leading up to the battle as well as on the day of the battle itself.44

On the Hittite side Muwattalli, determined to crush once and for all Egyptian military aggression against his Syrian territories, had amassed a vast army in Syria. It was made up of a substantial body of regular Hittite troops, contingents from a wide range of vassal states, and large
numbers of mercenaries. The Egyptian record provides a valuable source of information on the composition of this armed force:

His Majesty arrived at the town of Kadesh, and now the wretched Fallen one of Kadesh had come and had collected together all the foreign countries so far as the end of the sea; the entire Land of Hatti had come, that of Nahrin (i.e. Mitanni) likewise, that of Arzawa, Dardany,\textsuperscript{46} that of Keshkesh (i.e. Kaska), those of Masa, those of Pitassa, that of Arawanna, that of Karkisa, Lukka, Kizzuwadna, Carchemish, Ugarit, Kedy, the entire land of Nuhashshi, Musanet, Kadesh . . . They covered mountains and valleys and they were like the locust by reason of their multitude. He left no silver in the land, he stripped it of all its possessions, and gave them to all the foreign countries in order to bring them with him to fight. (Kadesh Inscription P40–53, after Gardiner (1975: 8))\textsuperscript{47}

The total figure given by Ramesses for the enemy forces is 47,500, including some 3,500 chariotry and 37,000 infantry.\textsuperscript{48} While Ramesses may have exaggerated the figures, it is quite conceivable that the Hittites did in fact gather such a force from the sources available to them.\textsuperscript{49}

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Heliopolis the army of Re, from Memphis the army of Ptah, and probably from Tanis in the Delta the army of Sutekh. In late May 1274, this large military assemblage left Egypt and began its march into Syria, proceeding northwards up the coast of Palestine towards the territories of the king of Hatti.

Ramesses led the way with his imperial entourage and the Amun division, advancing post-haste towards the city of Kadesh. His progress was swift, unhindered by any resistance worth noting along the way, and within a month he was within striking distance of his objective. But normal military precautions had been thrown to the winds, and the pharaoh’s whole progress was characterized by poor planning and lack of reconnaissance. The risks he ran were substantial. He was now in enemy territory, and if attacked, he could call only on the resources of the Amun division, for the other three divisions were spread out over a considerable distance in the rear. Before proceeding any further, he had need to consolidate his forces by awaiting the arrival of the three lagging divisions, and carrying out at least some basic reconnaissance to determine the whereabouts of the enemy. Such must have been the advice given to him by his military advisers. If so, it was ignored.

Indeed just as he was preparing to cross the Orontes along with the Amun division by a ford near Shabtuna, his confidence received a considerable boost when two Shosu bedouins came to him, claiming that they and their fellow tribesmen wished to leave the service of the Hittite king and join the Egyptian forces. Under interrogation, they stated that their tribal chiefs were still with the Hittite army, which was far to the north, in the Land of Aleppo:

‘Our brothers who are headmen of tribes with the Fallen One of Hatti have sent us to His Majesty to say that we will be servants of Pharaoh and will separate ourselves from the Ruler of Hatti.’ Then said His Majesty to them: ‘Where are they, your brothers who sent you to report this to His Majesty?’ And they said to His Majesty: ‘They are where the wretched Ruler of Hatti is, for the Fallen One of Hatti is in the Land of Aleppo to the north of Tunip, and he feared Pharaoh (too much) to come southward when he heard that Pharaoh had come northward.’ (Kadesh Inscription B8–18, after Gardiner (1975: 28))

The story was a fabrication. The bedouins had been sent by Muwattalli to spy out Ramesses’ position. Incredibly, Ramesses accepted what they told him without any further investigation. Failing to make even a token reconnaissance he crossed the ford with the Amun division, and took up a
position north-west of Kadesh. The Amun division was thus isolated from the Re division, which was still occupied with crossing the ford. The Ptah and Sutekh divisions were still many kilometres to the south.

As his troops were setting up camp in preparation for laying siege to Kadesh the following day, and while awaiting the erection of his royal pavilion, Ramesses received a severe shock. Two Hittite scouts sent by Muwattalli to ascertain the exact position of the Egyptian army were captured and under a beating revealed the true location of the Hittite army:

Then said His Majesty: ‘What are you?’ They replied, ‘We belong to the Ruler of Hatti! He sent us to see where Your Majesty was.’ Said His Majesty to them, ‘Where is he, the Ruler of Hatti? See, I heard it said that he was in the Land of Aleppo, north of Tunip.’ They replied, ‘Behold, the Ruler of Hatti has (already) come, together with the many foreign lands that he brought as allies . . . See, they are poised, armed, and ready to fight behind Old-Kadesh!’ (Kadesh Inscription B35–51, trans. Kitchen (1982: 54–6))

The entire Hittite army was in a concealed position just across the Orontes, ready to attack!

After summoning and venting his fury upon his officers for this disastrous breakdown in the Egyptian intelligence service (for which he himself was largely to blame), Ramesses quickly dispatched two of his personal officials to hurry on the divisions of Re and Ptah, the latter still many kilometres distant; the division of Sutekh was too far away to be of any use at all. But then the Hittite army passed to the south of Kadesh, crossed the river, and charged into the midst of the Re division. Caught completely unawares, the division broke apart before the onslaught. Its troops fled in panic and confusion to the camp still being set up by Ramesses and the Amun division, with the Hittite chariotry in hot pursuit.

A total rout of the Egyptian forces, and the capture or death of the pharaoh, seemed inevitable. But Ramesses, making up for his earlier recklessness and gullibility, stood his ground with an exemplary show of courage and leadership—at least according to his own version of the events. As the Hittite chariotry surrounded his forces in an ever-tightening circle, the pharaoh launched a desperate counter-attack:

Then His Majesty started forth at a gallop, and entered into the host of the fallen ones of Hatti, being alone by himself and none other with him . . . And he
found 2,500 chariots hemming him in on his outer side, consisting of all the fallen ones of Hatti with the many foreign countries which were with them... I called to you, My Father Amun, when I was in the midst of multitudes I knew not. All foreign countries were combined against me, I being alone by myself, none other with me, my numerous infantry having abandoned me, not one looking at me of my chariotry. I kept on shouting to them, but none of them hearkened to me as I called... I found Amun come when I called him; he gave me his hand and I rejoiced... All that I did came to pass. I was like Mont. I shot on my right and captured with my left... I found the 2,500 chariots, in whose midst I was, sprawling before my horse. Not one of them found his hand to fight... I caused them to plunge into the water even as crocodiles plunge, fallen upon their faces one upon the other. I killed among them according as I willed. (Kadesh Inscription, extracts from P80–140, after Gardiner (1975: 9–10))

The outcome, according to the Egyptian record, was a decisive victory for Ramesses:

Then my army came to praise me... my high officers having come to magnify my strong arm, and my chariotry likewise boasting of my name and saying, '... You are great of victory in the presence of your army, in the face of the entire land... You have broken the back of Hatti forever!' (Kadesh Inscription, extracts from P235–50, after Gardiner (1975: 12))

Muwattalli, allegedly, acknowledged the Egyptian victory, paying homage to the pharaoh, and begging mercy for his subjects:

Thereupon the wretched Ruler of Hatti sent and did homage to my name like that of Re, saying 'You are Sutekh, Baal in person. The dread of you is a brand in the Land of Hatti... As for the Land of Egypt and the Land of Hatti, they are yours, your servants, they are under your feet... Be not hard in your dealings, victorious king. Peace is better than fighting. Give us breath!' (Kadesh Inscription, extracts from P295–321, after Gardiner (1975: 13–14))

What truth is there in all this? To begin with, Ramesses must have had considerably more military support than he claimed, to have lived to tell the tale. While we should not detract too much from his courage and the personal leadership he gave at the moment of crisis, the Hittite attack might well have resulted in a complete rout of the Egyptian forces but for what appears to have been a very timely arrival of reinforcements from Amurru. While these reinforcements are not mentioned in the
literary record, the relief sculptures of the battle illustrate a large orderly array of troops approaching the Egyptian camp. For his own purposes Ramesses would have played down their role. But their arrival may well have distracted the Hittite attacking force sufficiently to prevent the total destruction of the first two Egyptian divisions, providing time for the arrival of the third and fourth.

Ramesses may also have been helped by another factor. As we have noted, the Hittite army was made up of a motley collection of vassal troops and mercenaries in addition to the regular Hittite troops. After the success of the initial shock assault on the Egyptians, it is quite possible that discipline in the Hittite ranks broke down when the Egyptian camp was reached, with its enticing prospects for looting and plunder.

Even if we make allowance for exaggerations in the Egyptian account, there can be little doubt that the Hittites suffered substantial losses. Detailed lists of Hittite officers slain in the battle appear on the walls of the Ramesseum, and some of the names also appear in the temples of Ramesses at Abydos and Abu Simbel. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of these details.

But to which side were the overall battle honours due? Both sides claimed victory. The Egyptian records clearly depict the battle as an overwhelming triumph for the pharaoh. On the other hand our Hittite records, while they contain no surviving account of the battle itself, represent the outcome as a victory for Muwattalli (see below). The likelihood is that after a desperate rally from Ramesses and the forces immediately at his disposal, the Egyptian army was saved at the eleventh hour from a devastating defeat, and the battle itself ended in a stalemate; both sides sustained heavy losses and neither emerged as the decisive victor.

In the longer term, however, Muwattalli was the ultimate victor. After fending off the Hittite onslaught, Ramesses promptly withdrew his forces far to the south. Not only had he failed to regain for Egypt Hittite subject territories north to Kadesh, but his retreating forces were pursued by Muwattalli into Egyptian-held territory, as far south as the Land of Aba (region of Damascus). Aba fell to the Hittites, and before returning to Hatti, Muwattalli placed it under the control of his brother Hattusili, as the latter tells us:
Because my brother Muwattalli campaigned against the king of Egypt and the king of Amurru, when he defeated the kings of Egypt and Amurru, he went back to Aba. When Muwattalli, my brother defeated Aba, he... went back to Hatti, but he left me in Aba. (KUB xx1i 17 (CTH 86) i 14–21, with duplicate KUB xxx1 27 2–7,\textsuperscript{51} trans. Beal (1992b: 307))

For Muwattalli, the most important sequel to the battle of Kadesh was his recapture of the kingdom of Amurru. Control of this kingdom was of critical importance to the security of Hittite rule in Syria, particularly in view of its strategic location on the south-western flank of Hittite subject territory in the region. So long as Amurru was in enemy hands, the Hittite vassal kingdoms in northern Syria were at risk. The loss of Amurru to Seti I had been a severe blow to Hatti, and from that time Muwattalli was determined to regain it. Indeed it was this determination which provided on the Hittite side the immediate motive for the confrontation with Ramesses. Amurru was itself held partly responsible for succumbing to Egypt, its ‘defection’ being represented as an act of treachery:

When Muwattalli, the brother of the father of My Sun, became king, the people of Amurru broke faith with him, and had this to say to him: ‘From free individuals we have become vassals. But now we are your vassals no longer!’ And they entered into the following of the king of Egypt. Thereupon Muwattalli, the brother of the father of My Sun, and the king of Egypt did battle with each other over the people of Amurru. Muwattalli defeated the king of Egypt and destroyed the Land of Amurru with his weapons and subjugated it. (Tudhaliya IV: Shaushgamuwa Treaty (CTH 105)\textsuperscript{52} i 28–38)

In particular, Muwattalli’s wrath was directed against the Amurrite king Benteshina (c.1290/80–1235) who was blamed for his kingdom’s defection. Once the kingdom was restored to Hittite control, Benteshina would be deposed and taken prisoner: ‘On whatever campaign My Sun marches, if then you Gods support me and I conquer the Land of Amurru—whether I conquer it with weapons, or whether it makes peace with me—and I seize the king of Amurru... I will bestow gifts upon the Gods’ (KBo ix 96 (CTH 590) 7–9, 14).\textsuperscript{53}

The accusation of treachery which was levelled against Benteshina was probably unjustified. There had been little choice for the vassal but to submit to Egyptian overlordship, with Seti’s forces on the very borders of his kingdom and no prospect of immediate military support
from Muwattalli. Yet that cut no ice with the Hittite king, now bent on vengeance. Amurru was recaptured, and Benteshina was taken prisoner and transported to Hatti. He was replaced on the vassal throne by a man called Shapili, about whom nothing else is known. But Benteshina’s career was far from over. He had found favour with Muwattalli’s brother Hattusili, who apparently accepted his protest that he had been compelled to submit to Egyptian overlordship. Hattusili now requested that Benteshina be placed in his charge. Muwattalli agreed, and Benteshina was resettled in Hattusili’s own northern capital Hakpis. But only temporarily. He would one day reoccupy his throne in Amurru (see Ch. 10).

In spite of Ramesses’ claims to victory in the battle of Kadesh, the substantial loss of territory as well as loss of face which he suffered in the aftermath of the battle must have been a serious blow to Egypt’s status and authority in Syria, in the eyes of its subjects as well as its enemies. And in the two years immediately following Kadesh, local rulers in Canaan and Palestine openly defied Egyptian authority. Ramesses responded by conquering the centres of resistance in a rapid and decisive series of military operations.

These operations were a prelude to more extensive campaigns in the north in his eighth and ninth years, once again deep into Hittite subject territory. Advancing down the Orontes valley, Ramesses captured the cities of Tunip and Dapur. When firmly entrenched in this region, Egypt once more posed a serious threat not only to the kingdoms of Amurru and Kadesh, but to all the subject territories Muwattalli had but recently acquired, from Amurru south to Aba. For the remainder of Muwattalli’s reign, and indeed for the next sixteen years, tensions remained high between Hatti and Egypt. The prospect of another major confrontation was ever-present.

Yet it was a confrontation that neither power could afford. The conflict at Kadesh had seriously drained the resources of both kingdoms. From this they would never fully recover. And Assyria continued to lurk menacingly on the sidelines.

**Muwattalli’s Reign in Review**

Muwattalli had proved himself a worthy successor to his father Mursili. Undoubtedly he is best remembered as the opponent of Ramesses on
the field of Kadesh, and in terms of its outcome, the overall success of the Hittite–Egyptian confrontation was undoubtedly his. Had there been a less able or less determined occupant of the throne in Hattusa, Ramesses may well have succeeded in emulating the exploits of his great predecessor Tuthmosis III, and gaining control of much of the region over which Tuthmosis had once held sway.

Yet before meeting the challenge posed by Egypt’s resurgence, Muwattalli had first to reassert Hittite authority firmly and comprehensively amongst the territories and kingdoms of Anatolia. This had meant further campaigns in the west, particularly to counter the threats posed to Hittite subject territories in the region by disaffected subjects like Piyamaradu, probably with Ahhiyawan backing. It had also meant seeking more lasting solutions to the kingdom’s vulnerability to enemies closer to the homeland. Repeated military campaigns against the Hittites’ northernmost enemies, notably the Kaska people, had provided no more than temporary relief from attacks by these enemies. With the need now for a major concentration of Hittite resources in Syria, it was imperative for Muwattalli to ensure, first of all, the security of his Anatolian territories. The virtual partitioning of the kingdom, with the royal seat transferred to Tarhuntassa and the king’s brother Hattusili appointed as ruler of the northern regions of the kingdom, was a radical attempt by Muwattalli to bring about this security.

For a time he appears to have succeeded, at least long enough for him to achieve his objectives in Syria, while ensuring that Hittite territory in Anatolia was reasonably secure from enemy attack. But the arrangements he had made in Anatolia barely survived his death.

The Trial of Danuhepa

In the final years of his reign, Muwattalli was confronted with a serious crisis in the royal court. It involved his stepmother Danuhepa, last wife of his father and predecessor Mursili. In the time-honoured tradition, Danuhepa continued to exercise the functions of Hittite queen after her husband’s death, and was linked with Muwattalli by the appearance of her name with his on royal seals. But her relationship with her stepson seems to have been fraught with tension. Matters reached a head when he placed her on trial, apparently for acts of profanation in the service of the deity. In this respect, her career seems to have borne an ominous
resemblance to that of her predecessor, the notorious Babylonian Tawananna, wife of Suppiluliuma and stepmother of Mursili.

Indeed references to the careers and fate of both women appear together in a prayer uttered by Mursili’s son Hattusili to the Sun Goddess of Arinna. Hattusili denied any involvement in the action taken by his father against Tawananna and subsequently by his brother Muwattali against Danuhepa. So too Muwattali’s son Urhi-Teshub emphatically maintained that he had played no part in his father’s action against Danuhepa. Referring to her trial and anxious that he should suffer no repercussions from it, he stated:

I wish that my father and the queen would not be adversaries in a lawsuit! And may no evil whatsoever jeopardize me! Why should I pass judgment on those lawsuits? That is a lawsuit pertaining to the god! And if my father, as compared to the queen, would not (appear to) be in the right in the lawsuit, would I then be obliged to make him the losing party in the lawsuit with respect to Danuhepa, the queen? For my life’s (or my soul’s) sake I repeatedly made the following remark: ‘May no evil, whatsoever, jeopardize me!’ (KUB xxxi 66 + IBoT iii 122 (CTH 297.7) a iii, trans. Houwink ten Cate (1974a: 132))

Danuhepa was found guilty of the charges laid against her. She was stripped of office and presumably banished from the court and the city. Her sons and retinue were also victims of her downfall. In looking back to the trial, Hattusili raised serious questions about its justification, and whether the actions taken against the queen had divine sanction. One suspects that these actions were inspired, in part at least, by political motives.

Indeed, there is a strong possibility that the chief cause of the dispute between Danuhepa and Muwattali was the question of the succession. Was Danuhepa seeking to advance the claims of one of her own sons to the kingship over that of Muwattali’s son Urhi-Teshub? As we shall see, the latter was not the son of a first wife, merely of a concubine or secondary wife. And his eventual appointment as king was to cause major upheavals in the kingdom. The Nişantepe seal archive has presented us with an intriguing enigma. Amongst the bullae found in the archive are two which bear the seal impression of Danuhepa along with that of an ‘unknown king’. Was this yet another king with whom Danuhepa was associated? And if so, could it have been one of her
own sons, set up with her support in defiance of Muwattalli’s own plans for the succession? No doubt these questions will provide scholars with a fruitful field for speculation.

At all events, unlike her husband’s stepmother, Danuhepa was eventually restored to royal favour. The evidence provided by seals indicates that in the reign of Muwattalli’s successor Urhi-Teshub, she once more held the status of the reigning Hittite queen, quite possibly with the support of Hattusili. The career of this remarkable woman thus extended through the reigns of three Hittite kings—Mursili, Muwatalli, and Urhi-Teshub. Presumably she married Mursili at a young age, but not too young, it seems, to have presented him with offspring before his death. It is frustrating that we know so little about her, or her part in the palace intrigues which may well have bedevilled the reign of her stepson and were to continue through the reigns of at least Mursili’s first two successors.

We do not know whether the trial and downfall of Danuhepa took place before or after Muwattalli’s Kadesh campaign. But the former seems more likely. Whenever the king participated personally in a military campaign, there was a risk that he would be captured or killed in action. And the risk increased substantially for a king taking on the full might of the Egyptian army. Muwattalli must have been anxious to ensure that his plans for his son’s succession would proceed without challenge in the event of his own death. This no doubt was one aspect of the careful and detailed preparations he made within his kingdom before setting forth to confront Ramesses.

In any case, the history of the Hittite monarchy made all too clear a king’s vulnerability to court conspiracies while he himself was on campaign. Tensions between Muwattalli and his stepmother may have been increasing for some years. If she did in fact have ambitions for placing one of her own sons on the throne, she posed a serious threat both to her stepson and to his sons. This was a matter which Muwattalli very likely sought to resolve before he set out for Syria. Matters were brought to a head when he put the queen on trial and subsequently banished her from the capital, thus pre-empting any attempt on her part to conspire against him or stage a coup in his absence.

It is possibly in this context as well that he decided to hand over to his brother Hattusili the safekeeping and upbringing of his second son Kurunta. This may have occurred several years before the Kadesh
campaign. Presumably Kurunta was sent to Hakpis where Hattusili had been installed as king. At least while he was under Hattusili's protection he should be safe from the queen and her supporters. If the worst came to the worst and Muwattalli’s designated successor Urhi-Teshub fell victim to Danuhepa’s machinations, there would still be a surviving son of Muwattalli to claim the throne.

The ‘worst case’ scenario was avoided on this occasion. But in avoiding it, Muwattalli had laid the foundations for ongoing disputes within his own family which in the long term may have contributed to the kingdom’s final collapse.
The Ill-Fated Reign of the Second-Rank Son: The Reign of Urhi-Teshub (c.1272–1267)

A Sickly Child

While I was still a child... My Lady Ishtar sent my brother Muwattalli to my father Mursili in a dream (with the message): ‘For Hattusili the years (are) short. He will die soon. Therefore give him into my service, and let him be my priest. (If you do so) he will continue to live.’ (Apology of Hattusili §3, i 13–17)

There were grave fears for the health of the prince Hattusili, the youngest of Mursili’s four children. The chances were that he would not survive childhood. Certainly, none who saw the condition of this sickly child could have foreseen the long and illustrious career that lay ahead of him. But his father had faith in the goddess’s advice. Obedient to her command, he gave the child into her service. ‘Under the protection of My Lady Ishtar I saw prosperity. She took me by the hand, and led me on the right course’ (Apol. §3, i 20–1). Under Ishtar’s care, Hattusili did indeed survive and prosper. In the reign of his brother Muwattalli he was to become, next to the king, the most powerful figure in the Land of Hatti, even though illness seems to have dogged him for much of his life.

Much of our information about Hattusili’s early career comes from a document commonly known as the ‘Apology’, a largely self-laudatory and self-justificatory account of Hattusili’s progress through a succession of administrative and military appointments to his seizure of the Hittite throne. We shall refer frequently to this document—but always with the proviso that it presents a very one-sided view of Hattusili’s actions and achievements, and those of his enemies. This is more
marked than in most personal records of the Hittite kings, due no doubt to the fact that a number of Hattusili’s actions, particularly against the rightful occupant of the Hittite throne, were both illegal and unpopular with many of his subjects. Hattusili’s concern to justify what he had done inevitably led to a biased treatment of the events in which he was involved. Above all he sought to portray his successes as due not to superior brute force but rather to ‘the prevalence of reason and justice over military and political power’.\textsuperscript{4} In using the Apology as a source of information on Hattusili’s career, as well as that of the man whom he displaced from the throne, we must take into account the strongly propagandist flavour of the document.

### The Ruler of the Northern Kingdom

Perhaps shortly after his accession, Muwattalli assigned to his brother Hattusili the responsibility for governing the northern regions of the kingdom, beginning with his appointment while \textit{GAL MESEDI} as governor of the Upper Land.\textsuperscript{5} The appointment did not meet with universal approval. Indeed, it caused deep resentment in certain quarters, for it meant displacing the current governor Arma-Tarhunda, son of Zida, and a member of the royal family.\textsuperscript{6} Arma-Tarhunda reacted bitterly at his removal from office:

My Sun and Arma-Tarhunda came into conflict and were estranged for this reason, that the Upper Land was given to Arma-Tarhunda to govern. But when Muwattalli, my brother, gave me the Upper Land to govern, Arma-Tarhunda began to betray my brother and kept harassing me further. \textit{(KUB xx1 17 (CTH 86.1) i 3–9, after Archi (1971: 198))}\textsuperscript{7}

He was not alone in protesting the king’s action. Others rallied to his support. Charges were laid against the new appointee in an attempt to discredit him. Although we do not know the nature of the charges, the hostility which Hattusili’s appointment generated suggests that they were serious, and perhaps not without foundation. None the less, Hattusili successfully defended himself against his enemies, claiming the support and guidance of his patron goddess Ishtar. But the final reckoning was yet to come.\textsuperscript{8}

For the time being, however, Hattusili had survived the opposition to his appointment, and was given a number of military assignments in the
northern regions. To judge from his own account, he accomplished these with unqualified success: ‘To whatever land of the enemy I turned my eyes, none of the enemy could turn my eyes back. I conquered the lands of the enemy, one after the other. The favour of My Lady Ishtar was always with me. I drove out of the lands of Hatti whatever enemy had occupied it’ (Apol. §5, i 67–72).

But the severest test of his abilities came when Muwattalli left Hattusa for his new royal capital at Tarhuntassa. The king’s departure prompted widespread rebellion and attacks on Hittite territory:

In his rear all the lands of Kaska, the Land of Pishuru, the Land of Daistipassa rose up. They destroyed the Land of Ishupitta, the Land of Marista, and the fortified cities. Then the enemy crossed the Marassantiya river and began to attack the Land of Kanesh and the city of [ ]. Ha[ ], Kurustama and Gazziura immediately declared enmity and attacked the ruined cities of Hatti . . . (Apol. §6, ii 2–10)

The text continues in this vein. Hattusili was left to deal with the situation—apparently with little help from his brother who provided him (Hattusili claimed) with a pitifully small force for the defence of the beleaguered territories: ‘The enemy had 800 teams of horse and a countless number of infantry. But my brother Muwattalli sent me (against the enemy), giving me only 120 teams of horse and not even one infantryman’ (Apol. §7, ii 34–7).

Although this statement has been seen as directly critical of Muwat-talli, this was probably not Hattusili’s intention. Rather, he was simply seeking to highlight the magnitude of his task and subsequently his achievement, probably exaggerating in the process the disparity between his own and the enemy’s forces. This is of course a standard *topos* characteristic of many military memoirs, both ancient and modern. But Hattusili was not indulging purely or even primarily in self-aggrandizement. He attributed his success to divine intervention. Above all else, it was divine support and favour that validated his actions (according to his own arguments), leading up to and including his seizure of the throne. Right and justice were on his side. It was this rather than the size of his forces or indeed his own military prowess that ensured his success.

With Ishtar going before him into battle, he firmly restored Hittite control over the regions which lay within his charge, and thus paved the
way for the establishment under his authority of what was in effect a viceregal kingdom in the north, extending from Pala and Tumman to the Upper Land. As we have noted, Muwattalli conferred upon his brother the title of king, establishing the seat of his authority in the important northern centre of Hakpis. This served as a clear signal to the populations of the region, and the enemies who threatened it, that there would be no slackening of Hittite control in the north, despite the shift of the royal capital to the south. The northern region would be ruled virtually as a kingdom in its own right, by the king’s own brother and most able supporter.

One of Hattusili’s most pressing tasks was the repopulation of ruined, abandoned, or sparsely populated towns and countries within his kingdom.¹ This meant coming to terms with the Kaska population who lived in or near the areas where he sought to implement his repopulation programme. His policy towards the Kaska people in these areas is illustrated by the terms of a treaty which he drew up with the town of Tiliura, located on the Hittite–Kaskan border. Originally abandoned in the reign of Hantili II, Tiliura was eventually rebuilt by Mursili. But he only partly resettled it, using transportees from conquered territories for the purpose. Hattusili claimed the credit for full-scale resettlement, transferring to the town the remnants of its original population. He was critical of his father for failing to do this:

The city of Tiliura was deserted from the time of Hantili. My father Mursili built it up again, but did not resettle it properly. Rather he resettled it with his labour force (i.e. his transportees) whom he had conquered with the sword. But I, My Sun, have transferred such of the former population of Tiliura as remained and have brought them back and resettled them in Tiliura. (KUB xxi 29 (CTH 89) i 11–19, trans. Gurney in Garstang and Gurney (1959: 119))

Most importantly, Hattusili wanted to ensure that the town was resettled by the descendants of its former population, as distinct from the transportees whom Mursili had earlier settled in the town and also, more particularly, from the Kaska people who were explicitly banned from settling in or even entering the town. The treaty seems to be a reflection of a more general Hittite policy of allowing, or at least accepting, some degree of peaceful intercourse between Hittite subjects and Kaskans in the Hittite–Kaska border area, while strictly excluding Kaskans from inhabiting newly settled or resettled Hittite frontier
towns. But this policy apparently applied only to Kaska groups who were formally recognized as Hittite ‘allies’, as distinct from other Kaska groups who belonged to the ‘enemy’ category. The ‘allied’ group were bound by a number of regulations which gave them controlled access into Hittite territory and sometimes grazing rights in this territory, but generally barred them from settling in or otherwise occupying Hittite urban settlements.\textsuperscript{11}

The resettlement programme in the northern region was temporarily brought to a halt as final preparations were made for the Hittite showdown with Egypt. Unwilling to confront the pharaoh without the support of his most experienced and able military commander, Muwattalli now summoned his brother to join forces with him in Syria, as commander of the infantry and chariotry recruited from the northern kingdom.\textsuperscript{12}

**Hattusili’s Marriage to Puduhepa**

In the aftermath of the battle of Kadesh, Hattusili was left in command of the land of Aba following the defeat of the Egyptian forces there. We do not know how long he held this post. But his prolonged absence from his kingdom must have caused him increasing anxiety. The kingdom was still far from secure. Enemies from within as well as external enemies would certainly seek every opportunity to exploit his absence.

When finally Muwattalli gave him permission to relinquish his Syrian command, he at once began his homeward journey. But he had an important obligation to fulfil on the way. \textit{En route} to his northern destination, he visited the Kizzuwadnan city of Lawazantiya, now assuming increasing importance as a religious centre. The purpose of his visit was to carry out rituals in honour of Ishtar, the goddess who had watched over and protected him from his early years. Her continuing support would be essential to him in grappling with the problems he would face on his return to his kingdom.

The visit had another important outcome. In Lawazantiya he met and married Puduhepa, the daughter of Pentipsharri, priest of the goddess Ishtar, and herself a priestess in the goddess’s service.\textsuperscript{13} According to Hattusili, it was a union which quite literally had been made in heaven. He married Puduhepa at the command of Ishtar, whose wishes were revealed to him in a dream.\textsuperscript{14} The goddess had chosen well. On a
personal level, a close and lasting bond was to develop between the royal
couple; the goddess gave them the love of husband and wife.\textsuperscript{15}

Puduhepa’s role was not restricted to that of a loyal and devoted wife.
She was destined to come into high prominence in the affairs of the
kingdom, particularly after her husband’s accession to the throne. Apart
from being a major source of support and comfort to him, she became
an astute diplomatist in the international arena. We shall return to her
below.

The nuptials completed, Hattusili could not afford further delay in
Lawazantiya, for there was news of alarming developments in the north.
As he must have feared, the Kaskans had been quick to seize upon his
absence in Syria to renew their attacks on the northern frontier of Hatti.
Worse still, Hakpis, the seat of the viceregal kingdom, had risen in
revolt.\textsuperscript{16} On his return, Hattusili dealt promptly with the situation. He
drove the Kaskans back across the frontiers and restored his control over
Hakpis, where he resumed the viceregal throne and installed his bride as
queen. It was an eventful beginning to her life as Hattusili’s consort.

Further Dealings with Arma-Tarhunda
The uprisings had left Hattusili with a clear message. In spite of all his
efforts to establish lasting security and stability in the north, Hittite
authority in this region remained fragile. And the revolt in Hakpis made
it plain that even in the seat of his power, there were significant elements
of the population who were hostile to him. Much still had to be done to
ensure the security of the region as a whole, and to reconcile the
population to his rule.

The uprising in Hakpis may have been triggered at least in part by
Arma-Tarhunda, the man who had been deposed from governorship of
the Upper Land to make way for Hattusili. Still deeply resentful of
being cast aside, he too took advantage of Hattusili’s absence in Syria to
plot against him, even resorting to witchcraft.\textsuperscript{17} He further attempted to
discredit Hattusili by bringing another indictment against him. Hattu-
sili responded with a counter-indictment. Arma-Tarhunda lost the case,
and Muwattalli handed him over to Hattusili (presumably as the
aggrieved party) for punishment. Now was his chance to rid himself
of his arch enemy once and for all. But Hattusili was disposed to be
merciful:
I did not respond against him with malice. Rather, because Arma-Tarhunda was a blood-relation, and was moreover an old man, I took pity on him and let him go free. And I let (his son) Sippaziti go free and took no (further) action against them. I sent Arma-Tarhunda’s wife and his (other) son to Alasiya, and I took half of Arma-Tarhunda’s estate and gave it back to him.\(^\text{18}\) \(\text{(Apol. §10a, iii 24–30)}\)

He might have hoped that this gesture would help pave the way for an eventual reconciliation with Arma-Tarhunda’s family. If so, it apparently failed. As we shall see, Arma-Tarhunda’s son Sippaziti remained implacably hostile to him.\(^\text{19}\)

**A Second-Rank Son Occupies the Throne**

Up to the time of Muwattalli’s death, perhaps shortly after these events, Hattusili’s status and influence, and the powers accorded him, must have set him far above all others amongst the king’s subjects. Not without good reason. He had played an important role in Syria, he had confounded the attempts of his personal enemies to discredit him, and most importantly he had brought some measure of peace and stability to the northern regions of the kingdom. Thus when the king died without leaving a male heir of the first rank,\(^\text{20}\) he might have been sorely tempted to claim the throne for himself.

Muwattalli did in fact have a son whom he had designated as his successor. But the son, Urhi-Teshub, was the child of a secondary wife \((\text{DUMU EŠERTI})\).\(^\text{21}\) He still had a right to the throne, in terms of the succession principles laid down by Telipinu. But he was not the son of a first wife, and at least one vassal ruler, Masturi, Manapa-Tarhunda’s successor in the Seha River Land, was later to refuse him his support. ‘Should I protect a (mere) second-rank son?’ he protested.\(^\text{22}\) But Muwattalli clearly intended that his son should succeed him.\(^\text{23}\) And for the time being, Hattusili honoured his brother’s intention, while giving the distinct impression that the bestowal of kingship lay entirely within his own authority: ‘Out of esteem for my brother, I did no evil against him. And since he had left no son of the first rank, I took Urhi-Teshub, the son of a secondary wife (by him), and placed him on the throne of Hatti. I put all Hattusa into his hands, and he was Great King in the lands of Hatti’ \(\text{(Apol. §10b, iii 38’–44‘).}^{\text{24}}\)
On ascending the throne, Urhi-Teshub adopted the name Mursili (III). This, the name of his grandfather, was perhaps in itself an implicit statement of his right to sit upon the throne of his predecessors, and might help enhance his status in the eyes of his subjects. Throughout his reign he used it alongside his original name. But as far as we know, Hattusili never called his nephew Mursili. For all his outward declarations of loyalty, he must have found it very difficult to accept subjection to this son of a secondary wife, and may have particularly resented his adoption of so illustrious a name.

If these were in fact his feelings about his nephew, he kept them well hidden for a time, and remained faithful to his brother’s wishes. In the early days of Urhi-Teshub’s reign, uncle and nephew probably worked closely together. In view of Hattusili’s experience and standing in the kingdom, and his declared support for the new king, it would have made good sense for Urhi-Teshub to cultivate him and use him as his constant mentor. Indeed, behind a number of the actions taken by Urhi-Teshub, we can probably see the influence of Hattusili at work.

Hattusa Becomes the Royal Capital Again

‘He took up the gods from Tarhuntassa and brought them back to Hattusa’ (KUB xxi 15 (CTH 85 1b) i 11–12, trans. Houwink ten Cate (1974a: 125)). This brief statement records the most important initiative taken by Urhi-Teshub during his brief reign—his reinstatement of Hattusa as the Hittite royal capital. Its loss of status can have lasted no more than twenty years or so, during which time it had been entrusted to the governorship of Mursili’s former chief scribe Mittannamuwa. The position of chief scribe was now assigned to Mittannamuwa’s son Purandamuwa. Although the move back to Hattusa was almost certainly contrary to Muwattalli’s intentions, it seems to have met with little or no opposition from the king’s subjects. Indeed, Urhi-Teshub may have come under pressure from a number of quarters to reinstate Hattusa as the capital—and did so partly in order to fortify his position on the throne. Hattusili seems not to have disputed his nephew’s action, and may in fact have encouraged it. The fact that he later denied having any part in his brother’s decision to relocate the capital in Tarhuntassa (see below) suggests that he was not unhappy to see this decision reversed.
Thus Tarhuntassa lost its short-lived status as the Hittite royal capital. It would, however, continue to function as one of the most important regional centres of the kingdom, under a ruler whose status placed him on a par with the viceroy in Syria.

There were other cases where Urhi-Teshub overturned decisions made by his father. Some of these appear in a curious text which has caused much debate amongst scholars. The text in question records actions taken by Urhi-Teshub which clearly ran counter to his father's wishes. The recall of Manapa-Tarhunda, the former king of the Seha River Land sent into banishment by Muwattalli, was one of these actions. The vassal throne was now occupied by his son Masturi. Contrary to Muwattalli's wishes, Urhi-Teshub allowed Manapa-Tarhunda to return from exile, although Masturi apparently retained the vassal throne. His ailing father presumably lived out his final days in peaceful obscurity.

The link between Masturi and the Hittite throne was strengthened by the vassal's marriage with Muwattalli's sister Massanauzzi. We cannot be entirely sure when this took place. While credit for the marriage was later given to Muwattalli, we are told in KUB xxi 33 that it was Urhi-Teshub who arranged it: 'My Lord (i.e. Muwattalli) did not give(?) Massanauzzi to Manapa-Tarhunda as daughter-in-law(?) but Mursili (i.e. Urhi-Teshub) gave her to him' (KUB xxi 33 iv 12–13).

Other actions of Urhi-Teshub that nullified his father's decisions included the restoration of Benteshina to the throne of Amurru. This former vassal king had been deposed by Muwattalli for his alleged disloyalty in joining forces with Egypt, and replaced by a man called Shapili. He had subsequently been assigned to the custody of Hattusili, at Hattusili's own request, in the city of Hakpis. Here he resided for some years as Hattusili's protégé, in conditions of considerable comfort. Some scholars believe that his reinstatement did not take place until Hattusili himself became king. Indeed Hattusili later claimed the credit for putting the deposed king back on his throne, without any mention of Urhi-Teshub. But it is more likely that he regained his throne during Urhi-Teshub's reign, although almost certainly because of Hattusili's influence. In Benteshina Hattusili clearly had a loyal supporter—and once he was back in the strategically important kingdom of Amurru, a valuable ally.
If the text we have been considering does in fact belong to Urhi-Teshub’s reign, then it seems to be a remarkably frank admission of the new king’s defiance of a number of his father’s wishes. According to one view, it is probably to be assigned to a high official of Urhi-Teshub who composed it at Urhi-Teshub’s request—a ‘penitential’ text made up at a time when the king felt obliged to excuse himself for his conduct. Alternatively, the text might have been composed after Urhi-Teshub’s reign, at the instigation of Hattusili III, in order to highlight some of the ‘offences’ committed by Urhi-Teshub and thus help justify his removal from the throne.

There is a further question. Did Urhi-Teshub carry out the actions recorded in our document while his father was still on the throne, or after his death? Some scholars have argued for the former. But it is difficult to believe that during his own reign Muwattalli would have assigned to his son such extensive authority, including the power to restore disgraced vassals to their kingdoms both in the west as well as the east of the Hittite kingdom—particularly when their restoration had been expressly forbidden. Even if his son had been granted such power, his father would surely have overruled any decisions he made which were counter to his own decisions.

Another no doubt highly controversial action taken by Urhi-Teshub was the reinstatement of the queen Danuhepa after her removal from office by Muwattalli. Further, the king recalled from exile Sippaziti, son of his uncle’s bitter enemy Arma-Tarhunda. This action almost certainly did not have Hattusili’s support, and was probably taken at a time when tensions were mounting between uncle and nephew towards the end of the latter’s reign. Very likely there was an ulterior motive behind it (see below).

But prior to this Hattusili seems to have exercised considerable influence with his nephew in matters relating to the restoration of a particular person’s or family’s former status. A further illustration of this is provided by action taken on behalf of Mittannamuwa’s family. The former chief scribe Mittannamuwa was now old and sick. On appointing him as administrator of Hattusa, Muwattalli had conferred his scribal office on his son Purandamuwa. Subsequently, for reasons unknown to us, the office been taken from his family. However, Hattusili had interceded with his nephew on behalf of the family, with whom he had close and longstanding personal bonds. On this occasion Hattusili
prevailed and another of Mittannamuwa’s sons, Walwaziti (ur.mah-ziti), was appointed ‘Great Scribe’. There is little doubt that the record of Urhi-Teshub’s reign was subject to a good deal of revision by his immediate successors. On the one hand he was criticized for acting against his father’s wishes. On the other hand, any ‘positive’ actions taken by him, or at least under his authority, were credited to his successor, like the restoration of Benteshina to the throne of Amurru. In a number of actions and decisions taken by Urhi-Teshub, we can see Hattusili’s influence at work. But other actions, like the recall of Sippaziti, must have been taken by the king entirely on his own initiative, and for his own personal reasons— which were later to become apparent.

**Trouble Across the Euphrates**

Probably during Urhi-Teshub’s reign, news reached Hattusa of alarming developments east of the Euphrates. Here Shattuara I, king of Hanigalbat (what remained of the former kingdom of Mitanni), had launched an attack on Assyria, then ruled by the king Adad-nirari (c.1295–1264). The reasons for his attack are unknown. But it may not have been unprovoked. In the past, the Hittites had managed to curb Assyrian aggressive enterprises in the Euphrates region. But they were unable to deter the Assyrians from pursuing their territorial ambitions in this region whenever appropriate opportunities arose. Inevitably, the remnants of the Mitannian kingdom would be engulfed in any major Assyrian advance westwards.

Shattuara’s attack on Assyria may have been intended as a pre-emptive strike against such a threat. It was carried out entirely on his own initiative. The Hittites were apparently not consulted beforehand or asked for support. Under other circumstances, this might have been expected. Although nominally independent of Hatti, with its ruler accorded a status equal to that of the Hittite king, Hanigalbat had provided Muwattalli with troops at the battle of Kadesh and at least in theory enjoyed Hittite protection. But if his kingdom was now under serious threat from Assyria, Shattuara could have had little confidence that a new and inexperienced Hittite king, preoccupied with the affairs of his own kingdom, would provide him with effective support. It was this realization, perhaps, which led him to take matters into his own
hands. Predictably, his quixotic enterprise ended in failure, as Adad-nirari informs us:

When Shattuara, king of the Land of Hanigalbat, rebelled against me, and committed hostilities: by the command of Ashur, My Lord and Ally, . . . I seized him and brought him to my city Ashur. I made him take an oath and then allowed him to return to his land. Annually, as long as he lived, I regularly received his tribute within my city, Ashur. (Assyrian royal inscription, after Grayson (1972: 60–1 §392))

Shattuara was reinstated in his kingdom, but lost his independence. His kingdom now became a vassal territory of Assyria.

The Hittites apparently made no attempt to intervene in the conflict. But Adad-nirari’s conquest of Hanigalbat must have exacerbated tensions between Hatti and Assyria. Diplomatic relations between the two kingdoms continued, but relations were strained, as we hear subsequently, though in a somewhat muted way, in a letter from Hattusili to Adad-nirari: ‘The messengers whom you regularly sent here in the time of King Urhi-Teshub often experienced [ . . . ] aggravation’ (KBo i 14 (CTH 173), rev. 15′–16′, trans. Beckman (1999: 149)).

This may have emboldened Shattuara’s son and successor Wasashatta to attempt to break away from Assyrian overlordship. He clearly looked to support from Hatti in doing so. The hoped for support did not eventuate, and the rebellion was crushed:

After Shattuara’s death, his son Wasashatta revolted, rebelled against me, and committed hostilities. He went to the Land of Hatti for aid. The Hittites took his bribes, but did not render him assistance. With the strong weapons of the god Ashur, My Lord . . . I captured by conquest the city Taide, his great royal city, the cities Amasaku, Kahat, Shuru, Nabula, Hurra, Shuduhu, and Washshuganni. I took and brought to my city, Ashur, the possessions of those cities, the accumulated wealth of Wasashatta’s fathers, and the treasure of his palace. I conquered, burnt, and destroyed the city Taide and sowed kudimmus over it. The great gods gave me to rule from the city Taide to the city Irridu, the city Eluhat and Mount Kashiyari in its entirety, the fortress of the city Sudu, the fortress of the city Harranu, to the bank of the Euphrates. As for the remainder of Wasashatta’s people, I imposed corvée upon them. But as for him, I took out from the city Irridu his ‘wife of the palace’, his sons, his daughters, and his people. Bound I brought them and his possessions to my city, Ashur. I conquered, burnt, and destroyed the city Irridu and the cities within the district of the city Irridu. (Assyrian royal inscription, after Grayson (1972: 60–1, §393))

The Ill-Fated Reign of the Second-Rank Son
Exasperated by this further outbreak of hostilities against his kingdom, Adad-nirari probably withdrew Hanigalbat’s vassal status and annexed it to Assyrian territory, establishing a royal residence in the city of Taide (mod. Tell Brak?).\(^49\)

Such a development must have been viewed with considerable alarm in the Hittite capital, as well as in the viceregal kingdom of Carchemish. It was bad enough that Hanigalbat, which had provided an important buffer against Assyrian encroachment on Hittite subject territory, had been reduced to Assyrian vassal status. But far worse was the news that Hanigalbat had now been fully absorbed into Adad-nirari’s kingdom. Assyrian territory now extended to the very borders of the Land of Carchemish. Indeed a letter written by Hattusili shortly after his accession to Adad-nirari virtually acknowledged full Assyrian sovereignty over the former kingdom of Hanigalbat.\(^50\)

We cannot be entirely certain when Wasashatta’s abortive rebellion took place. But it may well have occurred before the end of Urhi-Teshub’s reign. If so, it must have been a serious blow to the young king’s credibility. What confidence could there be in his ability to defend his kingdom’s Syrian territories against invasion from across the Euphrates if he was unable to provide support for Hatti’s former ally in this region? Yet Adad-nirari apparently had no immediate plans to follow up his success with a campaign into Hittite territory. In fact, he seems to have wanted to preserve what was at best a very uneasy peace with Hatti.

He wrote to the Hittite king, claiming for himself the title of ‘Great King’, and requesting acknowledgment as his ‘Brother’. To this request he received an angry response. After grudgingly acknowledging his victory over Wasashatta, and accepting that he had become a ‘Great King’, the Hittite letter\(^51\) continues:

Why do you still continue to speak about brotherhood?…For what reason should I write to you about brotherhood?…Do those who are not on good terms customarily write to one another about brotherhood? On what account should I write to you about brotherhood? Were you and I born from one mother? As my grandfather and my father did not write to the King of Assyria about brotherhood, you shall not keep writing to me about brotherhood and Great Kingship. It is not my wish! (\(KUB\) xxiii 102 (\(CTH\) 171) (= Hagenbuchner (1989: 260–4, no. 192) i 5–19, trans. Beckman (1999: 147)))\(^52\)
Very likely the author of the letter was Urhi-Teshub. The young king was forced to acknowledge the Assyrian as the permanent overlord of Mitannian territory. But he refused to accept that Adad-nirari had by his actions attained a status which warranted addressing the Hittite king as ‘Brother’. This form of address was not merely a matter of courtesy. It implied a relationship of full diplomatic equality between two rulers of equal status, often linked by family ties, and at least on the surface committed to friendship and co-operation. And this Urhi-Teshub, whose regime was already insecure and had now been humiliated by the Assyrian king’s military successes, was not willing to concede. Hence his angry, somewhat petulant response.

In the interests of Realpolitik he might well have considered the benefits of establishing closer diplomatic links on terms of full equality with Adad-nirari, particularly in view of the threat still posed by Egypt to Hittite territories in Syria. If through an accommodation with Assyria greater stability could be achieved in the Euphrates region, the Hittites would be in a stronger position to deal with any renewal of Egyptian aggression from the south, in the knowledge that their eastern flank was secure. There could have been distinct advantages in responding positively to the Assyrian king’s overtures, even if Urhi-Teshub suspected his ultimate intentions.

It was perhaps Urhi-Teshub’s failure to do so that helped bring matters to a head in his own kingdom.

**The Overthrow of Urhi-Teshub**

What may have begun as a reasonably harmonious relationship between Urhi-Teshub and his uncle eventually turned sour. Unfortunately, we have only Hattusili’s version of the reasons for this, a version which predictably assigns all blame to Urhi-Teshub. According to Hattusili, his nephew’s jealousy was the chief cause of the increasing hostility between them: ‘When Urhi-Teshub saw the goddess’s goodwill towards me, he envied me and sought to do me harm. He took away from me all my subjects. Further, he took away from me all the depopulated lands which I had resettled and made me weak’ (Apol. §10c, iii 54–9).

In actual fact, Urhi-Teshub probably had good reason for distrusting his uncle, to the point where he was forced to strip him of much of his power. There was no denying the substantial contributions Hattusili
had made to the kingdom, particularly in strengthening the northern regions against enemy attack, and recapturing and resettling areas which had long been under enemy control and occupation. Further, in the early days of Urhi-Teshub’s reign one of Hattusili’s crowning achievements had been the reoccupation and rebuilding of the holy city of Nerik,\textsuperscript{56} which had been captured and sacked by the Kaskans during the reign of Hantili II some 200 years earlier,\textsuperscript{57} and left in ruins since that time:

My Lady, Sun Goddess of Arinna, you know how former kings neglected Nerik. To those kings of the past you gave weapons, My Lady, Sun Goddess of Arinna, and they subdued the surrounding enemy lands. But no-one made the attempt to capture the city of Nerik. However your servant Hattusili, even when he was not a king but only a prince—it was he who captured the city of Nerik. (from Puduhepa’s prayer to the Sun Goddess of Arinna, \textit{KUB} xxi 27 (\textit{CTH} 384) obv. 16–25)\textsuperscript{58}

Convinced that divine right was on his side, conscious of the personal support which he commanded in the kingdom, and conscious too of all that he had achieved for the kingdom, Hattusili might now have set his sights on greater rewards. In so doing he would undoubtedly pose a serious threat to the man to whom his first allegiance was due. He had been content to support the young king, so long as he maintained a strong influence over him and the latter relied heavily on his advice and support. But as Urhi-Teshub began acting independently of his uncle and against his advice (his response to Adad-nirari may have been a case in point), tensions between the two must have grown. If his own position were to remain secure, Urhi-Teshub could no longer allow his uncle to exercise the substantial powers which had been assigned to him.

He began by stripping him of the territories where he exercised direct authority, though still leaving him in control of Hakpis, the seat of his power, and Nerik, where he was priest of the Storm God. There may have been other reasons as well for taking from his uncle the regions where he had once held sway. His appointment as king in the northern regions had been closely associated with Muwattalli’s transfer of the Hittite capital to Tarhuntassa and his forthcoming confrontation with Egypt. But with the return of the Hittite capital to Hattusa, and with the chief objectives of Hattusili’s appointment in the north now having
been accomplished, there was arguably less justification for a continu-
ation of the arrangements which Muwattalli had made.

Initially Hattusili accepted his reduced status and remained submis-
sive to his nephew’s authority—because, he claimed, of his own sense of
right conduct and out of respect for and loyalty to his brother’s memory.
But as long as he controlled Hakpis and Nerik, he still remained a threat
to the king. Eventually Urhi-Teshub tried to deprive him of these as
well. This was the final straw:

For seven years I submitted. But at a divine command and with human urging,
Urhi-Teshub sought to destroy me. He took Hakpis and Nerik from me. Now
I submitted to him no longer. I made war upon him. But I committed no crime
in doing so, by rising up against him with chariots or in the palace. In civilized
manner I communicated thus with him: ‘You have begun hostilities with
me. Now you are Great King, but I am king of only one fortress. That is all
you have left me. Come! Ishtar of Samuha and the Storm God of Nerik
shall decide the case for us!’ Since I wrote to Urhi-Teshub in this manner, if
anyone now says: ‘Why after previously making him king do you now write to
him about war?’, (my reply would be): ‘If he had not begun fighting with me,
would Ishtar and the Storm God have now subjected him to a small king?’
Because he began fighting with me, the gods have subjected him to me by their
judgment. (Apol. §10c, iii 62–79)

The die was now cast. Hattusili sought to present the conflict not as a
rebellion, but ‘as a legal contest based on correctness of conduct and on
legitimacy of roles’. The issue would be decided not by superior force
of arms, but by divine judgement: ‘You are a Great King, while I am a
small king. Let us go in judgement before the Storm God My Lord and
Shaushga (Ishtar) of Samuha My Lady. If you prevail in the trial, they
will raise you; but if I prevail in the trial they will raise me’ (KBo vi 29
(CTH 85.1) ii 1–8, trans. Liverani (2001: 105)).

Whether or not he was confident that he had the forces to overthrow
his uncle, Urhi-Teshub could delay no longer. Hastily gathering his
troops in Hattusa, he took the initiative by marching into the Upper
Land to confront him. By so doing he would at least avoid bloody
conflict between his own and his uncle’s forces within Hattusa itself. But
there were major risks. He could not be sure of what support he would
get from his own subjects, how many of them would rally round
Hattusili. Further, he was forcing a showdown on what had become
his uncle’s home territory. Admittedly Hattusili had met with oppos-
ition in the region. But there must have been many who identified closely with the man who had brought them peace and stability, who had for many years been their king. It was surely with such a man rather than the undistinguished and largely unproven occupant of the throne of Hattusa that loyalties in the region would lie.

Conscious of this Urhi-Teshub appointed Arma-Tarhunda’s son Sippaziti, whom he had recalled from exile, to gather troops for him in the Upper Land. The price of Sippaziti’s support may well have been a promise of reinstatement of his family in the region, and the appointment of Sippaziti to his father’s old position as governor of the Upper Land. Presumably Arma-Tarhunda’s family still had its supporters there, including those who had protested Arma-Tarhunda’s removal from office. If so, this might be turned to Urhi-Teshub’s advantage.61

But it was a desperate ploy. Sippaziti failed to gather the support in the Upper Land that was essential to Urhi-Teshub’s success. Hattusili, on the other hand, was able to amass a considerable force in the region, which included elements of the Kaska peoples who had been permitted to settle within Hittite territory. But perhaps most importantly a significant number of the Hittite nobility seem to have rallied to Hattusili’s side. At least some of these were disaffected subjects who had apparently been exiled by Urhi-Teshub.62 Some may have acted out of contempt for the king’s ‘illegitimacy’.63 But the majority may simply have been eager to ensure that they were on the winning side—and judged that the odds, with or without divine intervention, clearly favoured Hattusili.

The conflict ended in a decisive defeat for Urhi-Teshub. He had managed to reach Samuha, where he established his base. But Hattusili placed the city under siege, shutting Urhi-Teshub up in it ‘like a pig in a sty’,64 and eventually forcing his surrender. Urhi-Teshub had left Hattusa as the king of the Hittite realm. He now suffered the ignominy of returning to the city as his uncle’s prisoner, probably only a few years after he had assumed the royal power.65 He was formally deposed, and his uncle seized the throne.

**Hattusili Becomes King**

In a formula unique amongst the rulers of the New Kingdom, Hattusili proclaimed his genealogy:
Thus (speaks) the Tabarna Hattusili, the Great King, King of Hatti, the Hero, beloved of the Sun Goddess of Arinna, the Storm God of Nerik, and Ishtar of Samuha; Son of Mursili, the Great King, King of Hatti, the Hero; Grandson of Suppiluliuma, the Great King, King of Hatti, the Hero; Great-Grandson (= Descendant?) of Hattusili, the Great King; (one) of the seed of Kussar (who was) singled out by the gods. (KBo vi 28 (CTH 88), after Güterbock (1973a: 101))

By tracing his ancestry back to his earliest namesake, and claiming that the gods were on his side, Hattusili sought to leave no doubt that he was indeed the legitimate successor to his brother’s throne.66 But his coup did not have the wholehearted support of his subjects. In a proclamation to the people of Hattusa he acknowledged the division in the population between his own supporters and those of Urhi-Teshub.67 Indeed there may well have been conflict in Hattusa itself, leading to the looting and destruction of what was perhaps the royal treasury.68 Hattusili’s first task was to reunite the population, and reconcile them to the coup. He tried to project the image of the aggrieved party, who had been steadfastly loyal to Muwattalli, and initially to his successor Urhi-Teshub; it was the latter’s ingratitude in stripping him of all his power that had forced him to take the action which led to his seizure of the throne. Now was the time for reconciliation. There would be no recriminations against those who had taken sides with Urhi-Teshub in the conflict. But henceforth the succession would remain within Hattusili’s family line. Henceforth Urhi-Teshub’s sons, and thus the direct descendants of Muwattalli, were explicitly excluded from the right to occupy the throne:

In future you must support the sons of My Sun. If something should happen to a son of mine, you, people, must support in kingship those sons that I, My Sun, have with the queen. Do not take anyone of other descent. No-one should look for a son of Urhi-Teshub. (KUB xxi 37 10–14, after van den Hout (1995: 1114))

The Exile

What was to be done with Urhi-Teshub? Indefinite imprisonment in Hattusa was clearly not an option. Banishment from the capital was the traditional punishment imposed on members of the royal family who had fallen from grace or been removed from power. And traditionally
the king who imposed this punishment had sought to ensure that the person banished would continue to live in reasonable comfort. But if the dethroned king were exiled to a location close to the capital, the possibility of an attempted counter-coup could not be ruled out. Removal to a location far from the seat of power, but still under Hittite control, was the better option. Hattusili chose the Nuhashshi lands in Syria as the place of exile.69

It was to be seen as an ‘honourable exile’,70 and entailed the exercise of some responsibility—for Urhi-Teshub was appointed governor of a number of fortified cities in the region. Perhaps Hattusili hoped that by keeping his nephew occupied with some administrative functions, he might divert his thoughts from attempting to regain his throne. The new king might also have relied on his former protégé Benteshina, now restored to the vassal throne of the nearby kingdom of Amurru, to keep a close eye on Urhi-Teshub’s conduct and alert him to any suspicious activities in which Urhi-Teshub might engage.

But whatever considerations led to Urhi-Teshub’s banishment to this region, the decision proved a major blunder whose consequences were to haunt Hattusili for the rest of his reign. He had seriously underestimated Urhi-Teshub’s determination to regain his throne. Within a short time of his arrival in Nuhashshi, Urhi-Teshub apparently began surreptitious dealings with the Babylonians.71 The specific purpose of these is unknown, but almost certainly Urhi-Teshub intended them as a first step in building up foreign support within the Euphrates region and strengthening his position to the point where he could restake his claim to the Hittite throne. His communication with the Assyrian king Shalmaneser I, who came to power not long after Hattusili’s accession, may also have had the same ulterior purpose.72

The coup in Hattusa must have created some perplexity in the foreign courts.73 Who was the rightful occupant of the throne in Hattusa? With whom—Hattusili or Urhi-Teshub—should foreign rulers negotiate in establishing or maintaining diplomatic relations with Hatti? So long as Urhi-Teshub remained at large, the doubts about who the legitimate king of Hatti was would persist. Prompt action was needed.

On receiving word of his nephew’s dealings with the Babylonians, and seeking to prevent any move he might have made to escape altogether from his authority, Hattusili ordered his removal to a new
place of exile, either somewhere on the coast, or offshore in the Land of Alasiya (Cyprus).\footnote{74} Urhi-Teshub remained defiant. He was determined to escape from his uncle’s clutches, and to find the means of winning back his throne. As soon as the opportunity presented itself, he eluded his Hittite custodians, fled his place of exile, and eventually resurfaced at the court of the man who had been his father’s bitterest enemy—Ramesses, pharaoh of Egypt!\footnote{75} Hattusili promptly wrote to Ramesses, demanding his nephew’s extradition. Ramesses failed to comply, as indicated in a letter which Hattusili wrote to the Babylonian king Kadasman-Enlil II (c.1263–55):

\begin{quote}
My enemy who fled to another country went to the king of Egypt. When I wrote to him ‘Bring my enemy’, he did not bring my enemy. Then I and the king of Egypt became enemies of one another, and to your father (i.e. Kadasman-Turgu) I wrote: ‘The king of Egypt went to help my enemy.’ So your father kept the messenger of the king of Egypt at bay. (\textit{KBo} 10 + \textit{KUB} iii 72 (\textit{CTH} 172) obv. 67–9, trans. Wouters (1989: 230))
\end{quote}

Ramesses’ failure to hand over Urhi-Teshub must have been a serious blow to Hattusili’s credibility as the legitimate sovereign of the Hittite world, at least in the eyes of those kings with whom Hattusili sought to establish diplomatic relationships. Now more than ever it was imperative for Hattusili to remove all doubt in foreign courts that the reins of power in Hatti were firmly in his own hands.
Hatti and the World of International Diplomacy: The Reign of Hattusili III (c.1267–1237)

Hattusili as International Diplomat

Vigorous military campaigner though he was before he occupied the throne, the predominant image of Hattusili in his own reign is that of diplomat and conciliator. This may in part be a reflection of his advancing years. He was in his fifties at the time of his accession, and was perhaps already suffering increasingly from bouts of ill health. He had no apparent ambitions to expand Hittite territory beyond the frontiers established by his great predecessors, and indeed undertook personal military campaigns both in Anatolia and further afield with considerable reluctance. The emphasis now was on ensuring the security of his kingdom’s subject territories by establishing formal diplomatic alliances with foreign kings whose territories bordered his own. This was all the more important in view of the stigma of illegality associated with his occupancy of the Hittite throne, and the persistent efforts of the deposed king Urhi-Teshub to regain the throne—if necessary with foreign support. Above all, Hattusili needed to persuade his royal counterparts—particularly the kings of Assyria, Babylonia, and Egypt—that he and not Urhi-Teshub was the rightful king of Hatti, that it was with him that all diplomatic negotiations should now be conducted.

Shortly after his accession, he had established an alliance with the Babylonian king Kadashman-Turgu (c.1282–1264), drawing up a treaty with him and persuading him to sever his links with Egypt. But within a year or so of the treaty, Kadashman-Turgu died, and was succeeded by his son Kadashman-Enlil II,¹ who quickly restored diplomatic relations with Egypt. Hattusili was angered and frustrated by the news. Yet
ill-considered protests and threats might only serve to strengthen the Babylonian king’s links with Egypt, and seriously jeopardize any hope of persuading him to renew his father’s alliance with Hatti. Hattusili was also aware that the young king’s policies were strongly influenced by his powerful vizier Itti-Marduk-balatu, leader of an anti-Hittite, pro-Assyrian faction in the Babylonian court. In view of the potential threats posed by both Egypt and Assyria to Hittite subject territories in Syria, Hattusili must have set great store on cultivating good relations with Kadashman-Enlil.

Thus he wrote to him in very measured terms, reminding him of his father’s accord with the new regime in Hattusa, and mildly reprimanding him for his failure to renew and maintain this accord:

When your father and I established friendly relations\(^2\) and became loving brothers, we did not become brothers for a single day. Did we not establish brotherhood and friendly relations forever? We then made the following agreement: ‘We are but mortal. The survivor shall protect the children of the one who goes first to his fate.’ Then when your father went to his fate while the gods allowed me long life, I wept for him like a brother. After I had shown proper grief for your father, I dried my tears and dispatched a messenger, writing to the noblemen of Babylonia thus: ‘If you do not protect my brother’s progeny in the kingship, I shall become your enemy. I will come and conquer Babylonia. But if an enemy somehow rises against you, or some matter becomes troublesome for you, write to me so that I can come to your aid.’ But my brother was a child in those days, and they did not read out the tablets in your presence. Are none of those scribes still alive? Are the tablets not filed? Let them read those tablets to you now! (\(KBo\ i\ 10 + KUB\ iii\ 72\ (CTH\ 172)\), obv. 7 ff, after Beckman (1999: 139–40)\(^3\))

Unfortunately the outcome of Hattusili’s long and carefully worded letter to the young Kadashman-Enlil remains unknown.\(^4\)

It was probably in the same period that Hattusili formalized his relationship with the Amurrite king Benteshina by drawing up a treaty with him—a treaty which, apparently, Benteshina himself requested in order to confirm the legitimacy of his regime and to secure the succession for his lineal descendants.\(^5\) Hattusili no doubt responded to the request with alacrity. Every formal agreement he concluded with either vassal or foreign ruler served to strengthen his position on the Hittite throne and broaden the base of support he could call upon if that position became imperilled. The vassal was reminded that he had
Hattusili to thank for his restoration to the throne of Amurru (even if the formal decision to reinstate him had been made by Urhi-Teshub). And his relationship with Hattusili was strengthened by a double marriage alliance between the two royal families:

My son Nerikkaili will take the daughter of Benteshina of the Land of Amurru in marriage.6 And I have given the king’s daughter Gassuliyawiya7 to the Land of Amurru into the royal house to Benteshina for marriage.8 In the Land of Amurru she will have the status of queen. The son and grandson(s) of my daughter will forever hold kingship in the Land of Amurru. (Hattusili: Benteshina Treaty, PD no. 9 (CTH 92) 128–9, obv. 18–21)

Hattusili had a plentiful supply of sons and daughters available for political marriages with vassal rulers or foreign kings. In addition to the double marriage with the royal house of Amurru, we learn of a double marriage with the royal house of Babylon, the provision of two of Hattusili’s daughters for the pharaoh Ramesses, the provision of a daughter(?) Kilushepa for the vassal king of Isuwa,9 and during Tudhaliya’s reign, another daughter of Hattusili was married to the Amurrite king Shaushgamuwa. Political marriages were a long-established means of consolidating alliances between royal families.10 Those contracted by Hattusili also helped provide him with the recognition which he so keenly sought from foreign rulers as the true king of Hatti.

Yet in spite of all his diplomatic efforts, both on the international scene and amongst his vassal rulers, Hattusili could never feel secure on the throne he had won by force while his deposed predecessor remained at large and under the protection of the most powerful of his royal counterparts, Ramesses, pharaoh of Egypt. This undoubtedly exacerbated tensions between Hatti and Egypt, and was to have a major impact on Hittite–Egyptian relations for some years to come.11

Before considering this further, we should retrace our steps a little in order to pick up several other strands, both domestic and foreign, which became woven into the fabric of events impacting on the reign of Hattusili.

Another Potential Claimant to the Throne

On Sunday 20 July 1986, during the course of the German excavations of Hattusa, a bronze tablet was discovered in a state of perfect preservation,
with over 350 lines of Hittite cuneiform text. It came to light 30 centimetres under a paved area of the city just inside the city’s south wall, near the Sphinx Gate.\(^\text{12}\) The significance of this chance discovery can scarcely be overestimated. It is the only bronze tablet known to us from the Hittite world, it throws important new light on the political geography of Anatolia during the Late Bronze Age, and it provides important and hitherto unknown information about political developments in the Hittite kingdom in the final century of its existence.

The text of the tablet is that of a treaty drawn up between Hattusili’s son and successor Tudhaliya IV and a man called Kurunta. Before the discovery of the tablet Kurunta was already known to us as a nephew of Hattusili,\(^\text{13}\) perhaps also as a ‘powerful king’ during Hattusili’s reign,\(^\text{14}\) and the man appointed by Hattusili as ruler of the Land of Tarhuntassa.\(^\text{15}\) The bronze tablet confirms that Kurunta was a Hittite prince, a second son of the king Muwattalli,\(^\text{16}\) and thus a brother, or half-brother, of Urhi-Teshub. It also provides much valuable additional information about the role Kurunta played in the Hittite kingdom after the throne was seized from his brother.

At the time of Muwattalli’s death, Urhi-Teshub clearly had priority over Kurunta in the royal succession. The latter was presumably of the same status as his brother (i.e. son of a secondary wife) but younger than him.\(^\text{17}\) While preparing Urhi-Teshub for the succession, Muwattalli had entrusted Kurunta to the care of his uncle Hattusili: ‘Already had Muwattalli, the king, entrusted Kurunta to my father Hattusili to raise; and thus had my father raised him’ (Bronze tablet §2, i 12–13).

Though not destined to become king, he was no doubt marked out for high office and a distinguished career within the kingdom. Muwattalli saw in his brother Hattusili an appropriate guardian and tutor for the young prince in preparing him for his future role. We have suggested (in Ch. 9) that Muwattalli’s decision to send Kurunta to his brother in Hakpis may have been influenced by intra-family disputes in the royal court, and his wish to ensure that at least one of his sons would be protected from the possible consequences of these disputes.

Hattusili discharged his tutelage responsibilities conscientiously. He brought up his nephew as one of his own sons, and a particularly close friendship developed between Kurunta and his cousin Tudhaliya. If we can take at face value what the bronze tablet tells us, this greatly strengthened the bond between Kurunta and the family of Hattusili.
In the upheavals which accompanied Hattusili’s seizure of the throne, Kurunta apparently remained loyal to his uncle. For this he was rewarded with the prestigious appointment of king of the Land of Tarhuntassa: ‘But when my father removed Urhi-Teshub from the kingship, thereupon my father took Kurunta and made him king in the Land of Tarhuntassa’ (Bronze tablet §3, 1 14–15).

Apparently Kurunta’s appointment followed very soon after Hattusili’s seizure of the throne. The timing was probably deliberate. Given that the coup had led to civil war in the homeland and serious division within Hattusa itself, Urhi-Teshub must have had a significant following amongst his subjects, at least in the royal capital. He had lost his throne and been banished—but there was still Muwattalli’s other son. The supporters of Urhi-Teshub might well have redirected their support to this second son if he had remained in Hattusa. At the very least his continuing presence in Hattusa would have been a constant embarrassment to the new king. It was understandable, perhaps imperative, that Hattusili should remove both sons from the capital at the earliest possible opportunity. Hence as soon as Hattusili had seized the throne, Kurunta was dispatched to Tarhuntassa.\(^{18}\)

Although no longer the Hittite capital, Tarhuntassa continued to play an important role in Hittite affairs. No doubt this was largely because of its strategic location, extending as it did to the southern coast of Anatolia, and bordering on the country of Kizzuwadna. As we shall see, this region assumed increasing significance in the last decades of the kingdom. Thus the appointment of Kurunta to the former royal seat of his father was not only a reward for his loyalty. By placing Tarhuntassa under the direct rule of a prince of the royal line Hattusili made clear that it would henceforth function as one of the highest ranking and most important dependent territories of the kingdom. In recognition of his status, concessions and favours were heaped upon the prince, both by Hattusili and his successor Tudhaliya.

We should mention here the controversy surrounding a king of Tarhuntassa called Ulmi-Teshub and a surviving treaty which he concluded with a Hittite king (whose name is broken off in the text)—the so-called Ulmi-Teshub treaty.\(^{19}\) Who was Ulmi-Teshub, and who was his treaty partner?

A number of scholars have argued, or assumed, that Ulmi-Teshub was a third son of Muwattalli, and thus the brother as well as the
successor of Kurunta, and that the treaty in question was drawn up with him by Tudhaliya. But a contrary argument is that Kurunta and Ulmi-Teshub were one and the same person: Kurunta was the Luwian name adopted by the prince Ulmi-Teshub when he was appointed by Hattusili as ruler of Tarhuntassa, which lay in a Luwian area; the Ulmi-Teshub treaty was drawn up not by Tudhaliya, but by his father Hattusili, as the fourth in a series of treaties with Ulmi-Teshub/Kurunta. This is the line taken here. On the assumption that Ulmi-Teshub was Kurunta, we can thus see the treaty as providing a further illustration of the concessions and favours which were conferred upon the young prince.

Hattusili granted one of these concessions during a visit to Tarhuntassa, where he found that the šabhan duties (a form of payment or levy or tax in kind, often of a religious nature) were imposing a heavy burden on the land. Thus he abolished the garrison duties for the kingdom, so that the garrison troops could be redeployed to meet the commitments of the šabhan:

When I, My Sun, came to Tarhuntassa, I saw that the šabhan of the god (as imposed by) the treaty was onerous and could not be fulfilled. Formerly Muwattalli made Tarhuntassa his place of residence and celebrated the gods of Tarhuntassa, and all the Hittites honoured them. But now the king and queen have made Kurunta king in Tarhuntassa. He could not fulfill the šabhan of the god from (the resources) of his own land. So the king and queen have made for you this (revised) treaty: My Sun has waived the previous requirement for chariotry and troops from the Hulaya River Land. In future, only 200 men will be required for a Hittite campaign. No further troops will be sought from him. (Hattusili: Ulmi-Teshub Treaty, KUB iv 10 (CTH 106), obv. sec. 7, 40’–4’) This act of generosity may have been one of the measures designed to maintain Kurunta’s goodwill towards his overlord and keep him loyal. It was important to ensure that his duties and obligations in Tarhuntassa gave him no grounds for complaint or defiance, which might encourage him, with the support of his father’s former subjects in the region, to break his allegiance and perhaps attempt to exchange his throne in Tarhuntassa for the one in Hattusa. As a son of Muwattalli, Kurunta had a right to the Hittite throne. But unless he forced his claim, he could never hope to become Great King. Hattusili had made it quite clear that after his death the succession was to remain within his own family line.

But who within his family would succeed him?
Hattusili’s Heir

Tudhaliya was not his father’s first choice as successor to the throne.\textsuperscript{25} From the bronze tablet we learn that an older brother of Tudhaliya had originally been designated as the \textit{tuhkanti}, the crown prince.\textsuperscript{26} But Hattusili subsequently took the title from the older brother and appointed Tudhaliya in his place.\textsuperscript{27} Unfortunately the brother is not named in our text. Who was he, and why was he replaced?

The most likely candidate is the prince Nerikkaili, whom Hattusili married to the daughter of the Amurrite king Benteshina.\textsuperscript{28} Already in Hattusili’s reign Nerikkaili had been appointed \textit{tuhkanti}. He is referred to by this title at the head of a list of witnesses in the Ulmi-Teshub treaty,\textsuperscript{29} and he may also have been the \textit{tuhkanti} sent to the west by Hattusili to negotiate with Piyamaradu.\textsuperscript{30} But if he was in fact the older brother who was removed from office,\textsuperscript{31} the reason for his removal remains unknown. It is unlikely that he suffered demotion because he had fallen into disgrace, for he apparently continued to play a prominent role in the kingdom. He was the first person called upon, as \textit{dumu.lugal} (‘king’s son’), to witness his brother’s treaty with Kurunta.\textsuperscript{32} And later in Tudhaliya’s reign he appears once more with the title of \textit{tuhkanti}.\textsuperscript{33} It may well be that at the time Tudhaliya drew up his treaty with Kurunta, probably one of the first official acts of his reign, he had not yet appointed a crown prince;\textsuperscript{34} subsequently he reappointed Nerikkaili to the office, but perhaps as an interim measure and on the understanding that it would eventually be assumed by one of his own sons.\textsuperscript{35}

If Nerikkaili was in fact the older brother replaced by Tudhaliya,\textsuperscript{36} we are still left with the question of why Hattusili took this action. Did the queen Puduhepa have a hand in it? If Nerikkaili was Hattusili’s son by a former marriage, she may have persuaded her husband to set him aside in order to advance the claims of her own son Tudhaliya.\textsuperscript{37} But this is mere speculation. There may have been other reasons for the new appointment.

Quite possibly the personal relationship between Tudhaliya and Kurunta was an important factor in Hattusili’s decision. Kurunta had sworn to give unqualified loyalty and support to Tudhaliya, whatever position the latter was assigned in the kingdom:
But at that time when my father appointed my older brother as *tuhkanti*, I was still not at that time marked out for kingship. But Kurunta (already) showed his loyalty to me and gave me in person the following oath: ‘If your father does not appoint you to kingship, in whatever position your father places you, I will be loyal only to you and (be) your (loyal) servant.’ (Bronze tablet §13, ii 35–41)

Hattusili was very conscious of the close bond between his son and Kurunta. This might in the long term provide the strongest guarantee of the security of the succession in his family line. If in spite of his own eligibility for kingship Kurunta remained true to his oath, he would be bound to support Tudhaliya’s accession to the throne. But his loyalty to any other member of Hattusili’s family, even Nerikkaili who had long had a prior claim upon the throne, could have been open to question. Perhaps this influenced Hattusili’s decision to designate Tudhaliya as his successor to the throne. The last thing he wanted was yet another conflict over the succession. To avoid this, he set great store by the long-standing friendship between Kurunta and Tudhaliya, on their mutual assurances of loyalty to and support for each other, and on the substantial compensation Kurunta received in the form of the throne of Tarhuntassa.

It was essential that both Hattusili and his son and successor Tudhaliya ensure Kurunta’s loyalty—by rewarding him with the prestigious kingdom of Tarhuntassa and granting him a range of privileges and honours. For a time Kurunta seemed satisfied. But was he simply biding his time?

### The Lead-Up to the Treaty with Ramesses

From the beginning of his reign, Hattusili seemed intent on improving relations with Assyria and Egypt, Hatti’s two main adversaries in the south-east. Shortly after his accession, he had written to the Assyrian king Adad-nirari in conciliatory terms. Relations between Hatti and Assyria had become severely strained during Urhi-Teshub’s reign, particularly with the Assyrian conquest of Hanigalbat and the extension of Assyrian territory to the borders of Carchemish. But Adad-nirari had stopped short of an invasion of Hittite territory and had attempted, apparently, to strengthen diplomatic ties with Hatti. With little success. The missions which he had sent to Hatti had merely served to increase the tensions between the two kingdoms, and he had been soundly
rebuked by Urhi-Teshub when he wrote to him as one ‘Brother’ to another.

Hattusili sought to dissociate himself from the previous regime. He had more than one motive for doing so. In the first place he had no wish to become embroiled in further conflict in the south-east. But just as importantly, he was anxious to gain recognition abroad for the legitimacy of his own regime. This becomes very evident from the text of a letter he wrote to Adad-nirari, who had failed to provide the usual tokens of acknowledgement when Hattusili became king:40

Did [my brother?]41 not send you appropriate greeting-gifts? But when I assumed kingship, you did not send a messenger to me. It is the custom that when kings assume kingship, the kings who are his equals in rank send him appropriate greeting-gifts, clothing befitting kingship, and fine oil for his anointing. But you have not yet done this. (KBo i 14 (CTH 173) rev. 4–10, after Beckman (1999: 149))

The main purpose of the letter was to provide a basis for a more positive relationship between the two kingdoms. Indeed there was already an opportunity for demonstrating mutual goodwill. On the Hittite–Assyrian frontier the people of the town of Turira, located in Upper Mesopotamia and once part of the kingdom of Hanigalbat, had recently taken to raiding the neighbouring territory of Carchemish. This had the potential for escalating into conflict between Hittite and Assyrian forces, which Hattusili clearly wanted to avoid. If Adad-nirari claimed sovereignty over the territory (he wrote), then he should take action to stop the raids. If not, then Hattusili himself would take action against the offenders:

The people of the city of Turira constantly plunder my land. They constantly plunder the Land of Carchemish on that side, and the Land of [Ashtata(?)] on this side. The king of Hanigalbat keeps writing to me: ‘Turira is mine’. And from there, you keep writing to me: ‘Turira is mine, or Turira is yours. It does not belong to the king of Hanigalbat.’ Do you not know about the matter of Turira? When Turira plunders the land, they keep taking the booty to Turira. My subjects who flee also keep going up to Turira. If Turira is yours, (smash?) it. But you shall not claim the possessions of my subjects who are dwelling in the city. If Turira is not yours, write to me, so that I may smash(?) it. The possessions of your troops who are dwelling in the city shall not be claimed. Why do the people of Turira sniffat(?) the gift of me, the lion? (KBo i 14, obv. 6’–19’, after Beckman (1999: 148))42
It is clear from this appeal that Hattusili had accepted Assyrian sovereignty over the territories belonging to the former kingdom of Hanigalbat as a *fait accompli*. But in Hanigalbat itself, the spirit of resistance continued to smoulder. Some time after the death of Adad-nirari who had probably reigned for more than thirty years (c.1295–1264), Shattuara II, the son and successor of Wasashatta, rebelled against Assyria and sought to realign his kingdom with Hatti, counting on both Hittite support and the assistance of some local Aramaic tribes. It was a courageous venture, though one ultimately doomed to failure. Shattuara was taking on Adad-nirari’s formidable successor Shalmaneser I (c.1263–1234). There was little likelihood that Hattusili would come to the assistance of the rebel. It seems that he had already written off Hanigalbat. And he was too preoccupied with other matters, including the Egyptian question, to contemplate a change of heart. Further, he had written to Shalmaneser, probably shortly after the latter’s accession, in very amicable terms, acknowledging him as a Great King, and probably coming to terms with him over territorial claims in the Euphrates region. In such a context, Shattuara’s rebellion against the Assyrian king may have been a distinct embarrassment to Hattusili, and so he probably chose to ignore any appeals from Shattuara. None the less the rebels succeeded in holding out for some considerable time against Assyria. It was probably only in the reign of Hattusili’s successor Tudhalia that Shattuara and his kingdom finally succumbed (see Ch. 12).

The ‘Eternal Treaty’

In the mean time, Hattusili was intent on bringing about a final peaceful settlement with Egypt. The ever-present threat of Assyria has been seen as one of Hattusili’s chief incentives for concluding a peace with Ramesses; an alliance between Hatti and Egypt would help safeguard the interests of both in Syria against the increasingly ambitious and belligerent upstart power across the Euphrates. But the ‘Assyrian factor’ has probably been over-emphasized. Rather, Hattusili was motivated much more by personal considerations in initiating the steps which led to the conclusion of a treaty with Ramesses. The treaty would in effect provide him with formal recognition from the pharaoh of the legitimacy of his rule. Such recognition would serve to
strengthen his credibility amongst other foreign rulers, as well as his own subjects.

We know from his correspondence with foreign rulers how sensitive he was on this matter. Perhaps with good reason. The diplomatic overtures he had made to the Assyrian king, probably Adad-nirari, had met with a gratuitously offensive response: ‘You are (no more than) a substitute for the Great King!’ Ramesses took some pleasure in reminding Hattusili of this. He clearly saw how important the treaty was to Hattusili in helping to gain for him the international recognition which he so earnestly sought. Indeed Hattusili had written to Ramesses some time before the treaty complaining about the pharaoh’s failure to treat him with the respect that his status deserved. He reminded him that he and not Urhi-Teshub was now king of Hatti. All this is evident from Ramesses’ rejoinder:

I have just heard these harsh words that my brother wrote to me (saying): ‘Why did you write to me all these words as if I were a servant?’ It is simply not true that I wrote to you as I would to one of my servants. Have you not attained the kingship? Do I not know this? Is it not firmly instilled in my heart? Fulfil your role as king! Moreover, I have heard about this business of Urhi-Teshub of which you have written. You have written to me about him saying: ‘I have become king in his place!’ (\(KUB\) iii 22 (\(CTH\) 155) + \(KBo\) xxviii 3 (= \(ÄHK\) i no. 20) obv. 5–9)

Attempts to persuade Ramesses to extradite Urhi-Teshub to Hatti had so far failed. But a treaty with the pharaoh would at least have the effect of gaining from him an agreement that he would not support any attempts Urhi-Teshub might still make to regain the throne of Hatti. Indeed it might induce Ramesses, finally, to surrender Urhi-Teshub to Hattusili’s authority. The treaty would also endorse the right of succession in Hattusili’s own line. This was an important consideration, particularly in view of the existence of a second son of Muwattalli and the possibility that attempts might be made to restore the throne to Muwattalli’s lineal descendants. By the terms of the treaty, Ramesses was bound to oppose any such attempts.

What did Ramesses hope to gain from the treaty? Here again we can only speculate. While in the years immediately following the conflict at Kadesh he had continued to maintain an active military presence in the Syrian region, his campaigns had tapered off considerably in more
recent years. And any ambitions he originally had entertained for emulating the achievements of Tuthmosis III were now, he had to acknowledge, completely unrealizable. He had not even been able to recover former Egyptian territories lost to the Hittites in the aftermath of the battle at Kadesh. Nor did he achieve any territorial gains from the treaty, which made no reference to territorial matters and thus by implication confirmed the status quo.\(^5^1\)

It is possible that the growing power of Assyria was a factor in Ramesses' decision—though as yet Assyria posed no direct threat to Egyptian territory in Syria. But Ramesses was now two decades into his reign, and may have felt the need for some significant achievement in the international arena to bolster his image amongst his subjects. In the absence of any significant military triumphs abroad in recent years, perhaps the next best thing was a major diplomatic achievement—an alliance with the long-term enemy of Egypt. Ramesses could represent the treaty as a settlement sought by the Hittite king, abjectly suing for peace with Egypt—in itself an acknowledgement that under the pharaoh's rule Egypt was still regarded as a major power in the international scene. It provided good propaganda value for the pharaoh.

The treaty was concluded in the twenty-first year of Ramesses' reign (November/December 1259) in the city of Pi-Ramesse:

Year 21, 1st month of Peret (Winter). Day 21, under the Majesty of... Ramesses II. ... On this day, now, His Majesty was at the city-quarter of Pi-Ramesse, doing what pleased his father Amen-Re-Horakhti-Atum... There came the (three royal envoys of Egypt ...) together with the first and second royal envoys of Hatti, Tili-Teshub, and Ramose, and the envoy of Carchemish, Yapusili, bearing the silver tablet which the Great King of Hatti, Hattusili, had caused to be brought to Pharaoh, by the hand of his envoy Tili-Teshub and his envoy Ramose, to request peace from the Majesty of the King of Southern and Northern Egypt, Usimare Setepenre, son of Re, Ramesses ... (Introduction to the Egyptian version, after Kitchen, _KRIT II_, no. 64, 79–80)\(^5^2\)

Two independent versions were composed, one in Hattusa, the other in Pi-Ramesse. Each version presented the terms of the treaty from the respective treaty-partner's viewpoint. The Hittite version was originally written in Akkadian, from a first Hittite draft, inscribed on a silver tablet, and then sent to Egypt, where it was translated into Egyptian. Copies of this version were inscribed on the walls of the temple of Amun
at Karnak and the Ramesseum. Correspondingly, the Egyptian version of the treaty was first composed in Egyptian, and then translated into Akkadian on a silver tablet before being sent to the court of Hattusili.\(^5^3\) (Thus the version of the treaty written in Egyptian represents the original Hittite version, and the version in Akkadian the original Egyptian version.) We have here a classic illustration of the importance of Akkadian in the Late Bronze Age world as the international language of diplomacy.

While the two versions of the treaty were independently prepared, it is clear from the fact that there are no significant discrepancies between them that the critical issues had been thoroughly discussed and negotiated in advance of their preparation. Thus both versions essentially formalized agreements that had already been reached, after extensive diplomatic communication. Important provisions in the treaty included mutual assurances that neither treaty-partner would invade the territory of the other, that each would come to the aid of the other, if called upon, in the event of aggression by a third power or rebellion in his own country, that each would return fugitives from the other’s country seeking asylum with him, on the understanding that an amnesty for persons so extradited would be provided in their own country.

Although the treaty marked a major step forward in Hittite–Egyptian relations, it did not result in a total relaxation of the tensions between the treaty-partners. The memories of past hostilities lingered on. We know, for example, that Hattusili wrote to Ramesses protesting about the pharaoh’s depiction of the battle of Kadesh—in a way that was deeply humiliating to his new ally. In his reply Ramesses made no apology at all for what he had said about Kadesh. After all, he was speaking no more than the truth! And he repeated his version of his ‘victory’ at Kadesh, and the events leading up to it, to emphasize the point.\(^5^4\) But he then went on to assure his Hittite Brother of his total personal commitment to the treaty, and of his adherence to its terms:

See, the Great Gods of our lands, they are witnesses to the word of the oath, which we have made. Further: I have not set aside the oath. I have obeyed the oath. And I will adhere closely to it, the peace and the brotherhood . . . \(KBo\, 15 + 19\) \((+\) 22 \(CTH\ 156\) \(=\, ÄHK\ 1\) no. 24\) rev. 6–8\)\(^5^5\)

Most important from Hattusili’s point of view was the fact that the treaty provided him with explicit Egyptian acknowledgement of the
legitimacy of his regime. Hattusili wanted this to be made quite clear. The pharaoh obliged:

Certainly you are the Great King of the lands of Hatti. The Sun God has granted to you and the Storm God has granted to you, (the right) to sit in the Land of Hatti, in the place of the father of your father. (NBC 3934 (CTH 155) (= "AHK i no. 22) obv. 13’–15’, after Archi (1971: 209))

By implication, Ramesses was thus endorsing the legitimacy of Hattusili’s action in deposing his nephew Urhi-Teshub from the kingship, as he made clear in his response to Kupanta-Kurunta, the king of Mira, who questioned him on this matter. Although the passage containing this response is incomplete, there can be no doubt that the pharaoh was now declaring his full support for Hattusili over the Urhi-Teshub affair:

Take note of the good alliance which the Great King, the king of the Land of Egypt, made with the Great King, the king of the Land of Hatti, my brother, in good brotherhood, in good peace. The Sun God and the Storm God have granted this forever. Note further: (regarding) the matter of Urhi-Teshub about which you have written to me, the Great King, the king of the Land of Hatti, handled it as I would have wished. (KBo i 24 + KUB iii 23 + KUB iii 84 (CTH 166.1) (= "AHK i no. 28) obv. 9–13)

Equally important, the treaty provided Hattusili with a guarantee of military support from the pharaoh, should there be an uprising against him by members of his own nobility. This in itself seems to be a further reflection of what Hattusili saw as the continuing insecurity of the Hittite monarchy, particularly over the question of the succession. So long as both sons of Muwattalli lived, his determination to place his own son upon the throne might be open to serious challenge, by his own subjects. It is this possibility which must have been foremost in Hattusili’s mind when he included the following provision in his treaty with Ramesses—a provision which has no corresponding obligation demanded by Ramesses:

The son of Hattusili . . . shall be made king of Hatti in the place of his father Hattusili, after the many years of Hattusili, king of Hatti. If noblemen of the Land of Hatti offend against him, then Ramesses, the king of the Land of Egypt, will send infantry and chariotry in order to take revenge on these. (Akkadian version, 40–3, after Spalinger (1981: 338–9))
Relations between Hatti and Egypt Following the Treaty

Urhi-Teshub At Large

The tensions between Hattusili and Ramesses caused by Urhi-Teshub’s flight to Egypt, whether this occurred before or after the treaty, are evident from Hattusili’s letter to Kadashman-Enlil (referred to above). Such tensions might well have imperilled, right from the outset, the peace accord between the two royal brothers. For an unknown period Urhi-Teshub continued to enjoy the pharaoh’s protection. To begin with, Ramesses was probably quite happy to take the refugee under his wing, as one means of ensuring that his treaty-partner abided strictly by the terms of the accord, particularly as they related to Egyptian interests in Syria. In the knowledge that his nephew had by no means abandoned his hopes of regaining his throne, and might well make a serious attempt to get it back if he had Egyptian backing, Hattusili was probably all the more careful to avoid a rekindling of hostilities with Egypt. Aside from that, Ramesses undoubtedly found in the deposed king an invaluable repository of first-hand information on the kingdom whose throne had been taken from him, and on the idiosyncracies, strengths, and weaknesses of those under whose control the kingdom now lay—above all Hattusili and his formidable consort.

But there may well have come a time when Urhi-Teshub’s usefulness to his Egyptian host was at an end, and when as a gesture of goodwill towards his royal brother Ramesses contemplated handing the fugitive back to him. Perhaps getting wind of this, Urhi-Teshub eventually decided that he had outstayed his welcome in the Land of the Nile, and left Egypt for parts unknown—probably without Ramesses’ knowledge or consent. Initially, it seems, he made his way back to Syria. Receiving intelligence reports to this effect, Hattusili wrote to the pharaoh, demanding that he put all possible resources into tracking the fugitive down, apprehending him, and then taking him back to Egypt: ‘The Great King, the King of Egypt, should get his infantry and his chariots to exert themselves, and he should expend his gold, his silver, his horses, his copper and his garments in order to take Urhi-Teshub to Egypt. He shall not allow him to become strong and to wage war against Hatti...’ This was a remarkable turnabout on
Hattusili’s part—after his earlier demands that Urhi-Teshub be extradited from Egypt! The usurper apparently now believed that if Urhi-Teshub were consigned to a remote exile in the Land of the Nile he would be far less of a threat to the new regime in Hattusa than if he were relocated, or allowed to run loose, somewhere in his own former kingdom. Past experience had borne that out. It is not unlikely that Urhi-Teshub still commanded considerable support among his own former subjects.

The very fact that Urhi-Teshub succeeded in eluding the most determined efforts by his pursuers, both Egyptian and Hittite, to recapture him suggests that he did indeed have many supporters willing to shelter him in the regions where he now sought refuge. In spite of all the pharaoh’s efforts, undertaken in response to his royal brother’s request, he remained at large. Ramesses wrote to Hattusili, advising him that his search for the fugitive had been in vain—that in fact Urhi-Teshub had now returned to Hittite territory. He even went so far as to suggest where Hattusili should look for him. Hattusili took strong exception to this suggestion—that his nephew was now back in his own territory without his knowledge and with the support of his own subjects—and wrote angrily to Ramesses rejecting it. On receiving his letter, Ramesses wrote back angrily in reply, once more declaring that the bird had flown the coop:

As for what you have written to me regarding the matter of Urhi-Teshub: ‘It is not the case that he went to the Land of Kadesh! It is not the case that he went into the Land of Aleppo! It is not the case that he went into the Land of Kizzuwadna!’—thus you have written. Look, I do not understand these words you have written about this matter of Urhi-Teshub, as follows: ‘Bring him into the Land of Egypt!’ I do not know where he is lodged. [He has flown like a bird.] (KBo i 15 + 19 (+) 22 (CTH 156) (= ÄHKı no. 24), rev. 22–5) 

The likelihood is that Ramesses was telling the truth, that Urhi-Teshub was in fact back in Hittite territory. At one time he may even have been taken very briefly into Hittite custody in Syria, before escaping by bribing his guards. In any case, he succeeded in eluding both Hittite and Egyptian authority for the rest of his life, possibly setting up a kingdom in exile in southern Anatolia, and for long remained a source of tension between the two Great Kings.
A Royal Wedding

In other respects, however, the conclusion of the so-called ‘Eternal Treaty’ marked the beginning of a significant improvement in Hittite–Egyptian relations. Ramesses and Hattusili exchanged a series of cordial letters regarding the treaty, and relations between the royal families were consolidated thirteen years later by the marriage between Ramesses and a daughter of Hattusili (thirty-third year of Ramesses’ reign, autumn of 1246). The marriage was preceded by extensive correspondence between the two royal houses relating to the terms of the marriage settlement, the dowry to be provided, arrangements for the Hittite princess’s journey to Egypt, and guarantees that royal messengers from Hatti and members of the Hittite royal family would henceforth be permitted to visit the princess after her marriage. The correspondence was not without some acrimony. There were, for example, complaints from Ramesses about delays on the Hittite side in finalizing arrangements for the marriage. Much of the responsibility for these arrangements fell to the queen Puduhepa. It was to her that Ramesses wrote complaining of Hittite prevarication—but his complaint received a brusque response from Puduhepa, who took the opportunity to bring up again with him Urhi-Teshub’s alleged continuing sojourn in his kingdom. Who was Ramesses to complain about his ‘Brother’s’ failure to accede to his wishes?

Now you, my Brother wrote to me as follows: ‘My Sister has written to me: “I will send you a daughter.” But you have withheld her and are ill disposed towards me. Why have you failed to give her to me?’ . . . At present I cannot give her to you. Do I not know, as you, my Brother, know, that the ‘House of Hatti’ has been destroyed by fire? What remained Urhi-Teshub gave to the Great God. Since Urhi-Teshub is there (with you), ask him whether it is so or not! (KUB xxi 38 (CTH 176) (= ḤK i no. 105) obv. 7’–12’)

Puduhepa spent much of her letter explaining to Ramesses that the delay in sending him his bride was due to the time taken to collect a suitable dowry. It may be that a fire in Hattusa which destroyed the so-called ‘House of Hatti’ had been at least partly responsible for this. What this ‘House’ was remains uncertain. Perhaps it was a royal treasury of some kind, or warehouse, from which suitable items for a royal dowry
might normally have been collected.72 (What actually happened to the ‘House’ is also uncertain, since the assumption that a fire destroyed it depends on the reading of a fragmentary passage.73)

Finally Ramesses received word from Puduhepa that all arrangements had been finalized in Hatti. The princess was on her way. The pharaoh was delighted, and wrote in fulsome terms to Puduhepa:

I have seen the tablet that my Sister sent me, and I have noted all the matters on which the Great Queen of Hatti, my Sister, has so very, very graciously written to me . . . The Great King, the King of Hatti, my Brother, has written to me saying: ‘Let people come, to pour fine oil on my daughter’s head, and may she be brought into the house of the Great King, the King of Egypt!’ . . . Excellent, excellent is this decision about which my Brother has written to me . . . (our) two great countries will become as one land forever! (KUB III 63 (CTH 159.2) (= ÄHK i no. 51) obv. 12–20, trans. Kitchen (1982: 85))

As one might expect, Ramesses sought to make considerable political capital out of the occasion, representing the handing over of the Hittite bride as an act of tribute by his royal brother:

Then he (Hattusili) caused his eldest daughter to be brought, with magnificent tribute (going) before her, of gold, silver, and copper in abundance, slaves, spans of horses without limit, cattle, goats, and sheep by ten-thousands—limitless were the products which they brought to the King of Southern and Northern Egypt, Usimare Setepenre, Son of Re, Ramesses II, given life. Then one came to inform His Majesty, saying: ‘See, the Great Ruler of Hatti has sent his eldest daughter, with tribute of every kind; they (fairly) cover the roads with their going—the Princess of Hatti, together with all the grandees of the Land of Hatti.’ (trans. Kitchen, KRIT II no. 66, 94)

Inscriptions from Egypt provide details of the pomp and ceremony of the wedding.74 The princess’s Hittite name is unknown, but her Egyptian name was Maat-Hor-Neferure, which means ‘One who sees Horus, the Visible Splendour of Re’.75 In her correspondence with Ramesses, Puduhepa had asked that her daughter be recognized as Ramesses’ principal wife.76 Initially Ramesses agreed to her request,77 although subsequently the Hittite princess was apparently sent to live in the pharaoh’s harem near Fayum.78 At all events, the peace accord between Hatti and Egypt was now consolidated, and remained firm throughout the remaining years of the Hittite kingdom.
Further Communications between the Royal Courts

The royal correspondence provides further evidence of regular personal communications between the two royal houses, particularly between Puduhepa and members of the Egyptian royal family. There is also a well known instance in which Hattusili wrote to Ramesses requesting the services of an Egyptian doctor to assist his sister Massanauzzi (wife of Masturi, king of the Seha River Land), to have children. In Egyptian texts, the sister’s name appears as Matanazi.\(^7\) The assignment was a difficult one since Hattusili admitted that his sister was now a woman of mature years. Ramesses readily seized upon this. His ungracious response could hardly have endeared him to his Hittite Brother:

Thus to my Brother: (Concerning) what my Brother has written to me regarding his sister Matanazi: ‘May my Brother send to me a man to prepare medicines so that she may bear children.’ So has my Brother written. And so (I say) to my Brother: ‘Look, Matanazi, the sister of my Brother, the king your Brother knows her. She is said to be 50 or even 60 years old! Look, a woman of 50 is old, to say nothing of a 60-year-old! One can’t produce medicines to enable her to bear children! Well, the Sun God and the Storm God may give a command, and the order which they give will then be carried out continually for the sister of my Brother. And I, the king your Brother, will send an expert incantation-priest and an expert doctor and they will prepare medicines to assist her to produce children. \((KBo \, xxviii \, 30 \,(= \, AHK \, i \, no. \, 75) \, \text{obv.} \, 8-\text{rev.} \, 8)\)\(^8\)

The arrogant, patronizing tone of this letter surfaces elsewhere in Ramesses’ communications with the Hittite court. On a personal level, Ramesses sometimes adopted a lofty, condescending attitude towards his northern ally. None the less he was curious to meet the Great King, brother of his opponent at Kadesh and a major participant in the conflict, and usurper of the Hittite throne. Indeed he issued Hattusili with an invitation to visit him, shortly after the conclusion of the treaty.

Hattusili seems initially to have accepted the invitation, though probably with less enthusiasm than Ramesses has led us to believe. Subsequently the pharaoh renewed his invitation, with the further inducement that he would himself travel to Canaan\(^8\) to meet his royal brother there, and thence escort him personally to his residence in the eastern Delta:
The Sun God (of Egypt) and the Storm God (of Hatti) and my gods and the gods of my Brother will cause my Brother see his Brother—and may my Brother carry out this good suggestion to come and see me. And then we may see each other face to face at the place where the king (Ramesses) sits enthroned. So, I shall go (ahead) into Canaan, to meet my Brother and see him face (to face), and to receive him into the midst of my land! (KBo xxviii 1 (= ÄHK i no. 4) obv. 19′–24′, trans. Kitchen (1982: 90))

Ramesses probably represented the proposed visit primarily as a goodwill mission which would consolidate further the good relations between the two kingdoms. But no doubt his curiosity to meet his Hittite counterpart and his desire to impress him with the splendours of Egypt were also important motives. Moreover a visit from Hattusili offered considerable scope for enhancing Ramesses’ image amongst his own subjects. It could be depicted as a major act of homage paid to the pharaoh in his own court by the ruler of the Land of Hatti.

As far as we are aware, Hattusili never took up the pharaoh’s invitation. Initially he postponed acceptance of it, perhaps making the excuse of a personal indisposition. We know that he suffered from inflammation of the feet, and may have used this as a reason for not responding more enthusiastically. But he probably had no great wish to go to Egypt, and may well have been suspicious of Ramesses’ motives in issuing the invitation. In any case problems within his own kingdom, particularly in the west (see below), meant that he could ill afford a lengthy absence from his homeland—on a diplomatic mission of very dubious benefit to himself.

Nevertheless the close links between the two royal houses continued, and were further strengthened some years later when another Hittite princess was sent to Egypt to marry the pharaoh. Details are provided on a stele discovered by Petrie in 1896 in the Great Temple at Koptos:

The Great Ruler of Hatti sent the rich and massive spoils of Hatti, the rich and massive spoils of Kaska, the rich and massive spoils of Arzawa, the rich and massive spoils of Qode—which could not (even) be known in writing—to the king of Southern and Northern Egypt, Usimare Setepenre, Son of Re, Ramesses II, and likewise, many droves of horses, many herds of cattle, many flocks of goats, many droves of game, before his other Daughter, whom he sent to the king of Southern and Northern Egypt, Usimare Setepenre, Son of Re, Ramesses II, given life, to Egypt, on what was the second (such) occasion. (Koptos Stele, 7–11, trans. Kitchen, KRIT II, no. 69, 111)
It is possible that this second marriage took place after the death of Hattusili. In any case, we can have little doubt that the chief negotiator on the Hittite side was the queen Puduhepa.

**Puduhepa**

The marriage correspondence between Puduhepa and the Egyptian royal court (we have fifteen letters written to Puduhepa by Ramesses or members of his family) well illustrates the respect which the Hittite queen was accorded by foreign rulers. She was held in high esteem by Ramesses in particular, whose four surviving letters to her are couched in terms virtually identical to those used in his correspondence with the Hittite king himself.

This was but one instance of the extensive and largely unparallelled role which Puduhepa played in international affairs, as exemplified by her frequent communications with both foreign and vassal rulers. It was a role which she continued to fulfil following her husband’s death, in the reign of their son Tudhaliya. There is little doubt that her international profile had the blessing, and indeed the active encouragement, of her husband. She was included with him in the loyalty oath in the Ulmi-Teshub treaty, and important documents of state, including the treaty with Ramesses, bore the names of both king and queen as co-signatories. Puduhepa also issued seals in her own right.

Amongst her many activities, she played a role as royal matchmaker, claiming the credit for arranging the double marriage between the Hittite and Amurrite royal families, and taking responsibility for deciding on a wife for Urhi-Teshub’s brother (or half-brother) Kurunta. She also arranged marriage alliances with the family of the king of Babylon. It was probably a Babylonian princess who became the wife of her son Tudhaliya (see Ch. 12).

After her husband’s death, Puduhepa became increasingly active in the judicial sphere, sometimes intervening in legal disputes, and making pronouncements on cases brought to her attention in the vassal states. We learn of a case probably early in Tudhaliya’s reign in which she found against a defendant for wilfully damaging a ship and ordered that he pay compensation to the plaintiff, a shipowner in Ugarit:
Thus (speaks) My Sun: Say to Ammistamru: ‘When this man from Ugarit came with Sukku for judgement before My Sun, Sukku said: “His boat broke itself against the quay.” But the man of Ugarit said: “(No!) Sukku deliberately broke up my boat.” My Sun has made the following judgement: “Let the chief man of the boatsmen of Ugarit swear: Sukku must reimburse (the aggrieved party) for his boat and the goods therein.”’ (RS 17.133 (CTH 95) = PRU IV 118–19)

The document is in the form of a letter written to Ammistamru II, king of Ugarit, informing him of the Hittite queen’s decision. It was signed with her personal seal. The use of the royal title ‘My Sun’ indicates that she was acting on behalf of the Hittite king, and clearly with full authority to make such decisions on his behalf. It may be that such authority had originally been delegated to her by Hattusili, and then continued after his death during at least the early part of her son Tudhaliya’s reign.92

Puduhepa had been a priestess before her marriage to Hattusili, and for the rest of her life she seems to have devoted much time and attention to the religious affairs of the kingdom. Her role as chief priestess of the Hittite realm is visually illustrated by the well known relief sculpture on the rock face at Firaktin, approximately 100 kilometres south of Kayseri. Here she is engaged in a religious ceremony conducted jointly with her husband. He is making a libation to a god, she to the goddess Hepat.93 Her participation in the ceremony as her husband’s equal is one further example of the close working partnership between king and queen which characterized the reign of Hattusili.

In her capacity as chief priestess, Puduhepa seems to have ordered a comprehensive collection and organization of religious texts, and to have made extensive revisions to religious ceremonies and rituals. She may also have organized a major rationalization of the vast array of deities who had accumulated in the Hittite pantheon, establishing a number of syncretisms between Hittite and Hurrian deities in particular. The most important of these syncretisms is reflected in the opening lines of her prayer to the Sun Goddess of Arinna:

To the Sun Goddess of Arinna, My Lady, the Mistress of the Hatti lands, the Queen of heaven and earth. Sun Goddess of Arinna, you are Queen of all countries! In the Land of Hatti you bear the name of the Sun Goddess of Arinna; but in the land which you made the cedar land you bear the name
Amongst all the prayers uttered by Puduhepa, the most poignant were those in which she sought divine protection for the life and health of her husband.\textsuperscript{94} Ill health seems to have dogged Hattusili in his later years as well as in his youth. Puduhepa begged that his health be restored, that he be granted long life:

Hattusili, that servant of yours who is ill . . . If Hattusili is accursed, and if Hattusili, my husband, has become hateful in the eyes of you, the gods; or if anyone of the gods above or below has taken offence at him; or if anyone has made an offering to the gods to bring evil upon Hattusili—accept not these evil words, O Goddess, My Lady! Let evil not touch Hattusili, your servant! O gods, prefer not our adversaries, our enviers, (and our) [ ] to us! If you, Goddess, My Lady, will grant him life and relay to the gods, your peers, the good (word), and if you will tread underfoot the evil words and shut them out—O Lelwani, My Lady, may the life of Hattusili, your servant, and of Puduhepa, your handmaid, come forth from your mouth in the presence of the gods! To Hattusili, your servant, and to Puduhepa, your handmaid, give long years, months, and days! (\textit{KUB xxi 27 (CTH 384) iii 14’–35’}, after Goetze in Pritchard (1969: 393–4))

Along with her prayers, the queen made numerous heartfelt appeals to Lelwani, goddess of the Underworld, with offers of votive gifts if her appeals were answered and the king were restored to health and granted long life.\textsuperscript{95} Her requests were often quite specific. One of them sought that the king be cured of an inflammation of his feet:

A dream of the queen: Somebody said again and again to me in a dream: ‘Make a vow to the goddess Ningal as follows: “If that (disease) Fire-of-the-Feet of His Majesty will pass quickly, I shall make for Ningal ten (?) \textit{talla} (oil flasks) of gold set with lapis lazuli!” ’ (\textit{KUB xv 3 (CTH 584.2) f 17 ff.} trans. Güterbock in Oppenheim (1956: 255))

Other votive prayers refer to an eye-illness from which the king suffered.\textsuperscript{96} He was already subject to this affliction at the time of his treaty with Ramesses. Among the gifts which the pharaoh sent him to mark the signing of the treaty were some medicines to help alleviate it.\textsuperscript{97} In all Puduhepa’s votive prayers, we see expressions of ‘the love and loyalty of this queen, who always lived under the threat of losing her beloved husband’.\textsuperscript{98}
The death of Hattusili brought to an end one of the closest and one of the most enduring and constructive royal partnerships of the ancient world. For this much credit must be due to Puduhepa. In contrast to certain earlier Hittite queens who had played a prominent role in the kingdom, it is worth noting that history has left us with a very positive impression of Puduhepa. Our records give little indication that she used her substantial powers for purely personal ends, or that she ever provided her husband with less than total dedicated support. This must have been of inestimable value to the king in helping him to deal with the crises over the royal succession, and in establishing the credibility of his regime in the eyes of foreign rulers.

In forming such a picture of Puduhepa, we are of course dependent on the chance survival of documents—which in this case present a very favourable picture of the former priestess of Lawazantiya. Whether or not there was a more sinister dimension to her role as the Hittite queen, as in the case of Suppiluliuma’s wife Tawananna, is a matter on which we can only speculate. There is no doubt that she was an extremely powerful figure in the royal court, who was almost certainly influential in many of the decisions which her husband made. Indeed as illness and old age took their toll upon the king in his final years, Puduhepa may well have increasingly become ‘the power behind the throne’. In such a role, she could not have failed to make enemies.

She continued to play an active role in Hittite affairs for many years after her husband’s death, and may have still been alive as late as the reign of the Ugaritic king Niqmaddu III at the end of the thirteenth century. If so, she must have lived at least to the age of ninety, even if she was only fifteen when she married Hattusili not long after the battle of Kadesh.

**Campaigns in Anatolia**

Hattusili’s peace accord with Ramesses made a welcome and significant contribution, at least in the short term, to political stability within Syria. In effect it confirmed existing territorial boundaries between Hatti and Egypt, and the authority of each over the respective local kingdoms within these boundaries. In the past much of the volatility of the region had been due to vassals who had sought to increase their own territory and status at the expense of their neighbours by exploiting the rivalry
between the two major powers for overall supremacy. The treaty virtually ruled out opportunities for the local vassals to attempt to play off one power against the other. Further, the new alliance between Hatti and Egypt might also help keep the Assyrians out of Syria.

There were other reasons why a permanent settlement of affairs in Syria needed to be finalized as quickly as possible. As Hattusili negotiated his way through the complexities of his treaty with Ramesses, he became aware of further serious unrest in his Anatolian territories. In the north the Kaskans continued to menace the Hittite frontiers, and regular campaigns were needed to keep them at bay. But it was in the west and the south that the most serious problems were emerging.

We learn from the small surviving fragments of the king’s *Annals* of a major uprising in the Lukka lands, which extended through the region of the later Lycaonia, Pisidia, and Lycia. Rebel groups from these lands had apparently carried out extensive conquests in neighbouring Hittite subject territories in southern Anatolia.

Several scholars have sought to combine the events dealt with in the fragmentary *Annals* with those outlined in the well known document commonly referred to as the ‘Tawagalawa letter’, a document addressed to a king of Ahhiyawa. Neither the author’s nor the addressee’s name appears in what survives of the letter (only the last of three tablets). However most scholars now agree in assigning authorship to Hattusili. The letter refers primarily to the activities of Piyamaradu, whom we met in Chapter 9. Piyamaradu had already been harrassing the Hittites’ western vassal states in Muwattali’s reign, and was still active in the region, apparently with the support, or at least the connivance, of the king of Ahhiyawa.

The uprising in the Lukka lands was ripe for exploitation. As the Hittites prepared for retaliatory action, a large group of the rebels sought asylum with Tawagalawa, the brother of the Ahhiyawan king, who had apparently come to western Anatolia to receive the fugitives. Piyamaradu had brought them to Tawagalawa, probably to arrange their relocation in Ahhiyawan territory. But loyalties amongst the Lukka people seem to have been divided. For another group of them who had adhered to their Hittite allegiance were forcibly removed from their homeland by Piyamaradu, and now appealed to Hattusili to rescue them.

In response, Hattusili set out for the west in order to reassert Hittite authority over the region occupied by Piyamaradu, and to effect the
liberation of his subjects. It was a campaign which he undertook with great reluctance, and even while he was on the march, he attempted to reach a settlement with Piyamaradu. For a time Piyamaradu appeared willing to negotiate. But the negotiations broke down:

Now when I came to Sallapa, he sent a man to meet me (saying) ‘Take me into vassalage and send me the tuhkanti\textsuperscript{109} and he will conduct me to My Sun!’ And I sent him the tartenu\textsuperscript{110} (saying) ‘Go, set him beside you on the chariot and bring him here!’ But he—he snubbed the tartenu and said ‘no’. But is not the tartenu the proper representative(?) of the king? He had my hand. But he answered(?) him ‘no’ and humiliated him before the lands; and moreover he said this: ‘Give me a kingdom here on the spot! If not I will not come.’ (Tawag. letter, i 6–15, trans. Gurney in Garstang and Gurney (1959: 111))

This truculent demand from his former subject could not be tolerated. Hattusili continued his march westwards, determined to give an exemplary demonstration of Hittite force to his subjects and to his enemies, and to put an end once and for all to the activities of Piyamaradu. Word reached him that Iyalanda near the Aegean coast\textsuperscript{111} had been occupied by the forces of Piyamaradu. Hopeful that even now Piyamaradu could be intimidated into submission, he sent him an ultimatum. To no avail:

When I reached Waliwanda I wrote to him: ‘If you desire my overlordship, see now, when I come to Iyalanda, let me not find any of your men in Iyalanda; and you shall not let anyone go back there, and you shall not trespass in my domain. . . . ’ But when I came to Iyalanda, the enemy attacked me in three places.\textsuperscript{112} (Tawag. letter, i 16–23, trans. Gurney in Garstang and Gurney (1959: 111))

Hattusili conquered the land. But not promptly enough to lay hands on Piyamaradu, who fled to the Land of Millawanda (Milawata), still at that time subject to Ahhiyawa. Hattusili had no wish to provoke a conflict with the Ahhiyawan king, and later assured him that he had no designs on Millawandan territory. Nevertheless, more determined than ever to bring Piyamaradu to justice, he entered Millawanda, apparently with the consent of the Ahhiyawan king, and demanded that its local ruler Atpa (Piyamaradu’s son-in-law) hand the renegade over to him. Again Piyamaradu eluded him, making a hasty departure from Millawanda by ship and presumably seeking refuge in Ahhiyawan
territory—away from the Anatolian mainland but close enough to it for him to make continual raids on Hittite subject territory once the Hittite forces had left the area.

This much we know from Hattusili’s letter, which is in part a letter of complaint to the Ahhiyawan king about his apparent support of Piyamaradu’s activities. But the letter was written in a largely conciliatory tone, for Hattusili’s main intention was to seek the addressee’s cooperation in putting an end to Piyamaradu’s activities:

According to this rumour, during the time when he leaves behind his wife, children, and household in my Brother’s land, your land is affording him protection. But he is continually raiding my land; whenever I have prevented him in that, he comes back into your territory. Are you now, my Brother, favourably disposed to this conduct? (If not), now, my Brother, write at least this to him: ‘Rise up, go forth into the Land of Hatti. Your lord has settled his account with you! Otherwise come into the Land of Ahhiyawa, and in whatever place I settle you, [you must remain there]. Rise up with your prisoners, your wives and children, and settle down in another place! So long as you are at enmity with the king of Hatti, exercise your hostility from (some) other country! From my country you shall not conduct hostilities!’ (Tawag. letter, iii 55–iv 5, after Gurney in Garstang and Gurney (1959: 13))

With disarming frankness, Hattusili admitted that his expedition to the west had been unsuccessful. He had failed to secure the return of his subjects, and had failed either to capture Piyamaradu, or to put a stop to his constant raids on Hittite territory. But he had no wish to commit his forces to further campaigns in the west, if this could be avoided. These resources were needed elsewhere. His letter should be seen in this light. It has been described as abject, soft-spoken, apologetic, and is certainly written in very restrained and carefully measured terms. But the underlying sense of frustration and humiliation is evident—above all, humiliation at having to appeal for Ahhiyawan assistance where he himself had failed, in the knowledge that Piyamaradu had been operating with Ahhiyawan support. Hattusili could rely on little more than hope that the Ahhiyawan king would not seek to exploit the Hittites’ fragile authority in the west by further expanding his own influence in the region.

We do not know the outcome of Hattusili’s appeal. The likelihood is that it was ignored. And although we hear no more of Piyamaradu, there is no reason to believe that his activities in western Anatolia were in any
way curtailed. The need for a firm resolution of the deteriorating situation in the west was but one of the problems which Hattusili left to his son Tudhaliya. Above all, it must have been clear to Hattusili and his successor that so long as the Ahhiyawan king maintained a firm foothold on Anatolian soil, there could never be any lasting security for Hittite subject territories in the region.

**Hattusili’s Legacy**

Hattusili ran the risk of being a king who reigned too long. He was already in his fifties when he seized the throne from Urhi-Teshub, and had then occupied it for at least the next twenty-five years. He was at least in his seventies when he died. In his final years, his ability to perform effectively the responsibilities of kingship must have been seriously limited. There were many problems, some becoming increasingly serious, which required the direct attention of a fit and able monarch. The physical demands of travel, whether on goodwill missions, religious pilgrimages, or military campaigns, must have become increasingly difficult for him to cope with in his later years, particularly if he suffered from chronic ill health. But divisions between the various branches of his own family and the potential these had for erupting into open conflict were amongst his most immediate concerns.

The longer he lived, and the more enfeebled he became, the greater the likelihood that intra-family disputes would throw into disarray his plans for the succession. Challenges could come from several different quarters. There was his brother’s son Kurunta. So far he had been loyal. But could he be trusted to remain so if the political situation in Hattusa became increasingly unstable as the king’s death approached? There was Urhi-Teshub, apparently still alive and still at large. By now he must also have been a man of advanced years. But the possibility could not be ruled out that he would make a further bid for reclaiming his throne after Hattusili’s death. In any case, he had sons who might also seek to restore the sovereign line to the descendants of Muwattalli. And what of the sons of Danuhepa, or their sons? Did they have kingly aspirations? What of Hattusili’s older son Nerikkaili? He had, apparently, submitted with good grace to his father’s will when he had been removed from the position of tuhkanti. But might not his ambitions have been rekindled as his father’s end drew near? Apart from him,
Hattusili had other sons by a previous marriage (or marriages), whom Puduhepa had brought up, so she claimed in her draft letter to Ramesses, and made into military officers: ‘When I entered the palace, the princesses that I found inside gave birth under my care, and I raised them (i.e. their children). Those that I found already born, them I raised as well, and I made them army commanders’ (KUB xxi 38 (CTH 176) obv. 59–62, after van den Hout (1995b: 1110)).

The considerable number of potential claimants for the royal succession probably weighed heavily on the mind of Puduhepa. Her pleas to the gods for the health and longevity of her husband may not have been entirely altruistic. On her husband’s death, her own position could have become precarious if the succession did not proceed in accordance with his (and probably her) plans. The influence she wielded in the royal court and the kingdom at large had almost certainly made her many enemies within the extended royal family. If any of these succeeded in seizing power, her days as reigning queen might well have been numbered. There were after all precedents for ridding the court of a troublesome, domineering queen.
New Enterprises, New Threats: The Reign of Tudhaliya IV (c.1237–1209)

The Preparation of Tudhaliya for Kingship

In his early years, the prince Tudhaliya could have had little thought that he would one day become king. His cousin Urhi-Teshub, son of Muwattalli, had succeeded to the throne, with the endorsement and support of his uncle Hattusili, Tudhaliya’s father. In the normal course of events the succession would continue in Muwattalli’s direct line. Even after Hattusili had deposed Urhi-Teshub and seized the throne for himself, Tudhaliya’s prospects of following his father upon the throne must still have seemed remote. For his older brother Nerikkaili had been appointed to the office of tuhkanti which carried with it the expectation, if not the certainty, that he would one day be king.

But subsequently Hattusili had deprived Nerikkaili of his post, and installed Tudhaliya ‘in kingship’ (lugal-iz-na-ni). That is, Tudhaliya probably now assumed the role of crown prince.¹ Political considerations, particularly recognition of the close bonds between Tudhaliya and his cousin Kurunta, may have played an important role in prompting the action which Hattusili took. But whatever part such considerations may have played, the removal of Nerikkaili from office and the elevation of Tudhaliya was probably not a decision suddenly taken. Rather Hattusili had decided upon Tudhaliya as his heir some time before his formal announcement, and was waiting for an appropriate time to make this announcement. It may have been no coincidence that Tudhaliya’s early career followed a similar path to that of his father. Hattusili probably planned it that way. Thus he had assigned his son to the service of his own special patron goddess Ishtar (of Samuha),² just as in his own childhood he had been assigned by his father Mursili to the
goddess’s service. And he had appointed him priest of the Storm God of Nerik, again a significant appointment in view of his own special associations with the holy city; its restoration had been one of the great achievements of his early career, and here he too had been priest of the god. He also bestowed upon Tudhaliya governorship of the city of Hakpis, formerly the seat of his own power, and appointed him to the post of GAL MEŠEDI (Chief of the Bodyguards). Hattusili too had been GAL MEŠEDI early in his career.

It was while holding this post that Tudhaliya campaigned extensively in the Kaska region, thus gaining the battle experience that would help equip him for his eventual role as commander-in-chief of the Hittite army. Indeed Hattusili credited his son with a military victory in the region, the conquest of Hatenzuwa, which he himself had not been able to achieve. How much credit for this victory was due to Tudhaliya personally is open to question. He may have been no more than twelve years old at the time of the campaign.

The career path which Hattusili had mapped out for Tudhaliya may well indicate that he had been grooming his son for the succession for some years. Indeed, his so-called Apology may have been intended as much to justify his choice of successor, and to pave the way for his succession, as to defend his own course of action in seizing the throne. Almost certainly the Apology was composed in the later years of his reign, after the conclusion of his treaty with Ramesses and in the period when the question of the succession was assuming increasing importance.

Perhaps Hattusili went further than merely proclaiming Tudhaliya his successor and actually shared the throne with him for a time. In view of his age and state of health in the later years of his reign, and particularly in view of the potential for conflict among a number of possible claimants upon the throne after his death, this might have been an extremely wise move. Indeed several scholars have concluded that Tudhaliya became his father’s co-regent. The case for a co-regency has rested largely on a seal impression from Ugarit which features the name Tudhaliya in the inner ring and, allegedly, Hattusili in the outer. This would clearly indicate joint kingship. However it has now been demonstrated that the name Tudhaliya should be read in both the inner and the outer rings. This leaves only one dubious piece of evidence for a
co-regency between Tudhaliya and his father—an oracle text which *may* indicate that Tudhaliya bore the title ‘My Sun’ in the lifetime of his father.\(^{12}\)

**A Wife for the Heir to the Throne**

In order to help secure the succession in Hattusili’s family line, the future king needed a wife. Strangely, we can find no explicit reference to a consort of Tudhaliya, either in texts or in seal impressions. Yet it would be remarkable if a suitable marriage had not been arranged for him at the earliest feasible opportunity, in view of the precarious nature of the succession and all the other steps apparently taken to prepare him for kingship. In fact Tudhaliya probably had married some years before he succeeded to the throne. His wife may be referred to in the well known draft of a letter written by Puduhepa to Ramesses regarding his forthcoming marriage to her daughter (referred to several times in Ch. 11). In the course of this long letter the Hittite queen refers to two other Hittite marriages with foreigners: ‘The daughter of Babylon and the daughter of Amurru whom I, the Queen, took—were they not indeed a source of praise for me before the people of Hatti?\(^{13}\) This I did, taking as daughter-in-law a foreigner, the daughter of a Great King’ (*KUB* xxı 38 (CTH 176) (= *AHK* I no. 105) obv. 47–9).

The ‘daughter of Amurru’ was married to Tudhaliya’s older brother Nerikkaili. The ‘daughter of Babylon’ probably became the wife of Tudhaliya.\(^{14}\) Puduhepa seems to have taken the initiative in arranging these marriages.\(^{15}\) Such unions were of course a regular feature of Bronze Age international relationships. Indeed the Hittite and Babylonian royal houses were now linked by two marriages, since Hattusili had provided one of his daughters as a wife for the king of Babylon.\(^{16}\) A similar double marriage had already taken place between the Hittite and Amurrite royal families in Hattusili III’s reign.

Ramesses reacted with some contempt to the news of the marriage links with Babylon. In his view the occupant of the throne of Babylon no longer deserved recognition as a ‘Great King’. To this Puduhepa made a curt response: ‘If you say “the king of Babylon is not a Great King”, then you do not know the status of Babylon’ (*KUB* xxı 38, obv. 55–6, trans. Singer (1991c: 331)). Since her letter was written some
time before 1246, i.e. before the marriage of the first Hittite princess to Ramesses, then the Babylonian king who had aroused Ramesses’ contempt was Kudur-Enlil, who occupied the Babylonian throne from c.1254–1246 following the reign of Kadashman-Enlil II. If the Babylonian princess became Tudhaliya’s wife, then this must have been the period in which his marriage took place—some years before he acceded to his father’s throne.

In spite of Ramesses’ dismissive statement about the Babylonian king, the Hittite court still recognized him as the ruler of a Great Kingdom, and continued to do so down to the time when the kingdom finally succumbed to the forces of the Assyrian king Tukulti-Ninurta. Moreover there were two important incentives for a Hittite–Babylonian marriage alliance. In the first place the alliance further strengthened the ties between Hatti and Babylon, which Hattusili no doubt saw as very important in the face of the threats posed to both powers by a sword-brandishing Assyria. In the second place, it must also have helped promote the personal status of Tudhaliya above that of his brother Nerikkaili. Nerikkaili’s wife was merely the daughter of a vassal king. In this respect the influence of Puduhepa may well have been at work, particularly since she claimed to have taken the initiative in arranging the marriage.

She may later have had cause to regret this initiative. A lengthy oracle text which enquires into the reasons for the illness of a Hittite king indicates factions within the royal court involving the women of the court who had divided themselves into two groups—supporters and opponents of the Great Queen. The text is almost certainly to be assigned to the reign of Tudhaliya. The queen in question must be Puduhepa, who in the manner of the Tawananna continued to exercise her official powers after Hattusili’s death, in both foreign and domestic spheres. She was still a formidable figure in the royal court, seeking to maintain her role as the chief power-broker within court circles. It was this no doubt that led to the hostility and intrigues against her—by those who had fallen foul of her.

The leader of the anti-Puduhepa faction was apparently the dumu.sal gal, the Great Princess, very likely Tudhaliya’s wife. An attempt seems to have been made by Puduhepa to discredit her by bringing charges against her supporters Ammattalla and Pattiya; the latter, who had apparently enjoyed a very privileged position in the royal court, may have been the king’s mother-in-law. Caught between the
two factions, with his powerful, still very active mother on the one side, and his wife and her supporters on the other, Tudhaliya no doubt felt that he had been placed in a well-nigh impossible situation! The immediate outcome of this royal wrangle is unknown. It has been suggested that Puduhepa was expelled from the palace. But in the long term, she appears to have triumphed over her enemies and even strengthened her position. Indeed she continued to be a powerful force in both the foreign and domestic affairs of the kingdom for much if not all of her son’s reign.

**Other Problems Confronting the New King**

Tudhaliya inherited from his father a formidable list of problems and potential crises. To begin with, many vassal rulers appear to have held back from pledging their allegiance to the new regime. They adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude. In the west, Hittite control over the vassal states was becoming ever more shaky, particularly with the consolidation of Ahhiyawan influence in the region. The ability of men like Piyamaradu to raid Hittite territory and escape with impunity, even when a Hittite army had been dispatched to the region under the personal command of the Hittite king, merely served to underline the Hittites’ inability to guarantee the security of their western territories. It was a problem which Tudhaliya needed to address, as a matter of urgency. To the south-east, peaceful relations with Egypt had provided a strong measure of stability within the Syrian region. Even so, Tudhaliya did not entirely dismiss the possibility of further conflict with the pharaoh. But Assyria was cause for the greatest concern. The tensions in the south-eastern frontier region caused by an increasingly ambitious and aggressive Assyrian kingdom, were soon to take a dangerous new turn.

Closer to home, the people of Lalanda in the Lower Land, ‘notorious troublemakers’, broke out in rebellion. Tudhaliya wrote to his mother Puduhepa about the situation, and also expressed deep concern that the uprising might spread throughout the Lower Land. This was an ominous symptom of the perceived weakening of Hittite authority in regions where there had been relative peace and stability for many years.

Within the homeland itself, Tudhaliya had grave fears for his personal safety. No-one could be trusted, not even close members of his own family. We learn of a conspiracy plotted against him, probably early in
his reign, by his brother or half-brother Heshni, another of the sons of Hattusili III.\textsuperscript{28} Joined by a group of high-ranking dignitaries of the land, Heshni planned to assassinate Tudhaliya and a number of his most loyal supporters during a royal visit to the city of Hattina (in the region of Nerik). Should the first assassination attempt upon the king fail, a second was to be made, using poison. Fortunately for Tudhaliya the conspiracy was discovered before it could be put into effect. Heshni was arrested, and during the course of his trial, all details of the conspiracy came to light, including the names of his fellow-conspirators.\textsuperscript{29} Whatever the motive behind the plot—and it may well have been sparked off by a rival bid for the throne—\textsuperscript{30} it left its intended victim in no doubt that his life was constantly at risk, even within the confines of his innermost court circles. This is clearly indicated in a set of instructions which Tudhaliya issued to his dignitaries and high officials, demanding their unconditional loyalty:

> My Sun has many brothers and there are many sons of his father. The Land of Hatti is full of the royal line: in Hatti the descendants of Suppiluliuma, the descendants of Mursili, the descendants of Muwattali, the descendants of Hattusili are numerous. With regard to kingship, you must acknowledge no other person (but me, Tudhaliya), and protect only the grandson and great grandson and descendants of Tudhaliya. And if at any time(?) evil is done to My Sun—(for) My Sun has many brothers—and someone approaches another person and speaks thus: ‘Whomever we select for ourselves need not even be a son of our lord!’—these words must not be (permitted)! With regard to kingship, you must protect only My Sun and the descendants of My Sun. You must approach no other person. \textit{(KUB xxvi 1 (CTH 255.2) i 9–29)}\textsuperscript{31}

These are the words of a king who recognized that his throne was far from secure, and that the greatest danger to it came from possible rival claimants within his own family.\textsuperscript{32}

In another text, a treaty or protocol in which the king calls upon the loyalty and support of an (unnamed) ally, the risks he faced of being opposed or abandoned by his subjects are even more dramatically highlighted:

> If the king is preoccupied because not a single palace official is left, and nobody is left to yoke the horses (to the king’s chariot), and he has not even one house where to enter: in such a situation you must show even more support for your king . . . Likewise if the situation becomes so serious for the king that the...
chariot-driver jumps down from the chariot, that the chamber-valet flees from the chamber, that not even a dog is left, and I do not even find an arrow to shoot against the enemy, your support for your king must be all the greater. \( (KBo\ IV\ 14\ ('CTH\ 123)\ iii\ 42–9,\ after\ Liverani\ (2001: 131))^{33} \)

Some years later, in the treaty which he drew up with Shaushgamuwa,\(^{34}\) son and successor of Benteshina on the throne of Amurru, Tudhaliya still showed great concern about his personal security and the security of his throne:

Because however, I made you, Shaushgamuwa, my brother-in-law, so protect My Sun in his kingship. Thereafter protect also the sons and grandsons and descendants of My Sun in the kingship. Those however who are legitimate brothers of My Sun and those who are sons of ēsertu wives of the father of My Sun, all those who are of royal descent including those who are second-rank sons—desire none of them for kingship. Do not act like Masturi! \( (Tudhaliya:\ Shaushgamuwa\ Treaty,\ ii\ 8–15)^{35} \)

This last command reflects a deep and probably long-held concern by Tudhaliya:

This Masturi, who was king of the Seha River Land—Muwattalli took him, made him his brother-in-law by giving him his sister in marriage, and installed him as king in the Seha River Land. But when Muwattalli became a god, his son Urhi-Teshub became king. But my father (i.e. Hattusili) took the kingship away from Urhi-Teshub. Masturi, however, joined the plot, and he whom Muwattalli had made his brother-in-law, did not protect the latter’s son Urhi-Teshub but rather sided with my father (saying) ‘Should I protect a second-rank son?’ Would you ever act like Masturi? \( (Tudhaliya:\ Shaushgamuwa\ Treaty,\ ii\ 16–30,\ after\ Güterbock\ (1983b:\ 29–30))^{36} \)

Comment has been made about this surprising display of frankness from Tudhaliya.\(^{36}\) Indeed his criticism of Masturi may seem somewhat hypocritical. After all, Hattusili took considerable pains to justify his seizure of power from Urhi-Teshub and the establishment of the succession in his own family line. Masturi had apparently provided him with welcome support for his action, by refusing support for the ‘second-rank son’ Urhi-Teshub. Now, apparently, he was being reproached for this.

But the legitimacy of Urhi-Teshub’s claim to the throne was not an issue in the conflict between him and his uncle. Hattusili had never raised any doubt about his nephew’s eligibility to succeed his father, and
had openly endorsed and supported his accession. The justification for his removal from the throne was the alleged injustice of his actions, particularly towards his uncle, and more generally his alleged unfitness to retain royal power. Thus the reason stated by Masturi for his opposition to Urhi-Teshub was quite spurious. What was most alarming was that a vassal ruler should have seen fit to decide for himself whether or not he would support a particular successor to the Hittite throne. This was in breach of the standard treaty regulations whereby a vassal ruler was bound to give allegiance to his overlord’s duly appointed heir. Urhi-Teshub clearly fulfilled that criterion. 37

Tudhaliya sought to make it absolutely clear to Shaushgamuwa that he was bound by the terms of the treaty to maintain allegiance to the king and his descendants, and to them only. Within the context of his concern about so many potential claimants upon the throne from within his own family, his admonition to Shaushgamuwa had particular significance. 38

Favours Bestowed on Family Members

Tudhaliya did take a number of positive steps in an effort to ensure unity within his extended family and to gain support from its disaffected members. The reinstatement of his brother Nerikkaili as tuhkanti may have been one of these steps. There are indications that he saw his brother as a threat to his position, 39 and perhaps tried to counter this by continuing to involve Nerikkaili at a high level in the affairs of the kingdom. Favours were also bestowed on other branches of the royal family. Thus a decree which Tudhaliya issued probably early in his reign in association with his mother Puduhepa was designed to ensure that the descendants of Shahurunuwa, son of Sharri-Kushuh and his successor as viceroy at Carchemish, received fair and adequate land apportionments from the viceroy’s substantial estate. 40 And even before his accession, Tudhaliya apparently sought to make his peace with the descendants of Muwattalli, sons of Urhi-Teshub. In an oracle enquiry text dating to this period Tudhaliya considered the question of territorial compensation for Urhi-Teshub’s sons. 41

Such actions were no doubt intended as goodwill gestures designed to win extended family support for the new king, or at least acceptance of his kingship. But Tudhaliya probably relied most on Kurunta as his
greatest source of support. This second son of Muwattalli had been one of the few members of his family who had already declared his unconditional loyalty to Tudhaliya. But just to make sure of his loyalty, Tudhaliya probably lost no time after his accession in concluding a treaty with him, as recorded on the famous bronze tablet, and bestowing further concessions and favours upon him. These went significantly beyond the concessions already made in earlier treaties which his father concluded with Kurunta. Additional territories not included in previous agreements were given to Kurunta. He was granted freedom of choice in the matter of his successor in Tarhuntassa. The taxes and corvées imposed upon his kingdom were further reduced. Most importantly, Tudhaliya formally acknowledged his status as a king equivalent to the Syrian viceroys and second only to the Great King in Hattusa.

It was thus with great concern that Tudhaliya received news that his cousin had suddenly been stricken with illness, which was sufficiently serious and prolonged to warrant an urgent request for Egyptian medical expertise. He received the following advice from the pharaoh:

See, I have now dispatched the scribe and doctor Pariamahu. He has been sent to prepare medicines for Kurunta, the king of the Land of Tarhuntassa, and he will allocate all, all medicines as you have written. As soon as he comes to you, place Kurunta, the king of the Land of Tarhuntassa, in his charge so that he may prepare medicines for him. And dispatch these two doctors, who are there with Kurunta and let them go to Egypt. As soon as the scribe and doctor Pariamahu reaches him, on that day these two doctors must terminate their activity. See, I have understood what you have said. By this time the scribe and doctor Pariamahu is on his way, and he is to share all types of medicines as you have written. (KUB III 67 (CTH 163.3) (= ÅHK 1 no. 71) obv. 12’, rev. 1–12)

Kurunta obviously recovered, thanks to Egyptian medical science. Tudhaliya may subsequently have had cause to regret the skills of the Egyptian doctors! But in the mean time, after taking what steps he could to consolidate his hold upon the throne, the king had pressing matters to attend to in other parts of his kingdom.

Vale Masturi

In the west, Tudhaliya faced a rapidly deteriorating situation. His father’s campaign recorded in the Tawagalawa letter had almost certainly proved an embarrassing failure. Indeed it probably strengthened
the hands of those who had already seriously undermined Hittite influence in the region and were now ready to exploit any opportunity for destabilizing it further. The Lukka people again figured prominently. From a hieroglyphic inscription found in 1971 at Yalburt to the north-west of Konya, we learn of military operations conducted by Tudhaliya against the Lukka Lands and Wiyanawanda. Lukka also figures in another text of Tudhaliya’s reign as enemy territory along with the country of Azzi and the Kaska lands.

There can be little doubt that one of the key factors in the problems faced by the Hittites in the west was Ahhiyawa. Hattusili had appealed to the Ahhiyawan king for his co-operation in maintaining peace and stability in western Anatolia. Whatever his response, it is most unlikely that it led to any reduction in Ahhiyawan enterprise in the region. On the contrary, in Tudhaliya’s reign Ahhiyawa continued to support insurrectionist activity in the Hittites’ western states. This emerges from a text which refers to offences committed against the regime in Hattusa by the Seha River Land:

Thus speaks Tabarna Tudhaliya(?), the Great King: ‘The Seha River Land transgressed again for a second time(?). They said(?): “In the past(?) the great(?)-grandfather of My Sun did not conquer us by force of arms; and when the grandfather of My Sun conquered the countries of Arzawa, he did not conquer us by force of arms. He would have conquered us, but we erased(??) for him the transgression.” Thereafter Tarhunaradu waged war and relied on the king of Ahhiyawa. And he took refuge on Eagle Peak (i.e. Mt. Harana). But I, the Great King, set out [and ] and raided Eagle Peak. I brought home 500 (teams of) horse and . . . troops to the Land of Hatti(?) along with Tarhunaradu together with his wives, his children, his possessions( etc.) I transported [to ] and led him to Arinna, the city of the Sun Goddess. Ever since the days of (?) Labarna fourth no Great King went to the country. I made [personal name], a descendant of Muwawalwi, king in the Seha River Land and enjoined him to deliver xxx teams of horse and xxx troops. (KUB xxiii 13 (CTH 211.4), after Güterbock (1992a: 242))

The text begins by referring to Manapa-Tarhunda’s transgressions against Tudhaliya’s grandfather Mursili II in the first years of the latter’s reign. As we have seen, Mursili was on the point of taking punitive action when Manapa-Tarhunda made an abject plea for mercy, which Mursili finally accepted after the offender’s mother made a personal appeal to him before the gates of her son’s city. Subsequently, the ageing
Manapa-Tarhunda’s increasing ineffectiveness had provoked the wrath of Mursili’s successor Muwattallili, who had replaced him on the vassal throne with his son Masturi. Henceforth the Seha River Land appears to have remained loyal to its Hittite overlords until the reign of Tudhaliya.

But some time after Tudhaliya’s treaty with Kurunta there was a fresh outbreak of rebellion in the Seha River Land. It was led by a man called Tarhunaradu who may have unseated Masturi, or seized power in the vassal kingdom after his death. Masturi was still alive at the time of Tudhaliya’s accession, since he was one of the signatories of the treaty with Kurunta. But by then he was an old man. He had been appointed to the vassal throne of the Seha River Land some forty years earlier by Muwattallili, and was probably already a man of mature years at the time of his appointment.\(^{51}\) He was the husband of Hattusili’s sister Massannahuzi. We recall that the couple had been unable to produce an heir for the vassal throne. Understandably this had caused much concern in Hattusa, for the Seha River Land was one of the most important, and hitherto one of the most stable kingdoms in the west. Its stability might be seriously endangered if there were no suitable successor to Masturi.

The Hittites’ worst fears were realized. Masturi’s reign ended with a rebellion, and the vassal throne was seized by the upstart Tarhunaradu. Otherwise unknown to us, Tarhunaradu may have had no direct family connections with the previous rulers. What he did have, however, was the backing and perhaps the direct assistance of the king of Ahhiyawa.\(^{52}\) With this he led the vassal kingdom in rebellion against Hatti. Tudhaliya lost no time in responding. If he was to maintain any authority at all in the west, retention of the Seha River Land was vital. The rebellion was crushed, and Tarhunaradu and his family were captured and transported to Hatti, to the city of the Sun Goddess of Arinna, along with many prisoners and 500 teams of horse. Tudhaliya was also quick to restore the vassal throne to the family of the previous rulers, by placing upon it a ‘descendant of Muwawalwi’ who was the father of Manapa-Tarhunda.\(^{53}\)

His success in dealing with the rebellion in the Seha River Land no doubt gave a significant boost to Hittite authority in the west. But the political situation in the western vassal states would remain volatile while Ahhiyawa maintained an active presence and interest in the region. It was clear that in spite of Hattusili’s appeals, the Ahhiyawan king was still giving support, and probably active encouragement, to
rebels and dissidents who set themselves in opposition to the regime in Hattusa. And Milawata continued to serve as the base from which this support was being provided. This was a problem which now had to be resolved once and for all. Tudhaliya set himself the task of doing it.

The ‘Milawata Letter’

One of our important sources of information on political developments in western Anatolia during Tudhaliya’s reign is a document commonly called the Milawata letter. Originally only the left-hand side of the tablet on which it was inscribed had come to light—enough to tell us that in its complete form it contained important historical information, but too little to be of use for the purpose of detailed historical analysis. Then in 1981 Professor Harry Hoffner of the Oriental Institute, University of Chicago, discovered that a fragment in the Hittite tablet collection in Berlin fitted precisely along one of the broken edges of the document.

Once the join was made, it was possible to start correlating the incomplete scraps of information, and to provide a context for the personal and place names referred to in the letter. As a result of these correlations, the combined fragments have given us valuable information about the history of western Anatolia towards the end of the Late Bronze Age. We now have the name of a hitherto unknown king of the region, and information about a new administrative arrangement in western Anatolia in the last decades of the Hittite kingdom—an arrangement for which we have no precedent in Hittite history.

Neither the author of the letter nor the addressee is identified in the surviving portions of the text. There is little doubt that the former was Tudhaliya, but we have no clear idea who the recipient of his letter was, beyond the fact that he was a ruler of western Anatolia. Several suggestions have been made, the most recent by Professor Hawkins who has argued that he is to be identified with Tarkasnawa, now identified as the subject of the Karabel inscription and relief, and the occupant of the throne of Mira during the latter years of Tudhaliya’s reign (see below).

Of particular interest is the information which the text-join provides about a king of Wilusa called Walmu, and the events in which he was caught up. (We recall that Wilusa was one of the Hittites’ western vassal states.) The following extract from the letter demonstrates how
the text-join has advanced our knowledge of these events. The roman type indicates the text contained in the first identified fragment of the letter, the italicized type the additional material provided by the fragment discovered in Berlin:

*But Kuwalanaziti* kept the wooden tablets which [I/they(?) made] for Walmu. Now behold he has brought them to you, my son. Examine them! Now, my son, as long as you look after the welfare of My Sun, I, My Sun, will trust your good will. Now, my son, send Walmu to me, and I will install him as king again in Wilusa. And just as previously he was the king of Wilusa, now let him be so again! (*KUB xix 55 + KUB xlviii 90, rev. 38’–42’, after Hoffner (1982: 131))*

Even with the text-join, we are still unable to reconstruct fully the events to which the letter refers, and the following must be regarded as no more than a tentative attempt to do so.

It seems that the addressee of the letter had collaborated with the Hittite king in a successful attack on the land of Milawata, and had now been established as the land’s immediate overlord following a redefinition of its boundaries. The letter’s fragmentary remains do not indicate the circumstances which led to the attack, or who precisely the enemy was, though we learn from several passages of the hostility of the addressee’s father towards the Hittite king and his refusal to hand over to him hostages which he had taken from two cities in the region, Utima and Atriya.

During this period, there had been further trouble in the north, in the kingdom of Wilusa. Its king Walmu had been deposed, and had fled his country. He was now in the custody of the addressee of the Milawata letter. From the fact that Tudhaliya wanted him restored to his throne, it seems clear that he had remained loyal to his Hittite allegiance, and may indeed have been deposed for this reason. Now with Milawata back in the Hittite camp, Tudhaliya continued to reassert his authority in the west. One of his first objectives was to put Walmu back on Wilusa’s throne. He asked the new overlord of Milawata to deliver Walmu to him as the first step towards his restoration, and had sent an envoy Kuwalanaziti with documents confirming the legitimacy of Walmu’s claim to the throne.

Tudhaliya addressed his correspondent as ‘my son’, an almost certain indication that he was joined to the Hittite royal family by a marriage alliance, and had perhaps been adopted as His Majesty’s son. But his
status was clearly more exalted than that of a standard vassal ruler or subject ally, and he appears to have exercised a role as regional overlord in the west. The Wilusan king Walmu was apparently answerable to him as well as to Tudhaliya, who states in his letter: ‘As Walmu was previously our kulawanis vassal, so let him (again) be a kulawanis vassal!’ This suggests a new power-sharing arrangement in the west, with a local ruler being granted direct authority over other vassal kingdoms in the region.

Such an arrangement would have been a distinct divergence from previous Hittite policy which gave no local ruler precedence over any other, and insisted that each deal directly with and be answerable exclusively to the Hittite king. But times had changed. Hattusili’s western campaign had demonstrated how difficult it was to maintain a hold over Hittite subject territories in the region. Tudhaliya had no wish for a repetition of his father’s humiliating experiences in the west. By conceding more extensive authority to a local ruler he might succeed in achieving greater and longer lasting stability than his father had done, keeping the region within the Hittite sphere of influence but with minimal Hittite involvement. There were, besides, pressing matters to attend to in other parts of his kingdom, particularly in the south-east. These required a substantial commitment of his military resources, and he could ill afford to deplete these by redeploying part of them for further campaigns in the west.

We have noted the suggestion that Tarkasnawa, king of Mira, was the addressee of the Milawata letter. Mira was at this time the largest and most powerful of the western Anatolian states, and Tudhaliya might well have considered it appropriate to confer upon its ruler regional overlord status, granting him immediate authority over Wilusa, and probably also over Milawata and other territories in the region. Even so, Tudhaliya took care not only to stress to Tarkasnawa, if that is who his addressee was, the need to protect his own territory but also to warn him against attempting to extend the boundaries of his kingdom. There is more than one hint in the letter that Tudhaliya did not fully trust his correspondent. He clearly had no intention of abandoning Hittite interests in the west, and would doubtless have been prepared to take the field again in this region if he believed that these interests were in serious jeopardy.
The End of Ahhiyawan Involvement in the Near East?

What impact did the new developments in western Anatolia have on Ahhiyawan enterprise in the region? With the establishment of a pro-Hittite regime in Milawata, Ahhiyawan political and commercial activities must have been seriously curtailed, if not altogether terminated. The reversion of Milawata to Hittite overlordship would have deprived the Ahhiyawan king of his most important base on the Anatolian mainland—the base which the Hittites had conceded to Ahhiyawa several generations earlier, and from which Ahhiyawan kings had extended their influence either directly or through local agents into Hittite vassal territory. They had succeeded in doing so without provoking a major conflict with Hatti. Relations between Hatti and Ahhiyawa had remained cool, but relatively peaceful. That was now at an end. The Ahhiyawan king had lost his control over Milawata, and Tudhaliya now sought to end any further involvement by Ahhiyawa in the political and commercial activities of the Near East.

In the surviving draft of the treaty which Tudhaliya drew up with Shaushgamuwa, ruler of the Syrian state of Amurru, Tudhaliya placed a ban on traffic between Ahhiyawa and Assyria (with whom Hatti was then at war; see below) via the harbours of Amurru. In this draft, the name of the king of Ahhiyawa was included in, and then erased from, the list of kings whom Tudhaliya considered to be of equal rank with himself:

And the kings who (are) of equal rank with me, the king of Egypt, the king of Karadunia (= Kassite Babylonia), the king of Assyria, the king of Ahhiyawa, if the king of Egypt is a friend of My Sun, let him also be a friend to you, if he is an enemy of My Sun, let him be your enemy also . . . (Tudhaliya: Shaushgamuwa Treaty, iv 1–7)

Why was the Ahhiyawan king removed from the list? The erasure of his name might well indicate that he ‘was not, and could not be thought to be, a mighty sovereign of the same rank as that of the other kings mentioned’. But if this were so, why was his name put there in the first place? Was it simply a scribal error? Or had there been a sudden reversal in the fortunes of Ahhiyawa, of sufficient moment to warrant the removal of its king’s name from the treaty while it was actually being drawn up? Some years earlier Hattusili III had explicitly acknowledged
the Ahhiyawan king as his equal. But at that time the latter was still overlord of a part of western Anatolia.

It is possible that the erasure was associated with the loss of Ahhiyawan control over Milawata. With it once more under Hittite, or pro-Hittite, control, and in the absence of any other known Ahhiyawan base for political and military activity in Anatolia, the Ahhiyawan king could no longer claim to exercise any significant influence on the Anatolian mainland. In his treaty with Shaushgamuwa, Tudhaliya was concerned only with the Great Kings who controlled territories within the regions of the Near East. These were the kings whom he regarded as his equals, and with whom he had to deal, either as allies or as enemies. Once excluded from these regions, the Ahhiyawan king was no longer considered a Great King, irrespective of what power he may have continued to exercise elsewhere.

Reasonably confident that the Ahhiyawan problem had now been finally resolved, and with the situation in western Anatolia now under control, at least for the time being, Tudhaliya could turn his attention to the south-east. Here the situation was cause for much greater concern. In his treaty with Shaushgamuwa, Tudhaliya envisaged the possibility of hostilities with three other major powers in the region—Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria. Of these Assyria posed the most serious and most immediate threat. The support of Amurru might well be needed for the defence of Hittite subject territories in Syria against an attack from across the Euphrates. Assyria had long had ambitions to expand its territory westwards to the Mediterranean coast.

**A Problematical Marriage Alliance**

Hattusili had already laid the foundations for an ongoing close alliance between the royal houses of Hatti and Amurru. He had been instrumental in restoring Benteshina to the vassal throne, and had then consolidated Benteshina’s links to him by arranging a double marriage between his and his vassal’s families (see Chs. 10 and 11). Benteshina had remained true to his Hittite allegiance until his death, probably early in Tudhaliya’s reign. The succession now passed to his son Shaushgamuwa, whose appointment was confirmed by Tudhaliya. The links between the two royal houses were further strengthened by the marriage of Tudhaliya’s sister to the new Amurrite king.
As we have noted, diplomatic marriages were a long-established means of consolidating political alliances between kingdoms. But a marriage which turned sour could have serious political repercussions. Such proved to the case with a marriage link contracted between the royal families of Ugarit and Amurru.

In order to build further on the peaceful relations between Ugarit and Amurru which had lasted more than a century, a daughter of Benteshina (unnamed in the texts) and his Hittite queen Gassulawiya was married to the young king Ammistamru II, who had succeeded his father Niqmepa on the throne of Ugarit. Unfortunately the royal couple did not live happily ever after. The princess apparently committed a serious offence against her husband, perhaps adultery. A divorce followed:

Before My Sun Tudhaliya, Great King, King of Hatti: Ammistamru, king of Ugarit had taken as his wife the daughter of Benteshina, king of Amurru. With regard to Ammistamru, she has only sought to do him harm. (Therefore) Ammistamru, king of Ugarit, has repudiated the daughter of Benteshina for all time. (RS 17.159 (PRU IV, 126) 1–10)

The Amurrite princess returned in disgrace to her homeland. In accordance with the standard divorce provisions, all possessions she had acquired since her marriage would remain in Ugarit. But she took her original dowry home with her:

The daughter of Benteshina is to take back all that she has brought to the house of Ammistamru, and is to leave the house of Ammistamru. If Ammistamru holds back anything, the sons of Amurru should testify to this on oath, and Ammistamru is to reimburse them. (RS 17.159, 12–21)

But this was not the end of the matter. Brooding further over his wife’s offence, Ammistamru refused to accept that justice had been done. He demanded that the princess be extradited to Ugarit, for punishment, and was prepared to use force to back up his demand.

Initially it seems that Shaushgamuwa resisted any attempts to have his sister extradited, knowing that she faced execution. The affair looked like escalating into a crisis of major proportions. Hittite intervention became imperative. The last thing Tudhaliya could have wanted was a major conflict between two of his loyal vassals. There were obvious dangers in taking the side of one vassal against the other in the dispute.
Yet clearly Ammistamru was the aggrieved party—and he may well have been acting under pressure from his own advisers, particularly if his position on the throne was not yet fully secure. He had been involved in an earlier dispute, perhaps over the succession, with his brothers Hishmi-Sharrumma and Ir-Sharrumma. At the instigation of the queen mother Ahat-milku, who had apparently acted for a short time as regent following her husband Niqmepa’s death, the brothers had been exiled from Ugarit. This action had Tudhaliya’s support. But now, the Amurrite princess’ conduct had been a serious humiliation to the king, and could well have undermined his standing in the eyes of his subjects, and his enemies, if he failed to insist on exemplary vengeance.

Protracted negotiations followed, involving both Tudhaliya and Ini-Teshub, the current viceroy at Carchemish with overall responsibility for Syrian affairs. Considerable pressure was brought to bear on Shaushgamuwa by his Hittite overlords:

If Shaushgamuwa, son of Benteshina, king of Amurru, does violence to Ammistamru, son of Niqmepa, king of Ugarit, or does violence to the boats or the soldiers who go to retrieve the daughter of the Great Lady, Heaven and the Earth will know it . . . (A list of deities follows.) May these gods do him violence, may they make him disappear from the house of his father and from the country of his father, and from the throne of his fathers! (RS 18.06 + 17.365 (PRU IV, 137–8) 1’–15’)

Shaushgamuwa was left with no option but to send his sister back to Ugarit, and to certain death. But to soften the blow for the grieving brother, an agreement was drawn up which specified compensation of 1,400 shekels of gold to be paid to him by the aggrieved king of Ugarit. The agreement stipulated that this amount was non-negotiable, thus pre-empting any demand Shaushgamuwa might have made for more money to help soothe his grief.

One final footnote to this episode relates to Utri-Sharrumma, the son of the divorced couple. Tudhaliya gave him the option of remaining behind in Ugarit where he would inherit the throne from his father, or returning to Amurru with his mother. He apparently chose the latter option, for Ammistamru was succeeded on the throne by Ibiranu, his son by another wife.
The Assyrian Menace Resurfaces

The name of Ini-Teshub, who was involved in the divorce proceedings above, occurs several times in the context of Syrian affairs. Son of Shahurunuwa and grandson of Sharri-Kushuh,\footnote{87} he was the cousin of Tudhaliya, and the third viceroy of Carchemish, his appointment dating from the reign of Hattusili III.\footnote{88} The role which he played in Syria, particularly in arbitrating on judicial disputes between the local kingdoms, was vital to the maintenance of regional stability, and enabled Tudhaliya to devote his attention to maintaining, as best he could, peace and stability elsewhere in his kingdom. We learn, for example, of a dispute over compensation demanded by the king of Tarhuntassa for the murder of one of his subjects while trading in Ugarit. The case was brought to Ini-Teshub who resolved it with an award of 180 shekels of silver to the aggrieved party.\footnote{89} He was also directly responsible for the administration of the city of Emar, where his authority is attested by seal impressions. His communications with Hattusa provided valuable information on local affairs, particularly on relations between the vassal kingdoms.

Ini-Teshub must also have kept his king well informed of developments in the Euphrates region. This was of critical importance to the security of Hittite territory in Syria in view of the increasing menace posed by Assyria. Hattusili may have tried to maintain good relations with Shalmaneser until the very end of his reign. But Tudhaliya showed himself less enthusiastic about doing so, and rather more amenable to supporting the continuing resistance to Assyria by the Hanigalbatean king Shattuara II. Yet a cloud of suspicion hung over Shattuara. In spite of his declared loyalty to Hatti, he was apparently accused of dealing with Assyria in a way that compromised this loyalty. He wrote to Tudhaliya in response to accusations made against him by two of Tudhaliya’s most eminent subject rulers in the region—Halpa-ziti, king of Aleppo, and Ehli-Sharrumma, king of Isuwa.\footnote{90} Quite possibly their accusations contained some element of truth, and Shattuara seems to have gone some way towards admitting this. The position he found himself in was an unenviable one, sandwiched as he was between two Great Kingdoms on the brink of all-out war. In defending himself to Tudhaliya, he likened his situation ‘to that of a man pressed by two
creditors, who must yield to the one presenting the most immediate challenge’. 91

The situation was abruptly and violently resolved when Shalmaneser made a final concerted attack upon the rebel kingdom. He claimed a crushing and decisive victory over it, capturing and sacking numerous cities and settlements and taking many thousands of prisoners. What military support Tudhaliya may have provided to Shattuara was contemptuously and brutally disposed of:

When, by command of the great gods and with the exalted strength of Ashur, My Lord, I marched to the Land of Hanigalbat, I opened up the most difficult of paths and passes. Shattuara, king of the Land of Hanigalbat, with the aid of the armies of the Hittites 92 and Ahlamu, captured the passes and watering-places in my path. When my army was thirsty and fatigued, their army made a fierce attack in strength. But I struck back and brought about their defeat. I slaughtered countless numbers of their extensive army. As for Shattuara, I chased him westward at arrow-point. I butchered their hordes, but 14,400 of them which remained alive I blinded and carried off. I conquered nine of his fortified cult centres (as well as) the city from which he ruled and I turned 180 of his cities into ruin-hills. I slaughtered like sheep the armies of the Hittites and Ahlamu, his allies. (Assyrian royal inscription, trans. Grayson (1972: 82 §530))

The reliability of this account is open to question on a number of matters of detail, 93 but there is little doubt that Shalmaneser was responsible for dealing the final death blow to the kingdom of Hanigalbat. 94 Assyrian power was now firmly established up to the east bank of the Euphrates. It seemed but a matter of time before the Hittites would be faced with a major Assyrian onslaught west of the river.

But then came news of Shalmaneser’s death, and his replacement on the Assyrian throne by his young son Tukulti-Ninurta (c.1233). 95 Tudhaliya was no doubt relieved and delighted by the news. Perhaps all-out conflict with Assyria might yet be avoided. Tudhaliya wrote to the new king in very conciliatory terms, congratulating him on his accession, praising the exploits of his father Shalmaneser, urging him to protect the frontiers established by his father (and thus acknowledging that Hanigalbat was now part of Assyrian territory), offering assistance in the event of rebellion by any of his subjects, and making explicit offers of friendship. 96
Initially the new Assyrian king made a pretence of responding positively to these overtures, acknowledging the former enmity between Tudhaliya and his father, but expressing his own friendship with the Hittite king.\textsuperscript{97} The letter he wrote to Tudhaliya was specifically in response to a complaint from the addressee about repeated Assyrian raids on Hittite border territory. Tukulti-Ninurta firmly denied that the complaint had any substance.

But Tudhaliya remained unconvinced. With good reason. Even while Tukulti-Ninurta went through the motions of establishing and maintaining amicable relations with his Hittite counterpart, he was preparing for a major offensive against the Hurrian states constituting the land of Subari, between the Tur 'Abdin and the upper Tigris. The states in question were Paphi (Assyrian Papanhi), Katmuhi, Buse, Mumme, Alzi, (A)madani, Nihani, Alaya, Tepurzi, and Purukuzzi.\textsuperscript{98} Tudhaliya reacted with alarm when he received word of the planned offensive. With the subjugation of the Subari lands, Tukulti-Ninurta would thereby have gained control over the most important routes leading across the Euphrates into Anatolia, as well as the strategic copper mines at Ergani Maden.\textsuperscript{99} Amidst his continuing protestations of friendship for the Assyrian king, Tudhaliya warned the Assyrian chancellor Bâbu-ahu-iddina of the dangers faced by an Assyrian army in the impenetrable mountains of the land of Paphi/Papanhi.\textsuperscript{100} Tukulti-Ninurta could have had no doubt about the real motive behind the warning, and contemptuously disregarded it. Delaying only to quell some local rebellions, he led his forces northwards against the Subari lands.

With attempts at diplomatic settlement now clearly at an end, Tudhaliya made overt preparations for the inevitable confrontation with Assyria. He reinstated Ugarit’s obligation to provide him with military aid when called upon to do so,\textsuperscript{101} after previously cancelling this obligation in exchange for a payment of 50 minas of gold.\textsuperscript{102} It was perhaps in this context that he drew up his treaty with the Amurrite king Shaushgamuwa.\textsuperscript{103} The instructions to Shaushgamuwa regarding Assyria were very clear. The Assyrian king was now the Hittite king’s declared enemy:

As the king of Assyria is the enemy of My Sun, so must he also be your enemy. No merchant of yours is to go to the Land of Assyria, and you must allow no merchant of Assyria to enter your land or pass through your land. If, however,
an Assyrian merchant comes to your land, seize him and send him to My Sun. Let this be your obligation under divine oath! And because I, My Sun, am at war with the king of Assyria, when I call up troops and chariotry you must do likewise. (Tudhaliya: Shaushgamuwa Treaty, iv 12–20)

The attempt to impose commercial sanctions on Assyria may have been no more effective then than similar attempts in more recent times. Ultimately the sanctions may simply have served to strengthen the Assyrians’ resolve to gain the unrestricted access which they had long sought to the ports of the Mediterranean—by force if necessary. Military confrontation was the only possible effective means of putting an end to Assyrian aggression. A prayer of Tudhaliya appealing for divine assistance against the Assyrian king, with the promise of three stelae as a thank-offering if success was granted, probably portended the forthcoming clash between the two powers.

Where and when did this clash take place?

Following his conquest of the Land of Subari, Tukulti-Ninurta might well have turned westwards, to the lands across the Euphrates. But his first objective was the Nairi lands. These lay beyond the northern frontier he had now established and were likely to pose a continuing threat to the security of this frontier. Nairi can almost certainly be equated with Nihriya known from Mesopotamian, Hittite, and Urartean sources. It probably lay in the region north or north-east of modern Diyarbakır. A campaign against it presented formidable problems, both because of the region’s mountainous terrain, and the likely fierce resistance the Assyrians would encounter from the local tribes and the forty kings who ruled over them.

This may have been the point at which Tudhaliya entered the fray. A letter written by Tukulti-Ninurta to the king of Ugarit provides evidence of the conflict. The letter reports that Hittite troops had fortified Nihriya. Tukulti-Ninurta presented Tudhaliya with an ultimatum, demanding the withdrawal of his troops:

I sent this message to the king of Hatti: ‘Nihriya is at war with me. Why are your troops in Nihriya? Legally you are at peace with me, not at war. Why then have your troops fortified Nihriya? I am going to lay siege to Nihriya. Send a message ordering your troops’ withdrawal from Nihriya.’ (RS 34.165, rev. 6–13)

In spite of this peremptory demand, Tukulti-Ninurta still sought to maintain peace with Hatti, clearly not wishing to become embroiled in
a conflict with the Hittite king at the same time as he was at war with the kings of Nairi. Tudhaliya refused to withdraw his troops, but Tukulti-Ninurta persisted with his attempts at peace:

When I heard these words (i.e. Tudhaliya’s refusal to withdraw his troops from Nihriya), I had a treaty tablet written, and had it conveyed to him (with these words): ‘According to your custom, touch(?) this tablet before the Sun.’ He refused to touch(?) the tablet before the Sun. Then I withdrew my troops from Nihriya, and installed them . . . ? at Surra . . . (RS 34.165, rev. 16–22, based on French trans. by Lackenbacher (1982: 148))

Tudhaliya ordered his troops to advance against the Assyrian forces. There could be no better time, he must have reasoned, to try to humble the Assyrian king than when the latter was facing the formidable obstacles which the conquest of Nairi presented. But it was a major gamble. While he might have expected some support from the beleaguered Nairi kings, his troops were campaigning far from their base, close to the territories controlled by their powerful opponent and almost certainly without the support of auxiliary forces from the Syrian vassal states.

The Hittite and Assyrian armies clashed somewhere between Nihriya and the Assyrian base at Surra. Tukulti-Ninurta hastily prepared for battle when a fugitive brought him news that the Hittites were advancing. He gave an account of the battle and its outcome to the king of Ugarit:

When I heard the words of the fugitive, I called my camp herald (and said to him): ‘Put on your cuirasses and mount your chariots. The king of Hatti arrives in battle order.’ I harnessed [ ] my chariot and made a charge, [shouting(?) ‘the king(?) of Ha]tti comes ready to do battle!’ . . . Certainly I won a great victory. (RS 34.165, rev. 29–37, based on French trans. by Lackenbacher (1982: 148))

Tukulti-Ninurta followed up this victory by completing his conquest of the Nairi lands, and imposing his sovereignty upon the forty local kings who had resisted him. Flushed with success and with his Hittite opponent at least temporarily humbled, he might well have set his sights on the conquest of Hittite territory west of the Euphrates. Indeed his letter to the king of Ugarit could have been intended to win this important Syrian vassal away from his Hittite allegiance in preparation for a campaign in the region. Two later inscriptions from his reign do in
fact seem to indicate a major offensive against the Hittites’ Syrian possessions. They refer to the capture of 28,800 (eight šar) Hittites from across the Euphrates. But the figures may be greatly exaggerated, and the whole episode indicative of no more than a minor border clash.

Nevertheless, Tudhaliya had been severely humiliated by the Assyrian. In the aftermath of his defeat at Nihriya, he sent an angry letter to one of his vassal rulers, almost certainly the king of Isuwa, rebuking him for his loss of nerve and failure to come to the support of his Hittite overlord:

As (the situation) turned difficult for me, you kept yourself somewhere away from me. Beside me you were not! Have I not fled from Nihriya alone? When it thus occurred that the enemy took away from me the Hurrian lands, was I not left on my own in Alatarma? (KBo iv 14 ii 7 ff, trans. Singer (1985a: 110))

Yet in the grave situation in which Tudhaliya found himself following his defeat, punitive action against his disloyal vassal would have been impractical, or at least politically unwise. He could do no more than demand his vassal’s loyalty and support when it was called upon in the future.

Much to Tudhaliya’s relief, this proved unnecessary. Tukulti-Ninurta pursued his conflict with the Hittites no further, but instead turned his attention to the conquest of Babylon. The result was the defeat and capture of the Babylonian king Kashtiliash (IV) and the total subjugation of his kingdom:

With the support of the gods Ashur, Enlil, and Shamash, the Great Gods, My Lords, and with the aid of the Goddess Ishtar, Mistress of Heaven and Underworld, (who) marches at the fore of my army, I approached Kashtiliash, king of Babylon, to do battle. I brought about the defeat of his army and felled his warriors. In the midst of that battle I captured Kashtiliash, king of the Kassites, and trod with my feet upon his lordly neck as though it were a footstool. Bound I brought him as a captive into the presence of Ashur, My Lord. Thus I became lord of Sumer and Akkad in its entirety and fixed the boundary of my land as the Lower Sea in the east. (Assyrian royal inscription, trans. Grayson (1972: 108 §715))

This marked the pinnacle of Tukulti-Ninurta’s military achievements, and it was accomplished by the end of the first decade of his reign.
It also marked the end of his military adventures into foreign lands. For the remainder of his reign he seems to have devoted his attention to the internal affairs of his kingdom, including building programmes and the founding of a new capital Kar-Tukulti-Ninurta.\footnote{115}{In hindsight it is difficult to see what lasting benefits he hoped would come from his conquest of Babylon. Babylonia offered none of the material rewards in terms of raw materials and the expansion of commercial opportunities which had been one of the prime objectives of Assyrian imperialist enterprises. Indeed the main beneficiaries of the Babylonian conquest were the Hittites, for the vast resources required to maintain control over the territories conquered by Tukulti-Ninurta effectively ended any future threat the Assyrians might have posed to Hittite territory. Moreover Tukulti-Ninurta was faced with mounting opposition within his own kingdom, perhaps partly or even largely inspired by the ruinous cost of maintaining control over Babylonia for little apparent benefit, at the expense of adequate protection of Assyrian territories elsewhere in his empire. His depleted defence forces in other regions suffered several military defeats, and for all his efforts he eventually lost control of Babylonia. Such was the legacy he left to his successor Ashur-nadin-apli when he eventually fell victim to an assassination plot (c.1197).

**A Royal Coup in Hattusa?**

In spite of the favours and concessions conferred upon Kurunta, the burning question still remained. How long would he continue to be satisfied with rewards which left him short of the main prize? Why settle for an appanage kingdom, no matter how much Tudhaliya jacked up the prestige of his appointment, if he believed that the Hittite throne was rightfully his, and he had the means to force his claim to it? Did he in fact attempt to do so?

The answer to this question may be provided by the recent discoveries of seal impressions in Hattusa bearing within the royal aedicula the inscription *Kurunta, Great King, Labarna, My Sun*,\footnote{116}{A likely implication of these inscriptions is that the Kurunta so identified became king in Hattusa.\footnote{118}{To achieve}
this, he would almost certainly have had to take the Hittite throne by force, wresting it from his cousin Tudhaliya.119

His coup would have occurred some years after Tudhaliya’s accession, perhaps in the context or aftermath of the king’s unsuccessful campaign against Assyria. Kurunta may have considered this an appropriate time to make his move and seize the capital.120 According to Professor Neve, archaeological evidence indicates the destruction of parts of Hattusa, particularly the walls and temple quarter, during Tudhaliya’s reign.121 This could have been caused, if the evidence has been correctly interpreted and dated, by armed conflict in the city between the forces of Kurunta and those loyal to Tudhaliya. But if coup there was, the usurper’s triumph was short-lived; if Tudhaliya lost his throne for a time, he succeeded in regaining it, and shortly afterwards commenced an ambitious restoration and rebuilding project in the upper city.122

Written records have yet to provide clear evidence for a coup by Kurunta.123 That is perhaps due to the increasing paucity of these records in the final decades of the kingdom. On the other hand it is possible that after Kurunta’s fall, every attempt was made to expunge all trace of his career culminating in his seizure of the Hittite throne. The unique find-spot of the bronze tablet, beneath the pavement near the Yerkapi Gate at Hattusa, might well support this. Neve has suggested that after Tudhaliya regained control of Hattusa, he took the tablet and gave it a de-sacralizing burial under the newly constructed pavement, where it remained hidden until it was unearthed in 1986.124 On the basis of Neve’s theory, the intention would have been to conceal forever all trace of Tudhaliya’s former compact with Kurunta.

In any case all theories about a violent coup in Hattusa must remain speculative until we have more direct evidence of such an event. There could well be other explanations for Kurunta’s ‘Great King’ inscriptions. It has been argued, for example, that he was not merely a self-styled ‘Great King’ (as occupant of the throne of Tarhuntassa), reluctantly tolerated by the Great King of Hatti, but that this title was entirely legitimate, or even conferred upon him by imperial authority.125

But whatever interpretation we put upon the Kurunta inscriptions, Kurunta’s ultimate fate remains a mystery. If he had rebelled against his overlord he may, like his brother Urhi-Teshub, have spent his remaining days in exile. It is hardly likely that he would have been reinstated as ruler of Tarhuntassa. Indeed a large question mark hangs over the
The subsequent relationship between Hatti and Tarhuntassa. If Muwattalli did in fact have a third son Ulmi-Teshub, then almost certainly Tudhaliya now appointed him to the kingship of Tarhuntassa in place of Kurunta, and drew up with him the treaty we have called the ‘Ulmi-Teshub treaty’ (see Ch. 11). But if Ulmi-Teshub was simply another name for Kurunta, then as yet we have no clear information on what became of the kingdom of Tarhuntassa after Kurunta. Very likely Tudhaliya lost control of it. There may well be indirect evidence, some of it relatively new evidence, that Tarhuntassa now broke from its Hittite allegiance and became openly hostile to the kingdom of Hatti.

We shall take this up in the next chapter.

The Conquest of Alasiya

The military threats facing the Hittites in almost all parts of their kingdom made it imperative for Tudhaliya to ensure that his forces were kept at full strength and in a constant state of alert, ready to be deployed at short notice to defend Hittite territory against enemy attack, wherever it occurred along the kingdom’s frontiers. With some surprise, then, we find Tudhaliya committing his forces to a campaign on the island of Alasiya.

Information about the campaign appears on a tablet from the reign of his son Suppiluliuma II. The tablet contains a cuneiform copy of two Luwian hieroglyphic inscriptions. The first, originally appearing on a statue of Tudhaliya, commemorates Tudhaliya’s conquest of Alasiya and the imposition of tribute on the land:

I seized the king of Alasiya with his wives, his children, and all the goods, including silver and gold, and all the captured people I removed and brought home to Hattusa. I enslaved the country of Alasiya, and made it tributary on the spot. (KUB xii 38 i, 3–8, after Güterbock (1967a: 77))

A list of the tribute imposed, including gold and copper, then follows.

What was the object of this campaign? What did Tudhaliya hope to gain from it—especially when it must have meant a significant redeployment of forces needed for the defence of his mainland empire? Hittite kings had certainly claimed Alasiya as a Hittite possession in the past. But their control over it can have been no more than nominal,
and obviously relied on the support of seagoing vassal states like Ugarit. Important practical considerations probably provided the chief incentive for Tudhaliya’s campaign.

A number of scholars have claimed that the Hittite world suffered a severe and prolonged famine in the last decades of the Hittite kingdom. Whether or not food shortages were as severe or prolonged as has been suggested, it does seem that Hatti became increasingly dependent on shipments of grain from abroad, probably from the reign of Hattusili III onwards. The chief sources of such grain appear to have been Egypt and Canaan, whence the grain was transported to Ugarit and from there to the port of Ura on the coast of western Cilicia (the later Classical name for the region).

During Hattusili III’s reign a trip was made to Egypt by a prince of the Land of Hatti called Heshmi/Hishmi-Sharrumma to organize a shipment of grain back to his homeland. In the past, scholars have suggested that the prince in question was Tudhaliya, and that Heshmi-Sharrumma was his birth-name. But since we now know, from the bronze tablet, that there was a prince other than Tudhaliya who was called Heshmi-Sharrumma, this latter must have been the man who went to Egypt as the Hittite king’s representative. Following Hattusili’s treaty with Ramesses, grain was probably imported from Egypt into Anatolia via the Levantine ports on a regular basis, rather than on an occasional basis in response to a particular food shortage.

Hatti may have come to rely heavily on grain importation during the last century of the kingdom. But we cannot tell whether this was due to a prolonged drought or series of droughts in the homeland, or to other factors such as substantial redeployment of Hittite manpower from agricultural to military activity. We shall have more to say about this in the next chapter. In any case, shortfalls in local grain production would have posed no serious problems as long as the Hittites could count on regular grain shipments from Egypt and the Syro-Palestinian region. But problems could arise if the grain routes came under threat from hostile forces.

This may well have a bearing on Tudhaliya’s campaign in Alasiya. Because of its abundant resources of timber and copper, as well as its strategic location in the north-east corner of the eastern Mediterranean, Alasiya had come into increasing prominence in the last century of the Bronze Age. It provided an extremely attractive prospect for
exploitation by outsiders, either through alliance or conquest. Under
the control of a native or foreign regime hostile to Hittite interests, it
had considerable potential for disrupting transhipments of grain from
Egypt and Syria to a port on the southern Anatolian coast. We have no
specific information about what the regime in Alasiya had done to
provoke the Hittite attack upon it. We can but point out that Tudhaliya
could not have tolerated a hostile Alasiya which threatened his king-
dom’s grain supplies, or else provided naval bases for other enemy forces
to do so.

These other forces might have included elements of the so-called Sea
Peoples, soon to figure prominently in Egyptian records. It is also
possible that the country of Tarhuntassa, which extended along the
Anatolian coast directly north of Alasiya, had now broken its ties with
Hatti and had become involved in anti-Hittite activity in the region. We
shall return to this in the following chapter.

Tudhaliya apparently succeeded in defeating the Alasiyan king and
establishing a pro-Hittite regime in his place. But his victory had little
long-term effect in reasserting Hittite authority in this part of the eastern
Mediterranean. Within the space of a few years enemy forces were again
active in the region, and Tudhaliya’s son Suppiluliuma was forced to
undertake a naval campaign off the coast of Alasiya, almost certainly to
protect the supply routes which were becoming increasingly vital to the
provisioning of the Hittite world.

The Achievements of Tudhaliya

The majority of our records for Tudhaliya’s reign convey the impression
of a kingdom coming under mounting pressures from both within and
beyond its boundaries, and of a king preoccupied with his attempts,
both military and diplomatic, to keep his realm intact and to hold at bay
the hostile forces which threatened to engulf it. Undoubtedly the
problems Tudhaliya faced were complex and far-reaching in their pos-
sible consequences. On the one hand he was faced with the possible
disintegration of his western vassal states, on the other with the ever-
present threat of the loss of his Syrian possessions to the warlords of
Assyria. And the military action he took against Alasiya may well
foreshadow the mounting crisis in the eastern Mediterranean associated
with the last years of the Hittite kingdom.
Closer to home, we find evidence of increasing unrest in Hittite subject territories, with a rebellion in the Lower Land probably early in Tudhaliya’s reign, and later the possible loss of the kingdom of Tarhuntassa. We also have glimpses of tensions within the Hittite royal family itself, stemming from Hattusili’s usurpation of the throne and the potential to which this gave rise for ongoing challenges by a number of contenders for the kingship from the various branches of the royal family.

Yet severe though these pressures undoubtedly were, the reign of Tudhaliya was characterized by a number of substantial achievements both at home and abroad. In the west the king seems to have accomplished considerably more than his father or even his uncle Muwattalli. He had crushed a rebellion in the Seha River Land, he had regained overlordship of the land of Milawata, in the process probably removing any future threat of Ahhiyawan interference in the region, and very likely he restored the deposed king of Wilusa to his vassal throne. The Yalburt inscription provides further evidence of successful campaigns which he undertook in the west. In the east the Syrian vassal states remained under Hittite control. And although Tudhaliya’s forces may have suffered a major military defeat at the hands of the Assyrian king Tukulti-Ninurta, no serious attempt seems to have been made by the victor to expand his kingdom westwards across the Euphrates. Indeed, although Tudhaliya took little direct part in Syrian affairs, it is clear from documents like the Shaushgamuwa treaty that he was fully committed to maintaining firm Hittite control within the region. And to the south of the Anatolian mainland, he appears to have won a significant victory against enemy forces on Alasiya which for the time being at least he restored to Hittite sovereignty.

Within Hattusa itself, Tudhaliya may have been temporarily removed from his throne by his cousin Kurunta. But if so, he soon regained it. And any damage caused by conflict within the city at this time was more than matched by substantial restoration and new building projects. Of particular importance was the development of the upper city, which included an extensive temple construction programme and covered an area which more than doubled the size of the original city. In this period the Hittite capital assumed its most impressive proportions, and could justly be regarded as one of the greatest cities of the ancient Near East.
The rock sanctuary at Yazılıkaya, one kilometre to the north-east of the capital, and probably associated with the Hittite New Year festival, provides further evidence of a florescence in Hittite material culture. The sanctuary had been in use for some considerable time, extending back before the beginning of the Hittite kingdom, but it underwent its most significant development during the reigns of Hattusili and Tudhaliya. To Tudhaliya was due the sculptural decorations and hieroglyphic inscriptions which appear on the walls of the two natural rock chambers. Tudhaliya himself is represented three times in the reliefs, once in close association with his patron deity Sharrumma. While the artistic concepts embodied in the reliefs may owe something to Egyptian influence, the depiction of the procession of Hurrian deities in the main chamber represents the culmination of a programme of religious reform initially undertaken by Hattusili and his Hurrian queen Puduhepa and completed by Tudhaliya. The sanctuary in its fully developed form, clearly representing the Hurrian pantheon as the national Hittite pantheon, is the most sophisticated surviving artistic achievement of the Hittite world.

Tudhaliya has left a number of enduring tangible monuments to his reign—more enduring, indeed, than those of the kings who reigned in what might be regarded as peak periods of Hittite power. From a number of viewpoints, it is very difficult to detect in the reign of this third-last monarch of the Hittite realm the outward signs of a kingdom in irreversible decline.
Figure 5. Tudhaliya in the embrace of the god Sharruma, Yazılıkaya
The Fall of the Kingdom and its Aftermath

On the death of Tudhaliya, the succession passed to his son Arnuwanda (III). But the latter’s death after perhaps only a year or so on the throne has left him as no more than a passing footnote in the history of the Hittite monarchy. Apart from seal impressions bearing his name,\(^1\) and a reference to him in a coronation oath to his successor, we have no further information about him in our texts. He had left no issue, and after his death the succession passed to another of Tudhaliya’s sons, Suppiluliuma, whose name was usually written Suppiluliamā.\(^2\) Two texts contain oaths of allegiance to him, probably at the time of his coronation.\(^3\) One of these indicates unrest in Hatti during his brother’s reign and problems over the succession following his death:

The inhabitants of Hatti offended against him (i.e. Arnuwanda). But I have not offended. If he had had offspring, I would not have replaced him; I would, rather, have protected his offspring. (Because) he had no offspring, I enquired about (whether there was) a pregnant wife; but there was no pregnant wife. As now Arnuwanda has left no descendants, could I have offended by passing over his descendants and making [myself another(?)] lord? \(\text{(KUB xxvi 33 (CTH 125) ii 3’–13’)}\)\(^4\)

The unrest may have been provoked by intrigues within the royal court arising from still unresolved questions over which branch of the royal family had legitimate claims to the throne.\(^5\) Indeed an oath taken by one of the scribes may imply this:

I will acknowledge only the descendants of my lord Suppiluliamā. I will not appear on the side of another man, (whether) a descendant of Suppiluliuma the Older (i.e. Suppiluliuma I), a descendant of Mursili, a descendant of Muwat-talli or of Tudhaliya. \(\text{(KUB xxvi 32+ (CTH 124) iii 10’–14’)}\)\(^6\)
Whatever its causes, unrest and disunity within the homeland could have seriously limited the new king’s ability to deal effectively with the external forces which were threatening his kingdom. His first task was to restore the kingdom’s internal political stability. The majority of surviving documents from his reign indicate his commitment to this task. He also devoted his efforts to the mortuary shrine of his father and to other religious establishments. Singer sees this as typical of a civilization in decline: ‘Rather than reflecting self-confidence and security, it is a mute plea to the gods and spirits to grant salvation where the sceptre and the sword have failed.’

The subject territories required urgent attention. Here too the king was faced with outright defiance and disobedience from his vassals, as illustrated by a letter of reprimand written by his ‘son’ Pihawalwi to Ibiranu, king of Ugarit, who had failed to provide the usual tokens of loyalty after his accession:

Thus speaks Pihawalwi, son of the king: ‘To Ibiranu, my son, say: “... Since you have assumed royal power at Ugarit, why have you not come before My Sun? And why have you not sent messengers? This has made My Sun very angry. Therefore send messengers to My Sun with all haste, and see that gifts are brought for the king along with my gifts!”’ (RS 17.247 = PRU IV, 191)

We know of no direct involvement by Suppiluliuma in Syrian affairs. These may have been left largely in the hands of others, notably the current viceroy of Carchemish, Talmi-Teshub, son of Ini-Teshub. Fragments survive of a treaty between Suppiluliuma and Talmi-Teshub, but insufficient of it remains to determine what precise responsibilities were assigned to the viceroy. Quite possibly he exercised an almost independent role in Syria.

We do know that he was responsible for supervising a divorce settlement apparently between Ehli-Nikkalu, a daughter of the Hittite king, and Ammurapi, king of Ugarit. Unfortunately, the circumstances which led to the dissolution of the marriage are not recorded. But the divorce of a Hittite princess by a local vassal ruler or a member of his family was, as far as we know, without precedent in the Hittite world. It may provide yet more evidence of the increasingly tenuous nature of the relationship between vassal and overlord in the last years of the Hittite kingdom, and the diminished respect in the vassal states for the authority of the Hittite king.
Final Campaigns in the West

On at least some occasions the flouting of royal authority or acts of outright defiance or rebellion in the subject states did meet with retaliation. This is indicated by an inscription in one of two stone chambers belonging to a cult complex discovered in Hattusa in 1988 on the city’s so-called Südburg, which lies just south of the royal acropolis. ‘Chamber 2’ is embellished with reliefs of a deity and a king called Suppiluliuma, and inscribed with a text in the hieroglyphic script. Once thought to be the king’s tomb, the structure is more likely to have been what the Hittite texts refer to as a kaskal.kur—an entrance to the Underworld (in this case a symbolic one).

Following Hawkins’ interpretation, the inscription records Suppiluliuma’s conquest and annexation of the lands of Wiyanawanda, Tamina, Masa, Lukka, and Ikuna, which all lay within or near Lukka territory in south-western Anatolia. If this interpretation is correct, then the campaigns in question would point to continuing unrest amongst the western vassal states in spite of Tudhaliya’s efforts to bring about greater stability and more lasting peace in the region. What conclusions can we draw from his son’s conquests? We might take the view that in spite of the problems Suppiluliuma faced elsewhere in his kingdom, he was still determined to maintain control over his western territories. Alternatively, the western campaigns may have been simply rearguard actions designed to protect or buffer Hittite territories to the south and south-east of the homeland from concerted onslaughts against them from the west. The risk of such onslaughts may have increased significantly if the Hittites were now confronted with a hostile regime in the kingdom of Tarhuntassa on the southern coast. Indeed the inscription goes on to report the conquest and annexation of Tarhuntassa. How extensive was Tarhuntassa’s role in the events recorded in the inscription? It has recently been suggested that Suppiluliuma’s chief opponent was in fact the ruler of Tarhuntassa; that the latter had seized all the lands named in the inscription, and that it was this which had forced Suppiluliuma to undertake the reconquest of his southern territories. In so doing, he had to deal not with a number of different rebellions but with a single, well-identified enemy who was attempting to weaken, if not totally eliminate, Hittite power.
Figure 6. Suppiluliuma II (deified?), Südburg, Hattusa
in the south. We shall consider below who this enemy ruler might have been.

**Food Shortages in Hatti?**

Tarhuntassa was probably lost to the Hittites in Tudhaliya’s reign, in the aftermath of Kurunta’s presumed seizure of and removal from the Hittite throne. Whatever Kurunta’s fate, Suppiluliuma’s later conquest of the appanage kingdom over which he had ruled is a clear indication that it had broken its ties with Hattusa and become openly hostile to its former overlord.

There were several pressing reasons why a hostile Tarhuntassa could not be tolerated. One of the most important of these was the location of the port of Ura within or at least very close to its borders. We recall that Ura was the Anatolian port to which grain shipments were brought from Egypt and Canaan via Ugarit for transhipment to Hatti. Particularly at times of food shortages in the Hittite kingdom, it was vital that the grain route be kept open. Ura’s location was thus of considerable strategic significance. So long as it remained under the control of an independent and particularly an enemy regime, Hittite communications with Syria and Egypt would be seriously imperilled.

We have already referred to the Hittites’ apparent increasing dependence on grain supplies from abroad (Ch. 12). This dependence may well have intensified in the final years of the Hittite kingdom. Several texts dating to Tudhaliya’s reign seem to indicate the critical importance to the Hittite world of imported grain. Thus the pharaoh Merneptah in his Karnak inscription recording his victory over Meryre and the Libyans referred to a shipment of grain which he had sent to ‘keep alive the land of Hatti’. A particular note of urgency was sounded in a letter sent from the Hittite court to the Ugaritic king, either Niqmaddu III or Ammurapi (his name is not preserved in the text), demanding a ship and crew for the transport of 2,000 kor of grain (c.450 tonnes) from Mukish to Ura:

> And so (the city) Ura [acted(?)] in such a way . . . and for My Sun the food they have saved. My Sun has shown them 2,000 kor of grain coming from Mukish. You must furnish them with a large ship and a crew, and they must transport this grain to their country. They will carry it in one or two shipments. You must not detain their ship! (RS 20.212, 17’–26’, after Heltzer (1977: 209))
The letter stresses the need for the Ugaritic king to act without delay.\textsuperscript{31} It ends by stating that it is a matter of life or death.\textsuperscript{32}

\section*{Suppiluliuma’s Sea Battles}

Very likely it was in the context of increasing threats to supply routes in the eastern Mediterranean that Suppiluliuma undertook the only recorded sea battles in which Hittites engaged—battles fought off the coast of Alasiya. Information about these battles is provided by the second of two texts inscribed in cuneiform on a clay tablet during Suppiluliuma’s reign. We have referred above to the first of these texts which describes a campaign undertaken by Tudhalia IV against Alasiya, and the establishment, or re-establishment, of Hittite control over the kingdom. The second text, which like the first is probably copied from an original hieroglyphic inscription,\textsuperscript{33} records three naval engagements and a subsequent land engagement—against the ‘enemies from Alasiya’:

\begin{quote}
My father [ ] I mobilized and I, Suppiluliuma, the Great King, immediately [crossed/reached(?)] the sea. The ships of Alasiya met me in the sea three times for battle, and I smote them; and I seized the ships and set fire to them in the sea. But when I arrived on dry land(?), the enemies from Alasiya came in multitude against me for battle. (KBo xii 38 (CTH 121) iii 1’–13’, trans. Güterbock (1967a: 78))
\end{quote}

It is clear from this account that Tudhalia’s earlier campaign against Alasiya had succeeded in establishing no more than temporary Hittite control over the island, and that his son had to undertake the task all over again. But it is not clear whether the enemy forces encountered by Suppiluliuma were (\textit{a}) the same as those who had fought against Tudhalia, (\textit{b}) native Alasiyans, (\textit{c}) foreigners who had occupied Alasiya, or used its ports as their bases, or (\textit{d}) belonged within the context of the activities of the so-called Sea Peoples.\textsuperscript{34}

Whoever the enemy, the Hittite forces on this occasion apparently fought a successful campaign against them. Of course, the Hittites had no naval resources of their own. Their success could only have been achieved by having at their disposal a war fleet from an allied state, probably Ugarit. Under its last kings Ugarit seems to have played a valuable role in helping to prop up the beleaguered Hittite kingdom.

When disaster finally struck, it was but one of many disasters which devastated large parts of the Near Eastern world in the early years of the
twelfth century. For this the so-called Sea Peoples are generally held responsible.

The Sea Peoples

The final collapse of the Hittite kingdom has traditionally been associated with massive movements of peoples who swept through Anatolia, Syria, and Palestine, and across the eastern Mediterranean to the coast of Egypt early in the twelfth century. On the walls of his funerary temple at Medinet Habu, the pharaoh Ramesses III presented a graphic description of the havoc and devastation which they caused before reaching Egypt:

The foreign countries made a conspiracy in their islands. All at once the lands were removed and scattered in the fray. No land could stand before their arms, from Hatti, Qode, Carchemish, Arzawa, and Alasiya on, being cut off at one time. A camp was set up in one place in Amurru. They desolated its people, and its land was like that which has never come into being. They were coming forward toward Egypt, while the flame was prepared before them. Their confederation was the Peleset, Tjeker, Shekelesh, Denyen, and Weshesh, lands united. They laid their hands upon the land as far as the circuit of the earth, their hearts confident and trusting: ‘Our plans will succeed!’ (Medinet Habu inscription of Ramesses III’s 8th year, lines 16–17, trans. Wilson in Pritchard (1969: 262))

A letter from Ammurapi, the last king of Ugarit, provides further evidence of the crisis engulfing the Near Eastern world. The letter is a dramatic response to an appeal for assistance from the king of Alasiya, and highlights the desperate situation confronting Ugarit:

My father, behold, the enemy’s ships came (here); my cities (?) were burned, and they did evil things in my country. Does not my father know that all my troops and chariots (?) are in the Land of Hatti, and all my ships are in the Land of Lukka? . . . Thus, the country is abandoned to itself. May my father know it: the seven ships of the enemy that came here inflicted much damage upon us.’ (RS 18.147 = Nougayrol et al. (1968: 87–9 no. 24), trans. Astour (1965: 255))

Ammurapi himself appealed to the viceroy of Carchemish. But all the latter could do was to offer him encouragement, and some words of advice:
As for what you have written to me: ‘Ships of the enemy have been seen at sea!’ Well, you must remain firm. Indeed for your part, where are your troops, your chariots stationed? Are they not stationed near you? No? Behind the enemy, who press upon you? Surround your towns with ramparts. Have your troops and chariots enter there, and await the enemy with great resolution! (RSL 1 = Nougayrol et al. (1968: 85–6 no. 23))

The crisis confronting the Ugaritic king became even more desperate when news came that his own ships and crews were actually collaborating with the approaching enemy they had been sent out to repel. Thus Eshuwara, Alasiya’s chief administrator, advised him in an urgent dispatch: ‘As for the matter concerning those enemies: (it was) the people from your country (and) your own ships (who) did this! And (it was) the people from your country (who) committed these transgression(s) . . . I am writing to inform you and protect you. Be aware!’ (RS 20.18 = Nougayrol et al. (1968: 83–5 no. 22), trans. Hoftijzer and Van Soldt (1998: 343)).

The attacking forces with which Ammurapi had to deal now included his own countrymen! The kingdom to which they owed their allegiance was doomed. Far better, then, to join the ranks of the predators rather than share the fate of the victims of the kingdom’s final and inevitable collapse.

There can be little doubt that the end of the Late Bronze Age in the Near East was marked by cataclysmic upheavals and the collapse and disappearance of many of the old centres of power. But was this caused by marauding groups of northerners collectively identified as the Sea Peoples? Who were these Sea Peoples? Whence did they come? Early theories represented them as barbarian invaders from some homeland to the north of Anatolia who swept through the Near East, massacring, pillaging, destroying everything in their path—the Huns and Goths of the Late Bronze Age world—until they were eventually stopped on the coast of Egypt.

But theories of dramatic invasions by bloodthirsty northern barbarians against long-established, sophisticated civilizations are no longer fashionable in Bronze Age scholarship. We need to re-examine very carefully the meagre information available to us before drawing any firm conclusions as to who the Sea Peoples were and what role they played in the final decades of the Bronze Age.
Seaborne attacks were by no means a new phenomenon. Already in the fourteenth century the pharaoh Akhenaten complained to a king of Alasiya about piratical raids conducted on his coastal cities by people from the Lukka lands. He accused the Alasiyan people of aiding and abetting their enterprises. But the Alasiyan king denied responsibility, declaring that his country too was suffering from raids by the Lukka people: ‘Why does my brother speak in these terms to me? “Does not my brother know what is going on?” As far as I am concerned, I have done nothing of the sort! Indeed each year the Lukka people seize towns in my own land!’ (EA 38: 7–12).

The raiders appear to have engaged in what has been described as hit and run commando-style operations, arriving at seaside communities in small flotillas to pillage and burn them (like the seven enemy ships that attacked the Ugaritic coast), then escaping before the local militia could come to grips with them.\(^{39}\) We learn also of a raid on the Egyptian coast during Ramesses II’s reign by Sherden pirates. These seaborne predators had already taken to plundering the coast in the time of Amenhotep III and were to figure later in the list of Sea Peoples. From the inscription which records the raid it is clear that they had long been a threat in the region: ‘the unruly Sherden whom no-one had ever known how to combat, they came boldly sailing in their warships from the midst of the sea, none being able to withstand them’ (Inscription on a stele from Tanis, trans. Kitchen (1982: 40-1)).

On this occasion, Ramesses succeeded in repelling the invaders. But the pressures continued to mount, and the Egyptian Delta was subjected to further and more concerted attacks in the reign of his son and successor Merneptah (c.1213–1204). In a long inscription carved on the eastern wall of the temple of Karnak, Merneptah recorded his conflict with large groups of invaders. They included bands of Libyans who had previously made attacks on the Delta, no doubt attracted by the rich, fertile soil of the region. Now, under the leadership of the Libyan chief Meryre, they were joined by other peoples from across the sea:

The wretched fallen chief of Libya, Meryre, son of Ded, has fallen upon the country of Tehenu with his bowmen . . . Sherden, Shekelesh, Ekwesh, Lukka, Teresh,\(^{40}\) taking the best of every warrior and every man of war of his country. He has brought his wife and children . . . leaders of the camp, and he has reached
Of the groups that joined the Libyans for this onslaught on Egypt, we have already referred to the Sherden, who were active in the region at least as early as Amenhotep III’s reign, and may have eventually occupied the island of Sardinia in the western Mediterranean at the end of the Bronze Age. The Shekelesh were another group, possibly of Anatolian origin, and probably like the Sherden they eventually moved westwards, settling in Sicily. The Lukka people are well known from the Hittite texts, and from their raids on Alasiya and Egypt during Akhenaten’s reign. The Teresh group may be identifiable with the Tyrsenoi, referred to later in Greek texts, and were perhaps the ancestors of the Etruscan people of southern Italy. The Ekwesh (Akaiwasha) are commonly identified with the Ahhiyawans of the Hittite texts.

Merneptah’s Karnak inscription indicates that the pharaoh succeeded in driving the invaders from Egypt. But their invasion was little more than a prelude to the main movements of these groups in the reign of Merneptah’s eventual successor Ramses III (c.1185–1154), (effective) founder of the Egyptian Twentieth Dynasty after the preceding...
Nineteenth Dynasty had died out in a succession of short reigns bedevilled by dynastic intrigues.

According to the records of his reign, Ramesses was confronted with several major onslaughts in the north of his kingdom, by both land and sea. In the fifth year of his reign, he was at war with the Libyan invaders, in his eighth year, with peoples from across the sea, in his eleventh year, with Libyans once more. We have two sources of information for these conflicts: inscriptions from the walls of Ramesses' temple at Medinet Habu, and a document now known as the Great Harris Papyrus. Compiled by Ramesses III's son and successor Ramesses IV, it is the longest known papyrus from Egypt, with some 1,500 lines of text, and covers the entire period of Ramesses III's reign.

The list of the peoples from across the sea included Peleset, Tjekker, Shekelesh, Weshesh, and Denyen. Only one of these groups, the Shekelesh, had figured amongst the invaders during Merneptah's reign. The most notable group, the Peleset, can be confidently identified with the Philistines who eventually settled in Palestine. The Denyen (Danuna) were associated with Cilicia.

Ramesses' Medinet Habu inscription vividly illustrates in both word and picture the strenuous preparations the pharaoh made to meet the enemy, and the decisive defeat which he claimed to have inflicted upon them:

I equipped my frontier in Zahi (Djahi) prepared before them. The chiefs, the captains of infantry, the nobles, I caused to equip the harbour-mouths, like a strong wall, with warships, galleys, and barges [. They were manned completely from bow to stern with valiant warriors, soldiers of all the choicest of Egypt, being like lions roaring on the mountain tops. The charioteers were warriors [, and all good officers, ready of hand. Their horses were quivering in their every limb, ready to crush the countries under their feet . . . Those who reached my boundary, their seed is not; their heart and their soul are finished forever and ever. As for those who had assembled before them on the sea, the full flame was their front, before the harbour-mouths, and a wall of metal upon the shore surrounded them. They were dragged, overturned, and laid low upon the beach; slain and made heaps from stern to bow of their galleys, while all their things were cast upon the water. (Extracts from Medinet Habu inscription, trans. Breasted (1906: iv §§65–6))

It should be stressed that the invasions were not merely military operations, but involved the movements of large populations, by land
and by sea, seeking new lands to settle. Their land forces were moving south along the Levantine coast and through Palestine when they were confronted and stopped by Ramesses’ forces at the Egyptian frontier in Djahi (in the region of later Phoenicia). However, their fleet reached the coast of Egypt, where it was destroyed by the Egyptian fleet.

We must now examine the identity and provenance of these invaders, and the part they played in the collapse of the Late Bronze Age civilizations. The term ‘Sea Peoples’ was coined in the late nineteenth century to refer to the invaders from across the sea described in Egyptian sources, and has been widely used by historians and archaeologists ever since. Yet it is a misleading term, for there can be little doubt that a number of the groups of peoples covered by it had neither an island nor a coastal origin, and indeed their movements and activities were not confined to the sea or to coastal regions, but encompassed almost the entire Near Eastern world.

Their possible origins have also caused much debate and speculation. We can, however, assign an Anatolian origin to at least the Lukka element amongst the groups that attacked Egypt in Merneptah’s reign, and very likely to the Denyen (Danuna) group who figure in the records of Ramesses III’s reign. Indeed it is quite possible that all groups listed in the Egyptian records originated in Anatolia, particularly western Anatolia. The Teresh may, as we have noted, be identical with the Tyrsenoi whose original homeland, according to the Greek historian Herodotos, was in Lydia. The Ekwesh, if the name can be equated with Hittite Ahhiyawa/Greek Achaia, may represent the remnants of Achaian/Mycenaean settlement at various points along the western Anatolian coast after Ahhiyawa lost the significant presence and influence it had enjoyed in the region for two centuries. The Peleset may also have originated from western Anatolia. A further suggestion is that the name Tjekker is associated with Teucer, ancestor in Greek literary tradition of the Troad people known as the Teucri. But we are now getting into the realms of pure speculation.

Nevertheless the western Anatolian region may well have provided the genesis for the movements of the ‘Sea Peoples’. For this seems to have been the region where the political structures established by the major Bronze Age powers first began to crumble and disintegrate. We have seen the problems which the Hittites had in controlling the region,
very marked in the reign of Hattusili III, and the probable loss of Ahhiyawan political and military influence in the same region during the reign of Hattusili’s son Tudhaliya. However much foreign control may have been resented by the subject states upon whom it was imposed, the overlordship of the Hittite and Ahhiyawan kings in western Anatolia probably helped ensure some protection for the regions where vassal states were established, at least for limited periods of time.

On the other hand, the overlords also helped create the conditions for ever-increasing population instability. They did so through their practice of removing and relocating in their home territory large groups of transportees from rebellious vassal states, a practice which led to prisoners or disaffected subjects trying to escape their authority by seeking refuge in other nearby kingdoms. The tensions and rivalry between Hatti and Ahhiyawa in western Anatolia merely served to exacerbate these unsettled conditions. With the decline and disappearance of both Hittite and Ahhiyawan influence in the region, the movements of population groups, large and small, gained increasing momentum. Local rulers could no longer call on the support of an overlord, or guarantee protection to their own subjects. In an environment of increasing insecurity and anarchy, groups began abandoning their old homelands in search of new lands to settle.

These groups were not in themselves the cause of the cataclysmic events which brought about the collapse of the Bronze Age kingdoms. Rather they were associated with the gradual disintegration of these kingdoms, and were at least in part the victims of it. In the widespread unsettled conditions of the period, they took on a marauding aspect in their search for new lands. By so doing they may well have accelerated the final collapse of the main centres of power.

Yet the actual nature, extent, and duration of their activities leave much room for doubt. The view that they were participants in a carefully planned military operation is not sustainable. Rather, they were a largely disorganized array of groups, who banded together from time to time in their wanderings and sometimes joined forces for raids and, on occasions, more extensive military operations. They may have had much of the character of the roving, marauding bands that are frequently depicted by science fiction writers in a post nuclear war environment.
The perception of them as a united organized enemy depends very largely on their depiction in Egyptian records, most notably the account of Ramesses III. Yet questions have been raised about the historical validity of these records. Cifola sees the graphic account of Ramesses’ conflict with and triumph over his enemies as a ‘narrative condensation of a continuous long-lasting process, consisting in small skirmishes and rebuffs of repeated attempts at assault and penetration, into a single great military event, to serve a precise propagandistic purpose’. Liverani expresses a similar view: ‘A number of small episodes were probably joined together in order to build up artfully a “battle” that as such never took place, but had to be evoked for the sake of tradition and the propaganda celebration—even for the sake of symmetry (in the monumental representation) with the real and decisive battle won against the Libyans.’ Such reductionism markedly reduces the dramatic impact of the Egyptian narrative, and considerably scales down the extent of the Egyptian military achievement. But it may well provide us with something closer to the truth.

There is also a disappointing lack of unequivocal archaeological evidence for the movements of the displaced peoples. The combination of both written records and archaeological evidence reveals a clear break in occupation of many sites along the Syro-Palestine littoral, and of some inland sites c.1200. However, it is virtually impossible to identify the authors—Egyptian, Israelite, or Sea Peoples—of the destruction of the cities of the Levant, even if the last of these remains a prime suspect for sites along the coast. As far as the Levant is concerned, the debate over assigning responsibility for the destructions at the end of the thirteenth century to the Sea Peoples, to invading Hebrews or rebellious dispossessed Canaanites on their way to becoming Hebrews, really highlights the lack of any evidence from which we can draw meaningful conclusions.

The Collapse of the Hittite Kingdom

Many theories have been proposed to account for the collapse of the Hittite kingdom and other contemporary powers in Greece and the Near East at the end of the Late Bronze Age. Amongst these theories several have attributed the demise of the Late Bronze Age kingdoms largely to natural forces, such as earthquake and drought.
A strong advocate of the earthquake theory was C. F. A. Schaeffer who proposed that many of the cities of both Anatolia and Syria, including Hattusa and Alalah, fell victims to earthquake c.1200. The destructions of Minoan Knossos and Troy VI were similarly explained by Sir Arthur Evans and Professor Carl Blegen respectively. Such theories are no longer given much credence. In the great majority of cases, there is little or no demonstrable archaeological evidence of earthquake activity, at least on such a scale as to have caused the total destruction and abandonment of a site. Even in the few cases where earthquake may have played some part (such as at Troy; see Ch. 14), the evidence is equivocal and inconclusive.

The theory of a prolonged drought in the Greek and Near Eastern worlds has had wider currency amongst scholars. Rhys Carpenter, the most influential advocate of this theory, argued that c.1200 the eastern Mediterranean world suffered a drought of such length and severity that many of the peoples of this world were forced to abandon their homes. Spurred on by hunger, they attacked and destroyed the major Bronze Age centres, in order to gain access to their storehouses of grain and other food supplies. We have referred to a number of texts which indicate food shortages, if not actual famine, in the Hittite world during the reigns of the last Hittite kings. But such shortages may have been due largely to human factors, such as the disruption of grain supply routes, rather than to a disastrous change in weather patterns. We simply do not have evidence of a drought of such length and intensity and extent that it brought about, or contributed substantially to, the collapse of the Bronze Age centres of power.

This does not of course rule out the possibility of periodic droughts in Greece and the Near East, which in the last decades of the Late Bronze Age exacerbated the mounting pressures and problems faced by the rulers of the Near Eastern and Mycenaean worlds. If the kingdom of Hatti in particular was becoming increasingly dependent on importation of grain supplies, even temporary shortfalls in local grain production caused by drought would have given an increased urgency to ensuring that regular shipments from abroad were not disrupted. And if other factors intervened which seriously affected the Hittites’ ability to maintain political stability throughout their kingdom, then food shortages caused by drought or the disruption of supply routes might well have led to a crisis of major proportions.
A further theory that the introduction of ironworking technology which placed weapons of iron in the hands of Anatolian rebels and enabled them to overthrow the Bronze Age kingdoms has been justifiably dismissed.  

A ‘systems collapse’ has also been adduced as a prime reason for the decline and collapse of the major centres of power in the Late Bronze Age world, in Anatolia and Syria, and Mycenaean Greece. In the case of the Mycenaean world, Nancy Sandars argued that complex commercial operations absolutely demanded conditions of reasonable security, that the prosperity of the Levant and the Aegean was commercial and depended on the existence of markets for surplus products, that the Mycenaean kingdoms were over-specialized, over-dependent on central bureaucracies, that dependence on the palace and the over-specialized economy became an acute danger point, and that increasingly unstable conditions in the region led to economic breakdown and ultimate general collapse. More generally, the collapse of the royal palaces—the basic and almost exclusive agents of long-distance trade in the Late Bronze Age—has been seen as producing a complete crisis in inter-regional contacts, because of the disappearance of the very protagonists of trade (kings, scribes, ambassadors, palace merchants etc.) and the destruction of the political and juridical organization of trade (judicial guarantees, alliance treaties, military protection, financial indemnification, credit letters etc.). Increasing disruption of commercial networks and trading operations may well have been a prominent feature of the last decades of the Late Bronze Age kingdoms in both Greece and the Near East. But they are in themselves symptomatic of a period of general decline and disintegration rather than one of the root causes. We must look elsewhere for these causes.

Another theory is that the ‘Catastrophe’ at the end of the Bronze Age was the result of a radical innovation in warfare, which suddenly gave the ‘barbarians’ the military advantage over the long established and civilized kingdoms of the eastern Mediterranean. The argument goes that the ‘barbarians’—in Libya, Palestine, Israel, Lycia, northern Greece, Italy, Sicily, Sardinia etc.—with their swarming infantries and equipped with javelins, long swords, and a few essential pieces of defensive armour were able to overwhelm the chariot-based forces on which the great kingdoms relied, assaulting, plundering, and razing the richest palaces and cities. But even if we were to admit the possibility of such a scenario,
or a modified version of it, we are still left with one fundamental question. What finally had so weakened these centres, which had long stood firm against the forces which now allegedly overwhelmed them, that they succumbed? The theory of changes in style of warfare, or weapons used, does not in itself address this question, even if it could be proved to be true.

Should we look for signs of decline and disintegration within the kingdoms themselves as a major factor in their final collapse? We have seen that at a much earlier period in its history the Hittite kingdom had suffered serious internal political upheavals which encouraged aggression by outside forces and led to a substantial reduction of Hittite territory. In the aftermath of the assassination of Mursili I, struggles for the succession had allegedly brought the kingdom to the verge of extinction. Yet the situation had been saved when control was seized by a strong leader, Telipinu, who committed himself to uniting the kingdom beneath his sway. As Hattusili I and subsequently Telipinu had both pointed out, so long as the kingdom remained united, it could resist all foreign aggression. But if it became weak and divided against itself, it would easily fall prey to its enemies.

Until the early 1980s the Hittite New Kingdom was generally considered to have enjoyed much greater internal stability than the Old. Hattusili III’s coup against his nephew Urhi-Teshub was seen as the only significant exception to an otherwise peaceful series of royal successions down to the end of the Hittite empire. Discoveries within the last two decades, most notably the bronze tablet and the seal impressions of Kurunta, have made it necessary for us to reconsider this view, and to look afresh at other texts dating to the last years of the kingdom. Even before the discovery of the bronze tablet Singer had commented: ‘Without diminishing the role of the outside enemies in the fall of the Hittite Empire, I feel that more weight should be given to the symptoms of inner decline and disintegration.’

Texts from both Tudhaliya IV’s and Suppiluliuma II’s reign indicate that the monarchy was under constant threat from elements within the higher echelons of Hittite society, particularly members of the extended royal family. In spite of the efforts made by these last Hittite kings to shore up their authority, the threats continued, apparently, to have a destabilizing effect upon the monarchical structure and may well have seriously undermined the king’s authority in the eyes of many of his
subjects. This is reflected in the rebellion in Hatti and perhaps also in
the insubordination of vassal rulers, both reported in Suppiluliuma's
reign. If the king had difficulties in securing his own position in
Hattusa, what confidence could his vassals have that he could protect
them and their kingdoms if they came under threat, from outsiders or
disaffected elements amongst their subjects? What incentives were there
for them to maintain a strong allegiance to their current overlord in
Hattusa? As yet we cannot prove that there was a direct connection
between a perceived weakening in the central power structure and an
apparent crumbling of Hittite authority in the subject territories. It does
however remain a distinct possibility, particularly if we give credence to
the warnings sounded many generations earlier by Hattusili I and
Telipinu.

But in attempting to find reasons for the collapse of the Hittite
kingdom, we should be careful not to give undue prominence to any
specific set of factors, whether internal or external. Further, its collapse
did not occur in isolation. The fact that a number of centres of the
Mycenaean world were destroyed in roughly the same period as the fall
of Hatti and other Near Eastern kingdoms gives some credence to the
view of a series of widespread upheavals and disasters, at least within
the Greek and Near Eastern worlds, which led to, or helped precipitate,
the downfall of the major centres in both regions. Hence the theories of
a long-lasting and ruinous drought, or of simultaneous or contemporaneously related onslaughts by ‘Sea Peoples’ upon both the Greek and
Near Eastern worlds, or of a widespread ‘systems collapse’. While we
should be mindful that there were significant differences in the patterns
of decline and collapse of the Mycenaean and Near Eastern centres of
power, it is difficult to believe that there is not some relationship
between the course of events in both regions in the last decades of
the thirteenth century and the early twelfth century. But given the
apparent paucity of contact between the Mycenaean and Hittite worlds,
particularly from the middle of the thirteenth century onwards, we
must at present avoid the temptation of devising too precise a set of
common factors to explain the pattern of events in both regions in this
period.

Historical records of the Hittite kingdom finish abruptly in Suppi-
luliuma II’s reign with the account of the naval battles off the coast of
Cyprus and the record of military events in the Südburg inscription.
The end of Hattusa must have followed soon after, perhaps while the Egyptian throne was occupied by the pharaoh Ramesses III who included Hatti in the list of countries that fell before the onslaught of the ‘northerners in their islands/sealands’. Archaeological evidence indicates widespread devastation by fire in the capital—on the royal acropolis, in the temples of both Upper and Lower Cities, and along stretches of the fortifications. This has conjured up the scenario of a royal capital succumbing all at one time to violent destruction in an all-consuming conflagration.

However Dr Seeher, the current director of excavations at Hattusa, has come to a rather less dramatic conclusion. His scenario is one of gradual abandonment of the capital, firstly by its royal family and leading members of the palace bureaucracy who took with them all their valuable and portable possessions, including the kingdom’s most important official records. They must have done so once it became clear that the capital was doomed. Certainly there is evidence that many buildings in the city were finally put to the torch—but by this time, according to Seeher, the city had become largely derelict. Those who stayed behind were left to fend for themselves as best they could, scavenging at leisure through the leavings of those who had departed. The decline, abandonment, and final destruction of Hattusa probably occurred in the very early years of the twelfth century. The whole process may have taken no more than a few months. Satellites of the Hittite kingdom must have fallen around the same time, possibly even earlier in the case of Ugarit. Archaeological evidence further indicates that in addition to central and western Anatolia, the eastern (mainly Hurrian) and southern (mainly Luwian) Hittite districts were also being invaded from almost all directions.

Were the Kaska people responsible for the final sack of Hattusa, as they had been for its destruction in the past? However one explains the weakened state which led to its destruction—internal political instability—severely depleted defence capabilities—communication networks and supply lines in disarray—critical shortages of food and other resources—the royal capital perhaps eventually fell prey, after its abandonment by the royal administration, to an enemy who had plagued the Hittites from almost the beginning of their history, an enemy over whom they had often triumphed, but from whose menace they had never been completely secure. Was this the enemy who now delivered
the **coup de grâce** to the very heart of a kingdom already on the verge of total disintegration?

**Other Major Powers in the Aftermath**

Egypt escaped relatively unscathed from the upheavals at the end of the Bronze Age. In fact Ramesses III claimed to have followed up his victory over the Sea Peoples with further campaigns in Syria. At least this is what he depicted in scenes on the walls of his temple at Medinet Habu, though Faulkner considered the scenes to be anachronistic copies taken from a building of Ramesses II.\(^86\) In any case, apart from an apparent fresh incursion from Libya in year 11, Egypt seems to have remained secure from any major external military threats in the last twenty years of Ramesses III’s reign, and his inscriptions record a number of peaceful enterprises, including an expedition to the Land of Punt.\(^87\) But within his kingdom, the pharaoh was faced with serious troubles during his final years, apparently due to administrative incompetence and disloyalty on the part of his officials.

The Twentieth Dynasty to which he belonged continued for almost a century after his death. But under his successors, the kingdom of the pharaohs was but a pale shadow of what it had been during the ascendant years of the two previous dynasties. While it outlasted its northern counterpart, the kingdom of Hatti, it was never again to regain the initiatives which had led to its becoming one of the dominant powers in the Near East. Finally, in the seventh century, Egypt was conquered by Assyria (see below). The future course of Near Eastern history was to be determined by other powers which were now beginning to emerge and would come to full strength during the course of the first millennium.

In Assyria, we have seen that Tukulti-Ninurta’s reign had limped to an inglorious finale, ending with his assassination. Although Assyria seems not to have been directly affected by the chaos occurring in other parts of the Near Eastern world in the years following his death, it none the less experienced a period of continuing political and military decline under his immediate successors.

At the beginning of the first millennium it was no more than a remnant of the great kingdom it once had been in the days of Adad-nirari and Shalmaneser. Its territory was reduced to a narrow strip of
land extending some 150 kilometres along the Tigris river; to the south its prospects for expansion were limited by the kingdom of Babylonia, and to the north and east it was in constant danger from warlike tribes—particularly the Arameans—who encroached upon its frontiers and threatened its cities.

But then, early in the first millennium, Assyria entered upon a new era of aggressive militarism and territorial expansion. This was initiated by the king Adad-nirari II (c.911–891). After driving the Arameans out of the Tigris valley, the new Assyrian warlord conducted campaigns into Babylonia where he defeated the king Shamash-Mudammiq, seized a large slice of his territory, and incorporated it afresh into the Assyrian kingdom. These campaigns laid the foundations for further expeditions by his successors beyond the kingdom's frontiers. By the reign of the king Sargon (c.721–705), Assyrian authority extended through the entire Fertile Crescent, westwards into Anatolia, southwards to the Persian Gulf, and eastwards into Elam (part of modern Iran). In the reign of Sargon's grandson Esarhaddon (c.680–669), Assyrian military enterprise extended as far afield as Egypt. The once great kingdom of the pharaohs was conquered after a short campaign and added to the long list of subject states of the Assyrian empire.

Ultimately, then, Assyria proved to be the only major survivor of the great Late Bronze Age powers. But its survival proved short-lived. For in the late seventh century it too was to fall, the final blow being delivered by a coalition formed between the Chaldaean rulers of Babylonia and the newly emerging kingdom of the Medes.

**What Happened to the Hittites?**

With the fall of the Hittite capital early in the twelfth century, the kingdom over which it had held sway was at an end. Within but a few generations, all trace of it seems to have been lost to human memory. But how complete was the actual destruction of the Hittite centres outside the capital? Or of the vassal kingdoms subject to Hatti? What was the fate of those who populated the Hittite world? Who inherited what survived the devastation which brought about its final collapse?

While a few cities like Ugarit undoubtedly suffered sudden, violent destruction, there is little evidence for widespread, violent devastation in the Near Eastern world in this period. The sites destroyed by fire seem
to have been limited to the regions east of the Marassantiya river, with Karaoğlan (south of Ankara) the only site west of it; there is no visible evidence of such a catastrophe further west.\textsuperscript{88} Indications from archaeological excavations are that only a small number of sites of the Hittite world were actually destroyed; the majority were simply abandoned, as Bittel has demonstrated in the case of the Late Bronze Age level at Gordion. In summary, ‘the conclusion to be drawn from the very small number of sites that can prove to have been burnt c.1176 BC and the very large number that just seem to have been deserted in the Hittite homeland is that though politically the attack by its neighbours was disastrous for Hatti, the loss of life must not be exaggerated’.\textsuperscript{89}

The overall, though still far from complete, picture we have of the centuries immediately following the collapse of the Hittite kingdom is not one of widespread destruction and massacre, but of large-scale movements of peoples—abandoning their homelands, grouping and regrouping with other peoples on the move, then finally dispersing, sometimes to lands far from their places of origin. Some groups, like the Sherden, Shekelesh, and Teresh, and a group of Pelasgians may have gone west, to Italy, the Adriatic region, and the islands of the western Mediterranean. Others, most notably the Peleset, generally identified as the Philistines,\textsuperscript{90} settled on the coast of Canaan, where sites like Ashdod, Eqron, and Ashqelon are revealing important aspects of the Philistines’ material culture.\textsuperscript{91}

Other groups seem to have remained in or returned to their original homelands. Notable amongst these were the Luwian-speaking inhabitants of the Lukka Lands in south-west Anatolia. These became prominent in the countries which in the first millennium BC the Greeks called Lycaonia and Lycia. The countries in question were part of the original Lukka homeland. In Lycia the native population was joined by immigrants from other regions, probably including Crete.\textsuperscript{92} But the original inhabitants retained a number of features of the civilization and culture of their Bronze Age Luwian ancestors, most evident in the names of their deities\textsuperscript{93} and in their language, which was closely related to Bronze Age Luwian.\textsuperscript{94} Further, there is a notable persistence of Hittite and Luwian place-names in first millennium Lycia; thus Arña (Greek Xanthos) derives from Late Bronze Age Awarna, Pttara (Greek Patar(a) from Ptar(a),\textsuperscript{95} Pinara from Pina[, Tlawa (Greek Tlos) from T/Dalawa, Oenoanda from Wiyanawanda.\textsuperscript{96} With the exception of the
last of these, all are names of settlements in the Xanthos valley region. The survival of such a contingent of names of Bronze Age origin denoting towns or communities in close proximity to each other seems to reflect a stable population group which remained relatively unaffected by the upheavals which were associated with the demise of the major Bronze Age kingdoms, although this still requires confirmation by archaeological evidence.

In any case, Luwian elements amongst the Late Bronze Age peoples of Anatolia continued with some vigour beyond the end of the Bronze Age through the succeeding ‘Dark Age’, and figured prominently in the Iron Age civilizations of the first millennium. The predominantly Luwian-speaking population groups of Tarhuntassa, which extended through the region later known as Cilicia and Pamphylia, may well have retained a high degree of coherence, and enjoyed a high degree of independence, in the centuries which followed the collapse of the Hittite kingdom. Even as late as the Roman imperial period, Luwian names figured prominently in the inscriptions of Cilicia Aspera as well as Lycia. It is also significant that the majority of hieroglyphic inscriptions, attributable to the rulers of the early Iron Age kingdoms in south-east Anatolia and northern Syria, date to the first two centuries or so of this period.

The communities along the Aegean coast of Anatolia were no doubt affected by the unsettled conditions in the centuries which followed the end of the Bronze Age. And there may well have been a southward shift of some of the peoples in this region. But major centres like Millawanda/Milawata (Classical Miletos) survived, as did other settlements along the coast. They continued to be occupied by local inhabitants, while absorbing large numbers of Greek-speaking immigrants from across the Aegean. Indeed it was the influx of Aiolian and Ionian settlers from the Greek world around the end of the second millennium, and their admixture with the native Anatolian inhabitants, which helped give the region to become known as Ionia its rich and distinctive character in the first millennium.

In spite of its inclusion in Ramesses III’s list of countries devastated by the Sea Peoples, the kingdom of Carchemish on the Euphrates, one of the two viceregal seats in Syria from the time of Suppiluliuma I, seems to have survived the upheavals at the end of the Bronze Age relatively unscathed. Indeed at Carchemish a branch of the Hittite royal
The central line of this dynasty did not, apparently, survive the catastrophe which brought about the end of Hattusa. This left Kuzi-Teshub from the collateral line as the dynasty’s sole heir. Yet the Anatolian kingdom had disintegrated, and Kuzi-Teshub’s domain extended through no more than part of the eastern territories of this kingdom, along the west bank of the Euphrates from Malatya through Carchemish to Emar.107

This may well have provided a new homeland for a number of groups from the old homeland, particularly perhaps the élite elements of Hittite society, including members of the royal court. Although Carchemish no doubt retained a markedly Hurrian character, the establishment of a Hittite viceregal seat there with its accompanying social and administrative infrastructure must have created an environment not unlike that of the palace society at Hattusa.108 It had obvious attractions for those who had the means to relocate themselves there. Yet this kingdom was not long to survive in the form in which Kuzi-Teshub inherited it. Perhaps even in his lifetime it too began to follow the pattern of fragmentation into smaller units that occurred elsewhere in the Near Eastern world. There would be no return to the political coherence which in the Bronze Age had been established to a greater or lesser degree by a succession of Mitannian, Egyptian, and Hittite overlords.

From this process several new kingdoms emerged, including the kingdom of Melid where Kuzi-Teshub’s grandsons ruled. To the south was the kingdom of Kummukh, the Commagene of Graeco-Roman
times, and further south again the kingdom of Hamath in central Syria. The fragmentation may have been caused in part by an influx of new settlers, most notably the Arameans who settled in large numbers across the Fertile Crescent from c.1100 onwards, and by the Phoenicians who occupied the Syro-Lebanese coast. These groups significantly altered the political and cultural environment and configuration of the region. Even so, a Hittite veneer persisted. Tangible illustrations of this are provided by Hittite-type monuments and sculptures, and above all by the ‘Hittite’ hieroglyphic inscriptions of the region. Assyrians, Urartians, and Hebrews continued to refer to Syria and the Taurus region as ‘the Land of Hatti’, and the Bible makes reference to the local Syrian rulers as ‘Kings of the Hittites’. Indeed in Assyrian records a number of the kings of the region continued to have names strongly reminiscent of those of the Late Bronze Age Hittite kings—names like Mutallu (cf. Muwattallil) and Lubarna (cf. Labarna) and even Ushpilulme (cf. Suppiluliuma). Such names may reflect attempts by later local rulers to claim traditional links, justifiably or not, with the Great Kings of Hatti, and serve to indicate that memories of these kings were kept alive at least into the early centuries of the first millennium. So too the hieroglyphic inscriptions of the neo-Hittite region helped perpetuate Late Bronze Age Hittite traditions, even though the cuneiform script disappeared entirely from both Anatolia and Syria. Because of the persistence of this Hittite veneer, the kingdoms which emerged in Syria out of the obscurity of the Dark Age are sometimes known as the neo-Hittite, or Syro-Hittite kingdoms.

The Hittites’ Successors in Anatolia

Who were the heirs of the Hittite homeland and adjacent regions? In southern Anatolia, we see a pattern of development similar to that in Syria, with the persistence of elements of Hittite civilization, for example in eastern Cilicia at the site now known as Karatepe-Aslantaş (anc. Azatiwataya). An important bilingual inscription, in Phoenician and Luwian hieroglyphs, was discovered here in 1946. The inscription was authored or commissioned by a local ruler called Azatiwata, who owed his appointment to Awariku, king of Adana. Also important are a group of inscriptions discovered on the mountain-top sanctuary Karadağ and in the city of Kızıldağ in the region of the Konya Plain.
These, composed by a ‘Great King’ Hartapu, who also designated his father Mursili as a Great King, are closely linked stylistically with the ‘Yalburt inscription’ of Tudhaliya IV. In 1971, a further hieroglyphic inscription came to light in the same region on the western slope of a hill called Burunkaya to the north-east of modern Aksaray. Here again the name Hartapu, the Great King, appeared along with the name of his father, the Great King Mursili.

Until recently, this group of inscriptions was generally considered to date to a much later period than the last years of the Bronze Age Hittite kingdom. This is because a figure in relief, which is next to one of the inscriptions (Kızıldağ 1) and assumed to be a representation of Hartapu, has been dated to the eighth century. Further, it was assumed that no local Anatolian ruler would have referred to himself as ‘Great King’ while the throne of the Hittite capital was still occupied. Singer, however, has challenged this latter assumption, arguing that on chronological and stylistic grounds Hartapu’s inscriptions belong more appropriately to the period before the fall of Hattusa. This would mean placing Hartapu and his father Mursili in the last decades of the Late Bronze Age; there would then have been two successive local kings of southern Anatolia who called themselves Great Kings while a Great King still sat upon the throne of Hatti. Is this historically plausible?

The answer to this question may be bound up with the identity of Hartapu and his father Mursili, and their place within the overall scheme of things. It is very tempting to see this pair as genealogically linked to the royal house of Hattusa. Indeed, Mellaart suggested some thirty years ago that the Mursili in question was Mursili III, i.e. Urhi-Teshub; if so, then Hartapu was Urhi-Teshub’s son. It may be quite true to say that no local king within the Hittite realm would dare call himself a Great King while the throne of Hatti was occupied by the Great King. But we must remember that Urhi-Teshub never acknowledged his usurper as the rightful king of Hatti, and that he never relinquished his ambition of regaining his throne. As we have already seen (Ch. 11), there is very good reason to suppose that the ex-king of Hatti had returned to Hittite territory after his lengthy stay in Egypt. Here he may well have started rebuilding support for himself in northern Syria and southern Anatolia, which led eventually to his establishing a kingdom in exile extending across a substantial area of southern Anatolia. Indeed his realm may have incorporated the land
of Tarhuntassa, which seems to have become openly hostile to the Hattusa regime in Bronze Age Hatti’s final years. We have noted above the suggestion that the campaigns of Suppiluliuma as recorded in the Sudbürg inscription were directed specifically against the regime in Tarhuntassa. In accordance with this scenario, Urhi-Teshub now openly used his throne-name Mursili and adopted the title ‘Great King’ as a defiant assertion of his right to the title and as a challenge to the present occupant of the throne in Hattusa. Hartapu followed in his father’s footsteps. Was he Suppiluliuma’s chief opponent in the events recorded in the Südburg inscription?\(^\text{123}\)

That still leaves the relief sculpture at Kızıldağ to be explained. Professor Hawkins has suggested that it was added to the inscription some four centuries later, in the eighth century, by a southern Anatolian king called Wasusarma, son of Tuwati, whose royal seat was probably at Kululu near Kayseri. ‘Possible military success in the Konya plain could have placed the city Kızıldağ and the mountain top sanctuary Karadağ in the hands of Wasusarma. Could we suppose that he felt moved to add to the inscriptions of the Great King (an ancestor real or pretended) an anachronistic likeness accompanied by a repeat of his royal cartouche?’\(^\text{124}\)

Hieroglyphic inscriptions indicate the existence of a country called Tabal (biblical Tubal) in the region of what in Hittite times was called the Lower Land, and which included the cities of the Classical Tyанитис—Tuwanuwa, Tunna, and Hupisna. Tabal seems originally to have consisted of a series of small independent states, or petty kingdoms, whose rulers sent gifts to the Assyrian king Shalmaneser III (c.858–823). Shalmaneser claimed that these kings had submitted to him in the course of a campaign which he conducted into Tabal in 836.\(^\text{125}\) During the course of the eighth century, Tabal became united into a single confederacy ruled by the dynasty of Burutas.\(^\text{126}\)

From the inscriptions of Tabal, we learn of the prominence of the Hurrian goddess Kubaba in Tabalic cult. Kubaba had been the city-goddess of Carchemish from at least the Old Babylonian period. The monumental hieroglyphic inscriptions discovered in Tabal along with the worship of Kubaba in the region give good reason to suppose that the ethnic and cultural affinities of the people of Tabal were predominantly Luwian, but with some admixture of Hurrian. Here too there seems to have been a significant continuity of traditions from the Late
Bronze Age Hittite world through the succeeding Dark Age down into the first millennium.

The Tabalic texts make mention of a people called the Kasku, whose territories apparently bordered on those of the country of Tabal. These were almost certainly the descendants of the Late Bronze Age Kaska people. We have suggested that Kaskans may have been associated with the final collapse and abandonment of Hattusa. With the disintegration of the Hittite kingdom, they may well have swept through the former Hittite homeland from their own homeland in the Pontic region and occupied large expanses of former Hittite territory, to the southern bend of the Marassantiya river, and east to the Euphrates. Indeed the Assyrian king Tiglath-Pileser I (c.1112–1072) was confronted by Kaska forces as far east as the upper Euphrates. Almost certainly they were one of the great survivors, and one of the principal beneficiaries, of the upheavals at the end of the Late Bronze Age.

We also learn from Assyrian records of another people, the Mushki, with whom Tiglath-Pileser was involved in conflicts in a region yet to be precisely identified to the south-east of the old Hittite homeland:

In my accession year: 20,000 Mushki with their five kings, who had held for fifty years the lands Alzu and Purulumzu—bearers of tribute and tithe to the god Ashur My Lord—(the Mushki), whom no king had ever repelled, being confident of their strength, they came down and captured the Land of Kadmuhu. With the support of the god Ashur, My Lord, I put my chariotry and army in readiness and not bothering about the rear guard, I traversed the rough terrain of Mount Kashiyari. I fought with their 20,000 men-at-arms and five kings in the Land of Kadmuhu. I brought about their defeat. Like a storm demon I piled up the corpses of the warriors on the battlefield and made their blood flow into the hollows and plains of the mountains. I cut off their heads and stacked them like grain piles around their cities. I brought out their booty, property, and possessions without number. I took the remaining 6,000 of their troops who had fled from my weapons and submitted to me and regarded them as people of my land. (Assyrian royal inscription, trans. Grayson (1976: 6–7 §12))

The origins and ethnic affinities of the Mushki, who may have formed an alliance with the Kasku, are far from certain. They may, however, have entered Anatolia in the west from Thrace and Macedonia in the course of the twelfth century, subsequently advancing through Anatolia, then southwards and finally encountering the Assyrians. They
are often closely associated with another group of foreign invaders from the west, the people referred to in Greek sources as the Phrygians. According to Homer’s *Iliad*, the Phrygians were already well established in their new homeland at the time of the Trojan War, although most scholars follow the Greek geographer Strabo and date their arrival slightly later. At all events, they appear to have become firmly established in central Anatolia, particularly within the region of the old Hittite homeland, before the end of the second millennium. Originally they may have been quite separate in origin from the Mushki, but subsequently amalgamated with them towards the end of the eighth century. Very likely this amalgamation was brought about by the Mushki king Mita, who is referred to in the *Annals* of the Assyrian king Sargon (who claims to have inflicted a defeat on him), and can be identified with the well known Midas of Greek tradition.

In Mita’s reign, Phrygia attained a high level of material prosperity, and by the end of the eighth century was a major political power in Anatolia. Mita established the city of Gordion, about 96 kilometres west of modern Ankara, as his capital. From here he ruled a kingdom which extended southwards to the Cilician plain, and westwards as far as the Aegean sea. More than any of the other tribal groups in evidence in Anatolia in the centuries which followed the end of the Bronze Age, the united Mushki-Phrygian peoples were the true heirs to the role of the sovereign people of Anatolia, a role which the Hittites in spite of their chequered fortunes had filled with distinction for half a millennium.

**The Hittites in Biblical Tradition**

The Bible contains a number of references to Hittites and Hittite kings. What connections, if any, do these biblical Hittites have with the kingdom which dominated Anatolia and parts of Syria in the Late Bronze Age, and its neo-Hittite successors in the centuries which followed?

A number of references place the Hittites in a Canaanite context, clearly as a local Canaanite tribe, descendants of the eponymous patriarch Heth, and encountered by Abraham around Hebron. The names of these ‘Hittites’ are for the most part of Semitic type; for example, Ephron, Judith, Zohar. These were presumably the Hittites who were subject to Solomon, and who were elsewhere in conflict
with the Israelites.\textsuperscript{138} They were a small group living in the hills during the era of the Patriarchs and the later descendants of that group,\textsuperscript{139} and are clearly to be distinguished from the Hittites of historical records.

Yet there are other biblical references to the Hittites and their land which are inconsistent with the notion of their being a small Canaanite hill tribe.\textsuperscript{140} Most notable among these is 2 Kings 7: 6: ‘The Lord had made the army of the Syrians hear the sound of chariots, and of horses, the sound of a great army, so that they said to one another, “Behold, the king of Israel has hired against us the kings of the Hittites and the kings of Egypt to come upon us.” ’ (RSV)

This conveys the impression that the Hittite kings were at least commensurate in importance and power with the Egyptian pharaohs. A similar impression is conveyed by 2 Chron. 1: 17: ‘They imported a chariot from Egypt for six hundred shekels of silver, and a horse for a hundred and fifty; likewise through them these were exported to all the kings of the Hittites and the kings of Syria.’ (RSV)\textsuperscript{141} In these cases the references may well be to the neo-Hittite kingdoms of Syria.\textsuperscript{142}

Is there any connection between the two sets of references, any relationship between the local Canaanite tribe and the neo-Hittite kingdoms? The name similarity could be due simply to chance conflation.\textsuperscript{143} Certainly there is no evidence that at any stage in their history the Hittites either settled in or extended their influence into Palestine or other states in southern Syria. On the other hand, Hoffner has commented that Hittite cultural influence reaching the Israelites indirectly via the Canaanite kingdoms, after a passage of time, is detectable in many instances. His contention is that through many years of contact with cities in Syria and Phoenicia (Carchemish, Aleppo, Ugarit) Hittite civilization left its marks there. From there Hittite influences may have filtered southwards to Israel just prior to the beginning of the kingdom of David.\textsuperscript{144}
The Trojan War: Myth or Reality?

The Enduring Fascination of Troy

The citadel with which the name Troy is associated lies in the north-west corner of Anatolia in the region called the Troad, so named by Graeco-Roman writers who believed that the whole area was controlled by Troy. The Troad forms a fairly clearly definable geographical unit. It is bounded on three sides by sea—the Hellespont (modern Dardanelles) to the north, and the Aegean Sea to the west and south. The whole area is mountainous and dominated in the south by the Mt. Ida massif. It has two major rivers, the Simois and the Scamander. At the confluence of these rivers lies the site of Troy itself, on a mound called Hisarlık, the modern Turkish word for fortress.¹

About 7 kilometres north of the site is the waterway linking the Aegean Sea with the Propontis (mod. Sea of Marmara) which the Classical Greeks called the Hellespont (mod. Dardanelles). Much of the flood-plain which lies in between may have been the location of Bronze Age Troy’s harbour. However Professor Korfmann, director of excavations at Hisarlık since 1988, believes that the city’s harbour was much more likely to have been the deep and sheltered anchorage at Beşik Bay, located 8 kilometres to the southwest of Hisarlık. It is of course possible that there were harbour facilities at both locations.

For almost 3,000 years, the story of the Trojan War has provided one of the western world’s richest sources of inspiration in the realms of art and literature. Amongst the ancient Greeks and Romans, episodes from Homer’s account of the war offered many themes for artistic expression and philosophical reflection. The story of Troy’s destruction provided the Augustan poet Vergil with the starting point for his great epic the Aeneid, a literary achievement which was tempered, perhaps enhanced, by its underlying political motives. In later European art and literature
the tradition once again captured the imagination of a succession of writers, artists, philosophers, and political theorists.

But behind the artistic reflections of the tradition, there has been since the time of the Classical Greeks one persistent question. Did the Trojan War really happen? In the history of Classical scholarship, whether ancient or modern, there has seldom been a time when this question has not been asked. In recent years in particular, Homeric scholars have devoted much effort to speculating on whether or not there is any historical basis for the tradition of a Trojan War. The tradition has been scrutinized in great detail at a number of international conferences, and numerous books, articles, and public media programmes have been devoted to it, as well as a blockbuster Hollywood epic.

Fascination with the possibility that Homer's account in the *Iliad* is based on fact is bound to continue, and scholars will continue to probe for the truth behind the legend. Moreover, Heinrich Schliemann's excavation of the mound at Hisarlık provided, apparently, a specific physical setting for the conflict, and seemed to dispel for all time the belief that the *Iliad* was no more than a literary fantasy.

There are those scholars who firmly believe that the story in the *Iliad* is based on fact—that there was indeed a major conflict between Bronze Age Greeks and Trojans, that the Greeks were united under the command of Agamemnon, that there really was a massive Greek armada of 1,000 or more ships (1,186 to be precise), and that the cause of the conflict was the abduction of Helen of Sparta by the Trojan prince Paris. Schliemann himself was in no doubt about this. Nor was Carl Blegen, the American archaeologist who continued the excavations at Hisarlık from 1932 to 1938. Blegen commented: 'It can no longer be doubted, when one surveys the state of our knowledge today, that there really was an actual historical Trojan War, in which a coalition of Achaians, or Mycenaeans, under a king whose overlordship was recognized, fought against the people of Troy and their allies.' But other scholars are sceptical. Dr Hiller comments: 'Our faith in a historical Trojan war is founded above all on Homer, but Homer is not a historian. First of all he is a poet; what he relates is not history but myth.'

We may well attribute many details of the tradition to a creative imagination, or to borrowings from other times and other places. But if
we strip away all these details, are we still left with a core tradition, based on historical fact, of a Greek–Trojan conflict which ended in the destruction and abandonment of Troy?

**Possible Anatolian Sources on Troy**

Since the conflict is set in Late Bronze Age Anatolia, our Anatolian sources provide an obvious starting point in our search for an answer to this question. Do these sources throw any light on the possibility that the tradition of the Trojan War has a historical basis?

Most scholars agree that Homer’s Troy did exist, and can be identified with the Late Bronze Age remains of Hisarlık. And it is generally agreed that the region around Hisarlık provided a plausible setting for Homer’s epic tale of conflict between Mycenaean Greeks and local Anatolians towards the end of the Bronze Age. If this region was in fact the location of an important kingdom during the Hittite period, then we might expect to find references to it in the Hittite texts.

The Swiss scholar Emil Forrer claimed to have found such references. In the course of his discussions of Ahhiyawa in the 1920s, Forrer drew attention to the place names Wilusiya and Taruisa, which are mentioned together in the *Annals* of the Hittite king Tudhalia I/II. These names appear last in a list of countries in western Anatolia which had rebelled against Hittite rule early in the New Kingdom (see Ch. 6). According to Forrer, they were the Hittite way of writing Troia (Troy) and (W)ilios (Ilion). Forrer noted references in other texts to the vassal kingdom Wilusa, particularly in the treaty drawn up early in the thirteenth century between the Hittite king Muwattalli and the Wilusan king Alaksandu. The latter recalls the name of the Trojan prince Alexandros (Paris) in the *Iliad*. Other identifications of Homeric names with Anatolian names have been suggested. Thus Priam(os), the name of the Trojan king, has been equated with *Pariya-muwa* or even *Piyamar-adu*, and Eteocles (*Etewocelewes*), son of Andreus, king of Orchomenos, with *Tawagalawa*.

In spite of Forrer’s arguments, many scholars dismissed the Wilusiya–Wilios/Taruisa–Troia equation as improbable, or at best unprovable. Nor was there any prospect of obtaining proof without a clear indication from the texts as to where the kingdom of Wilusa actually lay. Undoubtedly it was situated somewhere in western Anato-
lia. But its location by a number of scholars in the far north-west was really no more than a matter of faith.

Do recent discoveries throw any further light on the question? Unfortunately the silver bowl hieroglyphic inscription which records the conquest of Tarwiza (= Taruisa?) by a king called Tudhaliya (see Ch. 6) has little to offer in this respect since the bowl’s provenance is unknown. But Professor Hawkins’ translation of the Karabel inscription which refers to the kingdom of Mira and identifies a man called Tarkasnawa as its ruler (see Ch. 12) has provided an important key to the final solution. The monument on which the inscription appears, in the Karabel mountain pass some 28 kilometres east of Izmir, may well have served as a boundary marker on Mira’s northern frontier. From here the kingdom extended southwards, almost certainly incorporating the royal seat of the former kingdom of Arzawa proper, Apasa, which as we have noted very likely lay on the site of Classical Ephesos.

Now we know from information provided by two treaties drawn up by Mursili with his western vassals that Mira shared a boundary with the Seha River Land. This country must have lain north of Mira, a conclusion reinforced by a reference in Manapa-Tarhunda’s letter (see below) to the Land of Lazpa, apparently a dependency of the Seha River Land. Lazpa can be identified with the island of Lesbos off the north-west coast of Anatolia. As we have earlier noted (Ch. 8), the Seha river itself must have been either the Classical Caicos river (mod. Bakir) or Classical Hermos (mod. Gediz). Given this location for the Seha River Land north of Mira, we can turn once more to the question of where the kingdom of Wilusa lay.

In Chapter 9, we referred to a letter written by Manapa-Tarhunda, vassal ruler of the Seha River Land, to the Hittite king Muwattalli II. The letter informs us that Muwattalli had dispatched an expeditionary force to the region for the purpose of restoring order in Wilusa, which may have been occupied by the region’s notorious troublemaker Piyamaradu. An earlier confrontation between Manapa-Tarhunda and Piyamaradu, perhaps over Wilusa, had ended in Manapa-Tarhunda’s defeat and humiliation. What is significant for our investigation here is that the Hittite force arrived first in the Seha River Land, and from there proceeded to Wilusa. Clearly Wilusa lay beyond the Seha River Land; that is to say, it was further to the north. On this basis there can be little doubt that Wilusa lay in the far north-west of Anatolia, in
the same region as Homeric Troy. The conclusion now seems inescapable. The royal seat of Wilusa and the city of Troy were closely connected, if not identical.

As far as we can judge from the meagre evidence provided by our Hittite texts, Wilusa figured in a number of military operations and/or political upheavals during the thirteenth century. These may well have involved or been supported by the king of Ahhiyawa, particularly given Piyamaradu’s role as an agent for the expansion of Ahhiyawan interests in the western Anatolian states. On at least one occasion, a dispute over Wilusa had led to a confrontation between Hatti and Ahhiyawa, as attested in the so-called Tawagalawa letter (see Ch. 11). And Piyamaradu’s aggressive activities in the region had the potential for stirring up fresh hostilities between the Hittite and Ahhiyawan kings. On a later occasion, upheavals in the same region led to the Wilusan king Walmu being driven from his throne (see Ch. 12), perhaps again a consequence of Ahhiyawan intervention in western Anatolian affairs. If we accept that the Ahhiyawans of the Hittite texts were Mycenaean Greeks, then we certainly cannot rule out the possibility that the conflicts, or one of the conflicts, involving Wilusa provided at least part of the historical foundation for the tradition of a Trojan War.

Disappointingly, we have yet to find any clear evidence of a tablet archive at Hisarlık itself. Given the relatively sophisticated society that must have occupied the site in the Late Bronze Age, and Troy’s commercial importance and extensive trading links, it would be most surprising if there were no literate members amongst its population. Further, if the equation with Wilusa is valid, then Troy like all other Near Eastern kingdoms of its size and status must have had a chancellery served by scribes either of local origin or imported from elsewhere. Indeed it is becoming increasingly evident from a number of recent excavations that even quite small regional centres of the Hittite kingdom had their own tablet archives and scribal staffs. And there is no doubt that Hittite kings communicated in writing with most if not all their vassal rulers in western Anatolia, including Wilusa. But to date only one piece of writing has come to light in Troy. During the course of excavations in 1995, a biconvex bronze seal bearing a brief inscription in Luwian hieroglyphs was discovered. On one side of the seal a man’s name appears, along with his profession as scribe. On the other side is the name of a woman. Unfortunately neither name is complete, but...
presumably the pair are husband and wife. The seal belongs within the context of level VIIb1, and thus dates to the second half of the twelfth century—well after any feasible date for a Trojan War of the kind narrated by Homer (see below). Nor can we be sure whether the seal originated in Troy or was imported there, though an argument advanced in favour of the former is that we have the actual original seal and not just an impression of it.

The seal may thus provide us with our first tangible evidence not only of writing in Troy in the second millennium—albeit at a very late date—but also of an actual scribal presence there, since the seal owner identifies himself as a scribe. Further, the language of the inscription is our first tangible indication that the population of Troy at this time was at least partly of Luwian origin. Of course one swallow does not make a summer, and we must be wary about jumping to any firm conclusions either about literacy in Troy or the ethnicity of its population on the basis of a single small and very late piece of evidence. But it is a start. And we can always hope that at Hisarlık a tablet archive will one day emerge—as has happened more than once in recent years at a number of other sites of the Late Bronze Age world.

Troy’s Role in Anatolian Affairs

From Hittite sources we learn that Mycenaean involvement in Anatolian affairs covered a period of some 200 years, roughly from the last quarter of the fifteenth to the last quarter of the thirteenth century, and reached its peak during the first half of the thirteenth century. Both documentary and archaeological evidence indicate that Milawata (Miletos) became the most important base for Mycenaean activity in western Anatolia. As we have seen, it was from this base that the king of Ahhiyawa sought to extend his influence through adjacent regions in western Anatolia—regions which in some cases at least were subject to the overlordship of the Hittite king.

Where does Troy fit into this picture? To begin with, we should be aware that it has assumed an importance in modern scholarship, as well as in popular belief, which may well be out of proportion to its actual importance in its contemporary context. This of course is due partly to its literary associations, but also to the fact that when Schliemann excavated the site of Hisarlık, little else was known of the Bronze Age
civilizations of Anatolia. The discoveries during the last century of a number of these civilizations, most notably the kingdom of the Hittites, have helped provide a more balanced perspective of Troy’s role and status in the Bronze Age—though the romantic image of the kingdom of Priam lives on. In political terms, it was clearly not a major Anatolian state or kingdom, even amongst its western Anatolian neighbours. But it was by no means insignificant.

There can be little doubt that at the height of its prosperity in the Late Bronze Age, the citadel with its spacious residences was home to a wealthy, elite ruling class. And evidence uncovered by Blegen made it likely that at this time a substantial population also occupied the area immediately outside the citadel. That now appears to be confirmed. Excavations conducted on the site since 1988, under the direction of Professor Manfred Korfmann, have furnished evidence of a ‘lower city’, adjacent to and extending c.400 metres southwards from the citadel. The evidence is in the form of Late Bronze Age house remains, beneath the later Hellenistic and Roman levels, located next to as well as some distance from the citadel wall, and the remains of what the excavators believe to be a fortification system, consisting of a possible wall and beyond that a palisade and two ditches.21 An underground water system which dates back to the Early Bronze Age, and wells sunk apparently during the Late Bronze Age, are adduced as further evidence for the existence of a significant Bronze Age settlement south of the citadel mound.22

On the basis of the conclusions drawn from these findings—conclusions which have admittedly been the subject of some acrimonious debate23—the recent excavations have resulted in a tenfold increase in the area known to be covered by Hisarlik-Troy, from 20,000 to 200,000 square metres, during the period of levels VI and VII. In size Troy was roughly comparable to the city of Ugarit.24 Given the extent and food-producing capacity of the region in which it lay, Professor Korfmann estimates that Troy could have supported a population of between 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants.

These considerations give us a clearer view of Troy within the context of urban development in Anatolia during the second millennium. ‘The high mound and the outer town to the south are now recognized as similar to central Anatolian city-state systems with a high fortified mound and a lower fortified settlement, often at the level of the plain. This new understanding places Troy within the typology of Anatolian
sites such as Hattusa, with its royal residence complex in Büyükkale and its outer town, as well as the high mound/lower town configuration at Kültepe during the Assyrian colony period. There can be no doubt that Hisarlık-Troy was the centre of a prosperous if not politically or militarily powerful northern Anatolian kingdom, and lay in a zone of dense population amid great expanses of rich, arable soil. Through most of the Bronze Age, it had widespread commercial and cultural contacts. Mycenaean pottery in various sub-levels of level VI reflect contacts between Troy and the Mycenaean Greek world. Contact between mainland Greece and Troy is attested even in the Middle Bronze Age.

Yet if Troy equates with the kingdom of Wilusa, and Ahhiyawa with a Mycenaean Greek kingdom, then our Hittite records may indicate that the longstanding peaceful commercial intercourse between Greeks and Trojans was interrupted on a number of occasions, particularly in the thirteenth century, by disputes and perhaps open conflict between them. Such hostilities had wider ramifications. As we have noted, Wilusa had been the subject of a confrontation between Hatti and Ahhiyawa, possibly because of an Ahhiyawan or Ahhiyawan-sponsored attack on the Hittite vassal state.

A number of reasons have been suggested for an assumed Mycenaean assault, or series of assaults, on Troy, most of them rather more prosaic than a desire to revenge an outraged husband and recapture a beautiful Mycenaean queen. Perhaps Mycenaean aggression was due to a squabble over use of the Hellespont by Greek merchant ships; Troy may have used its strategic location on the Hellespont to prevent Greek vessels sailing through the straits to the Black Sea, or to impose heavy tolls on ships to which it did grant safe passage. Its location on an alleged major route linking Anatolia with central Europe may also have made it an attractive target for Greek conquest. Perhaps the war had something to do with attempts to gain control of the excellent fishing grounds provided by the Hellespont: ‘Troy with its former large bay would not only have formed an ideal harbour base for fishing, but the bay itself would almost certainly have been seasonally full to bursting with fish shoals.’ Another suggestion is that the conflict arose over access to copper resources.

All this is pure speculation. There are those who still firmly maintain that the war was fought over the abduction of a Mycenaean queen, even
if she were a willing abductee. Hittite kings were certainly prepared to
go to war to reclaim subjects who had been removed, whether forcibly
or voluntarily, from their kingdom. But all speculations about the
possible reasons for a Greek–Trojan conflict bring us back to the basic
question of whether the tradition of the Trojan War has an authentic
historical basis. Can we relate what we learn from Hittite records to such
a tradition? Further to this, can we provide a specific archaeological
setting in which the tradition originated?

The Identification of ‘Homeric’ Troy

According to Blegen, Homer’s Troy was the first phase of the seventh of
the nine major settlements on the site—Troy VIIa.33 This conclusion,
though long accepted, is no longer in favour. At this stage of its
existence, Troy has been described as little more than a ‘shanty town’,
markedly inferior to its immediate predecessor.34 And its destruction
has now been dated to c.1200—at the very earliest35—too late to be
associated with a major Mycenaean assault from the Greek mainland.

The more likely candidate for Homeric Troy is the final phase of the
sixth level of the city—Troy VIh. This level, with its imposing towers
and distinctive sloping walls,36 accords much better with the Homeric
description of Priam’s Troy than does its successor level. Blegen argued
that there were clear signs that VIh was destroyed by earthquake rather
than by human agency, as indicated by cracks in the tower and wall of
the citadel and evidence of floor subsidence. However while allowing for
the possibility that this damage was caused by earthquake activity,37 we
cannot be sure whether this happened in the last phase of Troy VI or the
first phase of Troy VII, or on a scale large enough to cause the destruc-
tion of the whole site.38 By way of compromise, it has been suggested
that Troy VIh could still have been brought to an end by enemy
action—perhaps assisted by an earthquake which made the city vulner-
able to conquest.39

The archaeological record provides no precise information on when
Troy VIh was destroyed. The large amounts of LHIIIA pottery found in
the destruction deposits40 together with a small quantity of LHIIB1
pottery suggest that VIh fell some time after 1300, probably in the early
decades of the thirteenth century.41 This would almost certainly place its
fall in the reign of the Hittite king Muwattalli, perhaps around the time
of the disturbances referred to in the Manapa-Tarhunda letter. It is possible that the confrontation between Hatti and Ahhiyawa over Wilusa, as referred to in the Tawagalawa letter, also belongs to this period. But subsequent hostilities involving Wilusa, such as the overthrow of its king Walmu, must date to the VIIa (VIIi) phase of Troy’s history. Whether or not any of this can be linked with the story in the Iliad has yet to be demonstrated.  

Let us review at this point what we learn from our Anatolian sources which may have some bearing on the Trojan War tradition:

1. Mycenaean Greeks were closely involved in the political and military affairs of western Anatolia, particularly in the thirteenth century.
2. During this period the Hittite vassal state Wilusa was subjected to a number of military actions in which Mycenaean may have been directly or indirectly involved. On one or more occasions its territory was perhaps occupied by outside troops; on one or more occasions its king was dethroned.
4. In philological terms, Wilusa can be equated with the Greek (W)ilios, or Ilion.

5. At some point within the period of the recorded hostilities against Wilusa, Troy VIh was destroyed. VIh is the level which best accords with Homer’s description of the citadel of Troy.

Do these points add up to some kind of proof of a ‘Trojan War’ as depicted in the Iliad?

Let us review the negative arguments:

1. Our Anatolian written sources provide no evidence for a single, major, extended attack by invading Greeks on an Anatolian kingdom which led to the eventual destruction of that kingdom. Rather the pattern is one of a number of limited attacks carried out over several decades or more, and perhaps an occasional temporary occupation of a beleaguered kingdom.

2. In some cases, Mycenaean Greeks may have been directly involved in the attacks. But in other cases, the attacks were carried out by Anatolian forces under the command of local leaders.

3. While Troy VIh suffered destruction during the period in question, we have no clear evidence that this was due to enemy attack.

4. Contrary to Greek tradition, archaeological evidence indicates that after the destruction of Troy VIh its successor Troy VIIa followed almost immediately. The site was apparently occupied by the same population group.

If we take all this into account, the most we can say is that our Anatolian sources provide evidence for a conflict, or series of conflicts, in which Mycenaean Greeks may have played some role, against a northwestern Anatolian kingdom towards the end of the Late Bronze Age.

Did this, then, provide the raw material for Mycenaean ballads and lays about the exploits of Mycenaean kings and noblemen on the Anatolian mainland, and ultimately the kernel of the ‘historical tradition’ in the Iliad?

The Making of an Epic

The assumption that the Homeric epics were in a sense an end-product of at least several centuries of oral tradition rests to some extent on the
evidence, though slight, of balladists or minstrels performing as entertainers at the banquets of Mycenaean kings and noblemen. The case for a significant body of Mycenaean poetry has been argued by Webster, who states: ‘We may suppose that there were three main kinds of poetry at every Mycenaean palace: cult songs, songs about the great kings of the past sung on their anniversaries, and songs sung at banquets, which dealt with the international present but laid a strong emphasis on the exploits of the present local king.’

Of course we have no actual Mycenaean ballads or tales or songs, and we can only deduce what their contents and themes might have been. To do this, we try to work backwards from the ‘final product’, so to speak, making assumptions about the starting point of the Homeric tradition, and hypothesizing about various ‘in-between’ stages before the epic reached the form in which we know it. In this respect, it might be useful to compare the development of the Mesopotamian Gilgamesh epic. The genesis of the epic dates back probably to the middle of the third millennium, when contemporary evidence attests to the existence of a king called Gilgamesh of the Sumerian city-state Uruk. The general view is that a body of legendary tales gradually arose about this king which were orally transmitted over a period of perhaps 500 years prior to the composition of the first version of the epic early in the second millennium.

But can we determine a specific starting point for the Homeric tradition? Our Greek sources assign various dates to the Trojan War, mostly between the thirteenth and the early twelfth centuries. Mycenaean involvement in western Anatolian affairs reached its peak in the same period. But the history of conflict between Mycenaean Greeks and native Anatolians in western Anatolia goes back at least to the early fourteenth century when Attarssya, a ‘man of Ahhiya’ was involved in military action with 100 chariots against the Hittites on the Anatolian mainland (see Ch. 6). It is just possible that Attarssya was the Hittite way of writing the Greek name Atreus, a name borne in Greek tradition by one of the early rulers of Mycenae. Could the Trojan War tradition have begun with a military engagement between Mycenaean Greeks and Anatolians in the early fourteenth, or even the fifteenth century?

Professor Vermeule has argued that there are linguistic as well as other elements in the *Iliad* which could well be dated to this period. From a study of a number of passages in the poem, she concludes that the
deaths of ‘Homeric’ heroes like Hektor and Patroklos were already sung in the fifteenth or fourteenth centuries. Thus Homer’s epic contained elements which go back a century, or perhaps much more, before the period when the Trojan War was alleged to have taken place.\textsuperscript{48} Ballads and lays celebrating Greek heroic exploits in western Anatolia may well have been sung at the courts of Mycenaean kings and noblemen in the thirteenth century. But they could have reflected episodes from a distant as well as a more recent past. The tradition on which the \textit{Iliad} was based may have begun much earlier than many scholars currently believe. With each succeeding generation, new episodes, new elements were added to the ongoing saga of conflict between Greeks and Anatolians.\textsuperscript{49}

The process continued beyond the end of the Bronze Age. This is apparent in a number of matters of detail in both the \textit{Iliad} and the \textit{Odyssey}. Attention has often been drawn to various inconsistencies in such detail, which make it clear that ‘Homeric society’ consisted of elements drawn from three different periods—the Mycenaean Age, the so-called Dark Age, and the early Iron Age. These inconsistencies support the notion of a dynamic oral tradition, in which details can readily be adapted to reflect contemporary fashions, practices, and beliefs.

We should think of Homeric tradition as consisting of a number of chronological layers covering a period of many centuries, with each layer adding to or blending in with preceding layers, with Bronze Age warriors inhabiting a Dark Age world, and vice versa. Finally the tradition of a Greek–Anatolian conflict was distilled in Greek literature into the story of a single major conflict. But it needed a specific setting—a citadel in north-western Anatolia whose population was subjected to a ten-year siege by Achaian Greeks. The citadel was finally occupied and destroyed by the Greeks, and its population was dispersed—according to Greek tradition. Is such an event purely the result of a creative poetic imagination?

Perhaps not entirely. We have linked Homeric Ilion/Troy with the Anatolian state of Wilusa, and noted the military actions affecting Wilusa during the thirteenth century in which Mycenaean Greeks may have been directly or indirectly involved. Yet it is clear from the Hittite records that Wilusa survived any attacks and enemy occupations inflicted upon it. The archaeological record also bears this out—if
Wilusa's royal seat is the citadel of Hisarlık–Troy. Troy too rose again almost immediately after its destruction at the end of Level VI.

But there did come a time when Troy was left virtually derelict—at the end of level VIIb, some time between 1100 and 1000. This was after the collapse of the major Bronze Age civilizations in the Near East. The agents of Troy's destruction at this time may well have been marauding groups similar to the Sea Peoples of the Egyptian records. Whether or not that is so, we cannot rule out the possibility that an episode or episodes from this period contributed significantly to the tale of conflict in the *Iliad*, and may in fact have provided the epic poet with a closure for his tale.

All this contributed to the making of the epic: a long tradition of conflicts between western Anatolian peoples and Mycenaean Greeks or their agents, a north-western Anatolian state which on several occasions in the thirteenth century may well have been a victim of these conflicts, the final destruction and abandonment of the citadel of this state. It was a ruined and largely deserted site that greeted Greek travellers to the Troad from the Aiolian and the Ionian peoples who settled in western Anatolia after the Bronze Age. Tradition associated this site with an extended conflict or series of conflicts between the immigrants' Bronze Age ancestors and the local population and their allies. They now saw before them Troy's ultimate fate—its destruction and abandonment. Perhaps it was in this context that the epic of the Trojan War began to take final shape.

In this respect, then, the story of the Trojan War is almost certainly a literary conflation—one which was several hundred years in the making. During this period, there was a gradual accumulation of traditions, many of which may have been inspired by a range of historical incidents. Some of these may have extended well back before the period when the war was alleged to have taken place. At some point, a selection was made from amongst these traditions, and those selected were woven into a continuous narrative. Yet the long-standing belief that this was the achievement of a single great creative genius of the late eighth century, a blind Ionian poet called Homer, may well be an oversimplification. As Vermeule points out, 'it seems fairly clear that no one used the name “Homer” to refer to an individual person until, c.500 BC, Xenophanes and Herakleitos created him to find fault with him.' It could be that there were a number of ‘creative geniuses’ who contributed
significantly to the development of the epics. Quite possibly this part of the process began long before the late eighth century. There may have been one or more Dark Age poets to whom the bard’s mantle should be assigned, or at least with whom it should be shared.
A Final Comment

With the reign of Suppiluliuma II, we have reached the final pages in the saga of Hittite rule in the Bronze Age Near East. The kingdom over which Suppiluliuma and his predecessors held sway came quickly to an end. Hattusa, the royal capital, fell into ruin and its population was dispersed. So much we conclude from the archaeologically attested degradation and abandonment of the site of Hattusa early in the twelfth century, so much from the absence of any evidence to indicate that the Hattusa-based kingdom of the Hittites continued beyond the reign of Suppiluliuma.

For almost half a millennium, the Hittites were the dominant power in Anatolia, and for much of this period controlled substantial amounts of territory extending eastwards across Anatolia and northern Syria to the Euphrates river. Yet in their progress from petty kingdom to political and military supremacy over much of the Near Eastern world, they experienced dramatic fluctuations in their fortunes. Periods of internal political stability and great military triumphs abroad alternated with periods of internal political upheavals, rebellions in the subject territories, and invasion of the homeland by foreign powers. Indeed on more than one occasion, the kingdom of Hatti was brought close to extinction, by disruptive and destabilizing forces within it as well as by a range of external forces which threatened to engulf it.

When we consider the kingdom’s vulnerability to such forces, the remarkable fact is that it survived even the first few decades of its existence, let alone continued and sometimes flourished over a timespan of five centuries. Yet even in its peak periods, the power structure which the kings of Hatti built up in the wake of their conquests always remained precarious, given the difficulties which these kings experienced in mounting major campaigns in more than one region of their kingdom simultaneously, their manpower shortages, their dependence
on the loyalty of often unreliable vassal rulers, and the everpresent danger of formidable enemies implacably opposed to them. That their lease of power in the Near East lasted so long was an achievement due as much to their political and diplomatic astuteness in their dealings with vassal states and foreign kingdoms as to military prowess. In the field of international diplomacy they were clearly at the forefront of the peoples of the ancient world.

In other respects, they left some enduring legacies to later civilizations long after they themselves had disappeared from human memory. The neo-Hittite civilization of Iron Age Syria provides one of the immediate and most tangible examples of this. But there were other, less easily definable legacies. Hittite civilization drew much from the cultural traditions—social, religious, literary, artistic—of both earlier and contemporary Near Eastern civilizations. In this respect the Hittites were not themselves, apparently, a highly innovative or creative people. Yet by absorbing and preserving many elements of the civilizations of their neighbours, they helped ensure the preservation and transmission of these elements for later civilizations.

Customs, traditions, and institutions which are first attested in the earliest historical societies of Mesopotamia passed from one generation to another and from one civilization to another through the entire Near Eastern world over a period of several thousand years. The Hittites played an important part in this process. They absorbed within the fabric of their own civilization cultural and ethnic elements drawn from the wide range of civilizations with which they came into contact, either directly or through cultural intermediaries. Their religion was a composite of rituals and beliefs made up of native Hattian, Indo-European, Hurrian, and early Mesopotamian elements. Hittite ‘literature’ was also multi-cultural, consisting largely of folk tales, legends, and myths which were Hattian, Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian, and Hurrian in origin, and included a Hittite version of the epic of Gilgamesh. The Hittite collection of laws carried on a long line of legal tradition which extended back through the Code of Hammurabi to the reform texts and legal proclamations of the rulers of the Sumerian city-states in Early Bronze Age Mesopotamia. And aspects of Hittite laws and Hittite diplomatic contracts, which drew at least some of their inspiration from earlier Mesopotamian societies, left their mark on biblical laws and covenants.
More speculative, but perhaps no less important, is the role the Hittites may have played in the transmission of Near Eastern cultural traditions westwards to the Greek world. Graeco-Roman divination procedures had their prototypes in the procedures which are described in detail in Babylonian and Hittite texts. Significant elements of Greek mythology, first appearing in Hesiod’s *Theogony*, can be traced back to Near Eastern mythological traditions, some of which are preserved in Hittite texts. Nor can we rule out the possibility that the Gilgamesh epic directly or indirectly influenced the Homeric epics, and that the Hittite version of the former was known in the early Greek world.

The possible reasons for the fall of the Hittite kingdom have provided grounds for much inconclusive theorizing and debate. Yet we should give as much if not more attention to the question of how the kingdom managed to survive so long. Against many odds, its timespan considerably exceeded that of a number of other Near Eastern kingdoms—Akkadian, neo-Sumerian, Old and Middle Assyrian, and the later neo-Assyrian, Chaldaean, and Persian empires—and matched that of New Kingdom Egypt.

In the final analysis we might compare the kingdom of Hatti with a living organism that grows and flourishes for a time before succumbing to its inevitable end. The kingdom had emerged and developed, it had survived a number of setbacks which might have brought its life to a premature end, it had reached its prime, and for a relatively long period flourished in its prime. In its later years, when decline appeared to be setting in, it had enjoyed a brief but vigorous new lease of life. Finally and inevitably its time ran out. There were others to take its place. But even after its demise, its progeny lived on, until this progeny too succumbed to other forces which were to shape the Near Eastern world in the decades and centuries to follow.
APPENDIX 1

Chronology

Relative and Absolute Chronology

In attempting to construct a time-framework for the history of the Bronze Age kingdoms, scholars use the terms relative and absolute chronology. Broadly speaking, the former refers to the sequence in which events, including the reigns of kings, took place within a particular period, and any degree of coincidence or overlap between them. But such sequences, and the periods to which they belong, are left floating in time until they are anchored by absolute chronology. It is the latter which provides a quantitative, numerically measurable dimension to studies in chronology.

As an initial basis for absolute chronology, a fixed point in history needs to be chosen, from which time-spans for events which occurred before or after it can be calculated. Most civilizations, ancient and modern, have used a year of 365 days as the basic time-unit in such calculations. But a variety of starting points have been chosen. For example, peoples of several of the early Mesopotamian civilizations dated events by noting the year of a particular king’s reign in which they occurred; thus the year of the king’s accession became the fixed point for dating purposes. The Romans used the legendary date of the founding of Rome as the starting point for their dating system. The ancient Greeks calculated their dates in terms of Olympiads, periods of four years beginning with the traditional date of the first Olympic Games (776 BC). For the last 2,000 years, however, the Christian tradition has led to the year of Christ’s birth being widely used as the chronological point of reference in calculating absolute dates for the course of human history.

Studies in the complementary areas of relative and absolute chronology provide the foundation for reconstructing the time-framework within which the Bronze Age kingdoms of the Near East rose, flourished, and fell. We shall consider below the methods used in attempting to arrange in their correct sequence the events which made up the histories of these kingdoms, and in assigning absolute dates to these events, calculated in terms of the number of years they occurred before the beginning of the Christian era.
Hittite Chronology

The chronology of the Hittite kingdom presents scholars with a number of problems. To begin with, Hittite records have left us no comprehensive king-lists, comparable to those of Egypt, Assyria, or Babylon. What are sometimes misleadingly called the Hittite king-lists are in fact royal offering-lists—records of sacrificial offerings to be made to dead kings and members of their families during the course of religious festivals. The information which we can obtain from these lists is very limited, and sometimes unreliable. They provide us only with the names of the recipients, they leave out (perhaps deliberately in one or two cases) persons we know occupied the throne, the names are not always in the correct chronological order, and there are inconsistencies between the seven different versions of the lists. Further, the lists end with the reign of the king Muwattalli II who died c.1272 BC, thus omitting the last five or six kings of the New Kingdom. In effect, the historical validity of the lists depends essentially on the extent to which the information they contain can be checked against other independent sources of information.

Hittite scholars thus have to construct their own list of Hittite kings, based on information derived from both tablets and seal impressions. This task is often facilitated by the inclusion of genealogical information in these sources, which sometimes traces a particular king’s ancestry back several generations to his great-grandfather, or even earlier. By collating this information, we can in most cases arrange the known kings in their correct order, and determine their relationship with their most recent predecessors on the throne.

But problems sometimes arise with a number of kings who had the same name. Thus we know of at least two kings called Hattusili, at least three called Tudhaliya, and three called Arnuwanda. In most cases we have little difficulty in determining whether a particular king was the first, second, or third of that name, particularly if his father’s name is given. But there are significant exceptions. For example, there were two kings called Arnuwanda, one of whom reigned early in the New Kingdom another towards its end, whose father was called Tudhaliya. Until comparatively recent times, historical events associated with the first father–son pair had been mistakenly assigned to the second. Further, there has been debate over how many homonymous kings there were. Two Hattusilis or three? Three Tudhaliyas or four? Were there two Hantilis, Zidantas, and Huzziyas who occupied the throne, or only one of each?

The lengths of the various reigns are also problematical. In contrast to information provided in Egyptian, Assyrian, and Babylonian records, we have no explicit information on how long each Hittite king reigned. But in many cases we do have a range of information, both Hittite and foreign, on which we can draw in making our calculations. The inevitable margin of error is probably quite
small in these cases. But again there are exceptions. For example, we can only
guess at how long most of Suppiluliuma I’s predecessors reigned. And several
scholars have proposed that Suppiluliuma’s reign, long assumed to have lasted
some forty years, should be reduced to about half this period. Obviously
adjustments of this kind have important implications, not only for Hittite
chronology per se, but also for synchronisms with the reigns of foreign rulers
and with political and military developments elsewhere in the Bronze Age
Near East.

Historical Synchronisms

Hittite scribes did not use any system of dates in their own records, and in
attempting to establish an absolute chronology for the reigns of the kings of
Hatti, and the events which took place during their reigns, we have to rely very
largely on a small number of synchronisms with events recorded in texts from
contemporary Near Eastern kingdoms. The following are some of the best
known examples:

1. Though the evidence remains circumstantial, the sack of Babylon by the
Hittite king Mursili I (very likely) brought to an end the reign of Samsudita-
tana, the last member of the dynasty of Hammurabi (see Ch. 5).
2. The pharaoh Tutankhamun died in the year the Hittite king Suppiluliuma I
conquered the Mitannian kingdom of Carchemish, which was some six
years prior to Suppiluliuma’s own death.
3. The Amarna letters may provide a series of synchronisms (some of those
suggested are very speculative) between events in Suppiluliuma’s reign and
the reigns of contemporary Near Eastern rulers—the kings of Mitanni,
Babylon, and Assyria, and the rulers of Hittite, Egyptian, and Mitannian
vassal states in Syria.
4. The battle of Kadesh was fought between the Hittite king Muwattalli II and
the pharaoh Ramesses II in the fifth year of the latter’s reign.
5. The battle of Nihriya was fought between the Hittite king Tudhaliya IV
and the Assyrian king Tukulti-Ninurta probably early in the latter’s reign
and provides useful synchronistic data on the kingdoms of Hatti,
Assyria, and Ugarit in the final decades of the Late Bronze Age.

Theoretically, correlation of events in Hittite history with the better estab-
lished chronologies of the kingdoms of Babylon, Egypt, and Assyria should
help provide some important fixed dates in Hittite history, given the use that
can be made of astronomical phenomena in compiling absolute dates for the
history of these kingdoms along with the information which the texts provide
about the lengths of the reigns of their respective kings. Yet the astronomical
data are open to different interpretations, and have led to different conclusions
about absolute dating. Thus a range of dates have been proposed for the sack of
Babylon by the Hittite king Mursili I—as early as 1651, and as late as 1499.
These differences have arisen for a number of reasons.

For Babylonian history, date calculations are based on a study of astronom-
ical observations recorded on tablets now surviving in neo-Assyrian copies of
the seventh century BC. The originals date back to the Old Babylonian period.
These indicate the observations made of the planet Venus in the eighth year of
the reign of the Babylonian king Ammisaduqa, the fifth and second last
member of the dynasty of Hammurabi.6 In theory, correlation of the recorded
positions of Venus with recorded lunar calendar dates should enable us to
calculate an absolute date for the eighth year of Ammisaduqa’s reign. And
since we know his position in the Babylonian dynasty, and the length of the
reign of each king who belonged to it, we should be able to establish a series of
absolute dates for the entire dynasty.

Unfortunately the calculation is not quite so simple. The complete cycle of
upper and lower conjunctions of Venus recurs every 275 years, and similar
positions of the planet also repeat themselves in two shorter cycles, one of 56
years, the other of 64 years.7 This has given rise to three possible chronologies,
with variations in between—what is commonly referred to as a High, a Middle,
and a Low chronology. With the help of Assyriological data contained in the
Mari archives, we can at least establish upper and lower limits, in terms of
absolute chronology, for the period of the Old Babylonian dynasty. Information
from these archives indicates that the Assyrian king Shamshi-Adad, whose reign
can on other grounds be dated to the late nineteenth–early eighteenth centuries
was contemporary with Hammurabi.8 On the basis of this information, plus
astronomical (and also ceramic) data, a range of possible dates have been
calculated for the end of the Babylonian dynasty, and thus the Hittite conquest
of Babylon—1651, 1595, 1531, 1499.9 Even then, allowance still has to be
made for unknown variables, such as the locations where the astronomical
observations were made, the possibility of corruption in the transmission of the
records between the time of their composition and the time when they finally
resurfaced in the neo-Babylonian texts, and sheer human error—or fabrica-
tion.10

Egyptologists have also attempted to establish an absolute chronology for
Egyptian history by combining information from king-lists and other textual
data with recorded observations of astronomical phenomena.11 A starting point
for studies in Egyptian chronology was provided by the remains of a work called
the Aegyptiaca (History of Egypt), compiled in the third century BC by the
Egyptian priest Manetho. In this work, Manetho listed thirty-one Egyptian
royal dynasties, from mythical times down to 323 BC (to the reign of Nectanebo II). We will leave aside here the question of the reliability of this list. In the main, dates in Egyptian history have been calculated by comparing data provided by the Sothic calendar (based on observations of the heliacal rising of the dog-star Sirius—called Sothis in Greek, Sopdet in Egyptian) with data from the Egyptian civil calendar. This was made possible by using the information that a Sothic cycle was of c. 1,460 years’ duration, and that a new cycle began in 139 AD; hence the previous cycle began c. 1320 BC. It then became possible, at least in theory, to calculate a set of absolute dates for events in Egyptian history on the basis of recorded synchronisms between civil calendar dates and the Sothic cycle. Once again, however, this is complicated by the fact that we cannot be certain where in Egypt particular astronomical observations were made. Clearly, calculations based on the Sothic cycle are dependent on where the observations of the heliacal rise of Sothis occurred. Opinion is largely divided between Thebes and Elephantine. Sightings at the latter (which lay on Egypt’s southern frontier) would produce a lower, i.e. later, date than the former. The overall result is that Egyptologists have produced a range of possible dates for various significant events in Egyptian history, including the royal accession dates. Thus we have four possible dates for Ramesses’ accession—1304, 1290, 1279, 1274, and five possible totals, ranging from 225 to 175, for the number of years between the accessions of Thutmose III and Ramesses II.

In view of these uncertainties, most Egyptologists now make little use of astronomical data, and are focusing their attention purely on internal evidence, i.e. the evidence provided by the texts themselves. In this context, the Manethonian tradition still continues to surface. Yet the internal evidence presents a further set of variables. As we have noted, the Egyptians have left us detailed king-lists which generally provide data about the lengths of individual reigns. But not always. And the chronology is made more complicated by the co-regency question. How many co-regencies were there, and how long were these co-regencies? Does the stated length of a particular reign include a period of co-regency, or does it indicate the length of a reign after a period of joint rule?

These questions have a bearing on attempts to construct an absolute chronology for Hittite history. For no dates in this history can be established with any degree of confidence or precision independently of the synchronisms provided by the Hittites’ Near Eastern neighbours. One may hope that further attention to correlations between Babylonian, Egyptian, and Assyrian data may help eliminate at least some of the uncertainties and variables in the task of establishing a firm absolute chronological framework for the history of the Near East during the Late Bronze Age. Currently, three main chronologies have been
developed, and scholars differ on which of the three they support—High, Middle, or Low. The periods between the established historical synchronisms, and the time-frame of events which occurred during these periods, have to be compressed or expanded accordingly.\textsuperscript{18} Scholars often show remarkable ingenuity in doing so, in accordance with their own preferred scheme.\textsuperscript{19}

There is, however, a current tendency for scholars progressively to lower absolute dates, and in a number of cases to compress the lengths of reigns or a sequence of historical events into a shorter time-frame. Thus there is general (though not universal) support for lowering the accession date of the pharaoh Ramesses II from an originally proposed 1304 BC to a presently favoured 1279 or 1274 BC.\textsuperscript{20} This consequentially leads to a lowering of the dates of his immediate royal predecessors and successors, and because of historical synchronisms between Egypt and Hatti, to a number of revisions to the dates of the reigns of the thirteenth- and twelfth-century Hittite kings.

Further revisions may of course be necessary in the light of subsequent developments in the general field of Bronze Age chronology. There is also the question, still to be effectively addressed, of the degree of compatibility between dates established by the analysis of texts and astronomical phenomena on the one hand and dates established by archaeological analysis (including, for example, dendrochronology) on the other. We might note in passing that while many Near Eastern historians are busily lowering dates, techniques used by Aegean archaeologists suggest that these dates should be pushed in the other direction!

It should be stressed, then, that the dates used throughout this book are provisional, will be disagreed with by a number of scholars, and may need revision or refinement in the light of subsequent developments in the field of Bronze Age chronology. For the present, the chronology used here arises largely from several points of reference—three assumed dates associated with three of the synchronisms referred to above: (a) 1595 for the fall of Babylon; (b) 1327 for the death of the pharaoh Tutankhamun; (c) 1279 for the accession of the pharaoh Ramesses II. In terms of the three proposed basic chronologies, my own chronological scheme falls within the Middle range.

\textbf{Redating of Hittite Texts}\textsuperscript{21}

We have referred above to the difficulties of assigning to particular reigns a number of texts associated with a name borne by more than one Hittite king. This has applied particularly to a small group of important texts in which the names Tudhaliya and Arnuwanda appear. As we have noted, there were two occasions on which a king Tudhaliya was succeeded by a son called Arnuwanda. In the past, the texts in question were commonly attributed to the second pair,
and were thus considered to provide information about historical events in the thirteenth century, in the last decades of the Hittite New Kingdom. However, one of the texts, the so-called Annals of Tudhaliya, contains a reference to the king of the Hurrians, almost certainly a king of Mitanni. Since the Mitannian kingdom was destroyed by Suppiluliuma I in the fourteenth century, and its remnants were subsequently absorbed into the Hittite and Assyrian kingdoms in turn, then the reference to the Hurrian king raised serious doubts about assigning this text, along with a number of others, to the thirteenth century.

A study of the language of the texts was needed to help resolve the matter. No living language remains static. Over a period of several centuries it will undergo a number of changes in its modes of expression, its grammar, its orthography, and in the characteristics of the script used to write it (i.e. the *ductus*; see Appendix 2). We would have little difficulty today in determining whether a piece of English prose was written in Elizabethan, Victorian, or modern times, on the basis of style, idiom, vocabulary, and even handwriting. Similarly the Hittite language underwent a number of changes during the five centuries of the Hittite kingdom. How does knowledge of these changes assist with dating the texts?

Many texts can of course be firmly assigned to the reigns of particular kings purely on the basis of the events which they record. This provided a useful starting point in using linguistic data for dating purposes. An analysis of the language of these texts, combined with the knowledge of when they were composed, enabled scholars to identify certain features of the language which were characteristic of particular periods in its development. The linguistic criteria which they established for each of these periods could then be applied to texts which proved difficult or impossible to date on other grounds. As a result, the texts were divided into three chronological categories—Old Hittite, the language of the Old Kingdom texts (dating predominantly to the seventeenth–sixteenth centuries), Middle Hittite, the language of the texts of the first half of the New Kingdom (fifteenth–fourteenth centuries), and Late Hittite, the language of the texts of the second half of the New Kingdom (fourteenth–twelfth centuries). Pioneering studies in this area were carried out by a number of scholars.\textsuperscript{22} The conclusions which they reached were reinforced by research on Hittite palaeography. This showed changes in writing styles over a period of time which were not simply due to idiosyncratic features of individual scribes.\textsuperscript{23}

The redating of a number of texts has led to a revision of the chronology of some of the major events recorded in Hittite history. Thus texts which had long been assigned to the last decades of the Late Bronze Age, notably those associated with the names Tudhaliya and Arnuwanda, have been reassigned to a period some 150 or more years earlier, to the reigns of the first two kings of

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these names.\textsuperscript{24} Most notable amongst the texts in question are the so-called \textit{Indictments} of Madduwatta and Mita of Pahhuwa (\textit{CTH} 147 and 146 respectively), and the \textit{Annals} of Tudhaliya (\textit{CTH} 142).\textsuperscript{25} Clearly, the redating of these texts has important implications for our understanding of the course of Hittite history during the period of the New Kingdom.
APPENDIX 2

Sources for Hittite History: An Overview

With the disappearance of the Assyrian colonies in the latter half of the eighteenth century, written records ceased in Anatolia, not to reappear until the emergence of the Hittite kingdom in the first half of the seventeenth century. The earliest known Hittite texts were composed in the reign of Hattusili I, who probably refounded the city of Hattusa and presumably established the first palace archives there.\(^1\) The script used in writing these texts was cuneiform, a variety of the script used in the letters of the Assyrian merchants. But the cuneiform tradition was not inherited from the Assyrians. Rather, it was adopted from the scribal schools of northern Syria, probably through Hittite contact with them during Hattusili’s campaigns in the region.\(^2\)

Some 5,000 or more clay tablets impressed with the cuneiform script have been unearthed in the Hittite capital Hattusa in perhaps as many as 30,000 to 35,000 fragments. These provide us with our chief source of information on the history of the Hittite world.

The Tablet Archives\(^3\)

The tablets were rectangular in shape, and generally the whole of their surface front and back (obverse and reverse) was closely covered with cuneiform symbols. Each side of the tablet was divided into as many as four vertical columns, and the text was also divided into sections by ruled horizontal lines or ‘paragraph dividers’. Three types of materials were used for the tablets—clay, wood, and metal. Until fairly recently, we had no surviving examples of the last two types, although the use of wood and metal for writing was made clear by references in the clay tablets to wooden tablets\(^4\) and to treaties inscribed on gold, silver, and iron.\(^5\) Treaties were also inscribed on bronze, as we know from the discovery in 1986 of the famous and already much discussed bronze tablet.\(^6\)

It is a find of major, indeed unique importance.

The great majority of tablets so far discovered were housed in a number of buildings in Hattusa—several on the acropolis now called Büyükkale (Buildings A, D, E, and K), one on the ‘House on the Slope’, and one in the the city’s most important temple, the temple of the Storm God.\(^7\) In recent years, tablet
archives have also come to light during the course of excavations at Tapikka (mod. Maşat), which lies 116 kilometres north-east of Hattusa, Sapinuwa (mod. Ortaköy), 50 kilometres south-east of Çorum, and Sarissa (mod. Kuşaklı), 50 kilometres south-west of Sivas. The sites where they were unearthed were clearly regional administrative centres of the kingdom.

In the archive rooms, the clay tablets were stored on wooden shelves which were built above stone benches covered with mud plaster. Originally the tablets were labelled and arranged according to content. This was the task of the ‘tablet librarian’. Unfortunately we know little about the original arrangement or locations of the tablets. During the upheavals to which the capital was subject on several occasions throughout its history, the archives must have suffered substantial damage and disruption. Also, much of the archive material may have been shifted a number of times from one site to another—for example when the Hittite capital was relocated at Tarhuntassa early in the thirteenth century, and shifted back to Hattusa a few years later. Further, the buildings on Büyükkale were totally levelled and rebuilt in the reign of the king Tudhaliya IV not long before the kingdom’s final collapse. This must also have led to temporary and perhaps haphazard storage of archive material until such time as a full and systematic reorganization of the material could be undertaken. Very likely the Hittite capital fell before this happened.

All these factors make extremely difficult the task of determining what system was originally used in arranging archive material, and what the rationale was for its distribution over a number of locations. Were the tablets stored in one building of a particular character or group which distinguished them from those stored in another? Were there basic differences between the tablets housed in the buildings on the acropolis and those stored in the temple of the Storm God? Or was the storage of archive material at the end of the kingdom’s history so hasty and haphazard that it is impossible for us to draw any conclusions about their original arrangement? A detailed systematic investigation of the contents of each tablet repository is necessary before we can answer these questions.

The Scribes

Reading and writing in the ancient Near East was a highly specialized occupation, and literacy may well have been confined largely to a professional scribal class. Hittite scribes had the responsibility of drawing up treaties, taking down the letters of the Hittite king to foreign or vassal rulers, recording important exploits of the king, revising and updating religious, legal, and administrative texts, copying and recopying them whenever necessary, and then storing the
tablets away for future generations. Training for this occupation was provided by scribal schools. It involved learning and mastering the cuneiform script by copying existing texts, progressing from simple to more complex documents. Student scribes must also have learnt at least one, and probably several foreign languages. Given that Akkadian was the international language of diplomacy, many if not all scribes may have been required to be fluent in this language.

No doubt there was a clear hierarchy within the scribal class, ranging at the bottom from persons engaged in mechanical tasks such as copying texts to those at the top who were amongst the most important of the king’s advisers. The chief scribes presumably had a detailed knowledge of foreign affairs, particularly Hatti’s previous and current relationships with both foreign kingdoms and its own vassal states. They must at least have known where to find this information, for much of the detail contained in treaties and in the king’s correspondence was probably based on information and advice which they provided. Records containing this information could only be consulted by those able to read them. It may well be that the kings themselves were illiterate. After consulting earlier treaties in the archives and extracting relevant clauses from them, the scribe drafted a treaty and read the draft to the king. In the light of changes, modifications, and special provisions required by the king, or agreed to by him after preliminary negotiations with his treaty-partner, the final version of the treaty was prepared.

The chief scribes held a position of considerable responsibility and trust—and influence. It was a highly privileged position, and usually an inherited one, passing from father to son. Some scribes rose to high eminence in the kingdom, as illustrated by the appointment of the chief scribe Mittannamuwa as the administrator of Hattusa when the royal capital was transferred by the king Muwattalli II to Tarhuntassa. In the Hittite-administered city of Emar on the Euphrates, the chief scribe’s status was equivalent to that of ‘son of the king’.

We know the names of a number of scribes from their practice of signing documents which they had written, and often stating their official position and genealogy. For example:

One tablet (single tablet) of the Presentation of the Plea to the Storm God, written down from the mouth of His Majesty. (Text) complete.

(Written by) the hand of Lurma, Junior Incantation Priest, Apprentice of , Son of Aki-Teshub. (KBo xi 1, Colophon, rev. 24–7, trans. Houwink ten Cate and Josephson (1967: 119))

Sometimes, a scribe in one royal court appended at the end of an official letter a note to his counterpart in the recipient court:

May Nabu the king of wisdom, and Istanu of the Gateway graciously protect the scribe who reads this tablet, and around you may they graciously hold their hands.
You, scribe, write well to me; put down, moreover, your name. The tablets that are brought here always write in Hittite! (EA 32: 14–20, trans. by V. Haas in Moran (1992: 103))

A double-dividing line separates this last note from the rest of the letter which is addressed by the king of Arzawa to the pharaoh of Egypt. It is most unlikely that it was read either to or by the king on whose behalf the letter was written.21

_Scribal Handwriting_

As we have noted, one of the important tasks of the scribes was to make copies of all treaties, and all other important documents, for future reference. Furthermore they were constantly involved in the copying and rewriting of old texts. Clay tablets were generally not baked, and thus had a limited life span. Hence it was necessary to copy and recopy them from one generation to another to ensure their survival.22 This means that the earliest Hittite texts are available to us only in copies made by scribes of a later period. But at least this has ensured their survival. A further benefit of this scribal practice is that in many cases a particular text survives in a number of copies, known as exemplars. These copies are often fragmentary. But the fragments can sometimes be pieced together to give a more or less complete version of the original text.

Further, the texts which bear the signatures of particular scribes enable us to recognize distinctive features of the handwriting of these scribes, and perhaps more importantly distinctive features of handwriting in a particular period.23 Scholars have selected a number of datable texts ranging from the early to the later periods of Hittite history, and listed the sign shapes characteristic of these texts, and thus of the periods in which they were written. This helps establish what is known as a _ductus_ for the period, that is, ‘the manner of impressing cuneiform signs on tablets’,24 which in turn enables us to assign a number of texts which we cannot date on other grounds to the periods when they were composed, or in many cases when they were copied from earlier compositions.

But the exercise is not a straightforward one. It is complicated by the fact that some of the later scribes had an apparent tendency to ‘archaize’—that is, to use the vocabulary and _ductus_ of an earlier period in their compositions. A further complication is caused by variations in handwriting between scribes of the same period. ‘Different scribes clearly had different hands, even if they wrote on the same wet clay only a few seconds apart.’25 This has to be taken into account by scholars in their attempts to establish the chronology of a number of texts not datable on other grounds.26
The Languages of the Texts

When the texts from the archives at Hattusa began to come to light early last century, many of them were found to be written in Akkadian, sometimes translations from original Hittite texts, which had already been deciphered and thus could be read with ease. Throughout the Late Bronze Age Akkadian was used as a diplomatic *lingua franca*, the international language of diplomacy. Thus letters exchanged between a Hittite king and his Egyptian, Assyrian, or Babylonian counterparts were written in Akkadian, as also were the treaties drawn up with these kings. The same applied to correspondence and treaties between the Hittite kings and their vassal rulers in Syria.

But numerous other tablets came to light which initially could not be read since they were written in an unintelligible language. This was the language of Nesa, the name of the city which became the royal seat of Pithana and his son Anitta in the Assyrian colony period. As we have noted, from the large number of texts henceforth written in this language, it is clear that ‘Nesite’ became the official language of the Hittite kingdom.

The task was to decipher the Nesite—what we call the Hittite—language. To some extent this task was facilitated by the Hittites’ use of the cuneiform script. Thus when the Czech scholar Bedřich Hrozný began working on the language in the 1910s, he was assisted by the fact that Nesite used many of the same ideograms, with the same meaning, as Sumerian and Akkadian. This enabled a number of scattered words and phrases in the texts to be translated, and in some cases helped establish the character of these texts. But significant progress on the decipherment depended in the first instance on establishing the language group to which Nesite belonged.

As his investigations proceeded, Hrozný kept coming back to a conclusion that had already been suggested by the Norwegian scholar J. A. Knudtzon, but discarded, even apparently by Knudtzon himself—that Nesite (or what Knudtzon called ‘Arzawan’) was an Indo-European language, and thus related to Greek, Latin, and other languages of the Indo-European family. Once this had been conclusively demonstrated, the decipherment of Nesite proceeded relatively quickly. This marked the genuine beginning of Hittite studies, for it provided the key that unlocked the vast range of information preserved in the archives of the Hittite capital.

But more was to follow. So far, two distinct languages, Akkadian and Nesite, had been identified in the archives. Yet a number of the tablets found at Hattusa were written in neither of these languages. In 1919 a Swiss philologist Emil Forrer identified six other languages in the archives, generally designated in the tablets by their adverbial forms—Hurrian (ḫurlili), Hattian (ḫattili), Luwian
(luwili), Palaic (palaumnili), Sumerian, and a language apparently spoken by the kings of Mitanni.\textsuperscript{29} One question which these ‘minority languages’ raises is the extent to which Hittite scribes were required to be multilingual. Or were specialist scribes employed for particular languages? As noted above, we might at least expect that training in Akkadian was a regular feature of the scribal schools, given its international importance and the regularity with which it appears in the archives.

### The Hieroglyphic Script

One further task had to be undertaken—the reading and decipherment of the strange unintelligible hieroglyphic script that appeared on monuments throughout Anatolia and Syria,\textsuperscript{30} and had done much to stimulate the interest and the researches which had led eventually to the rediscovery of the Hittites. The earliest known example of the script appears on a seal impression of the sixteenth century, from the seal of Ispuhus, king of Kizzuwadna. But the majority of hieroglyphic texts date to the thirteenth century, or (by far the larger category) to the period from c.1100 to 700 BC, i.e. the period of the neo-Hittite kingdoms.

The task of decipherment proved rather more difficult than the decipherment of the Nesite cuneiform language. It was, however, greatly facilitated by the discovery in 1946 of a bilingual text, in Phoenician and Luwian hieroglyphs, at Karatepe in eastern Cilicia.\textsuperscript{31} More recent work on the language of the inscriptions has established its virtual identity with that of the Luwian cuneiform texts.\textsuperscript{32}

The character of the script, which was perhaps initially inspired by the monumental script of Egypt, made it a more appropriate medium than cuneiform for recording important achievements on public monuments. In the last century of the Hittite New Kingdom, increasing use seems to have been made of the script for this purpose. This is illustrated by several important discoveries in recent years, including the Yalburt inscription (see Ch. 12), and the so-called Südburg inscription in Hattusa (see Ch. 13). Both date to the final decades of the Hittite kingdom.

After the fall of Hattusa, the practice of writing cuneiform on clay tablets ceased. However the surviving branches of the Hittite royal family in Syria and southern Anatolia continued to use the hieroglyphic script, primarily for monumental inscriptions on stone as in the past. But the script also appears in a small number of letters and economic texts, on leather and strips of lead, and on small votive objects.
Hittite Seals

Seals were used as a form of personal signature, both on clay *bullae* as well as on a range of documents, including land-grants, other royal gifts, records of goods purchased, and treaties. Some of the *bullae* were affixed to important documents, others served to seal access to buildings or rooms within them and sometimes to chests or boxes. The inscriptions which they bear often provide useful supplementary information about their owners in addition to what we know of them from other sources. In one case a seal impression on a document discovered in Temple 8 at Hattusa in 1984 enabled us to identify a hitherto unknown king (see Ch. 5). More generally seal impressions sometimes contain valuable information about their owners' genealogy. An excellent example is provided by a seal in the shape of a Maltese cross, the so-called cruciform seal. A number of impressions of this seal were discovered in 1986, during the course of a new excavation of Temple 3 at Hattusa. On these impressions the genealogy of the king Mursili II appears, extending back through many generations to the early years of the Hittite Old Kingdom. The names of at least eight of Mursili’s predecessors are recorded, along with their queens.

The earliest Hittite seals known to us, dating to the late sixteenth and early fifteenth centuries, were engraved in the hieroglyphic script. Later, from c.1400 onwards, royal seals featured both hieroglyphic and cuneiform inscriptions. The hieroglyphic inscription recorded the name and titles of the king in an inner circle; the cuneiform inscription appeared in (usually two) rings around this circle. Such seals are known as ‘digraphic’. Sometimes the name of the reigning queen appeared with that of the king on the seals. Sometimes the queen’s name appeared alone. Other seals bear the names of palace functionaries, including princes. Royal seals often featured a winged sun-disc, used as a symbol of royalty, extending over the hieroglyphic inscription in the centre of the seal. Other pictorial motifs, including human and divine figures, are also found on a number of royal seals.

Until recently, only a few hundred Hittite seals were known to us. This number has now increased dramatically. Excavations conducted in 1990 and 1991 on the site of Nişantepe, a rocky outcrop within the Lower City of Hattusa, uncovered a ‘seal archive’ consisting of several thousand items. Located in three basement rooms in the so-called Westbau, some 3,535 seal impressions have come to light. The great majority of these are on clay *bullae*, but they also appear on a small number of land-grant documents. The earliest of the sealings, which record the names and titles of the seals’ owners, date to the reign of the king Suppiluliuma I, the latest to his namesake Suppiluliuma II, the last known king who occupied the throne in Hattusa.
The Nişantepe archive still awaits a detailed, comprehensive study. But even apart from some surprises already revealed by the archive’s contents, its importance is evident from the sheer volume of new seal impressions which have come to light.

The Tablets as Sources for Hittite History

With the decipherment of the Hittite language, the many complexities of the field of Hittite studies soon became evident. From the tablets it was clear that Late Bronze Age Anatolia was occupied by a large, heterogeneous conglomerate of kingdoms, clusters of communities, and tribal groups that differed markedly in their size, ethnic composition, and political organization. The tablets range widely in their contents. They include annalistic records relating the achievements of the kings who composed them, decrees, political correspondence, treaties between kings and their foreign counterparts or vassal rulers, administrative texts, edicts, a collection of laws, ritual and festival texts, and a number of mythological and literary texts.

Obviously the most important texts for historical purposes are those which might be described as historical narrative texts. These include the annals composed or commissioned by various kings to record their military achievements, several decrees or proclamations, a fragmentary biography of the king Suppiluliuma I composed by his son Mursili, and a so-called autobiography of the king Hattusili III, designed to justify Hattusili’s seizure of the throne and his arrangements for the succession. Valuable historical information is also provided by the preambles to a number of treaties. These often contain a résumé of past relations, sometimes peaceful, sometimes hostile, between the kingdom of Hatti and the country of the king’s treaty-partner. From the preambles too, we learn much about political developments within the Hittites’ vassal states.38

Correspondence between the Hittite king and his foreign counterparts, his vassal rulers, and his administrative officials is a further source of important historical information.39 The large collection of letters which have survived in the archives of the Hittites and their contemporaries gives us considerable insight into the nature of the administration of the Hittite kingdom and the control of its subject territories, and more generally into the world of Late Bronze Age international diplomacy.40 Of particular importance in this last respect are the numerous letters exchanged between the royal houses of Hatti and Egypt in the thirteenth century, during the reigns of the Hittite king Hattusili III and the pharaoh Ramesses II.41
The Hittite world has left us no historians or comprehensive histories, as we understand these terms, no Bronze Age Herodotos, Thucydides, or Livy to chronicle, interpret, and critically assess for us the raw factual data which provide the basis of Hittite history. We have to do this for ourselves. And in taking on this task, we have always to bear in mind the limitations of the material with which we are working. The annalistic compositions contain little more than bald records of military enterprises, highlighting for posterity the successes of the kings who undertook them. While they sometimes contain admissions of failures, they are none the less highly selective in the information which they convey and that which they exclude. In diplomatic texts—treaties and royal correspondence—the authors almost invariably had one or more political axes to grind. In communications with their subject rulers, their allies, their enemies or potential enemies, they obviously sought to present their actions and policies and grievances in a light most favourable to themselves. Undoubtedly this sometimes led to the omission of relevant facts, or the distortion of facts, if it suited their purposes. Of course in this respect they were no different from kings, politicians, and diplomats in any age. In many cases they were probably a good deal more honest.

But while the material from the Hittite archives has many limitations, it also has a number of advantages when compared with written source material in later ages. Our histories of Greece and Rome are based largely on the works of ancient writers who for all their claims to impartiality none the less have presented us with subjective, biased, and often conflicting treatments of the periods about which they wrote. In making use of their works for the purposes of modern scholarship, we are already one step removed, and sometimes more, from the primary sources on which they were based.

For writing a history of the Hittite world, we have much more direct access to primary data—the original sources—much less need of a Bronze Age Thucydides to relay to us, in a selective way, information derived from such sources. We can read them for ourselves. Indeed in some cases our primary sources take us back one further step, since we have drafts of a number of documents, like letters and treaties, which were corrected and edited before final versions were made. What was corrected can often be as instructive as the correction itself.

In reconstructing a history of the Hittite world, we also make use of texts which may at first sight appear less relevant to our task. Of particular interest and importance in this respect are a number of prayers and votive texts. For example, we learn from a series of prayers composed by the king Mursili II of a plague which devastated the homeland for many years. Other religious texts inform us of various misfortunes suffered by the royal family—illness and death, political intrigues, family feuds. Many of these texts are extremely
personal in nature, confidential communications between a member of the royal family and a relevant deity. Thus we learn of the possible Hittite violation of a treaty with Egypt, not publicly admitted, of a conspiracy leading to the assassination of Suppiluliuma I’s brother, of a speech affliction suffered by Mursili II, of the illness and death of Mursili II’s wife and the alleged complicity of his stepmother, of the arraignment and banishment of two Hittite queens, of the foot and eye ailments suffered by Hattusili III, of tensions and intrigues in the royal family around the time of Hattusili III’s death. These matters were aired in the context of prayers which reflect the belief that misfortunes suffered by the Land of Hatti, or by particular members of the royal family, were attributable to divine wrath.

In order to appease the offended deity, the reason for his or her wrath had first to be determined through oracular consultation. One by one the possible reasons were stated, an animal sacrificed, and its entrails consulted to determine the god’s response. A negative response meant that the process had to be repeated with another possible reason stated. And so on, until an affirmative response was obtained and appropriate expiation made. Alternatively, a number of votive texts sought the god’s co-operation in curing an illness which had afflicted a member of the royal family, with the promise of gifts to the god in the event that the illness was cured.

Religious texts provide us with valuable insights into the lives of many of the chief participants in the rise and fall of the Hittite kingdom, and into the fortunes and misfortunes of the dynasty to which they belonged. In so doing they help flesh out the history of this kingdom in ways which generally lie well outside the scope of the more overtly historical documents on which our knowledge of it largely depends.
Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. On the use of the terms Near and Middle East and the regions which they conventionally designate, see van de Mieroop (2004: 1–2).
2. Whose two principal varieties are Assyrian and Babylonian.
3. The term ‘Syria’ is used here as elsewhere in this book in the very broad sense of the region lying between the Euphrates river and the Mediterranean Sea. This usage, which goes back to antiquity, obviously covers a much more extensive region than modern Syria.
4. As illustrated by the papers collected in Yener and ‘Hoffner (2002). See also Güterbock (1995).
6. As in the case of Egypt where the intervals between the main phases are designated as First Intermediate and Second Intermediate, each of which lasted several hundred years.
7. There is some uncertainty about several of the kings who reigned between Telipinu and Tudhaliya I. We cannot be sure whether these were in fact related to their predecessors on the throne since so little is known about them.
8. See now the comprehensive discussion of this matter by Archi (2003: 4–10).
9. Thus also Archi (2003: 10–11), who provides more specific arguments against the inclusion of a Middle Kingdom phase in Hittite history.

CH. 1: THE ORIGINS OF THE HITTITES

1. For an overview of the transition from the Chalcolithic to the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia, see Mellaart (1971a).
2. Further discussed in Ch. 4.
3. Classical Halys (or Salt) River.
4. Brief accounts of these are given by Akurgal (1962: 15–25), Lloyd (1967: 20–9).


8. The references to Zipani and Pamba appear in KBo III 13 (CTH 311.1) obv. 11’.


10. Palaic is attested as a liturgical language in a few ritual texts from Hattusa. On the language and texts, see Carruba (1970).

11. Or alternatively nešumnili (in the language of the Nesite). There is also one instance of the form kanišumnili (in the language of the Kaneshite).

12. For reviews of the whole question, see Crossland and Birchall (1974), Diakonov (1985), Drews (1988: 25–37), Steiner (1990). Makkay (1993: 122) claims that Steiner’s proposal of a western route of immigration, i.e. from the Balkan region, seems to have the support of recent archaeological discoveries. The evidence adduced remains tenuous.

13. See the references cited by Steiner (1990: 201 n. 117).

14. The view of Steiner himself (e.g. 1981: 169; 1990: 200–3), who bases his conclusion largely on the assumption of a west to east migration route.

15. Thus Macqueen (1986: 27–32). In general on this whole matter, see Melchert (2003: 24–5).


17. In general on the question of the origins of the Indo-European immigrants into Anatolia and the period(s) of their arrival, see Melchert (2003: 23–6).


27. On the equivalence of these two names for the one site, see Güterbock (1958), Otten (1973: 57), Bryce (1983: 29).
31. For a more detailed discussion, see Freu (1997). Singer (1981) attempts to delineate ethno-cultural zones by mapping the cults of the local gods belonging to different ethno-cultural circles; see also Singer (2000b: 638). This procedure may have some validity, but we do not know to what extent population movements may have altered the original ethno-cultural configuration of Anatolia by the early 2nd millennium.
32. Güterbock (1983b: 24–5) suggests that Babylonian- or Assyrian-trained scribes may have been employed for writing documents in Nesite.
33. It is probable, but not certain, that it was the dynasty’s first language. Although the names of the first two members of this dynasty, Pithana and Anitta, are commonly supposed to be Indo-European in origin, these names have so far defied conclusive linguistic analysis. See Neu (1974: 130 n. 319; 133–4), Singer (1981: 129).
35. See also Ch. 3, n. 21.
36. Which was not the first Hittite capital, if we attribute its foundation, or refoundation, to King Hattusili I who claims at least one predecessor in the ruling Hittite dynasty (see Ch. 4).
37. See also the discussion by Drews (1988: 48–55).
38. Thus Steiner (1990: 199).
39. Names like Mursili, Huzziya, and Telipinu have sometimes been identified as Hattic. But this remains open to debate.
41. Thus Melchert (2003: 16), citing also Stefanini (2002: 789 ff.).
43. It need not of course follow that a person’s name always indicates his or her ethnic origin. Political and other factors may well have influenced the choice of a name in certain cases.
44. Attested throughout the Maṣṭat letters. For the letters themselves, see Alp (1991a), and for a discussion of these letters, with excerpts, see Bryce (2003a: 170–81).
45. Due essentially to the phonetic resemblance between biblical hittî, hittîm, and the Land of Hatti in texts of the Late Bronze and Early Iron Ages. See further on this, Singer (Fs Mazar).

CH. 2: ANATOLIA IN THE ASSYRIAN COLONY PERIOD

1. It may well be that there were established commercial links between Mesopotamia and Anatolia through the 3rd millennium; see Veenhof (1982: 154), who notes that the texts from Ebâla seem to provide evidence of early contacts with Kanesh.
3. Balkan (1957: 31–2) cites the letter TC 18—which is the main source for the reconstruction of the routes from Ashur to Kanesh. See also Hecker (1981: 187), who comments that the journey from Ashur to Kanesh was not direct, but crossed in a wide arc through northern Syria, across the Euphrates in the region between Birecik and Samsat, and then perhaps to Malatya and Marash before making a new swing west—to Kanesh.
4. As noted in Ch. 1, this is probably the ancient Ankuwa.
5. So far, and surprisingly, only texts from Kanesh have come to light in the level II phase. Those discovered at Ališar and Hattusa belong entirely to Ib; see Larsen (1976: 52), Bittel (1983c: 55), Dercksen (2001: 49).
7. Thus Michel (2001: 30–1). Her estimate represents a significant advance on Veenhof’s estimate several years earlier (1998: 424) that official excavations had yielded c.15,000 tablets, illicit excavations c.3000.
8. Michel (2001) has translated 400 of the letters from the correspondence of the merchants of Kanesh.
10. Further on the possible differences between the two types of settlements, see Larsen (1976: 278). Larsen (1976: 236) notes that several of the settlements changed character in the interval between level II and Ib, so that they are attested both as kârum and wabartum settlements.
11. See Larsen (1976: 277) and Gorny (1989: 83–4) with respect to the Assyrians’ selection of the site as the centre of their trading system. As Gorny notes, the Assyrians were following an already long-established
Mesopotamian tradition in using Kanesh as their gateway for trade with the Anatolian highlands.

12. On this (and also the palace at Acem Höyük), see Özgüç (1998).

13. See the reconstruction in Lloyd (1967: 46–7). On the various districts of the kārum, see Özgüç (1986: 14). For further details of the physical layout of the kārum, see Özgüç (1964: 27–39). The kārum may have covered as much as 30 hectares; see Veenhof (1995b: 860).


16. A letter from this king was discovered in level II of Kanesh.

17. Veenhof (1998: 436) concludes that its destruction should be dated to c.1838.


19. See Balkan (1955: 45, 61). Note also Larsen (1976: 366), who comments that it is uncertain whether the gap between II and Ib was a local phenomenon, or whether it reflects a genuine break in the Old Assyrian activities in the entire area where the colonies existed.


21. A number of scholars would extend it further, beyond the reign of Hammurabi (1792–1749, according to the ‘middle chronology’), i.e. well into the second half of the 18th century. This would significantly reduce the gap between the end of the colony period and the emergence of the Hittite kingdom. Cf. Güterbock (1983b: 25 n. 8), Veenhof (1985: 192–4), Forlanini (1995: 123). But see most recently Veenhof (1998: 442) who concludes on the basis of his new analysis of prosopographical data (including information provided by the Mari Eponym Chronicle) and archaeological data that level Ib extended from 1810/1800 to 1750/1740.

22. Dercksen (2001: 65) concludes that there was a shift in focus of Assyrian trade after level II, to the emerging kingdom of Mama (see below) and to the area within the bend of Kızıl Irmak.


26. See the references cited by Houwink ten Cate (1970: 58–9 n. 8). Add Larsen (1976: 237), Bittel (1976a: Abb. 343 (map)), KatHet (302–3 (map)).
27. Six fragments of a Hittite version survive, four of an Akkadian version. For the Hittite fragments, see CTH 310, and for the text, Güterbock (1934: 86–91) and (1969); the additional fragment to which he refers in the latter publication is Bo 68/28 (CTH 310.5), subsequently published as KBo XXII 6. The sources are comprehensively listed by Klengel (1999: 17). The text has been re-edited by Westenholz (1997: 102–39), and discussed afresh by Rieken (2001).

28. See e.g. Güterbock (1983b: 26–7), Westenholz (1998), Beckman (2001). Note Klengel’s reservations (1999: 19–20) about the historicity of the tradition. In his recent important study of the tradition, van de Mieroop (2000) focuses on the questions of how the traditions of the Sargonic kings were transmitted into Anatolia (suggesting that the Assyrian merchants played a crucial role in the process) and why the Hittites preserved them throughout their entire history, rather than on the actual historicity of the traditions.

29. *rubā‘um* is in fact a rather vague term. It could be used of the ruler of a *māttum*, of a local vassal ruler, or simply of the head man of a village.

30. See also Orlin (1970: 237), and the comments by Larsen (1974: 472), on the complex political pattern of central Anatolia in this period.

31. The political relations between the merchants and local Anatolians are discussed in detail by Garelli (1963: 321–61).

32. Cf. Veenhof (1982: 147–8), who comments that the Assyrian presence was not based on military or imperial domination, but was in the nature of peaceful, commercial penetration on the basis of mutual interests and official agreements or treaties with local rulers; the official contacts served the establishment and maintenance of good political relations with the various Anatolian rulers by official representatives of Kanesh in conjunction with envoys of Ashur.

33. For discussion of what this expression means, see Larsen (1976: 250).

34. The terminology used in the texts for a commercial agreement.


36. Much of the information contained in the following pages is based on the correspondence of the Assyrian merchants. For a representative selection of this correspondence, see Michel (2001). For a recent discussion of trade relations between Assyria and Anatolia in this period, see Faist (2001).


38. Note the letters ATHE 66 (lines 9–14) and *KTHahn* 1 in which the Assyrian merchants Puzur-Ashur and Idi-Ishtar (respectively) indicate that they will not trade in politically unstable areas where the security of themselves and their goods is at risk. Cf. Veenhof (1989: 516).
40. See Muhly (1973), Larsen (1976: 87–9), Yakar (1976: 122–3). Weisberger and Cierny (2002: 181–5; map p. 180) advocate mines in Central Asia as possible sources of the tin ore which might have been traded continuously westwards to Anatolia. They comment that the output of a single mine in the Karnab area (south of the cities of Buchara and Samarkand) could easily have exceeded one ton of tin—and note that there are hundreds of mines in the area.
41. See Larsen (1967: 153–5): ‘The Assyrian capital thus was the centre of a transit trade linking the tin-producing areas in Iran with Anatolia and Babylonia’ (p. 155).
42. Further on the metal trade, see Faist (2001).
43. See Larsen (1967: 178).
44. On the role of women in the merchant enterprises, see Günbatti (1992). Günbatti comments (p. 234) that women in Assyria were almost as active as men in social life; not only were they the family partners, but also the business partners of their husbands; they helped their husbands and brothers, and looked after their interests in matters of business and judicial cases in Assyria.
45. See de Jesus (1978).
48. See Balkan (1974: 30), and Veenhof (1982: 148). The latter notes that the list of Anatolians indebted and often in arrears to Assyrians far exceeds that of Assyrians in debt to Anatolians; see the lists in Garelli (1963: 379–90).
49. The expression used is *hybullam masāʾum*—‘to wash away debt’ (Balkan (1974: 32)).
50. The witnesses to the agreement.
51. As Balkan (1974: 32) points out, the loan contracts which refer to the possibility of the king cancelling all debts are known only in the cases of native debtors and creditors; we may assume, however, that such a cancellation of debts would also apply to debts owed by Anatolians to Assyrian merchants.
52. On this and the following section, see also Michel (2001: 171–233).
54. For a list of the responsibilities it exercised, see Orlin (1970: 58–9). But note Larsen (1974: 470), who cautions against overestimating the role of the state in these enterprises and comments on the role of Kanesh at the centre of a special administrative and political structure which had its own
internal coherence and which in its relations with Ashur enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy (1976: 262).


56. The precise meaning and attributes of the term tamkārum seem to have varied; see Larsen (1967: 49–56; 1974: 470).


60. See Larsen (1976: 245).


64. For this translation, see Veenhof (1972: 322–3).

65. The names of Anatolian towns.


68. For the route or routes travelled by merchants between Kanesh and Hattus, see Dercksen (2001: 56–7).

69. Güterbock (1964b: 109) notes a fragment found in 1960 which mentions a certain Anum-Herwa (KBo xii 3 = CTH 2.1), who may be identical with Anum-hirbi. See also Helck (1983: 274–6), who transliterates and translates the fragment and supports the identification.

70. For a recent comprehensive re-examination of Anum-hirbi and his kingdom, see Miller (2001b), who notes (2001b: 65) the widespread attestation of his name in contemporary cuneiform texts (e.g. Mari texts dating to the reign of Zimri-Lim (c.1776–1761)), and indications from the texts of the kingdom’s wealth (2001b: 100).

71. On various possibilities for Mama’s location, see Balkan (1957: 33), who suggests that it lay in the vicinity of modern Elbistan, or the region of Comana Cappadociae and Göksün. See also Nashef (1991: 83). Miller (2001b: 70) tentatively favours a location between Göksün and Maras.

72. The letter is written in Old Assyrian, and is also trans. by Orlin (1970: 99).

73. See Larsen (1972), Bryce (1985a).
74. One from the 16th and two from the 13th century. The text has most recently been edited by Neu (1974). See also the discussions of Steiner (1984; 1989b).
75. Gurney (1990: 141).
76. See Neu (1974: 3–9).
79. See the references cited by Gurney (1973a: 232 n. 8).
81. For other proposals, see the references cited by Del Monte and Tischler (1978: 230; 1992: 87–8).
82. Note also the presence of Luwian personal names in the Kanesh texts; see Tischler (1995).
85. See Balkan (1955: 78).
86. Its destruction is archaeologically attested by the end of level IVd on the acropolis (Büyük Kale), which can be synchronized with level Ib at Kanesh, partly on the basis of the archaeological context of the Assyrian tablets at Hattusa, and partly on the basis of the close similarity in ceramic ware and ritual objects from the two sites; see Bittel (1983c: 54–8).
88. See Neu (1974: 35), comments on line 71. For further discussion, see Houwink ten Cate (1984: 59, 80–1 n. 66), Drews (1988: 101–2).
89. Note that Wahsusana is not mentioned in the Anitta inscription. Its territory may already have been absorbed within the territory of the kingdom of Purushanda (see below), or else it had been supplanted by another southern state, perhaps Salatiwara.
90. See e.g. Orlin (1970: 228–9), and Lewy, H. (1971: 707). This of course assumes that the tradition reflects historical fact.
92. An alternative reading in copy B of the text is ‘As soon as he enters Zalpa’. For the possible implications of this reading, see Bryce (1983: 40).
93. As suggested by the alternative reading in copy B referred to in n. 92.
94. Cf. Derksen (2001: 66), who comments that a general decrease in the area covered by the merchant network is discernible after level II at Kanesh, and a general level of impoverishment, both probably due to political developments in the region.
CH. 3: TERRITORIES AND EARLY RIVALS OF HATTI

1. For descriptions of the physical geography of the regions over which the Hittite kings held sway, see e.g. Lloyd (1989: 12–23), Houwink ten Cate (1995: 259–61).


5. See Goetze (1957b).


7. A series of maps of the Hittite world has been published by Forlanini and Marazzi (1986), though much of the detail in these maps is highly conjectural; see the review by Gurney (1992). Del Monte and Tischler (1978; suppl. 1992) is a valuable reference work on Hittite place-names and suggested locations; see also Cornil (1990). For the most recent review of the political geography of western Anatolia, see Melchert (2003: 5–7, with map 2, p. 37).

8. Although as Bittel (1983c: 33–4) points out, it was much smaller than the Babylon of Nebuchadnezzar or the Nineveh of Sargon II.

9. For a comprehensive account of the city in the light of recent excavations, see Neve (1993b). An excellent guidebook to the city has been produced (in both English and German versions) by Seeher (2002a), with information about the most recent finds and an up-to-date plan of the site. For general accounts of the history and chief features of Hattusa, see Bittel (1983c) (now somewhat dated), Bryce (2002: 230–56), Seeher (2002c) (also with site-plan).

10. Though the sculpture on the gate has commonly been assumed to represent a Hittite king, it probably depicts a god; see Bryce (2002: 239–41).

11. In the opinion of Dr Neve, these three gates were integrated into a sacred road used for processions, which started from Temple 5, left the city at the King’s Gate, and then continued to the Lion Gate where it re-entered the city. For a summary of the results of Neve’s excavations, and the conclusions drawn from them, see Neve (1989–90). See also Neve (1993b: 16–80).

12. In general on the role of the Councils of Elders in the Hittite kingdom, see Klengel (1965a).
13. With them were associated officials who bore the title BEŁ MADGALTI (literally ‘lord of the watch-towers’). These officials had both civil and military responsibilities, on which see Beal (1992b: 426–36), Bryce (2002: 16–17, 116–17), and for the relevant texts (CTH 261) von Schuler (1957: 36–65).

14. On the system of land-grants in the Hittite kingdom, see Ch. 4, n. 110.

15. For a detailed treatment of the Kaska people and their relations and conflicts with the Hittites, see von Schuler (1965). To the sources dealt with by von Schuler, we can now add the letters from the Maşat archive (anc. Tāpikka), ed. Alp (1991a), which are concerned largely with matters relating to Kaska, and provide detailed information on the regular dealings, exchanges, and conflicts between the Hittites and the Kaska peoples; see the comments by Klinger (1995a: 83–4).

16. For a discussion of the extent of the Upper Land and the territories which it comprised, see Gurney (2003).

17. For a more detailed discussion of Hittite frontier zones and Hittite frontier policy, see Bryce (1986–7).


19. Mursili II’s treaty with Duppi-Teshub of Amurru (CTH 62), Friedrich (1926: 12–13, §8), Beckman (1999: 59, §2). An edict of Suppiluliuma I (which supplements the king’s treaty with Niqmaddu II of Ugarit) contains a comprehensive list of tribute payable by Ugarit to Suppiluliuma and to other members of his court (CTH 47, trans. Beckman (1999: 166–7)). Korošec (1960: 72) notes that clauses referring to the payment of tribute are found only in treaties with the Syrian vassals.


21. Carruba (1992b) argues that the term nuwa’um in the Assyrian colony texts from Kanesh refers to Luwians. Melchert (2003: 3) comments that this identification is important in establishing the presence of Luwians in south-central Anatolia already at the start of the 2nd millennium.
22. For a comprehensive treatment of Luwian history, language, inscriptions, religion, art, and architecture, see Melchert (ed.) (2003). For a summary treatment, see Bryce (1997).


24. For a detailed treatment of these lands, see Heinhold-Krahmer (1977).

25. See Bryce (2003b: 35–6). There is still no certainty about the precise locations and territorial limits of these countries. However we are reaching some consensus on those that apparently extended to or close to the Aegean seaboard, namely Wilusa in the north-west, with the Seha River Land and Arzawa Minor further south. See Gurney (1992: 217–21), Hawkins (1998a: 21–9), Melchert (2003: 5–7), and in this book the references in Ch. 8, n. 22.

26. It has been argued that Lukka should be understood as the Hittite equivalent of the Luwian name Luwiya; see Easton (1984: 27). Against this, see Crossland in the discussion of Easton's paper, Foxhall and Davies (1984: 58). See also Laroche (1976: 18–19), and most recently Melchert (2003: 14 n. 8). I have suggested (Bryce 2003b: 78) that the term Lukka could apply to Luwian peoples and regions in a general, non-specific way, as well as to a Lukka land in a more restricted, more location-specific sense.

27. This plurality is not so far attested before the 13th cent.


29. See Bryce (2003b: 40–4, 73–8).

30. Singer (1983a: 208). Cf. Mellaart (1974: 497). The Habiru were nomadic or semi-nomadic groups which included social outcasts, fugitives, and marauding mercenaries. These groups inhabited and roamed through the mountains and forests of Syria–Palestine, and were a particular danger to small towns, merchants, and other travellers in the region. See refs. in Ch. 7, n. 70.

31. See the Amarna letter EA 38, from the king of Alasiya to the pharaoh Akhenaten, which refers to raids by these people on both the coast of Alasiya and the coast of Egypt. Part of this text is translated below, Ch. 13. For a list of the texts dealing with the Lukka people, see Bryce (1979a; 1986c: 8–10). Further references to Lukka are cited by Röllig (1988). Add to these the references in the so-called Yalburt and Südburg inscriptions, discussed in Chs. 12 and 13.

32. In their own language the Lycians called their country Tr姆misa and themselves Tr姆mili.

33. On the links between the Lycians and their Bronze Age ancestors, and the role of the Lycians in legendary tradition, see Bryce (1986c: 1–41).

35. For a discussion of the various theories concerning the origins of the Hurrians, see Burney (1989).


38. On the equivalence of the various terms, see Astour (1972: 103–4). Wilhelm (1989: 24) refers to a fragmentary inscription probably from the reign of the pharaoh Tuthmosis I (c.1504–1492) which contains the name used by the natives for the first time: Maittani, later Mittani. See also von Weiher (1973). As Astour (1972: 103) notes, the 14th-cent. king Tushratta who styled himself ‘king of Mitanni’ referred to his kingdom in his letters to the Amarna pharaohs as Hanigalbat (EA 18: 9; 20: 17; 29: 49). Hanigalbat is also the name by which Hattusili I referred to the kingdom in the Akkadian version of his Annals, KBo x 1 (CTH 4) obv. 11 (see Ch. 4). Variant forms are Haligalbat and Habingalbat (the latter is an early form of the name).


40. Cf. Bilgic (1945–51: 19), Gütterbock (1954b: 383). Hurrian names were much more common south of the Taurus, indicating that already in this period there was a significant Hurrian presence in south-eastern Anatolia.

41. Thus Astour (1978: 8).

42. See Wilhelm (1989: 12–13) and the references cited therein.

43. See e.g. Forrer (1924a; 1924b). More recently the philological equation has been discussed by Finkelberg (1988).

44. Note, however, that Homer’s name for the land of the Achaians was not Achai(wi)a but Achaiis (e.g. Iliad 1.254; 3.75, 258; 7.124). According to Gurney (1990: 43), the Homeric form was due to metrical considerations.


46. Notable among the supporters of the Ahhiyawa–Mycenaean equation are the scholars Gütterbock, Mellink, and Vermeule. See in particular their papers published under the general title ‘The Hittites and the Aegean World’, A/IA 87 (1983), 133–43. However Gütterbock (1986: 33) regarded the equation as ‘a matter of faith’, for which no strict proof was possible, either pro or contra. Amongst recent supporters of the equation, see W.-D. Niemeier (1998; 1999: 143–4).


48. But probably only as a matter of pro tem political expediency; see Bryce (2003c: 65–7).

49. See the references cited by Steiner (1989a: 394 n. 3), although in his article Steiner himself argues at length against this view.
50. For recent discussions, see Hawkins (1998a: 30–1, with n. 207), Niemeier (1999: 144).
51. The older form of the name Ahhiyawa; see Güterbock (1983a: 134).
54. See Bryce (1989c: 14 n. 61).
55. For more detailed discussions of Ahhiyawa’s involvement in western Anatolian affairs and its relations with Hatti, see Bryce (1989c; 2003c).
56. Cf. Mountjoy (1998: 49–50), who also seeks to revive the possibility (1998: 51) that the land of Ahhiyawa may in fact have been a maritime kingdom located in western Anatolia, and incorporating offshore islands like Rhodes.

CH. 4: THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE KINGDOM

3. Although almost certainly Hattusili succeeded a king called Labarna (see below). It has been proposed that there was an earlier Hittite king called Tudhaliya, on the basis of the appearance of this name near the beginning of one of the royal offering lists (List C) after several names now lost. (On the offering lists, see Appendix 1.) According to Forlanini (1995), this king might in fact have provided direct continuity with the colony period. But most scholars do not accept the existence of an Old Kingdom Tudhaliya, father of PU-Sharrumma, regarding his creation as a misinterpretation of his appearance in the offering lists, and noting that PU-Sharrumma is a name which occurs also in a late Hittite text (KUB iv 14 iii 40); see e.g. Güterbock (1938: 135), Houwink ten Cate (1963: 276), Astour (1989: 85–6 n. 73), Singer (Fs Mazar). But see now Beal (2003: 16–21), who resurrects the possible historicity of an Old Kingdom Tudhaliya and PU-Sharrumma. The recently discovered cruciform seal impressions have raised the possibility of another early king Huzziya; see Dinçol et al. (1993: 105–6). See also Klengel (1999: 33–5) and the sources cited therein.
4. KBo x 1 + KBo x 2 (CTH 4), ed. Imparati and Saporetti (1965), de Martino (2003: 21–79). A detailed study of the text has also been published by Melchert (1978).
5. For recording on a small golden statue which was offered to the Sun God; see Kempinski and Košak (1982: 98).
6. The case for the former has been argued by Melchert (1978: 2–5, 22), for
the latter by Houwink ten Cate (1983). See also Beckman (1986b) for the
general argument that the Hittite language versions of the early Hittite
texts were the primary versions.
8. Thus Melchert (1978: 5). For a more detailed discussion of this type, see
9. KUB i 16 + KUB xl 65 (CTH 6), ed. Sommer and Falkenstein (1938).
The document is discussed below. See also Klengel (1999: 55–7).
10. CTH 4. KBo x 1 is the Akkadian version, KBo x 2 the Hittite.
11. Thus Sommer and Falkenstein (1938: 202–3).
16. Though this name was long thought to be a Hattic name or title in origin
(see e.g. Sommer and Falkenstein (1938: 20–7), Kammenhuber (1959:
27), Bin-Nun (1975: 32)), a case was subsequently made for an Indo-
European origin (as also for the feminine term Tawanna, on which see
recently Melchert (2003: 18–20) has argued a Luwian origin for both
terms. On the alternation between the variant forms Labarna and Tabarna,
see Puhvel (1989: 351), Tischler (1988: 355) (who considers Labarna to be
the older form). See also Imparati’s discussion (1999: 322) of the origin
and use of the term.
17. Thus I interpret the expression ‘he made them (i.e. the conquered coun-
tries) the boundaries of the sea’, an expression which is perhaps to be
understood, as ‘he made the sea their frontier’ (thus Gurney (1973a: 235));
see also Heinhold-Krahmer (1977: 13–14). Or the expression may mean
that the king drove the enemy back to the sea. The sea in question must be
the Mediterranean. Note that Gurney (1973a: 237) originally assumed
that the passage referring to Labarna in the Proclamation indicates that the
countries identified—Hupisna, Tuwanuwa etc.—already lay in Hittite
hands before the time of the alleged Labarna. But later (1990: 17) he
seems to follow the interpretation suggested above.
20. Cf. Dinçol et al. (1993:104) in the context of their discussion of the
cruciform seal. The information provided by this seal clearly supports a
distinction between a king called Labarna and his successor Hattusili who
also assumed the name (or title) Labarna (cf. Beal (2003: 13 n. 2)). Dinçol et al. assume that the first Labarna belonged to the generation immediately before Hattusili—i.e. that the Labarna of Telipinu’s *Proclamation* was the uncle of Hattusili. The assumption I have made here, contra Dinçol et al., is that the first Labarna was Hattusili’s grandfather. As noted above, Dinçol et al. have now proposed the existence of a king Huzziya as a predecessor of the first Labarna. If they are right in assuming that the Labarna of the *Telipinu Proclamation* was the son of Hattusili’s grandfather, then it may well be that the grandfather was the Huzziya in question. On the question of where Huzziya belongs in the royal dynasty, see also Beal (2003: 31–3).

21. *Telipinu Procl.* §8, 1 24–7. Güterbock (1983b: 29) comments: ‘The repetitions are an impressive stylistic device (a device discussed by J. Licht, *Storytelling in the Bible*, Jerusalem, 1979) telling us that under the second and third kings things went as well—or nearly so—as under the first; equally impressive is the use of corresponding phrases for the description of the bad times.’


25. But the problems of Hattusili’s genealogy are complex. For a detailed discussion of these, see Beal (2003).

26. The problem lies essentially in the meaning of the verb *iskunahbiš*, tentatively translated as ‘appointed’, which is found nowhere else in Hittite literature. For various possibilities, see Gurney (1973a: 237), Bryce (1981: 11–12). Klinger (1996: 120) has interpreted the phrase containing this verb ‘he banished his son Larbarna to Sanahuitta’. Contra this interpretation, see Beal (2003: 14 n. 7).

27. Bin-Nun (1975: 8–9, 55) suggests that he was Hattusili’s father, on the basis of a textual restoration which she proposes. Cf. Sommer and Falkenstein (1938: 209), Puhvel (1989: 353).


29. If one adheres to the ‘low chronology’, the accession date should be set c.1575/70; see e.g. Astour (1989: 12).

30. The translation is based on Melchert’s restoration (1978: 7).

31. Unless otherwise stated, the passages from the *Annals* are translated from the Hittite version of the text (*KBo* x 2).
32. This titulature was later recalled by the king Hattusili III; see Sommer and Falkenstein (1938: 105), though Melchert (1978: 7) comments that it was not part of the original text, but rather a late insertion ‘to accommodate the titulature to the Neo-Hittite pattern’.

33. Thus Sommer and Falkenstein (1938: 20) followed e.g. by Gurney (1973a: 238–9), Klengel, E. and H. (1975: 59), Klengel (1999: 35–6, 43).


35. The text-based arguments of Beal et al. involve certain assumptions which are plausible but clearly open to question.

36. Neve’s conclusion that the city was resettled within a generation of Anitta’s destruction of it would indicate a resettlement even before the time of Hattusili’s grandfather if we date the end of the colony period to the mid-18th cent. (see Ch. 2, n. 21).


38. Yener (1995: 101) also notes Hattusa’s close access to the mineral-rich resources of the Pontic region.


41. The fluctuation between 1st and 3rd person is a not uncommon feature of Hittite narrative texts.

42. There was, however, more than one site called Zalpa, and some doubt has been expressed about the identification assumed here; see Cornelius (1959: 292).

43. Mezzulla was the daughter of the Sun Goddess of Arinna.

44. Cited by Otten (1964: 120), Gurney (1973a: 244).


46. Thus Gurney (1973a: 242). See also Kupper (1973: 34).

47. For proposals on its location, see del Monte and Tischler (1978: 476).


49. See Bryce (1983: 85–6). In Klengel’s view (1999: 53), the siege is purely legendary and probably does not reflect an actual historical event.

51. Astour (1989: 89 n. 104) suggests that Zaruar (Zalwar of the Alalah texts) should be located at Koyuncu Höyük, near the marshes north of the Lake of Antioch.
52. i.e. the king of the Hurrians.
53. For the most recent translation of this text, see Beckman (1995c: 25–7).
55. The treaty drawn up early in the 13th cent. between the Hittite king Muwattalli II and Alaksandu, vassal ruler of Wilusa (CTH 76); Friedrich (1930: 50–1 §2), Beckman (1999: 87 §3). But note the reservations of Heinhold-Krahmer (1977: 18–19).
56. This is suggested by KBo iii 34 (CTH 8a), from a ‘palace chronicle’, or collection of admonitory anecdotes (CTH 8 and 9), dating back to the reigns of Hattusili I and his successor Mursili I. (For a sample, see Beal (1983: 123–4) and Önal (1989b: 134–5)). CTH 8a makes reference to a Man from Hurma called Nunnu, who had apparently embezzled gold in Arzawa which should have been handed over to the Hittite king. Presumably Nunnu had been appointed to an important administrative post in Arzawa, perhaps that of governor. See Hardy (1941: 189–91), Gurney (1973a: 246), Heinhold-Krahmer (1977: 19–21). For the text, see Eisele (1970: 86–7).
57. Wilhelm (1989: 21) comments that though the report may be somewhat exaggerated for dramatic effect, it does give an impression of the considerable strength of the new Hurrian fighting force.
58. See Bryce (1983: 74). The city is first attested in texts of the colony period.
59. Variant form Ullamma, also known from the colony texts as one of the cities destroyed by Anitta.
60. Annals, i 33–7.
61. Wilhelm (1989: 21) comments that when a report is only of pillaging the countryside, this is usually an indication that the attack on the town had failed; cf. Klengel (1965b: 262–3; 1969: 158).
63. It has been variously identified with the Euphrates (Güterbock 1964a: 3–4), the Orontes (tentatively by Wilhelm 1989: 22), the Afrin (tentatively by Klengel 1992b: 344 n. 24), and the Pyramos/Ceyhan (e.g. Laroche 1977: 205 s.v. Purana), Astour (1989: 89 n. 102), Forlanini and Marazzi (1986)). See Gurney’s review of the matter (1992: 216–17).
64. Akkadian Zarunti; it lay not far from Alalah.
65. For various proposals, see the references cited by del Monte and Tischler (1978: 98).
66. The name appears only in the Akkadian version of the text and is probably to be identified with the southern offshoot of the Amanus range, perhaps

67. Wilhelm (1989: 22) comments that an oracle text, *KBo* xviii 151, which names both Hassu and also the Hurrians, most likely refers to this event.


69. Liverani (1988: 170) notes that level 8 of Lidar Höyük, which is contemporaneous with the Old Assyrian, Old Hittite, and Mari references to Hahhum, was destroyed by a huge fire, the result of a violent attack (see also the report in *AS* 37 (1987), 204–5). Corpses were found under the collapsed walls and arrow heads sticking in the walls’ plaster. He comments that the town was certainly destroyed after a war storming, and links its destruction with the wars of the Old Kingdom Hittite kings in the area.

70. Though van de Mieroop (2000: 135) questions the logic of it.

71. A hypocoristic form of the name.


73. Collins (1998: 16) translates: ‘Eat up his grain ration like a dog.’

74. For a suggested connection between the events described in this letter and the Hittite military expedition in regions inhabited by cannibals, described in *KBo* iii 60 (*CTH* 17), see de Martino (2002: 80–1).

75. e.g. *Archives Royales du Mari* iv 76 (Durand (1997: 128–9, no. 31)).


77. That of course may be largely due to the highly selective nature of the military records, ‘which record only the military high points, in very concise form, leaving to other genres the Hittite efforts to consolidate their gains and the erection of an administrative apparatus’. Thus Miller (2001a: 426), who cites the Palace and Puhanu Chronicles as examples of such other genres.


79. Singer (2000b: 638–9). It should be noted that van de Mieroop (2000: 135) remains unconvinced that the document is in fact an actual letter sent by Hattusili and not a later fictional composition.
81. Cf. the comments of Klengel (2003: 283–4).
82. See also the discussion by Klengel (1992a: 80).
83. Goetze (1975a: 1).
84. Cf. Klengel (1992a: 80). Van de Mieroop (2004: 114) suggests that ‘as Anatolia is divided into river valleys with a limited agricultural area, the search for control over north Syria may have been driven by the need to obtain access to large cereal fields’.
85. See e.g. Cornelius (1979: 101).
86. Yakar (1976: 122–3) refers to a number of fields in Iran that may have supplied Mesopotamia with tin.
87. Notably in the Celaller region, where cassiterite and an Early Bronze Age tin mine have been discovered; see Kaptan (1995) for a summary of the results of the archaeological and geological investigations of the Celaller mining complex, under the direction of K. A. Yener.
88. See e.g. Muhly et al. (1991; 1992).
89. Kaptan (1995: 197) also concedes that evidence for economically viable tin deposits in Anatolia has yet to be substantiated.
91. For a more detailed treatment of this topic, see Gurney (1958) and Beckman (1995b).
96. From the so-called Aleppo treaty, KBo 1 6 (CTH 75) obv. 12, thus trans. by Gurney (1973a: 243). The treaty is discussed in Ch. 6.
97. Astour (1989: 17) takes a somewhat different view. He translates the above words: ‘he caused their kingship to be full’—i.e. ‘to end’. According to his interpretation, this means that Hattusili deprived Aleppo of its status as an independent great power by forcing it to bow to his overlordship.
98. In later times the term LÚ.MEŠ .DUGUD seems to have been used in reference to military titles of relatively low rank. In this period, it may have been a general term denoting important persons, perhaps military officers; see Beal (1992b: 500) and the references cited therein. The term panku is discussed below.
100. Testament §12, ii 63–4.

102. For the text, KBo iii 38 (CTH 3.1), see Forrer (1922–6: no. 13).

103. Testament §17, iii 14–22.


109. For a fresh consideration of family relationships and the system of inheritance in the Hittite royal dynasty during the first half of the Old Kingdom, see Sürenhagen (1998).

110. These are attested by a number of land-grant documents, in which estates and landed property (including gardens, woods, meadows, and sometimes the personnel belonging to them) were given to Hittite officials of various ranks and responsibilities either as a reward for services rendered or as a means of ensuring loyalty. It now appears that all such documents which have survived should be assigned to what philologists call the ‘Middle Hittite’ period (15th and 14th cents.). However there is no reason to believe that the practice attested by these documents was not already in operation as early as the reign of Hattusili. On the land-grant documents, see e.g. Riemschneider (1958), Balkan (1973), von Schuler (1980–3), Easton (1981), Otten (1991), Beckman (1995b: 538). Beckman notes that the land given to individuals ‘was not consolidated but scattered in different localities. Thus the king sought to prevent the nobility’s establishing independent local centres of economic power which might serve to challenge his own rule.’

111. For the possible implications of the use of the word ‘serpent’ (and its suggested associations with magic and sorcery) in this context, see Murphy (2002: 437, 441). According to Murphy, the word is used ‘not (as) a simple metaphor but rather (as) evidence of the great power attributed to the king’s daughter and sister and deriving from the danger which these women represent with their behaviour secret and hostile to the king’.

112. Mursili is so identified in a passage in the so-called ‘Aleppo treaty’, KBo i 6 (CTH 75) obv. 13, dating to the reign of the 13th cent. king Muwattalli II. However, some scholars have argued that Mursili was Hattusili’s actual
son; thus most recently Steiner (1996) within the context of a detailed reconsideration of the genealogy of the royal line (for earlier references, see Bryce (1981: 9 n. 3)).

113. i.e. Hattusili adopted him as his son in order to pave the way for his succession.

114. Cf. KBo iii 27 (CTH 5) 13–14: ‘See! I have given you Mursili. He will take the throne of his father and my son (is) no (longer) my son.’


116. Cf. the instructions to kings in KBo xx 31 = KUB i:vii 69 = KUB xi 21, ed. Hoffner (1992a). Hoffner notes that the archaic language of this text suggests that it belongs to the Old Hittite period (p. 299).

117. Further on the role of the panku in Hattusili’s reign, see Marazzi (1984).

118. The term was long considered to be Hattic in origin, largely on the basis of its appearance in archaic rituals of Hattic as well as Palaic and Hittite origin. For the identification of the term as an Indo-European one, see the refs. in n. 16 above, esp. Melchert (2003: 18–20) for its proposed Luwian ancestry.


121. It was the Hittite name of Suppiluliuma I’s Babylonian wife; see Ch. 7.

122. At least in those cases where the title is attested; see Carruba (1992a: 74–5).


125. See Lebrun (1979: 113, with n. 19).


127. Thus Astour (1989: 12). See also Dinçol et al. (1993: 104–5), in the context of their discussion of the cruciform seal; they conclude that ‘taking all the evidence together, it is safe to say that Labarna I and Tawananna represented the royal couple of the preceding generation’.

128. For further discussion of the Tawananna’s relationship with other members of the royal family, see Bryce (1981), Puhvel (1989: 353). It may well be, as Puhvel suggests, that the royal succession skipped a generation and that the definition of Hattusili’s filiation indicates that his aunt was the link of legitimacy through the intermediate generation which had yielded no king, and that in the absence of an immediate regal father, Hattusili
had to define himself via his grandfather and the latter’s daughter. Cf. Beal (2003: 15).

129. See also Beckman (1986a: 21).

130. I believe this refers to a particular Tawananna, and not to the abolition of the office of Tawananna as assumed by Bin-Nun; see Bryce (1981: 15), de Martino (1991a). Murphy (2002: 437) sees the banning of the Tawananna’s name as signifying her loss of identity.

131. See Carruba’s discussion of this text (1992a: 77–82) along with his transliteration and translation of the full text.

132. The assumption that Kaddusi was Hattusili’s wife is based on her appearance next to the king in the royal offering lists; see Beal (1983: 123). More recently Beal (2003: 34: n. b) notes that the cruciform seal supports the offering lists which portray Kaddusi as the king’s wife.


134. A further possibility, proposed by Beal (1983: 35; 2003: 29–30), is that the Tawananna in question was Hattusili’s aunt, now long-widowed and aged, who sought to take advantage of Hattusili’s illness and the absence of an adult heir to re-establish her own line on the throne.

135. Thus Sommer and Falkenstein (1938: 188–9).


138. On these, see Bin-Nun (1975: 120–5), Bryce (2002: 201–3).

139. For an interpretation and explanation of this very difficult passage, see Melchert (1991). See also Dardano (2002: 389–90) who interprets the last words as a plea for protection against malevolent chthonic forces rather than as a reference to the practice of inhumation (which is otherwise unattested for Hittite royalty).


CH. 5: THE STRUGGLES FOR THE ROYAL SUCCESSION

1. See the references cited by Laroche (1966: 144 no. 1000), Archi (1979: 39). For the appearance of the name in the offering lists (after Mursili), see Otten (1968: 104 and 122).


4. The text in transliteration appears in Forrer (1922–6: no. 20), Klengel (1965b: 149).
5. For a commentary on the text, see Grayson (1975: 45–9).
6. Depending on which chronology is followed, the date could be raised or lowered by up to 60 years. Gurney (1974) discusses five possible dates for the raid on Babylon, favouring 1595. Most recently Gasche et al. (1998) have argued for an ultra-low chronology, thus dating the fall of Babylon a century or so after the above-favoured date (see Appendix 1).
7. As emphasized by Manning (1999: 357 n. 1579) who points out that both texts date well after the period in question, and draws attention to Grayson’s comment (1975: 49) that the Babylonian record linking a Hittite attack on Akkad (i.e. Babylon) to Samsuditana’s reign is in fact an even later insertion in small script on the Babylonian Chronicle tablet.
8. Kempinski and Košak (1982: 110) comment that the account by Telipinu of Mursili’s expedition against these cities is a ‘striking paraphrase’ of a passage from the chronicle of Hantili, KBo iii 57 (CTH 11A) ii 10 17–18. For other fragments relating to the expeditions against Aleppo and Babylon, see CTH 10–12.
10. Gurney (1973a: 251) connects this conflict with the defeat of Aleppo. However Güterbock (1954b: 385) comments that the insertion of the conflict between the destruction of Babylon and the reference to its booty seems to indicate that Hurrians attacked the Hittite king on his way home, so that he had to defend his booty.
14. Zidanta’s relationship to Hantili is indicated by copy B of the Proclamation where it is stated that he was the husband of Hantili’s daughter; see Riemschneider (1971: 88–9).
15. As assumed by Gurney (1973a: 251), Astour (1989: 14), though as Goetze (1957a: 55) points out, there is no evidence that he was murdered almost immediately after his return.
16. There is no explicit statement in the Proclamation that Hantili actually became king. But his wife is referred to as queen (munus.lugal) in the Akkadian version of the text, and the phrase referring to his approaching death—‘When Hantili had grown old and was about to become a god’—recalls the standard expression which elsewhere is reserved exclusively for the death of a king.
17. Telipinu Procl. §12, i 37.
18. See the references cited by del Monte and Tischler (1978: 384).
19. *Telipinu Procl.* §§16–17 (Akkadian version, §15). For the possible location of Sugziya, see in addition to the references cited by del Monte and Tischler (1978: 363), Kempinski and Košak (1982: 101); the latter (following Bossew) place it north of Urshu which lay to the north of Carchemish.
20. According to the reconstruction and re-ordering of the relevant texts proposed by Helck (1984: 106–7).
21. Thus Goetze (1957a: 56) (following a reconstruction of the texts in question proposed by Forrer), and most recently Soysal (1990).
22. According to the interpretation of the text fragments by Soysal (1990), the chief culprit was the queen of Sugziya, who had refused to release Harapsili and her sons from captivity (on the assumption that the text refers to two queens—a local queen as well as Harapsili); on the orders of a high-ranking Hittite functionary, she was finally arrested and executed, along with her children, in retaliation for the death of Harapsili and her children.
23. Goetze (1957a: 56 n. 40) proposed the reading *Kasseni* in place of *Piseni*. But see Carruba (1993b).
25. All the documents associated with a king Zidanta should almost certainly be attributed to the second king of this name, one of the successors of Telipinu. Further to this, see Hoffner (1980: 309).
30. Fragments of three copies are preserved (*CTH* 18). Klinger (1995a: 90) expresses doubts about the attribution to Ammuna.
33. Though the Kaskans are not actually attested in Hittite records until the reign of Hantili II; see below n. 75.
34. *Contra* a longstanding assumption that Huzziya was also a son of Ammuna, and the younger brother of Titti and Hantili (who had to be eliminated if Huzziya was to succeed to the throne); see Goetze (1957a: 56), Easton (1981: 26), Astour (1989: 24).
35. In referring to his accession in the *Proclamation*, Telipinu states that he sat upon the throne of his father (§24, ii 16). Since we know that he was the brother-in-law of his immediate predecessor Huzziya, then he must be referring to the previous king Ammuna. In spite of Goetze's suggestion (1957a: 56) that Ammuna was really his father-in-law, I believe, with Gurney (1973b: 663) that Telipinu's statement was literally true—that he
was in fact one of the sons of Ammuna (but note Hoffner’s (1975: 53) comments), apparently the only one who escaped the conspiracy which led to Huzziya’s accession.


39. See Beal (1986: 424, with n. 2).

40. This is indicated particularly by a land-grant document, LS 28, discovered at Tarsus in the plain of Adana; see Riemschneider (1958: 344, 375) (for the text), Gurney (1973b: 661), Easton (1981: 16, 24), Beal (1986: 424–5).

41. Cf. Gurney (1973b: 661), Beal (1986: 426), although Wilhelm (1989: 23) suggests that it may have first achieved independence during Hantili’s reign.

42. The *bulla* bearing the seal impression was first reported by Goldman (1935: 535–6). See also Goetze (1936; 1940: 73). On the possibility that the seal bears the designation ‘King of Tarhuntassa’, see Houwink ten Cate (1992a: 250).

43. *CTH* 21. Fragmentary versions in both Hittite and Akkadian survive.

44. Suggested by Gurney (1973a: 665).

45. Thus Gurney (1979a: 155).

46. It depends essentially on the claim once made by Landsberger that the name of Isputahsu’s father was Indo-Aryan, implying a connection with the ruling clans associated with the expansion of Hurrian power. This claim is disputed by Gurney (1973a: 664–5, with 665 n. 1).

47. *Telipinu Procl.* §26, ii 26. The text is fragmentary at this point, but the import of the broken passage seems clear.


49. The precise relationship between the terms *tuliya* and *panku* remains problematic. For one view, see Haase (1988: 75–6).

50. i.e. a husband who *enters into* and therefore ‘becomes a member of the wife’s family in inversion of the usual custom’ (Beckman (1986a: 17). Contra the usual interpretation of *antiyant-* as ‘son-in-law’, see Haase (2003: 625).

51. See Goetze (1957c: 94).

55. See Hoffman (1984a: 76–7) for a survey of these discussions. Add Marazzi (1984) who discusses the range of meanings and nuances which the term had in different contexts, particularly in Hattusili’s Testament and Telipinu’s Proclamation
58. As Beckman (1982: 440) has pointed out, the panku had clearly never functioned as the normal judicial organ of the Hittite state.
59. For a recent re-examination of the passage to which this statement belongs, see Dardano (2002: 362–4).
60. We conclude this from a fragmentary reference to Harapseki as dumu-munus.lugal (daughter of the king), KUB xxvi 77 i 2, and another to Alluwamna as dumu.lugal (son of the king), KUB xi 3. See Goetze (1957a: 57), Gurney (1973b: 669).
61. The fragments naming Alluwamna (KUB xi 3, KUB xxvi 77, KUB xxxi 74) are grouped in CTH 23.
63. There is no textual evidence to indicate the point at which Tahurwaili intruded into the royal line. However, an examination of stylistic features of the royal seals of Telipinu’s successors led Easton (1981: 29) to conclude that Alluwamna and Tahurwaiili ruled successively, with the latter probably succeeding the former. Earlier Carruba (1974) and Bin-Nun (1974) had proposed the reverse order. More recently Freu (1995: 133–4) has argued that Tahurwaili was the later king, also on the basis of stylistic considerations, though Freu makes him the successor of Alluwamna’s son(?) Hantili II.
68. In view of the Hittites’ ‘strong sense of dynasty’, it is possible that Tahurwaili himself had some form of blood or marriage link with Telipinu’s family; cf. Beal (1992b: 329 n. 1257). Astour (1989: 25) points out that
there is no case (we should say no demonstrable case) in Hittite history in which kingship was held by a man who was not related to the royal house either by birth or by marriage. In Tahurwaili’s case, however, any such relationship may have been quite tenuous.

69. After removing Alluwamna from power, Tahurwaili may have sent him into exile. Evidence of this is perhaps to be found in a text which mentions the banishment of Alluwamna and his wife Harapseki, and may also refer to Tahurwaili (KUB xxvi 77 i 18). But the attribution of the text is not certain (see Bin-Nun (1974: 116–18) and Astour (1989: 27) who attribute it to Telipinu, and Easton (1981: 27)). In any case, the assumed reference to Tahurwaili involves substantial restoration of his name [Tahurw]aili (suggested by Carruba (1974: 81) and Bin-Nun (1974: 117)).

70. KBo xxviii 108+109; see Otten (1971: 66–7).

71. See the references cited by Gurney (1973b: 669 n. 7). Astour (1989: 31) believed that all three actually existed but as non-reigning members of the royal house.


73. On the basis of the restoration of the name Han[tili], Alluwamna’s son, in the land-grant document KBo xxxii 136; see Freu (1995: 134). It does not necessarily follow, as Freu assumes, that Hantili was his father’s immediate successor. Tahurwaili could well have come in between before the throne was restored to the legitimate family line; cf. Astour (1989: 34).

74. See Houwink ten Cate (1979a: esp. 160–1) and the review of possible locations by Gurney (1992: 214–15).

75. The loss of Nerik to the Kaskans, referred to both by Hattusili III in his so-called Apology (CTH 81) §10b, iii 46’–49’, and subsequently by his son Tudhaliya, KUB xxv 21 (CTH 524.1) 2–5, was once dated to the reign of Hantili I. However von Schuler (1965: 24–7) suggested that the loss did not occur until after Telipinu’s reign. And in view of the absence of any other reference to the Kaskans up to and including Telipinu’s reign, their capture of Nerik probably occurred in the reign of Hantili II. Cf. Klinger (1995a: 84), Freu (1995: 135). The recovery of Nerik in Hattusili III’s reign is recorded in the passage from the Apology referred to above.

76. Information provided by Hattusili III’s treaty with the people of Tiliura, KUB xxi 29 (with duplicates) (CTH 89) i 11–12.

77. See Forrer (1922–6: no. 22).

79. See Beal (1986: 431).

80. *KUB* xxxvi 108 (*CTH* 25). For the text of the treaty, see Otten (1951a). In spite of doubts expressed as to whether the Hittite signatory was Zidanta I or II (see Hoffner (1980: 309), Košak (1980a: 166–7)), it is virtually certain that the person in question was the second of that name; see Gurney (1973a: 661, 670–1), Beal (1986: 428), Freu (1995: 135); *contra*, Astour (1989: 21).

81. *KBo* xxxii 184 and *KBo* xxxii 185 respectively. See Carruba (1990: 539–40).

82. Carruba (1990: 547). Muwattalli appears to have risen to the post of *gal MESĘDİ* (Chief of the Bodyguards) under Huzziya; see Freu (1995: 136) with reference to *KUB* xxxii 187. Carruba (1990: 541) also draws attention to an Akkadian text fragment, *KUB* iii 20 (*CTH* 275), which names a Mutalli (Hittite Muwattalli) two lines after a Zitanza. Note the seal of Huzziya—*SBo* 51, no. 85 (= Beran (1967: 32 no. 147)). *Contra* Astour (1989: 24) who assigns it to Huzziya I, it is almost certainly to be attributed to Huzziya II; see Easton (1981: 29), Freu (1995: 136).

83. See Carruba’s table 1 (1990: 555).


85. Himuili can perhaps be identified with the high-ranking official who held the office of *gal GESTIN* (Chief of the Wine-(Stewards)) under Muwattalli (see most recently Freu (1995: 137), Klinger (1995a: 86–7); on the term, see Beal (1992b: 342–57)), Kantuzzili with the holder of the office of ‘Overseer of the Golden Chariot-Fighters’ (for the Hittite term, see Beal (1992b: 410 n. 1542, and 410–11)).

86. This follows the reconstruction of events proposed by Freu (1995: 137), on the basis of *KUB* xxxiv 40 (*CTH* 271) 8’–15’ (ed. Otten (1987: 29–30); see also Carruba (1990: 541–2)). The text makes reference both to ‘the queen, your mother’ (lines 8’, 12’), and to Kantuzzili and Himuili as the assassins of Muwattalli (lines 9’–10’). Freu’s reconstruction may well be right, though it is not clear from the text itself that the queen in question was the wife of Huzziya or that the assassins were her sons.

87. On the origins of the kingdom of Mitanni and the early phases in its development, see Freu (2003a: 25–31).

88. Note that by this time the Egyptians used the term *Hurru* to refer to the Asiatic regions where they campaigned; Singer (1991b: 73).

89. On Tuthmosis’ Syrian campaigns, see Breasted (1906, ii §§81, 85). Surviving inscriptions which clearly refer to these campaigns all date to the reign of his grandson Tuthmosis III; see Bryan (2000: 71–2).

90. The Euphrates is the river commonly identified in the statement made by his grandson Tuthmosis III that he set up ‘east of this water’ another stele
beside that of his (grand)father Aakheperkare (i.e. Tuthmosis I) (Urk iv 697) (Breasted (1906: II §478)). Some doubt has now been expressed as to whether the river in question was in fact the Euphrates; see Bryan (2000: 72).


92. The inscription was first published by Smith (1949). For a substantially revised German translation, see Dietrich and Loretz (1985), and for an English translation and discussion within the context of ancient Near Eastern autobiographical literature, Greenfield (1995: 2,423–8). See also Freu (2003a: 34–5).


95. Idrimi inscription, 50–8.


98. Idrimi inscription, 64–77. One of the towns, Zaruna, was amongst those previously conquered by Hattusili. Smith identified it with Seleucia, north of Antioch. For a review of the question of its location, along with the location of other place-names mentioned in context with it, see Gurney (1992: 216–17).

99. AT 3.

100. On this and the question of intra-empire treaties, see Beal (1986: 429 n. 26), contra Wilhelm (1989: 26).

101. It should be noted that the dating of the Idrimi–Pilliya treaty has been a matter of some dispute. One school of thought assigns it and its signatories to an earlier period, making them and the Mitannian king Parrattarna contemporaries of the Hittite king Ammuna; see e.g. Gurney (1973b: 661–2). In this case we would have to postulate an earlier king Pilliya of Kizzuwadna. However, a later dating, which removes the need for two Pilliyas and assigns Idrimi and Parrattarna to the first half of the 15th cent., seems much more likely; cf. Beal (1986: 429–30), with refs.

102. For a possible indication that Kizzuwadna’s change of allegiance occurred after Zidanta’s reign, see Ch. 6, n. 61. Beal (1986: 430–1) notes that in the next generation at Alalah, Idrimi’s younger son Niqmepa brought a dispute against Sunashshura, the king of Kizzuwadna, which was to be judged by the Mitannian king Saushtatar—a clear indication that Kizzuwadna was still at this stage a tributary of Mitanni.

103. This includes a period of co-regency with Hatshepsut. Tuthmosis’ sole rule began c.1458.

104. Thus Astour (1989: 57), who notes that his interest in the newly acquired region found expression in the metic collection of place-names for his


106. For a comprehensive treatment of Tuthmosis’ Syro-Palestinian campaigns, see Redford (2003). In particular on Egypt’s contacts and conflicts with Mitanni up to and esp. during the reign of Tuthmosis III, see Gundlach (2003).

107. Although without being able to determine precise or even approximate dates for Zidanta’s reign we cannot be sure who the Hittite king was. It could have been Zidanta’s successor Huzziya II.


109. The surviving fragments are grouped in *CTH* 134.


111. For discussion of the date, see Houwink ten Cate (1963: 274–5), Sürenhagen (1985: 26–38), and further refs. cited by Klengel (1999: 110 n. 116).

112. Singer (*Fs Mazar*).


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**CH. 6: A NEW ERA BEGINS**

1. For a discussion of changes in the character of the monarchy after the Old Kingdom, see Goetze (1957c: 88–92; 1964: 29–30). See also Archi (2003: 10–11).

2. On the distinction between these and later princes with the same names, see Freu (1995: 138; 2002b: esp. 72–4).

3. *KBo* xxxii 185 rev. 12; see Beal (1992b: 333). On the importance of the office of the *gal MESˇEDI*, see Beal (1992b: 327–42, esp. the summary on p. 342). Muwa also appears along with Himuili as one of the chief functionaries in the witness list on a land-grant document bearing Muwattalli’s seal (*KBo* xxxii 185); see Otten (1991: 346).

4. The full text has been ed. by Carruba (1977a: 162–3).


question was ‘Tudhaliya the Younger’, son of Tudhaliya III and the victim of the coup which brought Suppiluliuma I to the throne c.1350 (discussed in Ch. 7).

7. Thus Klinger (1995a: 95–6 n. 81). Cf. de Martino (1991b), Klengel (1999: 102–3), Singer (2002c: 309). However, Freu (1995: 137 and in a forthcoming article) proposes that Tudhaliya came from another clan with Hurrian affinities, and that his father Kantizzil is to be distinguished from the assassin of Muwattali (pointing out that the name Kantizzil is a common one in the elite circles of the Hittite court and administration). If he is right, then Tudhaliya’s succession marked a distinct break with the old dynastic tradition and the beginning of a new dynasty.

8. See Beal (1986: 442 n. 87) for a discussion of the various proposals to split Tudhaliya into two kings of that name, and more recently Carruba (1998a) in his discussion of the new information provided by the so-called cruciform seal. Freu (2003a: 55–79) in his reconstruction of the history of this period also assumes the existence of two Tudhaliyas, separated by a ‘Hattusili II’ (on this last, see below).


10. Further on this, see Bryce (1986b: 3–4).

11. News of the upheavals in the Hittite homeland could have provided the main trigger for this action.

12. These include the parallel texts KUB xxiii 11//12 (CTH 142.2), ed. Carruba (1977a: 158–63), also trans. by Gurney in Garstang and Gurney (1959: 121–3). The fragmentary text KUB xxiii 27 is also commonly assigned to these Annals, but probably belongs to a later period, perhaps the reign of Tudhaliya III; cf. Košak (1980a: 164). Taracha (1997) has argued for assigning the Annals themselves to the reign of Tudhaliya III.

13. Six known texts refer to the Land of Assuwa: KUB xxiii 11 + 12 (CTH 142), KUB xxiii 14 (CTH 211.5), KUB xxvi 91 (CTH 183), KUB xxxiv 43 (CTH 824), KUB xl 62 + KUB xiii 9 (CTH 258), and the text on the longsword. See also Cline (1996: 140–1 with n. 27), who notes that all these texts either date to Tudhaliya’s reign or refer to events during this reign (less certain, though still probable, in the case of KUB xxvi 91 and KUB xxxiv 43). For possible references to Assuwa in the Mycenaean Linear B tablets, see Cline (1996: 144). Following Starke (1997: 455), Niemeier (1999: 145) prefers to regard Assuwa as designating a federal country of c.20 members rather than a coalition.

the name Assuwa with the later city of Assos on the southern coast of the Troad.


17. The earliest of these, the seal found in Tarsus of the Kizzuwadnan king Ispuṭahsu (see Ch. 5), dates back to the last decades of the 16th cent.

18. The earliest known hieroglyphic inscriptions apart from this one date to the 13th cent. Hawkins (2003: 146) comments: ‘That such an inscription might be written in hieroglyphic at this (earlier) date (c.1400) would have a revolutionary implication for our view of the origin of the script . . . but it does not seem possible to exclude it.’


20. Thus Cline (1996: 141). This is also the assumption of Niemeier (1999: 145–6).


24. Cf. Neimeier (1999: 150). Ertekin and Ediz (1993) refer to another inscribed sword said to have been found in the Diyarbakır region, and probably belonging to the Assyrian colony period (discussed by Güterbock (1965)). See also Ünal (1999) for a discussion of the sword discovered in the vicinity of Kastamonu (in the region of Pala-Tumman, = Class. Paphlagonia), with characteristics similar to those of the Hattusa sword.

25. Note e.g. the extensive treatment given to Kaskan issues in the Maṣat letters. Like the rest of the archive discovered at Maṣat (anc. Tapikka), these letters are generally dated largely if not exclusively to the reign of Tudhaliya III (see Alp (1991a: 109–12)), though Klinger (1995a) considers an earlier dating. The archive has been published by Alp (1991a). See also Beckman (1995a: 23–6). For a discussion of a selection of the letters (with translated excerpts), see Bryce (2003a: 171–81).

26. See del Monte and Tischler (1978: 155). For a survey of what we know of Isuwa’s history from its earliest to its latest phase, see Hawkins (1998b).

27. To judge from the reference in Tudhaliya’s Annals to the king of the Hurri in association with Isuwa’s military action against Hatti, KUB xxiii 11/12 rev. 27’–34’.
28. *KBo* i 5 20–3.

29. Further on the relations between the Hittites and Isuwa, see Klengel (1968).

30. *KUB* xxiii 21 (CTH 143) ii 12, 14, 27, iii 20.


32. For the seal impressions which associate Arnuwanda with Tudhaliya, see *SBo* i 76 (= Beran (1967: 33 no. 153)); see also Boehmer and Güterbock (1987: 81–2 no. 253): *Seal of Arnuwanda, the Great King, Son of Tudhaliya, the Great King*.

33. *SBo* i, 31–2, no. 60, 44, no. 77 (= Beran (1967: 34 no. 162, 33 no. 152 respectively)).

34. The solution proposed by Beal (1983: 117), supported by Beckman (1986: 23).


37. *KUB* xxiii 21 ii 1’–32’.

38. *KUB* xiv 1 + *KBo* xix 38 (CTH 147), ed. Goetze (1927). See Beckman (1999: 153–60) for an English translation. As Beckman notes, the surviving document is clearly a draft rather than a final version. We have only the first tablet of the document. As the colophon implies, the record of Madduwatta’s ‘offences’ extended over at least one more tablet.

39. The shorter (older) form Ahhiya appears only here and in the oracle text *KBo* xvi 97 (CTH 571.2). See Güterbock (1983a: 134), Gurney (1990: 38).

40. Cf. Mountjoy (1998: 47). Niemeier (1999: 149) suggests that Attarssiya may have been one of the Mycenaean aristocrats displaced by the emergence of the centralized palace system on the Greek mainland; alternatively he could have been the agent of one of the new expanding Mycenaean palace centres.

41. It may have covered part of the later kingdom of Mira; see Hawkins (1998a: 25). Madduwatta’s name recalls that of the Lydian kings of the 1st millennium, Alyattes and Sadyattes; cf. Freu (1987: 123; 1990: 7).

42. For a contrary view, see Houwink ten Cate (1970: 63 n. 37).

43. Although Garstang and Gurney (1959: 92) suggested that the Siyanta River Land was another name for Zippasla, they should probably be distinguished; cf. Houwink ten Cate (1970: 64). Hawkins (1998a: 22) suggests that the river itself should be identified with one of the upper
tributaries of the (Class.) Sangarios river (mod. Sakarya), either the Porsuk or the Seydi.

44. i.e. Tudhaliya, the father or adoptive father of Arnuwanda, author of the text.

45. Though neither here nor in Arnuwanda’s Annals is Kupanta-Kurunta actually called ‘king’.

46. Forrer (1937: 175) suggested the possible identification of the events described here with the defeat of Kupanta-Kurunta referred to in Arnuwanda’s Annals (see above). See also Houwink ten Cate (1970: 59), Freu (1987: 124).

47. They probably belonged to the Lukka Lands. While the Hittites exercised little direct authority in the west in this period, Tudhaliya seems to have claimed some degree of authority over a number of the smaller communities in the region, perhaps in the aftermath of his western campaigns. But this may have required of them no more than annual payments of tribute to the king, as indicated in §24 of the Indictment.


49. Indictment. §16.

50. Indictment. §22.

51. Indictment. §24.

52. Indictment. §26.

53. This follows Beckman’s translation.


57. As indicated in the treaty concluded many years later between the Hittite king Suppiluliuma I and Shattiwaza of Mitanni, this was subsequently returned to the Assyrians by the Mitannian king Shuttatara (Shuttarna) III, son of Artatama, during Suppiluliuma’s reign; KBo 1 3 (CTH 52) = PD no. 2, 38–9, obv. 8–10. The location of Washshuganni is still unknown. For the suggestion that it lay on the site of mod. Tell Feherije, see refs. cited by Klengel (1999: 86 n. 6).


60. CTH 41. For the Akkadian version, see PD no. 7, 88–111, Goetze (1940: 36–9 (introduction only)). For a trans. of both versions, see Beckman (1999: 17–26), and for the treaty’s textual history Beckman (1999: 17–18). I follow Beal (1986: 432–45) in assigning all treaty fragments associated with the name Sunashshura to the one treaty and making Tudhaliya, rather than Suppiluliuma I as once commonly assumed, his treaty partner; cf.

61. i.e. Huzziya II if, as suggested above, Tudhaliya was the son of Kantuzzili and the latter was the son of Huzziya. The statement in the first line of the Sunashshura treaty, that in the time of the author’s grandfather Kizzuwadna was aligned with Hatti, suggests that it did not switch to a Mitannian alliance until at least part way through Huzziya’s reign. See also next note.

62. It is not clear from the relevant words of the text (KBo i 5, obv. 5–6) whether Kizzuwadna was at this time actually part of the Land of Hatti, or its ally. Goetze (1940: 37) followed by Freu (2003a: 74) adopts the first interpretation, Beal’s translation ‘Kizzuwadna was (on the side) of Hatti’ (1986: 433) implies the second. Wilhelm (1988: 368) simply translates: ‘Kizzuwatna das des Landes Hatti geworden (sic)’. The alliance attested in the treaty between Huzziya’s predecessor Zidanta II and the Kizzuwadnan king Pilliya (see Ch. 5) may still have been in force during at least the first part of Huzziya’s reign.

63. Reflected in Pilliya’s treaty with the Mitannian vassal Idrimi (see Ch. 5).

64. Thus Beal (1986: 439–40) who tentatively suggests that a fragmentary passage from Arnuwanda’s Annals (KUB xxiii 21, obv. 2–11) may describe the annexation; cf. Freu (1992: 47).

65. In the list of Kizzuwadnan kings, provision has to be made for a king called Talzu, known from a land-grant document, KUB xl 2 (CTH 641); see Goetze (1940: 60–1). It is uncertain where he should be located in the list, although he was probably the predecessor, or a predecessor, of Sunashshura. See Beal (1986: 445), Freu (1992: 51).

66. KBo i 6 (CTH 75) = PD no. 6, 82–5; see Goetze (1928–9), and trans. by Beckman (1999: 93–5). See also Klengel (1964a; 1965b: 177–8, 183–5), Beal (1986: 441). For a revised version of obv. 19–32, see Na’aman (1980). The treaty originally drawn up by Mursili II was lost, and was subsequently reissued by his son Muwattalli; see Beckman (1999: 93).

67. As suggested in Ch. 4, this strange expression probably means that Hattusili substantially weakened (rather than brought to an end) the kingdom of Aleppo.

68. Presumably Niqmepa, son of Idrimi, whose kingdom of Alalah included the former royal seat Aleppo.


70. The nature of this offence and subsequently the offence committed by Aleppo against the Hittite king, is not made clear in the text. No satisfactory explanation has been found by modern scholars.
71. *KBo* i 6, obv. 19–33. The interpretation followed here of the relevant passage from the text is that of Na’amān (1980). It should, however, be noted that both the reading and interpretation of this passage are problematic. A different rendering is given by Astour (1989: 39).


73. Note the extensive list of proposals cited by Astour (1989: 40–1). To these we can add Carruba’s suggestion (1990: 552–3) that Hattusili may be identical with Kantuzzili, one of the assassins of Muwattalli I (and as we have now seen, the likely father of Tudhaliya I/II). Otten’s proposal (1968: 17–18) that the document refers here in flashback to Hattusili I was refuted by Güterbock (1970b: 74) but is still supported by Astour. The main grounds for rejecting Otten’s proposal were that references to Ashtata and Nuhashshi during the reign of Hattusili I would be anachronistic. But as Astour (1972: 103–7; 1989: 45) has pointed out, both were clearly in existence at that time. The point at issue is whether their role was significant enough already in the Old Babylonian period (contemporaneous with the reign of Hattusili I) to be compatible with the references to them in the Aleppo treaty (thus Na’amān (1980: 39)).

74. *KBo* xxxii 145, *KBo* xxxii 224, cited and discussed by Klinger (1995a: 89–90), who comments that both texts indicate the existence of a Hattusili at the royal court in this period, but provide no clear evidence that he was a king. See also Klinger’s discussion of *KUB* xxxvi 109 (*CTH* 275), ed. Carruba (1977b: 190–1), which also dates to this period and mentions a Hattusili, again without any clear indication of his precise status.


76. See also Klengel (1999: 125–6).

77. In a complex discussion of the genealogy of Mursili II, Houwink ten Cate (1995–6) reasserts the existence of a Hattusili II. See also Carruba’s discussion (1998a) of the royal genealogy, using information provided by the cruciform seal.

78. For the most recent translation of this prayer, see Singer (2002a: 40–3).


84. On its location, see Gurney (1992: 214).
85. For a translation of the whole document, see Beckman (1999: 161–6).
86. On the identification of Mal(i)tiya with (mod.) Malatya, see most recently Hawkins (1998b: 64–5). The site is attested as Melid in 1st millennium Assyrian sources and later as (Class.) Melitene.
89. Presumably the prenomen of Tuthmosis IV appeared here.
90. Prenomen of Amenhotep III.
91. Most scholars now agree that he is to be identified with Tashmisharri, which was his Hurrian name (refs. in Laroche (1966: 180, no. 1298)); see Haas (1984: 7–8; 1985: 272). However, Houwink ten Cate (1995–6) has questioned the identification, preferring to equate Tashmisharri with ‘Hattusili II’, who he believes was Tudhaliya III’s father.
93. As noted above (n. 25), this was probably (though not certainly) Tudhaliya III.
94. As Beckman (1995a: 23) notes, the high officials mentioned in these letters do not change. Thus the period covered by the letters is almost certainly confined to the last few years, perhaps even the last few months, of this phase of Tapikka’s existence. For an illustrated summary account (in German) of the site of Mašat/Tapikka, see Özugç (2002).
96. Thus e.g. Forlanini (1979: 181), contra Güterbock (1961: 96) who prefers a location on the Euphrates. Scholarly opinion has long been divided between these locations; see del Monte and Tischler (1978: 339–40). Most recently the question was discussed afresh by Gurney (2003: 123–6), who favoured a Marassantiya location while admitting that the evidence remains inconclusive.
98. EA 31, 32. These letters were written in the Nesite (i.e. ‘Hittite’) language, which may indicate that Arzawan scribes did not know, or had limited competence in, the international diplomatic language Akkadian.
99. On this statement, see also Güterbock (1967b: 145). A diametrically different rendering has been proposed by Starke (1981b) (based on an earlier suggestion by Cavaignac): ‘I have heard all that you said. And also the land of Hattusa is at peace.’ On the latter, Moran (1992: 102–3 n. 8) comments: ‘This ingenious interpretation is based on an Egyptian
parallel(?), but if one takes into consideration the historical implications, it falls short of conviction.’ See also Hagenbuchner (1989: 362–3).

100. CTH 40, ed. Güterbock (1956a).

101. We might note in passing that in none of the surviving references to Suppiluliuma’s father in the Deeds is the name of the father actually given. (A fragment originally assigned to the Deeds which mentions ‘my grandfa[ther T]uthaliya’ (p. 61, frag. 2) has now been removed; see Dinçol et al. (1993: 100, with refs.)). His identity was long debated. But now most scholars confidently identify him with Tudhaliya III, on the basis of a tablet discovered in Tapikka (Maṣat) bearing the following seal impression: ‘[Seal of Suppilulijiuma, [the Great] King, King [of the land of Hatti, son of Tudhalija], the Great King, the H[ero]’ (Msṭ 76/15) published by Alp (1980: Taf. 4 and Abb. 3, and described on pp. 56–7). However Hoffmann (1984b: 45–8) has proposed a different solution. See also Houwink ten Cate’s discussion (1995–6). See Otten (1993a: 10–13), in reference to the seal impression on a clay bulla from Boğazköy (Bo 491/1314). For a consolidated list of sources on the filiation of Suppiluliuma, see Klengel (1999: 137 A1).

102. DS p. 65, frag. 13 ε ι 7 ff.


106. DS p. 60, frag. 4. For the various locations proposed for Sallapa, see Gurney (1992: 220), who is inclined to favour Forlanini’s proposal to put it at Classical Selma (mod. Gözören) or Selme in Lycaonia.

107. As indicated by DS pp. 75–7, frag. 15.

108. We know that he continued campaigning in Anatolia throughout his reign, even during the period of his campaigns in Syria; see Bryce (1989b: 20).

109. Klengel (1999: 150) comments that for the Hittites the significance of Tuwanuwa may not least have been provided by its position on an important trade route which led from the Mediterranean coast via Tarsus to the north.

110. See Cancik (1976: 161–2) for a stylistic analysis of this passage from the Deeds. The actual status of Anzapahhaddu in the Arzawa lands is not clear. Was he one of a number of Arzawan chiefs or petty kings? Or was he the successor of Tarhundaradu (not mentioned in the surviving sections of the Deeds) who had been involved in negotiations with Amenhotep III? If the latter, then he may have been head of some form of Arzawan confederacy. Freu (1992: 46–7) suggests that he could have been one of the sons or vassals of Tarhundaradu.
111. This and the lines in the passage immediately below are a duplicate of \textit{KBo} xiv 42 (\textit{CTH} 40 vi.52a) and contain restorations from that text, proposed by Houwink ten Cate. Both passages constitute an additional fragment of the \textit{Deeds}. Houwink ten Cate suggests that the fragment belongs towards the end of the \textit{Deeds}, but comments that an earlier location is possible.

112. The information comes from two documents of his grandson Hattusili III, \textit{KBo} vi 28 (\textit{CTH} 88) referred to above, and \textit{KUB} xix 9 (\textit{CTH} 83.1). The number 20 which often occurs in texts of the period should probably not be taken too literally. It may be essentially a relative term, indicating that a particular event or series of events occupied a long period of time in comparison with other events; cf. Wilhelm and Boese (1987–9: 90–1), Bryce (1989b: 20), Freu (1992: 45).

113. In the documents cited in the previous note.

\textbf{CH. 7: THE SUPREMACY OF HATTI}

1. The reasons why Tudhaliya the Younger was favoured over Suppiluliuma as heir to the throne remain entirely unknown to us. See Klengel’s comments (1999: 148).

2. For a translation of the whole prayer, see most recently Singer (2002a: 61–4).

3. Perhaps his half-brother.


5. Van den Hout (2000: 645) comments that the mention of the Oath Deities hints at a more complicated situation in which Suppiluliuma may have been legitimately fighting his (half-)brother.

6. The report of the accession must be assigned, at the earliest, to the short gap of c.11 lines (thus Güterbock) at the beginning of col. iv of the second tablet, since extant references to Suppiluliuma’s father continue to the end of col. iii of this tablet; see further, Bryce (1989b: 20).

7. Egyptologists still remain divided on the question of whether there was in fact a co-regency between Amenhotep III and his son. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, I have followed those who argue for a brief period of joint rule.

8. It is perhaps to be equated with modern Gürün on a tributary of the Euphrates; see Garstang and Gurney (1959: 47), Gurney (1979a: 156).


11. *EA* 17: 11–20 indicates the circumstances of his accession. For a discussion of his reign, see Freu (2003a: 88–90).

12. Wilhelm (1989: 31) notes that opinions differ on whether Artatama (II) actually ruled over a region in the north-east of the Mitannian kingdom (thus Goetze (1957a: 67–8)), or was no more than a king by name, a grace and favour status accorded by the Hittites (cf. Kühne (1973b: 19 n. 82), Freu (2003a: 20–1)).


15. Reference to it is made in the treaty later concluded between Suppiluliuma and Tushratta’s son Shattiwaza; *PD* no. 1 (*CTH* 51), 2–3, obv. 1–3. The treaty is discussed below.

16. It had been cemented by a marriage alliance when Tushratta, in the same manner as his father Shuttarna and grandfather Artatama, sent his daughter Taduhepa as a bride for the pharaoh (*EA* 19: 17 ff, *EA* 22: iv 43–9).


20. See *SBo* 1, 5–11. To these we can now add the seal impressions discovered in the Nişantepe seal archive which associate Suppiluliuma with Henti and Tawananna. The archive has produced three more seal impressions in which Henti is paired with Suppiluliuma, and more than fifty in which Suppiluliuma and Tawananna (= Malnigal; on this name see refs. in n. 24) appear together; see Otten (1994; 1995: 13–16) for a description of the Suppiluliuma-Henti seals. The three queens are also listed (after Walanni, Nikkalmati, and Asmunikal) in the *nuntarriyāša* festival text, *KUB* xxv 14 (*CTH* 626.iv) 1 28’ ff, 46’ ff, iii 10’ ff. For a transliteration and translation of part of this text, see Bin-Nun (1975: 199–200).


22. *KUB* xix 25+26 (*CTH* 44), discussed below.

23. In Freu’s chronological scheme (2002a: 102), the marriage alliance should be dated much later in Suppiluliuma’s reign, to c.1331.


25. *SBo* 1, 9–11. See *RS* 17.227, 17.373, 17.340 (Schaeffer (1956: 2–6)). The legend in Akkadian cuneiform reads: ‘Seal of Suppiluliuma, the Great
King, King of the Land of Hatti, beloved of the Storm God; seal of Tawananna, the Great Queen, Daughter of the King of Babylon.

26. See PRU iv, 32–4, with Dossier πια 1–3.
27. Cf. Goetze (1975a: 13). I have suggested that a Hittite–Kassite alliance may have served a similar purpose in Mursili I’s reign; see Ch. 5.
30. According to Liverani (1971), ‘Zannanza’ was an Egyptian epithet for the Hittite prince, not his actual name.
33. For the most recent treatment of Telipinu’s role in the Hittite kingdom, see Freu (2002b: 74–80).
34. For the most recent account of this war, see Freu (2003a: 120–38). Freu’s account differs from mine in a number of respects, both in terms of the episodes assigned to the war and the relative chronology of events of the period in general. For overviews of the Syro-Palestinian states which became caught up in the power-plays between the major kingdoms, see Bryce (2003a: 131–44), van de Mieroop (2004: 154–60).
35. It is possible that Suppiluliuma’s ‘one-year war’ was preceded by a preliminary Hittite expedition into Syrian territory, as far as Mt. Lebanon. This is suggested by line 4 of the treaty Suppiluliuma later drew up with Shattiwaza of Mitanni (cited in n. 37); see Bryce (1989b: 26–7, with refs.) and most recently Altman (2003: 346 with n. 3). But we cannot be certain that the particular episode referred to there occurred outside the context of the one-year Syrian war. Far from certain too is the claim that the Amarna letter EA 75 provides additional evidence for a preliminary Hittite expedition into Syria (see Altman (2001a: 6–7; 2001b: 42)); the information contained in the letter is not specific enough, in my view, to justify this claim.
36. DS pp. 84–5, frag. 29; see Wilhelm and Boese (1987–9: 89).
37. The account appears in the historical preambles to the treaties which Suppiluliuma drew up with Shattiwaza, PD no. 1 (CTH 51) and Tette, king of Nuhashshi, PD no. 3 (CTH 53). The treaties are translated respectively by Beckman (1999: 42–8; 54–8).
38. PD no. 3, 58–9, i, obv. 1–13.
40. Which he passed through apparently with the consent of its king Antaratli, PD no. 1, 8–9, obv. 26, PD no. 3, 58–9, i, 19–20. Further on Suppilu-
liuma’s Isuwan campaign as recorded in the Shattiwaza treaty, see Altman (2000).

41. PD no. 1, 6–9, obv. 17–29; cf. DS pp. 84–5, frag. 26.
42. PD no. 1, 10–15, obv. 30–41.
43. For the relevant texts, see Pritchard (1969: 234–7).
44. Breasted (1906: ii. §§465, 585).
45. PD no. 1, 14–15, obv. 40–3.
46. EA 140: 25–32.
47. He finally broke his ties with Hatti in the ninth year of the reign of Suppiluliuma’s son Mursili II, when he participated in a rebellion of Syrian princes against Hittite rule (see Ch. 8).
48. PRU IV, 32–52, Dossier ii a. For a useful summary of the contents of the archives and libraries of Ugarit (mod. Ras Shamra; hence the abbreviation RS used in cataloguing the tablets from the site), upon which most of our information about the kingdom of Ugarit and its relations with both Hatti and Egypt is based, see Pedersen (1998: 68–80).
49. See Korosˇec (1960: 72–3).
50. EA 46–8; See Moran (1992: 118 n. 1).
51. This depends on a dubious reference to the king of Hatti in EA 45. In fact Altman (2001a: 10) argues against any Hittite diplomatic campaign at this early stage of Suppiluliuma’s operations in Syria.
52. Trans. also by Beckman (1999: 125–6).
53. RS 17.227, 7–11 (PRU IV, 40–1).
54. Cf. Klengel (1992: 132–3), Beckman (1999: 34, 125) who assume that Niqmaddu’s Syrian neighbours attacked his territory prior to his pact with Suppiluliuma, which prompted him to accept Suppiluliuma’s overtures. The relevant lines from Suppiluliuma’s treaty with Niqmaddu (RS 17.340, 9–14 (PRU IV 49–50)) could be read either way (the treaty is trans. by Beckman (1999: 34–6)). For the various provisions of the accord between Niqmaddu and his Hittite overlord, see RS 17.227, 16–53 (PRU IV, 41–3), and the following texts in PRU IV, 44–52. Drawing on suggested supporting evidence in the Amarna letters (esp. EA 49 and 126), Freu (2002a: 99) assigns the alliance to a much later date in Suppiluliuma’s reign—c.1330 when the Egyptian throne was occupied by Tutankhamun. See also Freu (2000: 23–32). Here as elsewhere Freu’s chronology of Suppiluliuma’s reign warrants serious consideration. But one needs to be extremely wary about linking the often imprecise information contained in the small group of Amarna letters which relate to the international scene with specific historical episodes known from other sources.
55. RS 17.340, 2–8 (PRU IV, 49).
56. RS 17.340, 9–21 (PRU IV, 49–50). See Altman (2001a) for a detailed discussion of the political and historical context of this episode and a reconstruction of the order of events comprising it.


61. Sharrupshi is never actually referred to as ‘king’. This may be simple oversight, though Altman (2001b: 37–8, 40) suggests that Sharrupshi never actually occupied but was merely a contender for his kingdom’s throne, a fact which the Hittite texts have deliberately obscured for political reasons. The link proposed by Freu (2002a: 92–3) between the Sharrupshi episode and two Amarna letters, EA 45 and 75 is, I think, a very tenuous one. As already noted, such links underpin much of Freu’s chronology for the reign of Suppiluliuma. In this case he assigns the Sharrupshi episode to the aftermath of the Isuwan foray, but separates it entirely from the one-year Syrian war which he dates six years later, to the year 1341. See also the comments of Altman (2001b: 36 n. 28).

62. Primarily on the basis of legal argumentation, Altman (2001b: 28–34) concludes that Sharrupshi’s appeal to Suppiluliuma for assistance was made concurrently with his self-subjugation to the Hittite king.

63. PD no. 1, obv. 38. The precise interpretation of this line depends on whether el-ta-h˘ i-it is read as ‘he fled’ or ‘he was murdered’, with a preference for the former; see Klinger (2001: 288 n. 44).

64. Altman (2001b: 34–5) prefers to leave open the possibility that Sharrupshi had in fact remained loyal to his Hittite allegiance and was forced to flee the wrath of his own family for so doing. This was the line I too originally took (Bryce (1998: 180)). But I now think it more likely, particularly given the context, that Sharrupshi was a fugitive from Hittite justice rather than the victim of a family vendetta.

65. PD no. 1, 12–13, obv. 39–40. It was not, however, the capital; see Klengel (1969: 48 n. 15).

66. Freu (2003a: 127) comments that the lacunas in CTH 53 (PD 3) prevent us from understanding the relationship between the information (concerning Sharrupshi etc.) provided in this text and the events described in CTH 51 (PD 1).
67. *CTH* 46 (RS 17.340) obv. 1–18, from Suppiluliuma’s treaty with Niqmaddu II of Ugarit, trans. Beckman (1999: 34–6). He is presumably the same Addu-nirari who wrote a letter, *EA* 51, to the king of Egypt (unnamed) acknowledging allegiance to him, *apparently* indicating that he had rejected an offer of alliance from the king of Hatti (the text is very broken at this point), and requesting that the pharaoh send him an adviser along with troops and chariots. The fragmentary nature of the letter makes its context unclear. Freu (2003a: 128) identifies the addressee as either Smenkhkare or Tutankhamun. But an earlier dating to Akhenaten’s reign would seem at least as likely, more so if *CTH* 46 belongs within the context of Suppiluliuma’s one-year Syrian campaign. Altman (2001b: 36, 44) suggests that Sharrupshi and Addu-nirari were brothers, and that the former was the legitimate king of Nushashshi under Mitannian sovereignty. But since there was apparently a plurality of kings in the Nushashshi lands, it is possible that the persons in question were not related and in fact belonged to different kingdoms in the region.


70. *‘apiru* or *sa.gaz* in the texts. On the *sa.gaz* movement in Syria, see Waterhouse (1965: 192–9, with references). For a more recent general survey of the Habiru, see Loretz (1984), and for a brief summary treatment, Snell (1997: 68).

71. Singer (1991a: 141) comments that it was most unlikely that he came from one of the royal families of the coastal cities of Amurru. ‘He rather must have obtained his dominant position in one of the highland tribes, possibly in southern Amurru.’

72. Scholars disagree on the time-relationship between the careers of the Amurrite leader Abdi-Ashirta and subsequently his son Aziru on the one hand, and the reigns of the pharaoh Amenhotep III and his son Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten on the other. Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru both figure prominently in the letters of Rib-Hadda, king of Gubla, discussed below. Singer (1991: 148) believes that all of Abdi-Ashirta’s recorded activities fell within the reign of Akhenaten, after the transfer of the capital to Akhetaten in Year 5, while noting that his career in Amurru may have started long before his first appearance in the Amarna correspondence. *Contra* Singer, Freu (2002a: 90; 2003a: 100–1) following Moran *et al.* has argued that Abdi-Ashirta’s activities, at least those recorded in the ‘first series’ of Rib-Hadda’s letters, belong within the reign of Amenhotep III. This seems more likely, though the matter is further complicated by the question of whether or not, or for how long, there was a co-regency between Amenhotep III and his son.
79. *EA* 101. All that survives is the second tablet of a two-tablet letter which does not preserve its author’s name.
81. Thus Moran (1969).
84. On the basis of *EA* 95: 41–2, Altman (1977) argues that Abdi-Ashirta was in fact arrested and removed to Egypt, where he ended his life.
85. See also Singer (1991a: 146). Note his arguments, pp. 146–7, against the view that the reason for Abdi-Ashirta’s removal was his alleged co-operation with Mitanni and/or Hatti.
87. *EA* 98; 104; 140.
88. e.g. *EA* 107.
89. *EA* 106: 23 ff.
90. Goetze (1975a: 12) suggests that some understanding may already have existed between Suppiluliuma and Aziru, citing a passage from Mursili II’s treaty with Aziru’s grandson Duppi-Teshub, *CTH* 62; Friedrich (1926: no. 1, 4–5, obv. 2–3).
91. For his compliance, see *EA* 168.
92. *EA* 169.
93. *EA* 170.
94. The Biqā‘ valley between Lebanon and Antilebanon. For a discussion of the sources of information on the Hittite attack, see Sürenhagen (1985: 40–51).
95. A force of this size, twice the size of the force that later confronted Ramesses II at Kadesh, is inconceivable. Cf. Murnane (1990: 19 n. 101).
96. *PRU IV*, 281–6, Dossier ii c (for the suggested order of events, see p. 283).
98. A succession of letters from Rib-Hadda to the pharaoh relate these events: *EA* 136–8; 141; 142.
99. *EA* 162.
102. *EA* 165.
103. *EA* 164; 166–7.
105. *EA* 149: 37–40, 67–70. Zimredda was accused of attacking the pharaoh’s own vassal states, exploiting the pharaoh’s alleged indifference to their fate.
108. On his possible relationship with Sharrupshi, whom we have discussed above, see most recently Altman (2001b: 35).
110. See *KUB* xix 9 (*CTH* 83.1). For a discussion of the events of the war, see Freu (2003a: 146–55).
111. DS p. 92, frag. 28 a ii 1–14.
112. Reference to the appointment is made in two documents, already cited, from the reign of Hattusili III: *KUB* xix 9 1 17 ff. and *KBo* vi 28, obv. 19 ff. We cannot be sure when this appointment was conferred upon him, but it may well have been shortly after Suppiluliuma’s conquest of Aleppo in the First (one-year) Syrian War; see Bryce (1992b: 12–14), and cf. Cornelius (1979: 156).
113. It is unlikely that he held both posts simultaneously, as Goetze (1940: 12n. 51) suggests.
114. DS p. 92, frag. 28 a ii 1–14.
115. Or 700? See DS p. 92, n. 27.
116. *Contra* Goetze (1975a: 17), who says that the purpose of Telipinu’s return was to attend to urgent religious duties. The reference to Suppiluliuma’s religious activities in Uda seems quite incidental.
117. DS p. 93, frag. 28 a ii 21–3.
118. Although as we have noted it had formerly belonged to Egypt before it was conquered by Suppiluliuma.
119. The Hittite attack referred to here was the second of two such attacks on Amka, both perhaps by the same commander. For discussion of the relationship between the attacks, see Houwink ten Cate (1963: 275), Bryce (1990: 103 n. 28).

120. For a stylistic analysis of the account of the following episode, see Cancik (1976: 163–7). The following translated extracts are adapted from Güterbock’s translation.

121. Though Parker (2002: 35–7) has reasserted the argument that the cuneiform rendering of the name is applicable equally to Akhenaten or Tutankhamun.


125. This identification depends of course on the conclusion that Niphururiya = Tutankhamun. If the pharaoh in question is Akhenaten, then ‘Dahamunzu’ must be one of his wives; Helck (1994: 20) suggests Kiye (as in his earlier publications), Parker (2002: 48–52) argues for Meretaten.


127. DS pp. 95–6, frag. 28 e3 17–20. The appointment is also referred to in KUB xix 9 1 17 ff. and KBo vi 28, obv. 19 ff. Both documents refer to the appointment of Telipinu as king (i.e. viceroy) of Aleppo in the same context.

128. PD no. 1, 14–15, obv. 48. It has been suggested that the extremely fragmentary letter EA 43 may provide a scenario for the assassination. As tentatively reconstructed by Artzi (1993), the letter’s obverse appears to refer to a man’s assassination by a group of conspirators including his son. See also Na’aman’s reconstruction (1995). Artzi, however, doubts that the letter refers to Tushratta’s murder, and Freu (2003a: 133) discusses the chronological problems posed by Na’aman’s suggested reconstruction.

129. The actual letter which the queen sent to Suppiluliuma, KBo xxviii 51, survives in fragmentary form and has been ed. by Edel, ÄHK i no. 1. The text is written in Akkadian.

fragment *KB0 xii* 23 (*CTH* 832), and has produced a fresh edition of the combined texts. On the basis of the join, van den Hout argues that *KUB xix* 20 (+) is a draft letter written in response to a tablet brought by the Egyptian envoy Hani with official word of Zannanza’s death, and a disclaimer by the new pharaoh of any involvement in his death.

131. DS p. 111, frag. 36. Van den Hout (1994: 85) suggests that Suppiluliuma may have appointed his son to lead the campaign instead of doing so himself because of his ongoing involvement in further campaigns in Kaskan and Hurrian territory.


133. See *PD* no. 2, 36–9, obv. 1 f.

134. For further discussion of the murder and what followed from it, see Freu (2003a: 133–8).


136. See *PD* no. 2, 44–7, obv. 37 ff, DS pp. 110–11, frag. 35.

137. The treaty survives in two forms—one prepared by Suppiluliuma (*CTH* 51), the other by Shattiwaza (*CTH* 52). The Akkadian versions of the treaty appear in *PD* nos. 1 and 2. Fragmentary Hittite versions also survive. For further joins to the Hittite text of the Shattiwaza-Suppiluliuma treaty, see Beckman (1997: 97–9), and for a composite translation of the treaty (based mainly on the Akkadian versions), Beckman (1999: 42–54). For the most recent discussion of the treaty, see Freu (2003a: 155–61).


139. But see Freu (2003a: 168) for the suggestion that Shattiwaza actually gained for his kingdom a temporary resurgence of power following Suppiluliuma’s death; he may for a time have become virtually independent of his Hittite overlords by exploiting the crisis into which the Hittite kingdom was suddenly plunged. Freu further speculates (p. 171) that Shattiwaza may have formed a temporary alliance with Assyria against Hittite interests during the early years of the reign of Suppiluliuma’s son Mursili II, or alternatively (p. 222) that the Assyrians succeeded in reinstating for a short time their own protégé Shuttarna III in the Hurrian country.

121), who discusses the boundaries of the latter’s kingdom. For the suggestion that the land of Mukish was actually incorporated into the kingdom of Carchemish, see Klengel (1965b: 78); cf. PRU IV, 63 n. 1.


142. Klengel (1992a: 125 with n 198) notes that Egyptian inscriptions of the late 13th cent. call northern Syria ‘the land of Carchemish’, thus corroborating the dominance of Carchemish in the Hittite part of Syria.

143. See Arnaud (1987: 9).

144. For the excavations and layout of the site and the discoveries made there, see the papers assembled in Beyer (1982) and Margueron (1995). Earlier publications on the excavations are listed by Beyer (1982: 141–2).

145. e.g. it was referred to in the Idrimi inscription (see Ch. 5) which indicates that it was the city whence Idrimi’s mother came, and to which he fled as a place of refuge (Idrimi Inscription, 3–8).


147. Thus Arnaud (1987: 11). For a brief overview (in German) of the site and its history, see Faist and Finkbeiner (2002).

148. As revealed by the Akkadian texts from the site, ed. Arnaud (1985–7), which attest to four generations of viceroys at Carchemish: Sharri-Kushuh, Shahurunuwa, Ini-Teshub, and Talmi-Teshub. For further references to publications of the texts, see Arnaud (1987), van der Toorn (1994: 39–40 n. 4), Yamada (1995: 297–8). Note also the seals found there of Ini-Teshub, viceroy of Carchemish during the reign of Tudhaliya IV (Mšk 73.58 and Mšk 73.1025); see Laroche (1982: 55 no. 3 and 56, no. 4, respectively). For a comprehensive summary of the contents of Emar’s archives, see Pedersén (1998: 61–8). Already before the French excavations Astour (1969: 407) concluded from the Ugaritic document RS 17.143 (PRU IV 217–18) that Emar was part of the kingdom of Carchemish in this period. For a discussion of the chronology and socio-political aspects of Emar, see Adamthwaite (2001).


151. The šahhan and ḫuzzī were state-imposed taxes and services.

152. The whole text has been transcribed and trans. by Singer (1999a: 66–7). From a second letter which recently surfaced in the Bible Lands Museum in Jerusalem and has been published by Singer (1999a), we know that the case was dealt with by the viceroy at Carchemish as well as by the Great King. For this second letter, see also Westenholz (2000: 78–80).
154. Some of the territories taken from the kingdom by the Mitannian king may have been restored to it by Suppiluliuma at the time of Telipinu’s appointment; see Na’aman (1980: 38, 40).
155. Primarily disputes over routine matters. Those of a more serious nature were to be referred directly to the king for arbitration. This is made clear in the second of two documents contained in the text KBo iii 3 + (CTH 63) (ed. Klengel (1963), trans. Beckman (1999: 170–3), discussed by Bryce (1988a)). The document records Mursili’s intervention in a dispute between the Amurrite king Duppi-Teshub and local Hittite authorities over the latters’ removal of civilian captives from Amurrite authority.

CH. 8: A YOUNG KING PROVES HIS WORTH

1. We have no information about him beyond his expedition to Syria which paved the way for his father’s siege of Carchemish, and a subsequent expedition into Egyptian territory, DS p. 111, frag. 36. On a seal impression from the Nişantepe archive he is associated with his stepmother Tawananna; see Otten (1995: 17–19).
2. The appointment of such governors was rare, and confined to a few key territories close to the homeland—notably Pala-Tummanna, and the Upper and Lower lands; see Goetze (1964: 32).
4. AM 18–19.
5. The succession would normally have passed to a son of Arnuwanda. We do know of one such son, Tulpi.lugal.ma, who appears in a fragmentary sacrificial list, KBo xiii 42 (CTH 661.9), referred to by Bin-Nun (1975: 279–80). But there is no other mention of him in the texts, and if he were Arnuwanda’s son, he may have predeceased his father, or have been a young child at the time of his father’s death.
7. Bin-Nun (1975: 283–5, 288–9) has suggested that Mursili was forced to make concessions to Sharri-Kushuh regarding the succession in Hattusa in order to dissuade him from laying claim to the Hittite throne himself. Her suggestion is based largely on her interpretation of KBo 1 28 (CTH 57), the so-called miniature treaty which Mursili drew up with Sharri-Kushuh, probably shortly after his accession. But both her reading and interpretation of this text have been refuted by Gurney (1983: 100–1).
8. Both series are catalogued as *CTH* 61 and ed. Goetze (1933) (cited as *AM*). The *Ten-Year Annals* has also been ed. by Grélois (1988).

9. See most recently Hawkins (1998a: 1, and in Easton *et al.* (2002: 97)), Niemeier (1999: 142). Of particular interest in this context are the recent discoveries of Late Bronze Age pottery and parts of what is very likely a Late Bronze Age fortification wall on the acropolis of Ayasuluk; see Büyükkolanci (2000). This very likely was the location of pre-1st millennium Ephesos.


11. This follows the reading of Goetze, which is supported by Güterbock (1983a: 135). See B. and W.-D. Niemeier (1997: 196, 201 ff), and Niemeier (1999: 150–1) for a possible identification between this destruction and an archaeologically attested destruction of level II at Miletos/Milawanda (Milawata). Further on the conflict involving Millawanda, see Niemeier (2002).


13. On the interpretation of this celestial phenomenon, called *gหมายเลข* kalmišana in Hittite, see the refs. cited by Klengel (1999: 189 n. 225).

14. This river subsequently formed part of the boundary of the Arzawan state Mira-Kuwaliya. Melchert (2003: 6) notes the general consensus among scholars in locating the northern limit of Walma near the site of Classical Holmi, south-east of mod. Afyon.

15. For this interpretation of *gur编号wananza* ‘to the islands’, formerly translated by Goetze as ‘zu Schiffe(???)’, see Starke (1981a).


17. Hawkins (in Easton *et al.* (2002: 98)) proposes an identification with the hill now named. Bademgediği tepe, located a few kms. to the west of Torbalı.

18. i.e. those who were destined for transportation back to the homeland, as part of the spoils of conquest.


22. It lay north of and almost certainly bordered on the kingdom of Mira; see Houwink ten Cate: (1983–4: 48 n. 38), Hawkins (1998a: 23–4), Niemeier (1999: 142). Thus the river itself can obviously no longer be identified with the Maeander, as once commonly suggested, and must
have been either the (Class.) Caicos river (mod. Bakır) or (Class.) Hermos (mod. Gediz); see Gurney (1992: 221), Niemeier (1999: 142–3), Hawkins (in Easton et al. (2002: 100)).


24. It is also recorded in Mursili’s treaty with Manapa-Tarhunda, CTH 69; Friedrich (1930: 6–9 §4).

25. Cf. the reason given in the Deeds for Suppiluliuma’s eventual compliance with the Egyptian queen’s request, DS p. 97, frag. 28 a iv 13–15.

26. Compare, or rather contrast, the view expressed by Liverani (2001: 99) that Mursili’s final acceptance of the surrender was ‘only for ethical reasons and against his better political judgement’.

27. Mursili actually enlarged the territory of the Seha River land by adding to it the land of Appawiya, for which an identification with Class. Abbaitis at the headwaters of the river Macestus (mod. Simav) has been proposed. Cf. Garstang and Gurney (1959: 97), Hawkins (1998a: 23 and in Easton et al. (2002: 98)).

28. CTH 67.

29. See Heinhold-Krahmer (1977: 136–47). Her argument that the rump of Arzawa proper was incorporated into Mira-Kuwaliya is effectively confirmed, according to Hawkins (1998a: 15), by new evidence from the Karabel inscription.

30. AM 76–7.

31. Košak (1981: 15) comments that the total numbers of transportees could have been no less than 50,000 and might have been as high as 100,000. As he further remarks, the impact of such a number of displaced persons is difficult to imagine. Were they all transported back to the Hittite homeland, or were some settled in other regions?

32. See Jewell (1974: 319), Mellaart (1986b: 218–19). There are, however, references to a Land of Arzawa in texts from the reign of Mursili’s son Hattusili; notably KUB xxxi 69 (CTH 590), a vow of the queen Puduhepa, in which divine assistance is sought for the king in a campaign against the Land of Arzawa (obv. 7’), and KBo viii 23 (CTH 209.7) = Hagenbuchner (1989: 80–1 no. 48), a fragment of a letter written probably to Puduhepa, which also mentions the Land of Arzawa. In both cases, however, it is arguable that the name Arzawa is being used in its broader sense. Without more specific information, I am inclined to agree with Heinhold-Krahmer (1977: 243) that these texts provide no evidence that the kingdom of Uhhaziti continued to exist after Mursili’s campaigns in the region.

33. On the nature and purpose of the vassal treaties, see Ch. 3.

34. See also Klengel (1999: 180–8).
35. *AM* 78–81.
37. *KBo* 3 (CTH 63). See Klengel (1963), Bryce (1988a). Barga is probably to be located south of Aleppo and east of the Orontes river; see del Monte and Tischler (1978: 304 s.v. Parka).
38. On his rebellion, see also Klengel (1992a: 155).
39. If we can assign to this period the rebellion of Kadesh and Nuhashshi recorded in Mursili’s treaty with the Amurrite king Duppi-Teshub (CTH 62, Friedrich (1926: 6–7 §3)) rather than to Mursili’s 9th year when Mursili’s *Annals* records rebellions by both Nuhashshi and Kadesh (*AM* 110–15). See Bryce (1988a: 26). For an English translation of the Duppi-Teshub treaty, see Singer (2000c: 96–100.)
41. As recorded in Mursili’s treaty with Duppi-Teshub (Friedrich (1926: 18 §13)).
42. We have no surviving evidence of a coup, but such an event could well have been covered in the missing first column of *KUB* xiv 17 from the *Annals*, dealing with events in Mursili’s 7th year; see Bryce (1988a: 28).
43. Trans. also by Beckman (1999: 126). See further Kitchen (1962: 37), Klengel (1965b: 75–6; 1969: 51), Spalinger (1979: 66). The text we have is a copy of the original. It was commissioned as a replacement by Sharri-Kushuh’s grandson Ini-Teshub, since the seal of the original tablet had been broken.
44. See Kitchen (1962: 37).
47. *AM* 96–9.
50. It recalls the meeting held between Suppiluliuma and his son Telipinu at Uda in the Lower Land, where Suppiluliuma was celebrating religious festivals.
52. *AM* 116–19.
55. *AM* 116–19.
56. *AM* 130–3.
58. *AM* 112 preserves the original reading NIG.BA-Teshub of this name. For the revised reading, see Albright (1944: 31–2).

59. *AM* 124–5. A treaty which Mursili originally drew up with Talmi-Sharrumma was lost but was subsequently reissued by Mursili’s son and successor Muwattalli II. This document still survives and is catalogued as *KBo* i 6 (*CTH* 75) (*PD* 80–9, no. 6). It has most recently been trans. by Beckman (1999: 93–5).


61. See *PRU IV*, 84–101, Dossier IV D. The treaty has subsequently been ed. by del Monte (1986).


64. See *PRU IV*, 63–70, Dossier IV A.

65. Notably *CTH* 376, Prayer of Mursili to the Sun Goddess of Arinna, and *CTH* 378, the so-called Plague Prayers which appear in four, or possibly five versions. The prayers have been ed. by Lebrun (1980: 155–79, 192–239). For English translations of the Plague Prayers, see Goetze in Pritchard (1969: 394–6; selected passages), Beckman (1997b), Singer (2002a: 56–68). On the ‘5th’ Plague Prayer, see Singer (2002a: 66). The plague had been brought to Hatti by Egyptian prisoners taken by Suppiluliuma in his attack on Egyptian territory in Syria in reprisal for the death of his son Zannanza; see the 2nd Plague Prayer, obv. 25′–31′.

66. This sentence thus trans. by Singer (2002a: 52).

67. 2nd Plague Prayer, obv. 9′–12′.

68. 1st Plague Prayer, obv. 10–12.

69. 2nd Plague Prayer, obv. 13′–20′, 33′–46′.

70. For the most part this translation follows the restorations proposed by Laroche (1956: 102). The text was first ed. by Forrer (1926: ii.1, 1–3). For a translation of and commentary on the whole text, see Singer (2002a: 75–7).

71. šiwanzanni = ‘mother of god’; see Bin-Nun (1975: 190–1).


73. For a comprehensive discussion of the (divine) ‘stone house’ referred to in Hittite texts, see van den Hout (2002a).

74. Bin-Nun (1975: 187–8) remarks that the oracle text *KUB* xxii 70 (*CTH* 566) ‘gives a true picture of the tyranny which this old lady exercised on the king and on his family by her continuous threats of divine anger, and by her demands to punish the daughters of the royal house. Her priestly office enabled her to rule the people with the terror of divine oracles.’
75. Neve’s table (1992a: 313) indicates sixteen seal impressions bearing the names Mursili and Malnigal(?) (on the latter, see Ch 7, n. 20). See also Otten (1995: 19–21).

76. The name also appears as Gassuliyawiya; see Laroche (1966: 89 no. 539). The shorter form will henceforth be used in this book.

77. SBo 1, no. 37 = Beran (1967: no. 220).

78. For a detailed treatment of the seal, see Dinçöl et al. (1993), who point out that it now places beyond doubt the husband-wife relationship of Mursili and Gassulawiya (contra Tischler (1981: 67–8) who argued that the latter was the king’s daughter).

79. KBo iv 6 (CTH 380), ed. Lebrun (1980: 248–55), Tischler (1981: 11–45). For the attribution of the text to the reign of Mursili II, see also Kammenhuber (1976: 29–30). In another prayer, KUB xxxvi 81, ed. Tischler (1981: 46–54), Mursili again made an appeal for his wife’s recovery, this time to the Sun Goddess. De Roos (1985–6: 77–9) doubts that the subject of KBo iv 6 is Mursili’s wife, suggesting an attribution to a later Gassulawiya, daughter of Hattusili III and Puduhepa; see also his comments (1985: 133). Winkels (1985: 185) has claimed that the text does not belong stylistically to the context of the other prayers of Hattusili’s reign. More recently, Singer (1991c: 329) has supported the attribution to the later Gassulawiya on the basis of the ductus of the text which he says must be dated to the 13th cent. In his view, KUB xxxvi 81 is the only one of the two prayers that can be attributed to Mursili’s reign. However, account needs to be taken of the fragmentary text 335/e which is one of three additional small fragments to be added to KBo iv 6. See Otten (1984: 298–300) for the significance of this fragment in relation to the identification of Gassulawiya in KBo iv 6 (particularly in view of the reference to sa|l ta-wa-an-na[-in line 3’], and also Neu (1995: 121 n. 21). On balance, I still prefer to attribute this text to the reign of Mursili II.

80. We know this from KUB xiv 4, one of two texts in which Mursili refers to her death and holds his stepmother responsible. The other text is dealt with below. She died in the year Mursili went to Kizzuwadna to celebrate the festival of Hepat at Kummanni. Mursili’s Annals indicate that he did this in the 9th year of his reign (AM 108–9).

81. On the assumption that the duplicate fragment 355/e which identifies Tawanna[nna] as the author (line 3’) belongs to the same prayer as KBo iv 6; see Dinçöl et al. (1993: 98).


83. For a translation of the whole text, see Singer (2002a: 77–8).

84. KBo iv 8 ii 1–8.
85. Kitchen (1962: 5 n. 1) notes that his visit to Kizzuwadna is also recorded in *KUB xiv* 4, and that it was subsequent to this visit that Mursili decided on the queen’s punishment.

86. Or ‘eats the bread of life’.

87. *SBo i* 37 and the cruciform seal, on both of which Dinçol *et al.* (1993: 97) read Gassulawiya’s name and the title *magna regina* (according to the convention used in transliterating hieroglyphic texts).

88. Alternatively, Dinçol *et al.* (1993: 98) suggest that Tawananna had already been dismissed from her office, perhaps on the ground of her extravagances as mentioned by Mursili, and replaced by the already ailing Gassulawiya.

89. Because at the time he was still only a child.


92. *SBo i*, nos. 42–4. To these can now be added the seal impressions linking Tānuhepa with Muwattalli and Urhi-Teshub in the Nişantepe archive; see Neve’s table (1992a: 313).

93. e.g. Singer (2002b: 739–40).


96. *KUB xiv* 7, obv. 1 18’ + *KUB xxi* 19, obv. 2 4.


100. The land of Kuwaliya was an extension of the kingdom of Mira. Hawkins (in Easton *et al.* (2002: 98)) sees as its location ‘probably the headwaters of one or more branches of the Maeander, for which the site of Beycesultan is a good candidate as capital or other city’.

101. These events are recorded in the Kupanta-Kurunta Treaty, §§4 and 18. See also *AM* 142–3.

102. *KBo xix* 76 i 1’–8’ = *KUB xix* 34 i 1’–13’; see Houwink ten Cate (1979b: 284).

103. *AM* 144–5.

104. Kupanta-Kurunta Treaty, §6; *AM* 144–7 = *KUB xiv* 24, 17’–24’, to which add *KUB xix* 39 iii; for the joining of the latter to *KUB xiv* 24, on the basis that *KBo ix* 77 1’–8’ duplicates *KUB xiv* 24 19’–24’ and *KBo ix*
77 8’–14’ duplicates *KUB* xix 39 iii 1’–6’, see Houwink ten Cate (1979b: 267).

105. For the possibility that Kupanta-Kurunta is the subject of a hieroglyphic inscription recently discovered at Latmos in western Anatolia, see Herborgt (2001: 377).

106. The translation of the lines beginning ‘And because your father’ is adapted from that given in *CHD* 3/2, 142.

107. See e.g. §§11 and 21 of the treaty.

108. *CTH* 68. The treaty has already been cited several times. For further text-joins to it, see Beckman (1997: 99–100), and for a complete translation, Beckman (1999: 74–82).


110. *AM* 150–1.

111. *AM* 164–5.

112. See DS p. 109, frag. 34.


114. *AM* 188–9.

115. Haas (1970: 8–10) discusses texts from the reigns of Hattusili III and Tudhaliya IV which deal with campaigns in the Nerik region by Mursili II and also Muwattalli II. See also Houwink ten Cate (1973: 78).

116. The Sumerian logogram *nam.ra*$_{MES}$ or *nam.ra*$_{HI.A}$ (Akkadian *šallatu*) is used in Hittite texts to refer to the transportees.

117. Cf. also the practice of transportation in Egypt from the Old Kingdom onwards (see Redford (1992: 207–9)).

118. In this case, the 10,000 infantry and 600 chariotry taken as booty from the land of Assuwa rose in rebellion under the leadership of a man called Kukkulli (*KUB* xxiii 11//12 rev. 1–6). See Ch. 6.

119. There is, for example, just one passing reference to them in the Laws. Clause 40 of the Laws makes provision for the king to allocate transportees for the purpose of working the land.

120. Goetze (1964: 28) comments that they were not allowed to move freely from town to town, but were shifted around by the authorities presumably as the needs of state required.

121. For the provision of transportees for service to the deity, see *KUB* xv 21 (*CTH* 590) 4–6, cited by Alp (1950: 117).

122. Bryce (1986b: 8) suggests that Madduwatta’s *nam.ra*$_{HI.A}$ (referred to in the *Indictment of Madduwatta* §9) were originally transportees to the Hittite homeland subsequently reassigned to Madduwatta by the Hittite king.

123. See e.g. *AM* 106–7.

124. See *AM* 40–1.
125. The text which records this affliction (CTH 486) has been ed. by Goetze and Pedersen (1934). For more recent translations of the text, see Kümmel (1987: 289–92), and Beckman ap. Frantz-Szabó (1995: 2010).

126. On this name, see Goetze and Pedersen (1934: 14).

127. However, van den Hout (2000: 645) notes that the Hittite expression tapuṣa pai- ('to go sideways') in a figurative sense simply means 'cease to function' and that we can only guess at what really happened to the king.


CH. 9: THE SHOWDOWN WITH EGYPT

1. Scholarly opinions on the length of his reign vary from 16 to 30 years. See Aldred (1975: 72).

2. On possible though dubious evidence for a major Egyptian offensive against the Hittites in Horemheb's reign, see Murnane (1990: 30).


7. KUB xxxi 29 (CTH 214.16), ed. Sommer (1932: 328).

8. The reference to Tarhuntassa suggests (but does not prove) that the text belongs to Muwattalli’s reign since the kingdom of Tarhuntassa was apparently newly created by Muwattalli (see below). For the possibility of an earlier treaty with Ahhiyawa in Mursili II’s reign, see Košak (1980c: 41).


10. The account of Piyamaradu’s activities at this time and the response to these activities is provided by the so-called Manapa-Tarhunda letter, KUB xix 5 (CTH 191), augmented by the join-piece KBo xix 79, on which see Houwink ten Cate (1983–4: 33–64).

11. He participated in a campaign late in Mursili’s reign which appears to have begun in Mira-Kuwaliya (AM 186–7); see Heinhold-Krahmer (1977: 221), Houwink ten Cate (1983–4: 59). Although the text is broken, it is likely that he acted in support of the Hittite king (contra Jewell (1974: 331)).

12. This may be the campaign referred to in §4 of the Alaksandu treaty (§ nos. are those used in Beckman’s translation), discussed below. See Heinhold...


14. Presumably he had been installed, or re-installed, as Hittite vassal ruler after the Hittite expedition to Wilusa.

15. Alaksandu treaty §§3–4. Kukkunni was probably the immediate predecessor and perhaps the adoptive father of Alaksandu, according to a text restoration proposed by Friedrich (1930: 54–5) (followed by Garstang and Gurney (1959: 102)). Cf. Freu (1990: 18).

16. He may be referred to in §14 of the treaty as one of the kings of the Arzawa Lands (see Heinhold-Krahmer (1977: 146–7), Houwink ten Cate (1983–4: 62, 66)), on the assumption that the name Manapa-Kurunta which actually appears is written in error for his name. But Beckman (1999: 124 n. 20) suggests that the correct name may be Piyama-Kurunta.

17. Houwink ten Cate (1994: 241) comments that his banishment can easily be explained as having been caused by his military and diplomatic setbacks known from the Manapa-Tarhunda letter, iv 8’–11’.

18. The appointment is referred to in a later treaty, between Tudhaliya IV and Shaushgamuwa, king of Amurru, KUB xxiii 1 (CTH 105) 11 15–19. See the discussions of Stefanini (1964: 25–8), Houwink ten Cate (1974a: 127–8), Heinhold-Krahmer (1977: 228–31). Hawkins (1998a: 16 n. 70) observes that there is no actual direct evidence that Masturi was Manapa-Tarhunda’s son and immediate successor. But almost certainly this generally held assumption is a valid one. Manapa-Tarhunda was apparently later restored to his country, but probably not to his throne, by Muwattalli’s son and successor Urhi-Teshub (see Ch. 10).


22. See Murnane (1990: 52–8).


24. The conflict with the Hittites is recorded on the bottom-most of the three registers on the western wing of the war monument. The Kadesh and Amurru campaign appears in the top-most register. There has been some debate about the chronological sequence to be followed in reading these registers; see Murnane (1990: 51–2).

25. Those depicted in the pictorial record were clearly Hittites. See Murnane (1990: 58).
26. If one can so conclude from a reference in the treaty between Ramesses II and Hattusili III (see Ch. 11) to a treaty which existed in the time of Muwattalli (*KRI* ii 228: 1–3). Further on this, see Murnane (1990: 37–8).

27. The Land of Tarhuntassa seems to have been a new entity created by Muwattalli and incorporating the country known as the Hulaya River Land; see Otten (1988a: 46), Hoffner (1989b: 47), Beckman (1989–90: 290 n. 3). Gurney (1993: 26–8) argued that Tarhuntassa and Hulaya River Land were two different names of the same country, but elsewhere (1992: 221) that the names referred to different countries. However, it is now clear that the Hulaya River Land was in fact one of the frontier zones of the Land of Tarhuntassa—i.e. it was a part of Tarhuntassa, not synonymous with it (cf. Hawkins (1995c: 50)). Singer (1996a: 65) suggests that the recently discovered rock relief at Hatip (see Ch. 12) marked the north-western extent of Tarhuntassa. For a detailed discussion of the kingdom’s boundaries, see Dinçol, Yakar et al. (2000) (with map, p. 19). See also the discussions of Alp (1995), and Yakar et al. (2001).

28. The text, ed. Otten (1981), is referred to and discussed at greater length in Ch. 10.

29. On the question of whether the transfer took place in two stages, see Houwink ten Cate (1983–4: 69 n. 100).

30. For a summary of suggested motives for shifting the capital, see Klengel (1999: 210). Singer (1996b: 191–3; 1998) argues at some length for attributing the shift primarily to religious and (to a lesser extent) personal motives. He remarks (1998: 538–9) that Muwatalli’s adoption of his ‘new’ deity, the Storm God of Lightning, is intimately connected with the transfer of the capital; the god and his consort Hepat appear together as the patron gods of Tarhuntassa in *KBo* ix 98 + *KUB* xl 46 i 1–9.


32. But see Houwink ten Cate (1992a: 250), who suggests that a geographical notion Tarhuntassa may have existed much earlier. He refers to the possibility that the seal impression bearing the name of the 16th cent. Kizzuwadnan king Isputahsu may contain the designation ‘King of Tarhuntassa’.


34. For a detailed treatment of this question, including translations of the relevant texts, see Singer (2001a).

35. *KBo* iv 12 (*CTH* 87) rev. 17.


41. Bolger (1991: 426) in his review of Åström (1987/9), notes that four papers from the 1987 Gothenburg colloquium (by Hornung, Helck, Kitchen, and Bietak) address the existing chronologies for the Middle and New Kingdoms. With the exception of Kitchen they unequivocally support the low New Kingdom chronology which sets the start of Ramesses II’s reign at 1274. Most important in the view of Hornung and Bietak is the fact that the new chronology has been determined without the use of Sothic dating. I have none the less adopted an accession date of 1279, following Kitchen (and others).


44. See Liverani (2001: 119–21) for a quite different interpretation, from the one which follows, of the Kadesh engagement.

45. See the discussion of the list of Hittite allies in Goetze (1975c: 253).

46. The assumed identification of the ‘Dardany’ (Drdn) with the ‘Trojan’ Dardanoi is doubted by Mellaart (1986a: 82) but supported by Gurney (1990: 47).


50. B (= Bulletin) designates the inscriptions associated with the Pictorial Record.


54. Details of the above are provided by Hattusili’s treaty with Benteshina, PD no. 9 (CTH 92) 126–7, obv. 11–13, and Tudhalia IV’s treaty with Shaushgamuwa, i 39.


56. We have discussed in Ch. 8 the debate concerning the identity of Danu-hepa.
CH. 10: THE ILL-FATED REIGN OF THE SECOND-RANK SON

1. Mursili had three sons (the other two were Muwattalli and Halpasulupi), and a daughter dingir mes-ir (= Massan(a)uzzi); see Laroche (1966: 115 no. 775)). For the phonetic reading of the daughter’s name and her identification with Matanazi who figures in Hittite correspondence with Ramesses II (see Ch. 11), see Imparati (1992: 307 n. 8), and the references cited therein. Imparati (1992: 307) suggested that Hattusili’s claim to be the youngest child (Apol. §1, i 12) might be no more than a literary topos frequent in documents of this kind, although she has subsequently commented (1995: 144 n. 8) that we must keep in mind that this was a case of recent fact, easily verifiable by Hattusili’s audience.

2. As is clear from the numerous votive prayers of his wife Puduhepa, discussed below. See also Ünal (1974: i, 45–6).

3. Ed. Sturtevant and Bechtel (1935: 64–99), and more recently by Otten (1981). A shorter version of this account, with some variation in details, appears in KBo vi 29 (+) (CTH 85.1) i 18–21, ed. Goetze (1925). As to
the primary purpose of the document, a different view is proposed and argued at some length by Imparati (1995). She sees the document as intended to create a favourable climate for the king’s decision to name his son Tudhaliya as his successor in place of an older son who had been designated for this position. Van den Hout (1998: 62) suggests that one of the Apology’s aims was the foundation of the cult of Ishtar on the basis of the former possessions of Arma-Tarhunda, with Hattusili and his son Tudhaliya as her principal priests. For perhaps the best analysis of the document, see Cancik (1976: 41–5).

6. In Apol. §10a, iii 25, Hattusili calls him a blood relative. He would in fact have been a second cousin of Hattusili and Muwattallili, if his father Zida was the same as Suppiluliuma I’s attested brother of this name.
8. For further discussion of the hostility and legal contests between Hattusili and Arma-Tarhunda, see van den Hout (1998: 60–4).
9. Thus Liverani (2001: 83): ‘In the case of Hattusili . . . the boast for victories won in conditions of numerical inferiority is linked to a polemic towards Muwattallili.’
11. This information is provided by two treaties in particular, namely CTH 137 (von Schuler (1965: 130–4)) and CTH 138 (op. cit. 117–30). These treaties date to the early period of the New Kingdom (see Klinger and Neu (1990: 141)), and are probably indicative of Hittite policy towards ‘allied’ Kaska groups from this period onwards.
12. Apol. §9, ii 60–74.
13. Darga (1974: 950) comments that the goddess whom the Hittites represented with the sign of Ishtar was very different from the Mesopotamian Ishtar, goddess of love; the texts indicate that the Ishtar of Lawazantiya was not a goddess of love but a warrior goddess.
14. According to KBo vi 29 (+) (CTH 85.1) r 18–21, a passage from the shorter version of the Apology. Whatever the propaganda value of this claim, there may well have been political and strategic incentives for the marriage; cf. Klengel (1991: 225).
15. Apol. §9, iii 3.
17. Apol. §10a, iii 17–18.
18. The other half was dedicated to the service of Ishtar; Apol. §12b, iv 66–73.
20. On the suggestion that Muwattalli’s son Kurunta (also Danuhea’s son?) was in fact of the first rank but not yet old enough to rule Hattusa, see Singer (2001a: 403; 2002b).

21. Apol. §10b, iii 41’. On the term ḫurrzi used in reference to such a son, see CHD vol. P, fasc. 1, 17. The usual translation of this term is ‘bastard’ although in a society where concubinage was regularly practised the Hittite term does not have the strong stigma of illegitimacy which the English word implies. None the less it was clearly used as an expression of contempt for a person whose status was inferior to that of a ‘son of the first rank’.

22. As recorded by Hattusili’s son Tudhalia IV in his treaty with the Amurrite king Shaushgamuwa, KUB xxiii 1 (+) (CTH 105) ii 29. This statement probably belongs within the context of the conflict between Hattusili and Urhi-Teshub which led to the latter’s overthrow (see below).

23. Hawkins (2001: 76) points out that the seal impressions from the Nişantepe archive bearing the names of Muwatalli and Urhi-Teshub leave no doubt that Urhi-Teshub was duly installed and recognized as his father’s heir presumptive while Muwatalli was still alive; this contradicts the impression created by Hattusili that Urhi-Teshub owed his position solely to him. Cf. Klengel (1999: 226).

24. Also relating to this: KUB xxı 19 (CTH 383) ii 23–31 (prayer of Hattusili and Puduhepa to the Sun-Goddess of Arinna), KUB xxı 27 (CTH 384) i 33–48, esp. 38–40 (prayer of Puduhepa), KBo iv 12 (which also deals with the appointment of the scribe Mittannamuwa as administrator of Hattusa).

25. As we know from seal impressions bearing the name Mursili and clearly attributable to Urhi-Teshub. The first of these were found at Boğazköy in 1953. See Güterbock (1956c) and cf. Otten (1955: 19–23). The number has now been substantially increased by the recent discovery of the Nişantepe seal archive. Some 600 of the bullae found in this archive have been attributed to Urhi-Teshub/Mursili (III), second only in number amongst Hittite kings to the 700 bullae of Tudhalia IV; see Neve (1992a: esp. 313 and 315).

26. Güterbock (1956a: 121) comments that evidence that Urhi-Teshub used both names when king is provided by the seals SBo ı, no. 13 on the one hand and nos. 43 and 44 on the other. This is further confirmed by the evidence provided by the Nişantepe seal archive.

27. Although all references which Hattusili makes to Urhi-Teshub date to the period after the latter’s overthrow. Perhaps it was only then that Hattusili refused to use his nephew’s adopted name. Cf. Goetze (1975c: 256). Note that Hattusili’s son Tudhalia in his treaty with Shaushgamuwa also refers to Urhi-Teshub only by this name and not by his throne-name Mursili.
28. See also Klengel’s discussion (1999: 226–7).
29. On the sources relating to Urhi-Teshub’s shift of the capital back to Hattusa, see Houwink ten Cate (1994: 234 n. 5) and the references cited therein.
30. As recorded in KBo iv 12 (CTH 87), Hattusili III’s decree in favour of the members of Mittannamunwa’s family.
31. KUB xxi 33 (CTH 387).
32. The king is called Mursili in the text, and is almost certainly Mursili III, i.e. Urhi-Teshub; see Meriggi (1962: 70–6), Archi (1971: 201), Houwink ten Cate (1974a: 128) (contra Stefanini (1964), Heinhold-Krahmer (1977: 228–9), who assign the text to the reign of Mursili II). The text has been reconsidered by Houwink ten Cate (1994: 240–2), who emphasizes the close link between it and the oracle-enquiry text KUB xxi 66 (+) (CTH 297.7). In a consideration of KUB xxi 33, Mora (1992) proposed that the Mursili of this text, while probably identical with Mursili III, was a different person from Urhi-Teshub. This hypothesis is ruled out by evidence from the Nişantepe seal archive which confirms that Urhi-Teshub and Mursili (III) were one and the same; see Otten (1993a: 25).
35. For the term of relationship in question, see Heinhold-Krahmer (1977: 229–30).
37. Thus e.g. Singer (1991a: 168, with n. 50), who notes that in KUB xxi 33 the name of the king who reinstated Benteshina is missing (but see n. 39 below), and that in the Shaushgamuwa treaty Tudhaliya reports that his father was responsible.
39. See Houwink ten Cate (1994: 247 n. 42), who adduces evidence which virtually confirms the restoration of Mursili (III)’s name in the relevant passage of KUB xxi 33. On Hattusili’s suppression of information (for political reasons) relating to Benteshina prior to his (Hattusili’s) accession, see Houwink ten Cate (1994: 247).
40. Thus Houwink ten Cate (1974a: 128), taking up Stefanini’s categorization of the text, as well as Meriggi’s proposal regarding authorship of the text.
See also Houwink ten Cate (1994: 240–3) for further development of, and some revision to, the views he expressed in his (1974a) article.


42. e.g. Houwink ten Cate (1974a: 128).

43. Apol. §10c, iv 3–6.

44. Information on the fortunes of Mittannamuwa’s family is provided by KBo iv 12 (CHT 87) 15–30. See Goetze (1925: 42–3).

45. Singer (1985a: 102) notes that ‘the geographical extent of Hanigalbat, on the northern rim of the Mesopotamian plain, is provided by Adad-nirari’s and Shalmaneser’s descriptions of the conquered territory—from the Tur ‘Abdin westwards, across the upper reaches of the Habur and the Balih to the Euphrates.’

46. The dates in the short chronology proposed by Wilhelm and Boese (1979).

47. Muwattalli in his treaty with Alaksandu of Wilusa (CHT 76) lists its king amongst those of equal status with himself; see Friedrich (1930: 68–9 §14, iii 11), Beckman (1999: 90 §11).

48. See Weidner (1930–1).

49. See Rowton (1959: 1). According to Rowton, this conquest dates to no more than six years prior to Adad-nirari’s death.

50. KBo i 14, discussed below.

51. What survives of the letter is a fragmentary draft in Hittite.

52. Some scholars have identified the addressee of this letter as Shalmaneser, Adad-nirari’s successor. For a brief discussion of this alternative possibility, see Harrak (1987: 75–7). The traditional view, that the addressee was Adad-nirari, is the one favoured by Harrak, and is adopted here.

53. Although it is usually attributed either to his father or more commonly to his uncle (after the latter’s accession) (e.g. Wouters (1998: 270)), or even to his uncle’s son Tudhalia IV. For the attribution to Urhi-Teshub, see Hagenbuchner (1989: 263), supported by Beckman (1999: 146), Freu (2003a: 182). See also Harrak (1998: 242–4). Further on the letter, see Zaccagnini (1990b: 40–1).

54. Liverani (2001: 137) comments: ‘The Hittite king has reluctantly to accept the Assyrian king as a “great king”; this is a formal definition, based on factual evidence that cannot be denied. But he refuses the terminology of brotherhood, which is a voluntary option implying personal agreement and is too easy to ridicule if clearly inappropriate.’ On the ideology of brotherhood in the ancient Near East, see Liverani (2001: 135–8) and the list of refs. s.v. ‘brotherhood’ in Cohen and Westbrook (2000: 300).

55. For a relatively positive view of Hattusili in his dealings with his nephew, see Parker (1998) who argues that the coup in Hattusa was not entirely without justification.

57. Its destruction is also referred to in *KUB* xxv 21 (*CTH* 524.1) iii 2–5, which states that it remained uninhabited for 500 years. This is obviously a ‘round number’, and an inflated one at that.


59. See *KUB* xxi 19 (+) (*CTH* 383), rev. iii 26–35’ (from the prayer of Hattusili to the Sun Goddess of Arinna).


61. The western vassal states may also have taken sides in the conflict. Masturi, king of the Seha River Land, had refused to recognize the legitimacy of Urhi-Teshub’s succession and had supported Hattusili (Tudhaliya IV: Shausugmuwa Treaty (*CTH* 105) ii 24–9, discussed in Ch. 12), whereas the kings of other Arzawan lands apparently remained loyal to Urhi-Teshub. Included amongst the latter was an unnamed Arzawan king (*KUB* xxi i 69, obv. 7 = *KUB* xv 6 i 12 (*CTH* 590)) and perhaps also (at least to begin with) the king of Mira, if we can so judge from Ramesses II’s letter to him (*CTH* 166, discussed in Ch. 11); see also Bryce (2003a: 90–3). However, the conflict was probably brought to an end before the western vassals became actively involved in it.


63. As Goetze (1975c: 257) suggests. But see again n. 21 above.


65. The length of his reign is uncertain. Hattusili states that he ‘submitted to him for seven years’ (*Apol.* §10c, iii 62). This may indicate the period of overt tension between uncle and nephew, which was perhaps preceded by several years of relative harmony following Urhi-Teshub’s accession. However, it has been claimed that Urhi-Teshub’s reign may have been much shorter, its length being exaggerated by Hattusili to emphasize how long he had put up with the injustice done to him by his nephew. The substantial number of *bullae* attributed to Urhi-Teshub in the Nişantepe seal archive may point to a longer reign, though on their own quantities of *bullae* and sealings in general cannot be taken as a reliable indicator of a reign’s length.


68. This is indicated in a letter subsequently written by Puduhepa to the pharaoh Ramesses, discussed in Ch. 11.


70. Thus Gurney (1990: 28).

71. *Apol.* §11, iv 34–5. The *Apoloogy* states that he would have proceeded to the Land of Karaduniya (i.e. Babylon) if Hattusili had not aborted this plan. Urhi-Teshub may already have paved the way for a visit to Babylon by entering into negotiations with Babylonian officials, if not with the Babylonian king Kadashman-Turgu himself.

72. This may have been the subject of the letter he wrote to Shalmaneser, which the latter's son and successor Tukulti-Ninurta subsequently returned to Tudhaliya IV, as indicated in Tudhaliya's letter to Tukulti-Ninurta, *KUB* xxvi 70 (*CTH* 209.21); see Otten (1959: 67–8), Hagenbuchner (1989: 266–7 no. 194).

73. Thus Archi (1971: 208).

74. The new place of exile was *a.ab.ba* *ta-pu-ša*. This phrase means either ‘across the sea’ or ‘along the sea’—i.e. on the coast. If the latter, Houwink ten Cate (1974a: 139) suggests the Arzawan country Mira as a possibility. Other proposals favour a location still within Syria—either Ugarit or Amurru; see Singer (1999b: 644–5).

75. Houwink ten Cate (1994: 246) suggests that his flight to Egypt may be alluded to in a letter from Hattusili to Benteshina, *KUB* iii 56 (*CTH* 208.4) = Hagenbucher (1989: 379–82 no. 267).

76. The king's enemy who fled to Egypt is unnamed in this passage, but his identification with Urhi-Teshub is virtually certain; cf. Helck (1963: 96), Houwink ten Cate (1974a: 139), Wouters (1989: 230).

**CH. 11: HATTI AND INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY**

1. According to the standard reconstruction of Babylonian chronology, Kadashman-Turgu reigned from 1281 to 1264 and Kadashman-Enlil from 1263 to 1255; see Brinkman (1976: 31). These dates may require some revision as further information comes to light; see Brinkman (1983). Note Manning's arguments (1999: 384–6) in favour of an earlier period in
Kadashman-Turgu’s reign for the exchange of correspondence with Hattusili. More generally, see Manning’s discussion (1999: 380–1) of the various insecurities in Brinkman’s tentative chronological scheme.

2. Houwink ten Cate (1974a: 145) dates the treaty between Kadashman-Turgu and Hattusili to the period after Urhi-Teshub’s earlier dealings with Babylon and his removal from Nuhashhi.

3. As Beckman (1999: 138) notes, the letter was discovered at Hattusa, and is therefore either a draft or a corrected copy retained by chancellery; the infrequency of erasures on the tablet favours the second alternative.

4. For further discussion of it, see Imparati (1999: 382–4).

5. Hattusili’s treaty with Benteshina, PD no. 9 (CTH 92) 128–9, obv. 24–6. Houwink ten Cate (1994: 244) suggests that there may be indirect references to the treaty in letters sent by Benteshina to Hattusili (KBo viii 16 (CTH 193) = Hagenbucchn (1989: no. 260, 370–2)) and Puduhepa (KBo xxviii 54 = Hagenbucchn (1989: no. 263, 375–7)).

6. For the interpretation of this statement as referring to future rather than (as originally read) past time, see Hagenbuchner (1992: 112 n. 6), Houwink ten Cate (1992a: 259–60 n. 41 (referring to a reading proposed by del Monte); 1994: 248). This would mean that the treaty was concluded before Nerikkaili’s marriage took place.

7. She thus had the same name as her grandmother, the ill-fated first wife of Mursili. On the uncertainty regarding the allocation of the texts containing the name Gassul(iy)awiya between grandmother and granddaughter, see most recently de Roos (1985–6: 77–9), Singer (1991c: 328–9), and in this book Ch. 8, n. 79 (with reference to the prayer KBo iv 6).

8. The marriage is also referred to in a letter of Puduhepa, KUB xx xi 38 (CTH 176), discussed below.

9. See KUB xv 1 (CTH 584.1) iii 54–5, KUB xv 3 (CTH 584.2) iv 10–12, both texts trans. and discussed by Güterbock (1973b: 139–40), and KUB lvi 14 iv 1. For discussions of the identification of Kilushepa, see de Roos (1985–6: 76), who argues that she was either a daughter or sister of Puduhepa, and Singer (1991c: 327–8).


11. There is some debate as to whether Urhi-Teshub’s flight to Egypt took place before or after the treaty which Hattusili finally concluded with Ramesses, discussed below. Houwink ten Cate (1974a: 140, 145 etc.; 1994: 243) assigns the flight to the period after the treaty, contra Edel (1958), Helck (1963: 96; 1971: 214); cf. Rowton (1959: 6 n. 31; 1966: 244–9).

12. The text, Bo 86/299, has been published by Otten (1988a). See also Otten (1989a). For a list of publications on the tablet, see van den Hout (1995a: 462).


14. He may thus be referred to in the so-called Tawagalawa letter, *KUB* xiv 3 (*CTH* 181) i 73–4, discussed below; for the reading there of the name *šamma-a* (*škal-a*) as Kurunta, see Houwink ten Cate (1965: 130), Laroche (1966: 101 no. 652), Gordon (1967: 71–2 n. 6), Singer (1983a: 212). For a reinterpretation of the four lines i 73–ii 2, see Gurney (2002: 137–8).

15. *Apol.* §12b, iv 63–4. Two other texts refer to this appointment; namely (a) *KUB* iii 67 (*CTH* 163) obv. 12 ff. (letter from Ramesses II to Hattusili, discussed in Ch. 12), (b) *CTH* 96, obv. 3′–12′: ‘Hattusili, the Great King, was my lord, and I was indeed in his heart. [ ] And I was a prince . . . Then Hattusili, the Great King, my lord, and Puduhepa, the Queen, took me back into their concerns, set me in the place of his brother (i.e. Muwattalli), made me lord of the Land of Tarhuntassa, and installed me in kingship in the Land of Tarhuntassa. And he made treaty tablets for me’ (trans. Beckman (1989–90: 291)).


17. Note again Singer’s suggestion (2001*a: 403; 2002*b) that Muwattalli’s son Kurunta was in fact of the first rank but not yet old enough to rule Hattusa.

18. Cf. van den Hout (1995a: 86). Singer (2001a: 401–2) suggests that lines 37′–44′ of *KUB* xxı 37 (the proclamation delivered by Hattusili in Hattusa after the overthrow of Urhi-Teshub) have to do with Kurunta’s ‘coronation’ in Tarhuntassa.


23. i.e. the *sḥḥyān* was met out of the resources of the whole kingdom.

24. This corresponds to the first five of the eight lines of *ABoT* 57 (*CTH* 97), which as Laroche (1947–8: 48) noted, is a particular protocol for inserting in a general treaty.
For the proposal to identify Tudhaliya with Tashmi-Sharrumma, known as an important Hittite prince in Hattusili’s reign (refs. in Laroche (1966: 180, no. 1299), van den Hout (1995a: 197–9)), see Alp (1998a); Tashmi-Sharrumma would thus have been Tudhaliya’s Hurrian name, just as Urhi-Teshub was the Hurrian name of Mursili III.

26. Bronze tablet §14, ii 43. The precise meaning of the term *tuhkanti* has been much debated. For its interpretation as ‘crown prince’, see Gurney (1983). Alternatively, it has been interpreted as ‘heir presumptive’; see Houwink ten Cate (1992a: 262–3).

27. Bronze tablet §14, ii 43–4. As van den Hout (2000: 645) observes, we cannot be entirely certain that Tudhaliya ever held the title of *tuhkanti*. The bronze tablet simply states that Hattusili demoted his ‘elder brother’ from that position and subsequently ‘installed Tudhaliya in kingship’. The interpretation of these words is referred to further in ch. 12, n.1.


29. §16, rev. 28.

30. In the context of the events recorded in the Tawagalawa letter, discussed below.

31. It has been argued that he was the son of a former wife of Hattusili, prior to the latter’s marriage to Puduhepa; see Klengel (1989: 186–7 n. 8), Hagenbuchner (1992: 118). This argument depends at least in part on the assumption that he was already married to Benteshina’s daughter at the time of Benteshina’s treaty with Hattusili, probably early in Hattusili’s reign; if he were of marriageable age at this time, he must have been born before Puduhepa appeared on the scene. The argument is weakened, though not necessarily invalidated, if Nerikkaili’s marriage was merely envisaged when the treaty was drawn up rather than an event which had already taken place. See also Houwink ten Cate (1994: 246–7). Further on this question, see van den Hout (1995a: 100), Singer (1997: 422).

32. Bronze tablet §27, iv 30.

33. At the head of a list of persons called upon to witness a document which made a land-grant to a prince called Shahurunuwa (to be distinguished from his namesake, the viceroy at Carchemish), *KUB* xxvi 43/50 (*CTH* 225) obv. 28, where he is referred to as both *dumu.lugal* and *tuhkanti*. However Hagenbuchner (1992: 121) doubts the identification of this Nerikkaili with the son of Hattusili.


35. In this case ‘heir presumptive’ would obviously be a more appropriate rendering of *tuhkanti* than ‘crown prince’.
36. We might note here the alternative suggestion that Kurunta was the ‘brother’ who was removed from office; see Houwink ten Cate (1992a: 239–40, 265–8), van den Hout (1995a: 94). This would imply that Hattusili had actually adopted Kurunta as his son, and appointed him as tuhkanti, which would in effect mean that Kurunta held the positions of tuhkanti (with the expectation of succeeding to the throne of Hatti) and king of Tarhuntassa simultaneously. *Pace* van den Hout (1995a: 89), I think this unlikely. In fact on the basis of earlier precedents with the viceroys of Carchemish and Aleppo, appointment to a viceregal position, to which Kurunta’s position was tantamount, virtually excluded the incumbent from any expectation of occupying the Hittite throne.

37. Suggested by Otten (1989a: 11), Klengel (1991: 228), Hagenbuchner (1992: 122), Imparati (1995: 154). The suggestion that Tudhaliya was also a son from an earlier union (thus van den Hout (1995a: 86)) seems to be negated by a seal impression from Ugarit, which reads: ‘Seal of Tudhaliya, Great King, King of Hatti, the Hero, Son of Hattusili, Great King, the Hero; and of Puduhepa, Great Queen of Hatti; Grandson of Mursili, Great King, the Hero’ (RS 17.159; Laroche (1956: 111)). Cf. Klengel (1991: 225). Van den Hout (2000: 645) comments that the filiation on the seal impression does not altogether exclude the possibility that Tudhaliya was a son by adoption of Puduhepa, and thus the offspring of an earlier wife of Hattusili. *Contra* the view that Tudhaliya was not one of Puduhepa’s sons, see Singer (1997: 421). Houwink ten Cate (1996: 43) believes it very likely that Tudhaliya and Nerikkaili were full brothers, the offspring of Puduhepa’s marriage with Hattusili.

38. See e.g. bronze tablet §4, ii 45–8.

39. In general on the relations between Hatti and Assyria (esp. from the reign of Hattusili III onwards), see Harrak (1998), Freu (2003b).


41. Or ‘[my father]’.

42. Cf. Liverani (2001: 64–5). Skaist (1998: 64–7) suggests that the events described here belong to the same context as a Hurrian siege, apparently thrice attested, of the city of Emar.
Wasashatta’s nephew, according to Otten’s reconstruction of *KUB* xxiii 102; but see Harrak (1998: 244).

On the basis of Wilhelm and Boese’s lower chronology (1979).

*KBo* xviii 24 = Hagenbuchner (1989: 242–5, no. 188). The authorship of this letter has been attributed to either Hattusili or Tudhaliya; the latter is assumed by Harrak (1987: 187). But in my opinion Hattusili is the more likely candidate; cf. Hagenbuchner (1989: 243).


Thus argued by Rowton (1959).


The Assyrian king’s statement is recorded by Ramesses in one of his letters to Hattusili, *KBo* viii 14 (*CTH* 216) (= *ÄHK* i no. 5) obv. 10’. It may have been a rejoinder to Hattusili’s complaint that the Assyrian had failed to send him the usual tokens of acknowledgment on his accession. If so, this must have occurred shortly after Hattusili’s seizure of the Hittite throne. Although that was now some years in the past, Ramesses could not resist the temptation of reminding his treaty-partner of what the Assyrian king had said to him. However, Edel, *ÄHK* ii, 41, suggests that the statement in question was made much later, in the context of Ramesses’ attempts to persuade Hattusili to visit Egypt (see below). If so, the Assyrian king who made it was Shalmaneser.

See the Hittite version of the treaty in Pritchard (1969: 203) under *Succession to the Throne*.


The production and dispatch of these tablets were referred to in several letters from Ramesses to Hattusili around the time the treaty was concluded; see *KUB* iii 52 (*CTH* 165.7) (= *ÄHK* i no. 3), *KBo* xxviii 1 (= *ÄHK* i no. 4).

*KBo* i 15 + 19 (+) 22 (*CTH* 156) (= *ÄHK* i no. 24) obv. 15’–33’.

This translation is based on the German translation and restorations proposed by Edel in *ÄHK*. For a detailed discussion of the letter, see Edel (1950). See also Fecht (1984: 41–5), Bryce (2003a: 89–90).

Text also ed. Goetze (1947b).

Cf. Archi (1971: 209), and see the discussion in Bryce (2003a: 90–3).
58. The whole text is trans. by Beckman (1999: 130–1).
59. For a more detailed treatment of Urhi-Teshub’s activities following his flight from his place of exile, see Bryce (2003a: 213–22).
60. See Bryce (2003a: 216).
62. Singer (1988a: 330) comments that it appears he was still in Egypt when the subsequent marriage between Ramesses and Hattusili’s daughter was negotiated, citing KUB xxi 38, obv. 12, and referring to Helck (1963: 88). But see n. 70.
63. Passage from a letter by Hattusili to Ramesses, quoted by Ramesses in his letter to Kupanta-Kurunta, KBo i 24 + KUB iii 23 + KUB iii 84 (= ÅHK i no. 28) obv. 15–19, trans. after Beckman (1999: 130).
64. For a discussion of the composite text from which this passage comes, see Edel, ÅHK ii, 95–121. See also Wouters (1989).
65. Following the reconstruction of events proposed by Edel, ÅHK ii, 123–4.
67. Reflected in the regular diplomatic exchanges between the two kingdoms following the treaty. Singer (1995b: 92) notes that Megiddo (Makkitta) in the Jezeel valley was an important station on the diplomatic route between the two royal courts.
68. See ÅHK i, nos. 2–6.
69. The sentence ‘Do I not know . . . destroyed by fire’ (obv. 10–12) is adapted from the trans. of Houwink ten Cate (1994: 237).
70. The reference to Urhi-Teshub is generally assumed to indicate that he was still in Egypt at the time (e.g. Singer (1988a: 330)). But could it not simply be a sneer by the Hittite queen, in response to Ramesses’ no doubt oft-repeated claim that Urhi-Teshub had left Egypt and his present whereabouts were unknown? Such a sneer need not indicate the actual truth of the matter. In fact, Urhi-Teshub may well have long since departed from Egypt when this letter was written.
71. The whole text, which also appears in Helck (1963), is trans. by Beckman (1999: 132–5). See also Hagenbuchner (1989: 325–7, no. 222), and Houwink ten Cate (1994: 237–8). Note that only a draft of the letter survives. The final version may well have contained a number of modifications.
72. ‘House of Hatti-Land’ is the translation offered by Houwink ten Cate (1994: 238) for the term E KUR URU Hatti, contrary to earlier assumptions that it was a reference to the royal palace. As Houwink ten Cate points out, there is no archaeologically attested evidence for a major fire in Hattusa during Hattusili’s reign. He sees the term as one perhaps used in reference
to ‘an economic or administrative institution, presumably situated in the capital, but not necessarily forming part of the palace on the citadel’.

73. *KUB* xxt 38, obv. 10–11’. Singer (1998: 537–8; 2000b: 641) proposes a different reading, leading to the interpretation of ‘House’ as the royal residence which was ‘transferred’ (to Tarhuntassa) rather than ‘burnt’.


75. On the reading of this name see Gardiner (1965: 294, 484 no. 56).


77. *ÄHK* 1, no. 43, obv. 39–41.

78. See Kitchen (1982: 88–9, 110).

79. Thus her name appears in the response from Ramesses. In Hittite, as we have seen, her name was written Massan(a)uzzi/Massana-ı. Edel, *ÄHK* II 271, suggests that as Hattusili’s sister was married in Arzawa, *matana* could be a dialect form in the regional Arzawa language for *masšana*.

80. The letter was originally ed. Edel (1976: 67–75; see also 1976: 31 ff, 53 ff). Beckman (1983a: 254) comments: ‘It is the Hittite attitude which is of interest here. If there were persons at the Hittite court expert in the use of medicines for the treatment of gynaecological problems, they would certainly have informed Hattusili that his hopes in regard to the possible fertility of his sister were misplaced.’ But see Bryce (2003a: 121). Hoffner (1977: 78) cites Güterbock who sought to show in his article ‘Hittite Medicine’ in *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 36 (1962) that the Hittites did not approach a medical practice deserving of the name ‘medicine’ and were even more primitive than their contemporaries in Egypt and Mesopotamia.

81. Where the pharaoh probably had a royal residence; see Edel (1960: 18).

82. See also Edel (1960: 17–18). A further reference to the proposed visit occurs in *KBo* vii 14 (*CTH* 216) (= *ÄHK* I no. 5) obv. 3’–5’.

83. The text referring to his affliction is translated below. Apparently news of the king’s indisposition was sent to Egypt, quite possibly in the context of a reply to the pharaoh; see Edel (1960: 20).

84. Further on this whole episode, see Bryce (2003a: 86–9).

85. It was found in a fragmentary state, but another fragment was discovered a few years later, making it almost complete. For the publication of the full inscription, see Kitchen and Gaballa (1969–70: 14–17), *KRI* II no. 69, 282–4, and for the most recent translation, *KRIT* II no. 69, 110–12.

86. An example of the latter is the Amurrite king Benteshina’s letter to her, *KUB* iii 56 (*CTH* 208.4) (= Hagenbuchner (1989: 379–82, no. 267)),
which may refer to Urhi-Teshub’s flight to Egypt (see Houwink ten Cate (1994: 244)).

88. KBo iv 10, rev. 5, 8, 9.
89. SBo i, nos. 49–51 = Beran (1967: 42–3 nos. 231–3; 42 nos. 229–30), Boehmer and Güterbock (1987: 82 no. 257). See also Gonnet (1979: 1970: 20, 71–3 nos. 182–7, 83 no. 220), and the discussions by Darga (1974: 946–9) and Otten (1975: 24–5). The silver tablet of the version of the treaty translated into Egyptian (i.e. the version originating from Hatti) was impressed with ‘The Seal of the Re of the town of Arinna, the Lord of the Land; the Seal of Puduhepa, the Princess of the Land of Hatti, the Daughter of the Land of Kizzuwadna, the [Priestess] of [the town of] Arinna, the Lady of the Land, the Servant of the Goddess’ (trans. Wilson in Pritchard (1969: 201)).

90. Neve (1992a: 313) identifies fourteen seal impressions from the Nişantepe archive with the name of Puduhepa alone.
91. Already very early in her marriage to Hattusili Puduhepa appears to have been active in judicial matters, to judge from her appearance with her husband in the preamble to KUB xxi 17 (CTH 86.1) i 1–2, which contains the so-called ‘case against Arma-Tarhunda’. Cf. Imparati (1995: 146 n. 21).
92. For the queen’s involvement in other matters which were judicial in nature, see Darga (1974: 944–5).
94. For Hittite vows and dream texts, see CTH 583–90. Add the texts published by Klengel in KUB lvi (1986).
95. CTH 585. For the texts, see Otten and Soucek (1965).
96. e.g. KUB lvi 13, obv. 11. Klengel in his summary of this prayer (KUB lvi, Inhaltsübersicht) compares KBo viii 61, KUB xxii 61, KUB xlvi 119, KUB xlvi 121.
97. KUB lvi 51 (CTH 170) (= ÄHK 1, 2) rev.(? ) 2’–3’, 10’. The letter was sent to Hattusili before the silver tablet on which the treaty was inscribed had been produced; see Edel, ÄHK 11 27.
99. This conclusion is based on a letter from the Ugarit archives, RS 17.434, assumed to have been written by Puduhepa to Niqmaddu III (thus Nougayrol, PRU IV 199; cf. van den Hout (1995b: 1112); but see Klengel (1969: 397), and the reservations expressed by Otten (1975: 31)). If the
conclusion is correct, then Puduhepa was still alive, and politically active, down to the end of the 13th cent.

100. Hattusili’s son Tudhaliya seems to have played an important role in these, while holding the office of Gal Mesedi, and possibly from a very early age. See Ch. 12.

101. KUB xxi 6 + 6a (CTH 82) + KUB xxxi 19 (CTH 211.18). On the combined fragments, see Gurney (1997).


103. Note Gurney (1992: 218) with reference to the fact that the countries listed in CTH 82 are either part of or at least adjacent to the Lukka Lands.

104. KUB xiv 3 (CTH 181), ed. Sommer (1932: 2–194), and trans. in part by Gurney in Garstang and Gurney (1959: 111–14). For the proposal to combine the events dealt with in CTH 82 and 181, see Forlanini (1988: 157–9) and cf. Freu (1990: 49).


106. ‘Tawagalawa letter’ is thus something of a misnomer; see Singer (1983a: 210–13).

107. On the filiation, see Güterbock (1983a: 136). ‘Tawagalawa’ is commonly assumed to represent the Greek name Eteokles (Mycenaean e-te-wo-kere-ke-we).

108. Tawag. letter, i 4–5.

109. As suggested above, the person in question may have been Hattusili’s son Nerikkaili.


112. It has been suggested that a fragmentary letter from Ramesses to Hattusili referring to military action involving Iyalanda (AHK i no. 80, rev. 2’–3’) may belong to the same episode; cf. Heinhold-Krahmer (1998: 5–6 n. 24), Klengel (1999: 264–5), Singer (2000a: 25). If so, then this would further support the attribution of the Tawagalawa letter to Hattusili. But
as Freu rightly points out (personal communication), the Hittites may well have conducted more than one campaign against Iyalanda. The fragmentary context of Ramesses’ letter neither supports nor negates a link with the attack on Iyalanda in the Tawagalawa letter.

113. For a more detailed account of the letter and its contents, see Bryce (2003a: 199–208).

114. Parker (1999) puts a more positive spin on the outcome for Hattusili of events recorded in the Tawagalawa letter. He concludes that it was Hattusili who succeeded in removing Ahhiyawan control over Anatolian territory.

115. Wilhelm and Boese (1979: 36 n. 65) assume that he lived until at least the 42nd year of Ramesses’ reign—i.e. until 1237, which would make him at least 75 on his death, given that he was the youngest child of Mursili’s wife Gassulawiya, who died in 1212. However van den Hout (1984: 90) believes that this assumption is not compelling, and comments that the terminus post quem for his death remains the 34th year of Ramesses’ reign (1245), for he was still alive at least as late as the marriage of his first daughter to Ramesses. Even if he died shortly after this, he would still almost certainly have lived to his seventies.

116. This is to be inferred from the oracle text KUB xvi 32 (CTH 582) which makes reference to Urhi-Teshub and implies that he was still alive in the final years of Hattusili’s reign; see van den Hout (1991: 295–6), Houwink ten Cate (1994: 250). Further on this, see Ch. 12.

117. Referred to in KUB xvi 32, obv. π 14′–15′, π 28′–30′ (in the latter passage in connection with possible territorial compensation for Urhi-Teshub’s sons), and rev. π 32–3 (where reference is made to his sons ‘choosing his side’). See also van den Hout (1991: 295–6).

118. Note also the passage from the Mittannamuwa decree, KBo iv 12 (CTH 87) rev. 8–9 (Goetze (1925: 44–5)), where Hattusili appears to distinguish two groups of his lineal descendants, those deriving apparently from an earlier union (or unions), and those from his union with Puduhepa: ‘our sons, our grandson, the son of My Sun, the grandsons of My Sun, the descendants of Puduhepa, the great queen’.

CH. 12: NEW ENTERPRISES, NEW THREATS

1. Bronze tablet, §14, π 44. Although van den Hout (1991: 275–6) uses this passage in support of his argument for a period of co-regency between Hattusili and Tudhaliya (discussed further below), Professor Gurney suggested to me that LUGAL-IZNAI TITANU- is probably an elliptical
expression for appointment to (a position which will be followed by) kingship, i.e. the *tuḫkanti*-ship, the same as *lugal-iznani tapariya-* in §13, ii 36, and should therefore be translated ‘appoint for kingship’.


5. See *Apol*. §12a, iv 41–2, and *KUB* xix 8//9 (*CTH* 83.1); on the identification of the *gal* *MEŠEDI* Tudhaliya in the latter text as Hattusili’s son, see Riemschneider (1962: 118–19).

6. *KUB* xix 8//9 iii 25–31. He may well have had a political motive for highlighting this achievement. His own apparent failure to capture Hatennzuwa may have been due to the fact that he was occupied with military operations elsewhere when it declared its hostility, or to illness. But his primary aim could well have been to promote the image of his son Tudhaliya as a military leader of proven ability; cf. Riemschneider (1962: 120), van den Hout (1991: 298). The text belongs to the reign of Hattusili III (see Riemschneider (1962: 115–21)) and is one of the fragments surviving from a historical review of the reigns of Suppiluliuma I, Arnuwanda II, Mursili II, Muwattalli II, Urhi-Teshub, and Hattusili III (*CTH* 83).

7. If line 27 of the text has been correctly interpreted; see Riemschneider’s discussion (1962: 118–19).


11. See Otten (1993b: 107–10), who suggests that the name in the outer ring refers to Tudhaliya’s earlier namesake at the beginning of the New Kingdom (pp. 109–10).

12. *KUB* xvi 32 (*CTH* 582) ii 14’–22’: ‘As it was not established (with oracles) for My Sun to make offering according to the *mantalli* ritual in favour of the sons of Arma-Tarhunda, as I did no harm to them; (but) the man who did do harm to them, as he (is) still living, as his soul (is) not placated, then (it is) through his (fault) (that) it was not established to offer the *mantalli* ritual’ (after Archi (1971: 212)). Cf. van den Hout (1998: 178–81). For the attribution of this text to Tudhaliya, see Ünal (1974: 1, 107, 172), and for the conclusion that it dates to the period before Hattusili’s death, see
van den Hout (1991: 294–7); cf. Houwink ten Cate (1994: 249). In view of Hattusili’s earlier conflicts with Arma-Tarhunda and the punishment he inflicted on his family, the assumption has been that Hattusili was the man still living who ‘did harm to them’; therefore ‘My Sun’ must be Tudhaliya. But if, as is quite possible, the man in question was someone else, then the king referred to here may well be Hattusili and not Tudhaliya. For further discussion on the co-regency question, see Klengel (1999: 287–8).

13. This statement is treated as a rhetorical question, following Helck (1963: 91) and Beckman (1983b: 109; 1996: 128), contra Singer (1991c: 331), whose translation ‘they were not indeed a source of praise for me’ would give precisely the opposite sense. In the light of the overall context of this passage, a rhetorical question seems more likely.


15. That Puduhepa played an active role in arranging royal marriages is clear from the bronze tablet, §19, 11 84–6, where it appears that the Hittite queen assumed the responsibility of finding a wife for Kurunta. However Tudhaliya seems to have given his cousin the option of choosing his own wife, regardless of any choice made by Puduhepa (bronze tablet §19, 11 88–9). This may well have caused some tension between Puduhepa and her son early in his reign.

16. *KUB* xxi 38, obv. 55.

17. See Brinkman (1980–3). The king could not have been Kadashman-Enlil who was apparently only a minor when he came to the throne and reigned only for a short time (1263–1255 on the most common reckoning); see Brinkman (1976: 31; 1976–80: 285).

18. As indicated in Tudhaliya’s treaty with Shaushgamuwa of Amurru, where the king of Babylon is listed amongst the kings of equal rank with the king of Hatti (see below).


24. If §15, 11 53–4 of the bronze tablet can be so interpreted. Tudhaliya gives the impression that Kurunta’s immediate and unqualified support was in sharp contrast with that of other regional kings.

25. This is evident from the treaty which he concluded with his vassal Shaushgamuwa, in which he still saw Egypt as one of the potential threats to Hittite territory in Syria (*KUB* xxiii 1 (*CTH* 105) rev. iv 4–7), remote though this possibility may have been (cf. van den Hout (2000: 646)).

26. Thus Houwink ten Cate (1966: 30).
27. KUB xix 23 (CTH 192).
29. The details are provided by KUB xxxi 68 (CTH 297.8), which records the trial proceedings.
32. In this context Imparati (1992: 319) also draws attention to the fragment KUB xxvi 18 (CTH 275) π 9′–10′, 16′, which mentions Nerikkaili, Huzziya (the latter probably also a brother of Tudhaliya), and Kurunta, and indicates Tudhaliya’s concern to protect the succession against the possible pretensions of his brothers or members of the family of Muwat-talli.
33. For the attribution of this text to Tudhaliya, see Singer (1985a: 109–19), supported by Hawkins (1990: 313). See also Harrak (1998: 251–2).
34. For an interesting new (and very debateable) interpretation of the background to the treaty, see Altman (2003: 358–61).
35. The whole treaty is trans. by Beckman (1999: 103–7).
36. Thus Güterbock (1983b: 30).
37. In spite of Tudhaliya’s criticism of Masturi’s conduct, the latter seems to have held a high place in the king’s regard, to judge from his position immediately next to the viceroy of Carchemish in the list of witnesses in the bronze tablet (§27, iv 31–2). This emphasizes that the criticism was clearly an ‘in principle’ rather than an ad hominem one.
42. Bronze tablet §§4, 6, 9, 16.
43. Bronze tablet §19.
44. Bronze tablet §§12, 22, 24. See further on this Houwink ten Cate (1992a: 241–2).
45. Bronze tablet §18.
46. This is one of two parallel letters referring to Kurunta’s illness; the other is KUB iii 66 (CTH 164.2) (= ÄHK i no. 72). See Edel (1976: 46–50, 82–91), van den Hout (1984: 90; 1995a: 91–4 with n. 113). On the dating of this correspondence to the period between the 42nd and 56th year of Ramesses’ reign (i.e. 1237–1223), see Edel (1976: 20, 29–30).
47. The inscription, formerly known as the Ilgin inscription, was published by Özgüç (1988: pls. 85–95), in the form of photographs of the 20 blocks discovered; see also Özgüç (1988: xxv–xxvii) for a description of the site (‘a rectangular stone basin . . . lined with walls on all four sides. The walls on three sides have Hittite hieroglyphic inscriptions on large limestone blocks’) and excavations, and (1988: 172–4) for plans of the site. Wiyanawanda lay in the border zone of the kingdom of Mira-Kuwaliya; see Bryce (1974a: 105–6). Further on the inscription, see Masson (1979), Hawkins (1992; 1995c: 66–85).

48. *KUB* xxvi 12 (*CTH* 255.1) ii 15’.


50. In the past this text has been variously assigned to the reigns of Muwattalli, Hattusili, or Tudhaliya. We can now confidently assign it to the last of these, since the events to which it refers took place after the reign of Masturi in the Seha River Land, and we know from the bronze tablet that Masturi was still on the vassal throne when Tudhaliya drew up his treaty with Kurunta (bronze tablet §27, iv 32). Cf. Güterbock (1992a: 235).

51. To judge from the fact that his father had occupied the vassal throne for thirty years or more when he was finally removed from it. His advanced age at this time suggests that his son was no youngster when he took his place.


53. The new ruler (whose name is lost in the break) is called ‘offspring of Mu[-].’ Güterbock (1992a: 242) noted that Sommer restored this name as Mu[-wa-ur.mah], the name of the father of Manapa-Tarhunda (*AM* 68–9), which can now be read as Muwa-walwi.


56. For discussion of the combined fragments and the historical information which they provide, see Singer (1983a: 214–16), Bryce (1985b).


58. See Hawkins (1998a: 19). For earlier views, see Singer (1983a: 216), Bryce (1985b: 21–2). In general on Tarkasnawa and the Karabel inscription and sealings which name him, see Hawkins (1998a; 1999). Another hieroglyphic inscription recently discovered at Latmos in western Anatolia refers to a Great Prince of the Land of Mira, though the identity of the person in question remains unclear. For the inscription, see Peschlow-Bindokat
(2001) and for its reading (and the suggestion that it refers to Kupanta-Kurunta, a predecessor of Tarkasnawa), see Herbordt (2001).

59. On this reading of the name, in place of Kuwatnaziti as read by Hoffner, and the possible identification with the Hittite envoy Kulaziti who figures in Egyptian correspondence with Hatti, see van den Hout (1995a: 91, with n. 112).

60. For an alternative reading of this line (rev. 39'), including a proposed reference to Kurunta, see van den Hout (1984: 91) and (1995a: 91).

61. For a translation of what survives of the entire document, see Beckman (1999: 144–6).

62. This is deduced from Güterbock’s reading of rev. 45’–7’ of the text: ‘When we, My Sun, and you, my son, established/ fixed the border of Milawata for ourselves . . . I did not give you [such and such a place] within the borders of Milawata’ (Güterbock 1986: 38 n. 17). A slightly different reading proposed by Gurney (1992: 220–1 n. 58) would not materially alter the sense of this passage. Beckman’s translation (1999: 146) ‘[And the . . .] which I did not give to you along with the border territory of the land of Milawata [. . .]’ would also indicate a redefinition of boundaries in the region.

63. If Tarkasnawa was in fact the addressee of the letter, then the father referred to here was probably Alantalli, known from col. iv 36 of the bronze tablet as a king of Mira; see Hawkins (1998a: 18).

64. Rev. 43’. The meaning of the term kulawanis is not clear; see Hoffner (1982: 135 n. 14), and the references cited therein. Beckman (1999: 145) translates: ‘military (vassal)’.

65. For the likely extent of Mira’s territory, which incorporated the land of Kuwaliya and almost certainly a major part of the former kingdom of Arzawa proper after Mursili II’s dismemberment of the latter, see Hawkins (1998: 21–3) and in Easton et al. (2002: 98).


68. KUB xxiii 1 iv 23. But note Steiner (1989a) who argues that the generally accepted restoration Ab-\h\i-\i-a-u-\u-a-\a-s-\s-\s-
M\A\M\A’ (‘Ahhiyawan ships’) in this line is incorrect. He proposes [lah-\h\i-\i-a-u-a-a-s-\s-\s-\s-
M\A\M\A’ (‘warships’), a restoration which Singer (1991a: 171 n. 56) considers most unlikely. On the basis of the usual restoration, I do not believe (pace Cline (1991)) that the ban referred to in this passage indicates a general embargo on Mycenaean trade with the Near Eastern world, nor that there is any other evidence for an embargo by the Hittites on Mycenaean trading enterprises; see Bryce (2003c: esp. p. 71).


73. Shaushgamuwa Treaty, i 45–8.

74. Perhaps the son of the Hittite princess Gassulawiya; see Klengel (1969: 313).

75. Shaushgamuwa Treaty, ii 3.

76. Shaushgamuwa Treaty, ii 1–3; bronze tablet §27, iv 32.

77. On the identification of Gassulawiya as her mother, see most recently Singer (1991c: 334).

78. The actual nature of the offence is not known; see Kühne (1973a: 183–4).

79. Recorded in the texts RS 17.159, 17.396, 17.348 (PRU IV, 125–8, Dossier v c). See also Yaron (1963), Singer (1991a: 174–5). Brooke (1979: 83) supports Pardee (1977) in the view that the Ugaritic letter RS 34.124 is also concerned with this divorce.

80. The items she had acquired from her marriage included objects of gold, silver, copper, servants, and garments (RS 17.396, 5–9).

81. RS 16.270 (PRU IV, 134–6), RS 17.372 λ + 360 λ (PRU IV, 139–141), RS 17.228 (PRU IV, 141–3). Singer (1991a: 174) notes that contrary to earlier views it is now proved beyond doubt that there was only one Amurrite princess married to Ammistamru.

82. RS 18.06 + 17.365 (PRU IV, 137–8) 1′–6′.


84. See the texts in PRU IV, 129–48, Dossier v d. The divorce edicts issuing from Tudhaliya IV and Ini-Teshub are trans. by Beckman (1999: 180–2).


86. RS 17.159 (PRU IV, 126–7 = CTH 107) 31–9; cf. RS 17.348 (PRU IV, 128).

87. See RS 17.128 (PRU IV, 179) with the seal impression whose cuneiform legend reads: ‘Seal of Ini-Teshub, King of Carchemish, Servant of Kubaba, Son of Shahurunuwa, Grandson of Sharri-Kushuh, Great-Grandson of Suppiluliuma, Great King, King of Hatti, Hero’. On the genealogy, see Adamthwaite (2001: 58). Other seals of Ini-Teshub include RS 17.146, 17.59, 17.158. See also Schaeffer (1956: 20–9).

88. He was viceroy at the time of Hattusili’s treaty with Ramesses.

89. RS 17.158 (PRU IV, 169–71).


92. This almost certainly exaggerates the extent of Hittite involvement in the conflict, which was probably only minimal.


94. See Astour (1994: 228), who refers to tablets of Shalmaneser’s reign which show that a regular Assyrian administration was now installed in the cities of the conquered kingdom, that part of their population was being transported eastward, and that land estates and enslaved local persons were distributed to Assyrian aristocrats.

95. On the basis of the lower chronology proposed by Wilhelm and Boese (1979), who date Tukulti-Ninurta’s reign to the years 1233–1197.


99. Cf. Munn-Rankin (1975: 285), Singer (1985a: 104–5). Machinist (1982: 266) comments: ‘While the sources describe Assyrian–Hittite contact mostly in military–political terms, there was clearly also an economic side. This becomes especially clear in the documents bearing on the period of Tukulti-Ninurta, whose interest in the Upper Euphrates and Tigris must have included the rich mineral deposits of the region, particularly the copper mines of Ergani Maden. And the economic motive becomes explicit in the sanctions established by Tudhaliya against Tukulti-Ninurta, attempting to cut off the latter’s access to Syrian and Mediterranean trade (see *KUB* xxiii 1 iv 14–26).’

100. *KUB* xxiii 92//xxiii 103//KUB xl 77, rev. 20 f.


103. Singer (1991a: 172) comments that the treaty would best fit either at the beginning of Tukulti-Ninurta’s reign, or at the very end of Shalmaneser’s.


108. Thus Singer (1985a: 108). According to Singer, Surra is probably located at Savur on the northern slopes of Tur ‘Abdin. The battle may also be recorded in a Hittite text, KBo iv 14 (CTH 123), which refers to a Hittite– Assyrian engagement at Nihriya, but has generally been ascribed to one of the last two Hittite kings—Arnuwanda III or Suppiluliuma II.


111. See Munn-Rankin (1975: 291), Singer (1985a: 104). Liverani (2001: 27) explains the statement thus: there was no victory over the Hittites at all, either in the first year of Tukulti-Ninurta’s reign or later, but in the anti-Hittite climate during the war, while the real front remained stalemated on the Euphrates an old episode was re-used in order to provide a victory to celebrate.

112. KBo iv 14 (CTH 123). Singer’s attribution of this letter to Tudhaliya has been referred to above.

113. A town lying to the east of the Euphrates; see Singer (1985a: 110 n. 61).


118. Cf. Otten (1988a: 4), Neve (1989–90: 8), Beckman (1989–90: 293), Freu (1990: 58–9). However Singer (1996a; 2000a: 26) suggests that the words may indicate that there were now two Great Kings sharing power in Anatolia, and that the conflict between them was political rather than military. Contra Singer’s scenario, see van den Hout (2001: 217–19). Hawkins (in Easton et al., 2002: 96) believes that the relief provided a fixed point on the boundary between Hatti and Tarhuntassa.


123. Dincöl, Yakar et al. (2000: 16) suggest that Kurunta seized power after Tudhaliya's death, with the throne reverting to Tudhaliya's son Arnuwanda III after Kurunta's death. It should of course be emphasized, as Mora (2003: 290) rightly points out, that as yet we have nothing in the written record to indicate a violent seizure of power in Hattusa by Kurunta at any time.

124. Cited by Hoffner (1989b: 47–8). Cf. Beckman (1989–90: 293 n. 20). Beckman points out that the tablet was found beneath reconstruction work done under the aegis of Tudhaliya.


126. KBo xii 38 (CTH 121), ed. Güterbock (1967a) and also trans. Kümmel (1985).

127. The second describes a further campaign against Alasiya by Suppiluliuma II and will be discussed in Ch. 13.

128. e.g. Arnuwanda I, as indicated in his letter to Madduwatta; see Ch. 6.

129. See e.g. Klengel (1974), and for further discussion, Ch. 13.

130. In her (draft) letter to Ramesses, KUB xxi 38 i 17–18, Puduhepa makes reference to the lack of grain in her lands; see Singer (1983b: 5).


132. See Klengel (1979b: 77–8), Singer (1983a: 217; 1999b: 715–16). Overland transportation was then provided by caravans of donkeys; see Heltzer (1977).

133. Identified as a Hittite prince in a letter from Ramesses II to Hattushili, KUB iii 34 (CTH 165.1) (= ĀHK i no. 78) rev. 15.


136. Listed in §27, iv 34, as one of the witnesses to the treaty.

137. Imparati (1992: 311–12) remarks that we cannot be certain whether such a prince was in fact a member of the Hittite royal family; his place about midway in the list of witnesses in the bronze tablet and several names after the vassal rulers Masturi and Shaushgamuwa, would suggest that his provenance was elsewhere, even if Ramesses called him a prince of the Land of Hatti. Van den Hout (1989a: 138 ff) also argues that Heshmi-Sharrumma was not Tudhaliya but his son or more probably his younger brother; further on this, see Mora (1992: 141). Klengel (1991: 229) still considers that the identification with Tudhaliya is possible, though not compelling. For the most recent and most comprehensive treatment of the whole question, including the possible identification of the names Heshmi-Sharrumma and bu-lugal-(ma), see van den Hout (1995a: 127–32).

139. Though as Singer (2000a: 26) points out, it is hard to to tell how effective Tudhaliya’s western campaigns really were. ‘It is obvious that the restless Lukka Lands were far from being pacified, and continuous Hittite intervention was necessary in the following generation as well.’


CH. 13: THE FALL OF THE KINGDOM

1. To $SB\theta$ i no. 64 = Beran (1967: 34 no. 161) we can now add the (maximum of) 45 seal impressions found in the ‘seal archive’ at Nişantepe (Neve’s table (1992a: 313)). This is a significantly greater number than those so far attributable to some of Arnuwanda’s more illustrious predecessors. Of course we have to be careful not to place too much emphasis on absolute numbers of seal impressions when we do not know the circumstances which led to their production.

2. For the discovery of this king, see Laroche (1953). His name also appears on a number of seal impressions. To Boehmer and Güterbock (1987: 83 no. 261) add the seal impressions on clay bullae discovered during the excavations at Hattusa in 1987 and 1990. Five were found in temple 2 (Neve (1988: 374–6, Abb. 23a–c)) and six in the Nişantepe archive (Neve (1991: 332; 1992a: 313, 315)). The attribution of the seals to the second rather than the first Suppiluliuma seems virtually certain; see Neve (1992b).

3. $CTH$ 124 and 125.

4. Cf. Singer (2001b: 637). Singer (2001b: 640) argues that the author of the text is the viceroy at Carchemish—probably Talmi-Teshub, but possibly Ini-Teshub—who installed Suppiluliuma on the throne after his brother’s premature death, and that the text is one of four fragments containing portions of treaties between Suppiluliuma and the viceroy. See also Otten (1963: 3–4).


6. The full text appears in Laroche (1953). See also Otten (1963: 3).

7. See Singer (1985a: 120). The documents in question, protocols and instructions, are listed in $CTH$ 121–6; 256. See Otten (1976) for a comprehensive survey of these documents.

9. Not literally a prince of royal blood, Pihawalwi was one of the high-ranking officials appointed by the Hittite king as a 'surrogate son' to fulfil certain diplomatic and administrative roles. See Beckman (1992: 47; 1995c: 28), Bryce (2002: 27–8).
11. *KBo* xii 41 and *KUB* xl 37 (*CTH* 122); see Otten (1963: 7).
14. His status is confirmed by the royal cartouche bearing his name. For arguments in favour of attributing the text to Suppiluliuma II rather than to the first king of that name, see Otten (1989b: 336).
17. Ikuna probably = Hittite Ikuwaniya and should very likely be identified with Ikonion-Konya; see Hawkins (1990: 312; 1995c: 51). Further on the campaigns, see Singer (1996a: 66).
18. For a contrary interpretation, see Melchert (2002).
19. Further on the alleged campaigns recorded in the inscription, see Singer (1996a: 66).
21. Singer (2000a: 27) understands the attacks both on Alasiya and Tarhuntassa as part of the same last-ditch attempt to block the further advance of the Sea Peoples.
22. Although according to the interpretation proposed by Melchert (2002), Tarhuntassa was by this time already controlled by the Hittite king, who took punitive action against its rebellious occupants by transplanting them to another location, and thus depopulating the city.
24. But note the contexts suggested by Hoffner (1992b: 50–1), for the operations described in the Südburg inscription.
25. Several scholars have identified Ura with modern Silifke (Classical Seleucia); see Davesne *et al.* (1987: 373–6), in support of a proposal made originally by Albright. More recently it has been equated with modern Gilindere (Classical Kelenderis); thus Beal (1992a: 68–9). See also the discussions by de Martino (1999) and Yakar *et al.* (2001) of Ura’s political and geographical relationship with Tarhuntassa. Further on Ura’s role in the importation of grain to Hatti, see Singer (1996a: 65–6).
27. For a recent discussion of the evidence for food shortages in this period, see Singer (1999b: 715–19).

28. Klengel (1999: 311) suggests that the recently discovered grain silos in Hattusa, on Büyükkaya and alongside the city’s fortifications (see Seeher (2000; 2001a: 333–41)), could be an indication of a scarcity of food supplies (from local sources).


31. Cf. the Hittite letter Bo 2810, ed. and discussed by Klengel (1974: 170–4). It refers to the urgent need of a large shipment of grain to relieve a famine ‘in the lands’. Unfortunately the identities of both the author of the letter and the addressee are uncertain.

32. But Hoffner (1992b: 49) comments that the Ugaritic text does not mention a famine or catastrophe, and considers that the shipment may not have been a special case in response to an emergency but part of a standing arrangement between the two states. Cf. Klengel (1974: 168).


35. ‘Islands’ is the usual translation of Egyptian rww. But Drews (1993: 52) comments that the Egyptian language has no word or concept equivalent to our ‘islands’, and that the two Egyptian words that sometimes mean ‘islands’ are frequently used for continental coasts; a less prejudicial translation would therefore be: ‘As for the countries, they made a conspiracy in their sealands.’

36. Klengel (1992a: 150) comments that this form of address may indicate the youth of the letter’s sender.

37. See also Astour (1965: 255–6).


40. Vocalizations of Šrdn, Škrš, Ikšš, Lk, Trš respectively.

41. Very likely to be identified with a group described as ‘the people of Shikila who live on boats’ in a letter written by the Hittite king to a king of Ugarit, probably Ammurapi (RS 34.129 (Malbran-Labat (1991: 38–40 no. 12))).


43. Medinet Habu i 46 = KRI V 37–43.


45. For the text, see Breasted (1906: iv 110–206).
46. These are common vocalizations of the following names: Plst/Prst (Peleset, Pulesati, Philistines), Tjkr (Tjekker, Tjikar, Zeker, Teucrians?), Šklš/Škrš (Shekelesh), Wšš (Weshesh), Dnyñ (Danuna, Denyen, People of Adana, Hittite adanawanai, Egyptian daniuna, Greek Danaoi?).

47. See Barnett (1975a: 371–8). For the most recent and most comprehensive treatment of the Philistines’ migration into Palestine, see Barako (2001).


49. Note e.g. that the Peleset and Tjekker warriors who fought in the land battle are accompanied in the reliefs by women and children loaded in ox-carts.


51. Against this traditional picture, see the arguments recently advanced by Drews (2000), who believes that Ramesses III’s enemies were not migrants at all, but raiders who had sailed to the Delta in the hope of sacking one or more of the royal centres located there. In Drews’ opinion, the migration assumed from the Medinet Habu reliefs is a figment of 19th cent. imagination.

52. See also the detailed discussion of Niemeier, W.-D. (1998).

53. Herodotos 1.94.

54. See in particular Singer (1988c).

55. Thus Mellaart (1984: 77).


60. Thus Muhly (1992: 14).


62. For critical surveys of these, see also Drews (1993: chs. 3–8), van de Mieroop (2004: 186–9).


66. See e.g. Carpenter (1968: 9).

67. Texts from Emar provide graphic descriptions of the effects of famine on the region in this period; see Zaccagnini (1995), Singer (Fs Mazar).


69. Drews (1993: 79) refers to physical evidence from Gordoen, in the form of a series of narrow tree-rings in a juniper log unearthed at this site, pointing to an Anatolian drought c.1200.

70. As once argued by Childe (1954: 182–3).
72. See e.g. Sandars (1985: 47–9, 77–9, 197), Zaccagnini (1990a), and the comments by Drews (1993: 85–90).
75. Thus Liverani (1987: 70).
78. In the Greek Argolid, for example, archaeological evidence indicates a ‘destruction horizon’ which occurred in several phases over a century or more rather than a single devastating apocalyptic event.
79. Hoffner (1992b: 48) comments that if Suppiluliuma had a successor, it is likely that his reign was so short and chaotic that there was no opportunity to accumulate a tablet archive.
80. However Güterbock (1992b: 55) raises the question of what was actually meant by ‘Hatti’ in Ramesses’ account.
82. Seeher (2001b).
83. See Singer (1987: 416, 418), who notes that the fall of Ugarit is usually dated shortly before Ramesses III’s alleged land battle with the Sea Peoples in Amurru (p. 416, with references cited in nn. 22–4), but could conceivably have been 15–20 years earlier (p. 418). See Klengel (1992: 151) for theories relating to its destruction, and Yon (1992: 117–20) for material evidence relating to the destruction.
87. Information provided by the Harris Papyrus; Breasted (1906: iv §407).
88. See Bittel’s map (1983b: 32, Abb. 2), indicating the pattern of destruction. This is quite contrary to the assertion by Goetze (1975c: 266), that ‘wherever excavations have been carried out they indicate that the Hittite country was ravaged, its cities burnt down’. Cf. Mellaart (1984: 78–9).
90. However, van de Mieroop (2004: 192) comments that there is nothing to confirm the hypothesized identification.
95. A Mt. Patara is referred to in Block 4 of the Yalburt inscription. The identification with Lycian Patara is discussed by Poetto (1993: 33, 80) and Mellink (1995: 190).
99. See Houwink ten Cate (1965).
100. See Košak (1980c: 43).
102. Although immediately to the south Emar seems to have fallen victim to ‘troops of foreigners’ at this time; see Arnaud (1987: 20 n. 3), in reference to the text ME73, which mentions their siege of Emar.
105. Further on Melid (Malt(i)ya in 2nd mill. sources), see Hawkins (1998b).
109. For a concise account of the increasingly important role now played by the Arameans in Syria and Mesopotamia, see van de Mieroop (2004: 192–3).
110. The language of the inscriptions was Luwian, as in the Bronze Age.
111. 2 Kings 7: 6, 2 Chron. 1: 17, discussed further below.
122. Unless we take up Singer’s suggestion (1996a: 64–5) that there was a period of peaceful co-existence and co-operation between two Anatolian Great Kings at the end of the Late Bronze Age.


126. For a more detailed treatment of Tabal, see Bryce (2003b: 97–100).

127. See Grayson (1976: 9 §18), where reference is made to ‘4,000 Kasku (and) Urumu, unyielding troops of the Hittites’.

128. On the location of the region occupied by the Mushki, either in the upper catchment area of the Euphrates or further to the south-east in the upper Tigris region, see Bartl (1995: 205–6).

129. *Iliad* 3.184 ff.

130. *Geography*, 14.5.29.

131. For recent reconsideration of the question of the Mushki’s origins, see Kossian (1997).

132. Luckenbill (1927: 8 §18). Further refs. to the Mushki occur in texts from the reigns of the Assyrian kings Tukulti–Ninurta II and Ashurnasirpal; see Luckenbill (1926: §§413, 442).

133. On the Phrygian king’s role in Anatolian affairs and his alleged contacts with Greece, according to Greek tradition, see Muscarella (1989).

134. For a recent detailed and comprehensive discussion of this question, see Singer (*Fs Mazar*).

135. Gen. 10: 15.


137. 1 Kings 11: 1–2, 1 Kings 9: 20–1, 2 Chron. 8: 7–8.


141. Note also Joshua 1: 4, where the area around the Euphrates is described as Hittite territory and is clearly to be distinguished from the territory of the ‘Canaanite Hittites’.

142. Although Beckman (1996: 24) believes that in a biblical context the term ‘Hittite’ is more likely used in the looser Assyrian sense of ‘Westerner’. But see most recently the discussion of Singer (*Fs Mazar*), who regards as conclusive the identification of these Hittites with those of the neo-Hittite kingdoms of Syria and southern Anatolia.


CH. 14: THE TROJAN WAR: MYTH OR REALITY

2. For example, those held in Sheffield, 1977 (IVth International Colloquium on Aegean Prehistory), Liverpool, 1981, and Bryn Mawr, 1984. Proceedings of the latter two have been published by Foxhall and Davies (1984) and Mellink (1986) respectively.
3. He conducted seven campaigns, between 1871 and his death in 1890. Following his death two further campaigns were conducted in 1893 and 1894 by his assistant Wilhelm Dörpfeld.
4. Blegen (1963: 20). Most recently Latacz (2004: esp. 283–7) has argued strongly in favour of the possibility that the Trojan war was a discrete historical event.
5. Hiller (1991: 145). Cf. Finley et al. (1964: 9): ‘Until (new Hittite or North Syrian texts are produced), I believe the narrative we have of the Trojan War had best be removed in toto from the realm of history and returned to the realm of myth and poetry.’
6. See e.g. Forrer (1924b).
7. In Homeric tradition, Troy and (W)ilios were two names for the same place. Wilios was an early form of the name Ilios before the initial w, representing the archaic Greek digamma, was dropped. Ilion was the later Greek name adopted by Aiolian settlers in the 8th cent.
8. On the equation, see Güterbock (1986: 33 n. 1), who comments that the similarity between the names had been noted as early as 1911.
10. The suggestion is referred to by Morris (1989: 532).
13. This kingdom, we recall, had been dismembered by Mursili II; see Ch. 8.
14. See Ch. 8, n. 22.
15. On the identification of Lazpa with Lesbos, first proposed in the 1920s by Forrer, see Houwink ten Cate (1983–4: 44).
17. Our understanding of the events referred to in this letter has been enhanced by a text-join identified by Laroche in 1972. The augmented text has been ed. and discussed by Houwink ten Cate (1983–4: 38–64).
20. See Bryce (1989c: 2) and the references cited therein.
21. See Korfmann et al. (2001: 397, figs. 23, 26, 77, 462, 465). It is suggested that the palisade and first ditch date to level VI, the second ditch to VIIa.
22. Korfmann has provided regular reports on the progress of excavations conducted on the site since 1988 under his direction in *Studia Troica*, vol. 1, 1991 onwards. For summary accounts of the results of these excavations, see Korfmann (1995; 1998).
23. The leading critic of Korfmann and his team has been Prof. Frank Kolb, one of Korfmann's colleagues in Tübingen University. Kolb claims that Korfmann has greatly overestimated Troy's significance and provided exaggerated and misleading reports on the results of his team's work. See also Hertel (2001) (Hertel was a former member of Korfmann's team at Troy). The matter was given a public airing in a Symposium organized by Tübingen University entitled 'The Meaning of Troy in the Late Bronze Age', held on 15–16 February 2002. For a summary of the arguments used by Korfmann's critics, along with a defence of Korfmann's findings, see Easton et al. (2002). Hertel and Kolb (2003) have subsequently disputed a number of the conclusions presented by Easton et al. and reiterated their criticisms of Korfmann's findings.
26. So John Bintliff concluded from the surveys he conducted in the region, as reported in his paper 'Environmental Factors in Trojan Cultural History', presented at the 1977 Sheffield Colloquium.
27. See Mee (1978: 146–7), and (1984: 45). Note, however, Mee's comment (1978: 148) that this constitutes only a fraction of the pottery from the site dating to this period.
28. Mellink (1986: 94) notes that Aegean interests in Troy increased at the time of Achaian expansion to Crete, Rhodes, and the Anatolian coast, as attested by archaeological evidence for trade and settlement in the Halikarnassos peninsula, Iasos, Miletos, Ephesos, Klazomenai, Smyrna, and the Larissa area. This expansion was strongest in LH IIIA, from c.1425 on.
30. The reference to this occurs in the Tawagalawa letter, iv 7–10. It is just possible that the Hittite–Ahhiyawan confrontation was a diplomatic rather than a military one.

32. A theory cited but opposed by Muhly (1992: 17). In general on possible political and economic motives for the war, see Cline (1996: 149).

33. For a general account of Troy and the University of Cincinnati’s excavations of the site, see Blegen (1963).

34. See Mellink (1986: 97), Muhly (1992: 17). Easton (1985: 189) comments that the LH IIIC sherds among deposits of VIIa suggest that the destruction took place at a date later than that of the Mycenaean palaces, when Mycenaeans ought not to have been able to muster a coalition of the sort described by Homer. Cf. Mee (1978: 147; 1984: 48–50), Podzuweit (1982: 80). *Contra* Podzuweit’s ceramic dating, see Hiller (1991: 153).


36. The latter feature lends credibility to Homer’s account of Patroklos’ attempts to scale the fortifications by clambering up them.

37. The earthquake theory was revived by Rapp and Gifford (1982).

38. Thus Easton (1985: 190–1).

39. See Easton (1985: 189–90), Sperling (1991: 156), and the references cited by Morris (1989: 533). Morris further comments that new ceramic evidence and analysis associate VIIa with the LH IIIC era, and VIIb now appears sub-Mycenaean, eliminating phases of the citadel later than VI from the Homeric experience.

40. See Mountjoy (1999), espec. p. 298 for the table of Mycenaean ceramic dates and their synchronisms with the various phases of Troy VI and VII.

41. It is quite likely that VIh continued for a time after production of LHIIB1 ware had ceased. The presence of LHIIB1 pottery in the destruction deposits would seem to support this, despite Mountjoy’s claim that the LHIIB sherds were later intrusions.

42. Watkins (1986: 58–62) has suggested that the remains of an Anatolian prototype of the *Iliad* are to be found in a Hittite ritual text, *KBo* iv 11 (*CTH* 772.1). But at present only a tiny fragment of this text is known—far too little to justify serious consideration of Watkins’ suggestion. Cf. the comment by Macqueen (1986: 166 n. 81).

43. See e.g. *Odyssey* 9.1–11, together with evidence provided by Mycenaean vase-paintings.

44. Webster (1958: 133).

45. For a comprehensive treatment of the development of the epic, see Tigay (1982). The most recent translation is that of George (1999).

46. These sources are collected and discussed by Forsdyke (1956: 62–86). Herodotos 2. 145 proposes a date ‘about 800 years before my time’—i.e.
mid-13th cent. This would closely accord with the archaeologically proposed date for the destruction of Troy VIIh (see Korfmann (1990: 232)).

47. However Güterbock (1984: 119) comments that while the name sounds Greek it is hardly Atreus.


50. Jansen (1995: 1127) notes that a few sherds of LH IIIC type from VIIb reflect the final degradation of the Mycenaean civilization.

51. This would not be inconsistent with the views expressed by Finley in Finley et al. (1964: 1–9).

52. It should, however, be noted that Troy was not entirely deserted. In a second phase of VIIb a coarse ceramic knobbed ware referred to as Buckelkeramik makes its appearance, perhaps reflecting the arrival of an immigrant population group from south-eastern Europe. A brief summary of the final stages of Bronze Age Troy and what followed in its aftermath is provided by Jansen (1995: 1126–7).


APPENDIX 1: CHRONOLOGY


2. Probably adoptive father in the first case; see Ch. 6.


4. For a table of direct synchronisms between Hittite Great Kings and the rulers of other states, see Klengel (1999: 388–90).


6. The information is recorded on the 63rd tablet of the Enuma Anu Enlil, a collection of divine omens.


11. For a detailed discussion of Egyptian chronology (with particular reference to the 18th Dynasty) and the various methodologies employed by scholars in attempting to calculate absolute dates, see Manning (1999: 367–413).

12. Based on the fact that every four years the Egyptian civil calendar gained on the Sothic calendar by one day, so that it took $365 \times 4$ years ($= 1,460$ years) for a full cycle to be completed. For more precise calculations, see Ingham (1969).


18. This is well illustrated by the papers produced at the 1987 conference in Gothenburg, published by Åström (1987/9).

19. As Güterbock and Gurney remarked, more than 30 years ago; see Gurney (1974: 105), citing also a comment made by Güterbock some years earlier.


23. See Rüster (1972), and Neu and Rüster (1975).

24. There is, however, a school of thought which maintains the traditional dating of the above texts, and explains the apparent early forms as conscious archaizing by the scribes. See Heinhold-Krahmer et al. (1979); but note the review of this work by Gurney (1982). Knapp (1980: 45–6) also maintains the traditional dating of the Madduwatta text.

25. These texts are discussed in Ch. 6.

**APPENDIX 2: SOURCES FOR HITTITE HISTORY**

1. Though as we noted in Ch. 4, some scholars believe that Hattusa had already been resettled by a predecessor of Hattusili.


3. On tablet archives and libraries in general in the Near East, see Veenhof (1986), Otten (1986: 184–5), and for a most useful summary of their contents, Pedersén (1998). For the archives and libraries of the Hittite capital in particular, see Pedersén (1998: 44–56), and for those of the

4. For example in a text which sets out procedures related to the purchase of certain goods: ‘And what (the purchaser) buys should be set down in (the form of) a wooden tablet, and let that be provisionally(?) sealed. As soon as the King, however, comes up to Hattusa, he (the recipient of the gift) must produce it (for inspection) in the Palace and they must seal it for him (with a royal seal impression)!’ (KUB xiii 4 (CTH 264A) II 39–44, 48–51, trans. Houwink ten Cate (1994: 237)). We also have references to ‘scribes of the wooden tablets’; e.g. KUB xiii 35+ (CTH 293) iv 28, in the letter KB 9 x 82 (CTH 197) where the ‘chief of the wooden tablet scribes’ is one of the court advisers, and in the treaty on the recently discovered bronze tablet where the holder of the same office appears amongst the list of witnesses to the treaty (Bo 86/299 iv 37). Further on this, see Otten (1963: 3). See also Veenhof (1995a: 312).

5. For example, the treaty between Hattusili III and Ramesses II was inscribed on silver, the Ulmi-Teshub treaty on iron. On the use of metal tablets in Hittite diplomacy, see Watanabe (1989). Copies of the metal originals were made on clay.

6. Published by Otten (1988a).

7. Further on the various tablet collections found in the capital, see van den Hout (2002b: 859–60).

8. The archive has been published by Alp (1991a; 1991b).

9. See Süel (1992; 2002). With the exception of a small number of tablets, the material from the archive has not yet been published. For those already published, see Ünal (1998).


13. The latter seems to have been the chief repository for the treaties with foreign kings and vassal rulers; see Bittel (1983c: 23). Presumably the sacred inviolate character of these treaties was the reason for this. Tablets have also been found in a number of the Upper City’s temples.

14. This question has recently been examined afresh by Alaura (2001), who concludes that there was a systematic organization of material, though we cannot as yet determine what the underlying principles of the organization and distribution of the texts were.

15. Work has already begun on this task; see Košak (1995).
16. For a more detailed treatment, see Bryce (2002: 56–71).
17. On the Mesopotamian scribal school tradition, see Sjöberg (1974), and on the likely continuation of this tradition at Hattusa, see Beckman (1983b: 97).
20. The Hittite name of the Sun God of Heaven.
21. On the practice by scribes and other officials of appending personal notes to each other, see Otten (1956), Bryce (2003a: 174–6, 179).
22. The reason why the great majority of clay tablets in the ancient Near East were not baked, particularly those that were to be stored for future reference, is somewhat puzzling. See the comments of Veenhof (1986: 1).
23. Note in this respect the important studies of Rüster (1972), and Neu and Rüster (1975).
26. For the most recent discussion of the use of linguistic and graphic criteria for dating Hittite texts, see Archi (2003: 4–10).
27. See Labat (1962).
28. Knudtzon (1902), Hrozný (1915). Knudtzon’s proposal was based on two letters in the Amarna archive, EA 31 and 32, communications which passed between the Arzawan king Tarhundaradu and the pharaoh Amenhotep III, and which we now know were written in the Nesite/Hittite language.
30. For the locations of the hieroglyphic inscriptions, see Hawkins (2003: 142–3).
32. Amongst recent studies of the hieroglyphic inscriptions those of J. D. Hawkins are of particular importance; see the relevant items listed under his name in the Bibliography, including Hawkins and Morpurgo-Davies (1986). For a summary account of the discovery and decipherment of the inscriptions, see Hawkins (2003: 130–8), and for the corpus of surviving Iron Age hieroglyphic inscriptions, Hawkins (2000). Hawkins (2003: 148–151) summarizes the contents of these inscriptions, grouped according to find-spots.
33. See Neve (1987: 400–1; 1989–90: 10). The seal has the inventory number 573/z, and has been published by Boehmer and Güterbock (1987: 69 no. 214, with pl. 25).
34. See Neve (1987: 400–3; 1988: 374), and the detailed treatments by Dinçol et al. (1993) and Carruba (1998a). Neve (1987: 401) provided
preliminary readings of the names on the sealings, and assigned the seal to Suppiluliuma II. Revised readings have been provided by Dinçol et al. (1993: 89), who have reassigned the seal to Mursili II. They have identified the names as follows: side a: Suppiluliuma I surrounded by Labarna I, Hattusili I, Mursili I and one still uncertain name; side b: Mursili II surrounded by Tudhaliya I/II, [Arnuwanda I], Tudhaliya III, and a still problematic space. They state that these identifications are supported by the corresponding identifications of all the Great Queens except the one with the uncertain Great King.

35. The name comes from a rock-face located there bearing a very weathered and almost entirely illegible 11-line hieroglyphic inscription.


37. 60 per cent of the sealings have been identified as being of royal type. See Herbordt (2002) for a statistical analysis of the archive and a prosopographical study of the items of non-royal type.

38. The information contained in the archives at Hattusa is supplemented by a number of relevant texts (letters, diplomatic and administrative records) from the archives discovered at Alalah, Ugarit, and Emar. With regard to Ugarit, see Bordreuil and Pardee (1995), Singer (2000a: 21–4) for the important 13th cent. archive discovered in 1973 during salvage excavations in Ugarit, with further tablets from the archive coming to light during excavations from the late 1980s onwards. The archive, belonging to an official called Urtenu, has yet to be published in its entirety.

39. Much of this correspondence is catalogued in CTH 151–210. Many of the letters have been ed. by Hagenbuchner (1989).

40. For relatively detailed treatments of international correspondence in the Late Bronze Age, see Cohen and Westbrook (2000), Bryce (2003a).

41. The full corpus of this correspondence has now been published by Edel (1994), cited as ÄHK.
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