

UN Peacekeeping operations in Somalia and the Former republic of Yugoslavia:

A qualitative text analysis of how American involvement was transformed under

a UN mandate from peacekeeping, to war fighting, in both Somalia and the

Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

Introduction:

The conflicts in Somalia and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia came to a head in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The ‘new world order’ with America and the western liberal democracies at the forefront gave the UN a new lease of life. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought a change to the international environment, with the threat of ‘mutually assured destruction’ eradicated and a move from bi-polarity towards complex polarity with the U.S. emerging as a possible hegemonic force. Within the UN Security Council - veto paralysis was overcome, allowing a new role for the UN in terms of its peace-keeping operations. Not only had the incidence of peacekeeping increased, but the nature of the operations began to shift from inter to intra state conflict. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union; UN forces began to carry out a host of roles ranging from; a lightly armed peace builder, up to the coercive peace enforcer. These new roles brought complex and often contradictory mandates, which were often ‘ratcheted up’ from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, as can be seen in both Somalia and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

Background to Somali conflict:

The first signs of conflict surfaced in 1963, as the Somali nationalists unhappy with the territory dealt to them through UN self-determination.



Fig. 1 Somali Flag. (See Appendix 1)

The Organisation of African Unity failed to resolve the disputes between the newly formed Somali state and its neighbours, resulting in numerous short-border wars.



Fig 2. U.S. troops at an aid distribution centre in southern Somalia



Fig 3. A physical map of Somalia with its major cities and regions. Also shows borders with neighbouring states in the region known as the Horn of Africa.

In 1969 General Siad Barre successfully orchestrated a military coup which for sometime, stabilised the region. Barre however, was more focused on consolidating his own power within Somalia rather than risking his control of the territory. This desire lasted until 1977 when Ethiopian state ‘failed’ and gave General Siad Barre an opportunity to take back Ogaden. At this time the Soviets tried to broker a regional

organisation of Socialist states including both Ethiopia and Somalia. This did not receive regional ratification forcing the Soviets to pick sides in the conflict; they sided with Ethiopia. This allowed the Soviet backed Ethiopians to force back the WSLF (Western Somali Liberation Front) out of Ogaden along with 500,000 refugees¹.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, the leader of Ethiopia, Mengistu, agreed to open diplomatic relations with Siad Barre. Within Somalia the diplomatic agreements appeared to do more harm than good and encouraged three main opposition factions; the SNM (Somali National Movement), the USC (United Somali Congress) under the leadership of General Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed (later becoming interim president) and the SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement). The pressures put on the Siad Barre administration by the opposition movements eventually caused the disintegration of his government and, he was thrown from power on 27th January 1991. Unfortunately the alliance of the three factions formed after the coup was unable to prevent the humanitarian disaster that was occurring within Somalia. The USC controlled the largest territory including the capital Mogadishu.

Conflict between the two factions split Mogadishu in half. Prior to the collapse of the Siad Barre government Aidid controlled some areas of the capital but, primarily the ‘suburbs’ of Mogadishu and rural areas in the south east of Somalia. His supporters were mainly comprised of fellow clan members and militia that had served for Aidid in the offensive against Ethiopia. (See Appendix 2) Ali Mahdi’s, support lay in the urban areas of Mogadishu and other southern cities such as Merca and Kismaayo.

¹ James Mayall, *The New Interventionism 1991-1994; United Nations experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. pg 100.



Fig. 4. General Mohamed Farah Aidid.

Fighting between the two factions of the USC within Mogadishu caused massive population displacement, in particular the Darod clan. The USC (mainly of the Hawiye clan) outlawed the Darod in order to regain complete control of the south. Clan fighting is, in general blamed for the famine in Somalia as the rival clans engulfed agricultural areas in the North and on the South Eastern coast, [the key arable and livestock farming areas of Somalia], ‘UN estimated that as many as 300,000 civilians perished and 700,000 were displaced as humanitarian refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia’².

In 1992, after extremely heavy fighting within Mogadishu a ceasefire was brokered between the two leaders allowing some form of humanitarian aid from NGO’s to be sent in to the warring city. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary General submitted a report to the Security Council, titled “The Situation in Somalia; A report by the Secretary General” in February of 1992. His report advised that a technical team should be dispatched to monitor the ceasefire. On 24 April 1992 the Security Council

² James Mayall, *The New Interventionism 1991-1994; United Nations experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. pg 107.

adopted resolution 751, to deploy a force of 50 UN peace observers to monitor the ceasefire and passage of humanitarian aid to the city and its suburbs. The resolution reads, ‘the Security Council strongly supports the Secretary Generals decision to dispatch a technical team to Somalia. The Security Council request that the technical team also establishes a high priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance’³. This first section of UN personal sent to Somalia is widely regarded as the commencement of UNOSOM 1 (United Nations Operations in Somalia). On 28 August 1992 the UN mandate was strengthened and reaffirmed by the adoption of Security Council resolution 775. The new resolution ordered a food airlift programme in order to help the seven main NGO’s within Somalia. (See Appendix 3). Furthermore, the UN mandate stated that there would be a deployment of 3,500 UNOSOM security personal divided into four divisions in order to protect aid distribution centres especially in the South. The main section of the security personal for UNOSOM 1 came from a national Pakistan force of 500 soldiers.



Fig 5. Secretary Boutros-Boutros Ghali in Somalia during UNOSOM 1.

³ www.un.org/docs/sc. Security Council Resolution 751, 24 April 1992. Accessed 12th December 2005.

On 3 December 1992 following a worsening situation in Somalia, 'the Security Council adopted, unanimously, its resolution 794 (1992), authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia"'⁴. The resolution was significant; not only to the situation in Somalia, but for the future of post Cold War peacekeeping, as it was the first to establish operations under Chapter 7 of the UN charter. To aid the Pakistani security force; UNITAF (UN Task Force) was launched and President Bush ordered 28,000 troops to Somalia as the beginning of Operation Restore Hope. The US ambassador to Somalia Robert Oakley was able to bring the two leaders and twelve other warlords to the negotiating table via UN sanctioned peace talks in Addis Ababa. The talks lasted until 13 January 1993 when a US Marine was shot dead. Once again the UN mandate would soon change as UNOSOM 2 was launched.

Background to Conflict in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia:

As with Somalia, the role of the UN, in particular the United States in Yugoslavia can be said to be complicated and it arguably unsuccessful. The cracks in the Yugoslav federation can be traced to the death of Tito in 1980. 'The rigidities of the Cold War international system held Yugoslavia together for a while, but the demise of Communism and the ensuing changes in Eastern Europe released the centrifugal pressures which had been previously contained'⁵.

⁴ www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpkoindex. UN historical background of UNOSOM 1. Accessed 12th December 2005.

⁵ James Mayall, *The New Interventionism 1991-1994; United Nations experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. pg 59.

It was Slovenia, the most Northern Republic of Socialist Yugoslavia which was the first state to press for independence from Yugoslavia. Slovenia was the most economically developed state within the republic and therefore was in the best position to try and ‘break free’. In December of 1990, the Slovenian government held a 1945 style plebiscite, which generated a huge majority for the creation of an independent state. Croatia along with Slovenia, grasped at independence. ‘Croatia’s path to independence was neither as swift nor as smooth as that of Slovenia. Croatia’s population of about 4.7 million people included 600,000 Serbs’⁶.

On 25 June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. The declaration resulted in the Ten Day War, with Slovenia battling against the JNA (Yugoslav National Army). The conflict was brief, with the JNA being forced to pull out due to the activities of Slovenian militia. In July, following an EC arms and aid embargo on Yugoslavia, the JNA launched an offensive against the newly formed Croatian army under President Tudjman. By September, the JNA controlled roughly one third of Croat territory, including; territory in the Krajina. The Carrington Peace Commission in The Hague stated that international borders cannot be changed by force and began to broker conditions for peace. The adoption of Resolution 721 allowed the first UN negotiated ceasefire to take place and authorised peacekeeping forces to maintain the ceasefire of 23 November 1991.

On 15 October, the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence, while the Bosnian-Serbs created their own assembly. On 1 March 1992 a referendum took place in Bosnia which was boycotted by the Serbs but resulted in an

⁶ Edgar O’Ballance, *Civil War in Bosnia 1992-1994*. Hampshire, Macmillan Press 1995. pg 22.

overwhelming majority for the creation of an independent state. The infamous One Day Revolution took place on 2 March with Muslim President, Alija Izetbegovic proclaiming the independence of Bosnia. Still the Serbs rejected the independence as they could not outvote the other ethnic groups of Croats and Muslims. In December 1991, Germany recognised the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, which in turn led Izetbegovic to seek the same result.

On 5 March 1992 a UN special envoy arrives in Sarajevo, headed by Cyrus Vance. With it appearing that Bosnia would be accepted as a sovereign state, the Serb leader in Bosnia, Radovan Karadzic proclaimed the creation of a Serbian Republic in Bosnia Herzegovina (SRBH) on 27 March. Events culminate with both UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia) and the EC recognising the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Cessation of hostilities is no longer abided to and fighting breaks out between Serbs and rival ethnic groups, resulting in the dispatch of UN troops under Resolution 743.



Fig 6. Map of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia including all former republics but particularly focusing on Bosnia, Serbia and the Krajina where most fighting took place.



Fig 7. UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces in the Krajina

Methodology:

The stated aim of the research project was to examine the role of the UN and the US in post Cold War international relations. In particular, focus was placed on the two main conflicts after the collapse of the Soviet Union; these conflicts occurred in Somalia and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The research looked at a number of questions relating to the involvement of the United Nations and the United States. Firstly, the research project established whether American involvement, in Somalia, under a UN mandate, was the wish of the government to cement the U.S. as the hegemonic power, or was it to increase the legitimacy of the UN Security Council (UNSC)? More sinisterly, did the U.S. focus on Somalia as it appeared to be less costly than the emerging conflict in Eastern Europe. The research project also contained an assessment of how the UNSC mandated peacekeeping operations were carried out. As well as what causes led to their apparent failure, specifically the similarities that can be drawn from the conflicts in Somalia and Former Yugoslavia.

The study primarily involved text analysis. This form of analysis presented a wealth of information as well as the most reliable set of sources available for this particular topic.

The study, although only using text analysis, uses many different sources that differ widely in content and style. This produced problems in analysing the content that was not foreseen in the proposal. In particular; UN documents, specifically UNSC resolutions, are written in a format where all allied parties can be catered for. Therefore resolutions can be described as vague and all encompassing. It is

particularly important that analysis of each resolution used in the study must be accurate.

UN sources are particularly easy to find as any UN resolution, document or reports from the Secretary-General can be found at the UN Documentation Centre website. This particular source is a massive aspect of the research project as eighteen Security Council resolutions were adopted between January 1992 and November 1994 in relation to conflict in Somalia, in terms of Former Yugoslavia thirty three resolutions were adopted by the UN between September 1991 and November 1994. Furthermore, this particular source also includes the ability to access minutes from the Military Staffs Committee and personal letters by the Secretary-General to ambassadors or UN delegates.

In both conflicts, the UN led humanitarian operations through five organisations. Further humanitarian aid was provided by two non-governmental organisations that are not linked to the UN; firstly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and secondly Medicine San Frontiers. The study would have particularly benefited from accounts of NGO workers during their time in Somalia or Former Yugoslavia. Unplanned for in the proposal was the lack of text available in particular from NGO's. This, at first posed quite a serious problem to the breadth of information the study would contain. Further research showed that this particular style of discourse could be acquired from news agencies such as the Reuters and Frontline news websites. Specifically, the Frontline news website contained accounts of Somali civilians, members of the UN military command structure and NGO workers (See appendix 4). One resource that produced valuable information upon analysis was the account of

U.S. Army Blackhawk Helicopter Pilot Michael Durant (See Appendix 5) his book, 'In the Company of Hero's,' not only produces an examination into the failures of American military command in Somalia, but also, an insight into the role of NGO workers.

In evaluation of the research process, a few disparities are revealed. Other than the problems discussed previously; concerning the narrow amount of text available from NGO's, which was countered by using alternate resources such as independent news agencies, other problems relate to the planning stages. On evaluating the time plan it appears not enough time was allocated to the analysis of discourse obtained for the study. This was due to the width and breadth of the text available that was otherwise thought to be unavailable. In practice, the research of information required a smaller amount of time than planned for but, was replaced by a longer period of text analysis.

Analysis:

To interpret the role played by the United Nations and the United States, in post Cold War international relations, numerous factors require analysis. This firstly involves examining the nature of governmental administrations in power following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

“New World Order”:

Following his election to power in 1988 George H. W. Bush faced what is described as an uncertain period in history for the United States. It became hard to articulate what the role for the post-cold war United States should be⁷. It was certain that the Bush Administration would face stern challenges at the beginning of their term in office, namely the reunification of Germany along with the developing situation in Iraq. It appeared Bush was determined to establish America's hegemonic status. This can be witnessed in his speech to congress on 11 September 1990;

‘Clearly, no longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted U.N. action against aggression. A new partnership of nations has begun. We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times; our fifth objective - a new world order - can emerge: a new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice,

⁷ F. Cameron, *US foreign policy after the Cold War; Global hegemon or reluctant sheriff*. Second Edition, New York, Routledge. Pg. 14

and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony’⁸.

This paragraph is synonymous with the Bush Administration, and appears to follow the line of discussion stating that Bush was determined to position America as the world’s hegemonic power. Bush was able to secure UN approval to launch ‘Operation Desert Strom,’ but only with narrow backing from the Senate.

The Gulf War was a short conflict, often described as a successful and a somewhat spectacular victory. In his State of the Union address in January 1991 Bush announced, ‘there is a prospect of a new world order in which the principals of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong... a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. A world where the UN is freed from Cold War stalemate, and is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders’⁹. Not only does Bush reiterate his views on America’s place in global affairs, he begins to postulate on a new role for the UN. Analysis of Bush’s early speeches suggests that: he did not want to position the United States as the world’s policeman, but, as the only superpower to speak of, to take some responsibility. Bush’s early rhetoric reverberated of Wilsonian idealism [a similar concept to that of the League of Nations] which in turn, led to the election of Bill Clinton. Clinton targeted the lack of government spending on national affairs with his slogan; “It’s the economy- stupid”. Analysis of the 1992 election shows that Clinton may have

⁸ www.millercenter.virginia.edu/scripps/digilibrary/prezspeeches/ghbush/1990. GEORGE H.W. BUSH Iraqi Aggression in the Persian Gulf September 11, 1990. Accessed 2nd February 2006.

⁹ F. Cameron, *US foreign policy after the Cold War; Global hegemon or reluctant sheriff*. Second Edition, New York, Routledge. Pg. 16.

underestimated the importance of foreign policy. Many political analysts felt Clinton as President, would involve isolationism and America's detraction as the global superpower.

Former Republic of Yugoslavia or Somalia?

'President Bush took the decision after the election. I'm convinced that he took it for honourable reasons. I think his desire was to be seen leaving office on a high note. He had received a great deal of criticism during the campaign on his seeming unresponsiveness to the situations in Bosnia and Somalia. And I think he chose Somalia because it looked like it was going to be the easier of these two major humanitarian crises'¹⁰.

As Deputy Chief of Mission, Walter Clarke confirms: the decision of Bush to commit forces to Somalia is made considerably easier as he is no longer President. It can be argued that Bush involved American forces in the conflict through his personal need to fulfil his foreign policy targets. Although, as Clarke states, (a member of the administration who knows the President very well) he believed this was not the case.

Another reason for American involvement in Somalia rather than Yugoslavia can be based around the complicated political situation in Eastern Europe. Firstly, some states in the Yugoslavian republic still felt an allegiance to former Communist Russia. This could affect military conflict and future European politics, as a conflict in which Russia supports its former allies, possibly against a NATO force could recreate a bi-

¹⁰ Article from: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/clarke.html>
Interview with Walter Clarke. Accessed 20th December 2005.

polar Europe. A view taken by the U.S. Senate and numerous ambassadors including those to the UN, felt that Yugoslavia was a European problem and should be dealt with by European actors. (See Appendix6)

US success in Iraq in 1990 had borne new hope in the ability of UN chapter seven peacekeeping. This success had encouraged the U.S. to continue its role as forged by the Gulf War. As with Operation Desert Storm, America would be able to command a UN mandated mission, which is made more attractive to the U.S. as it automatically eliminates problems of military cohesion between varying states forces. Strategy problems still occurred. Firstly, during UNOSOM 1, the U.S. wanted more than the 3,500 troops suggested by Ghali. Secondly, in UNOSOM 2, a UN force was required to support the failed Olympic Hotel Mission (see appendix 7) but, due to poor communications, a rescue mission was very late coming. Furthermore, the opinion within the U.S. political climate was that peacekeeping missions were very tricky and peacemaking was far straighter forward. It was the opinion of Bush that the American presence in Somalia would be just that, and not the case in Yugoslavia thereby compounding the decision.

What were the problems with UNOSOM and UNPROFOR?

Both conflicts are of a similarly complicated nature and therefore draw comparison in how the UN approached peacekeeping missions in each conflict. A number of aspects must be analysed to evaluate the outcome of each instance.

Firstly, it can be argued that the choice of America to only involve themselves in one of the two crises may have caused the failure of UN peacekeeping missions. The decision to initially only intervene in Somalia included: fighting in a similar climate to Iraq, intervention in third world is easier and it would cost less.

Yugoslavia inherently appears more complex due to the numerous ethnic groups that are intertwined in the region. A strong comparison can be drawn from the clan ideology in Somalia. 'Somalia is normally described as a 'clan society'. The Samaale clans (Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Isaak) are seen as the 'pure' or 'ideal' Somalis. The Sab (Rahanweyn and Digil) along with the Cushitic peoples (Shebele and Gabwing) are a deviation.'¹¹ As in Yugoslavia, there are dominant groups, but during the conflict a multi-clan militia was formed under Aidid. Thus making the political process somewhat more complicated. 'This process was interrupted by the US-UN military intervention, which sharpened the political conflict by introducing high expectations of statehood once again. The UN also tried to freeze the political process whereby the clan-based factions had been fragmenting, by awarding representation to these existing, but inherently unstable fractions.'¹² From analysis, it appears that the U.S-UN forces were unable to ascertain the strength of clan ideology in Somalia. For example within Mogadishu two main clans co-existed, the Darod and the Hawiye clans, which contain their own sub clans. Failure in Somalia and Yugoslavia can be directed at the military analyst's inability to communicate with certain groups such as the SNA and the SRBH respectively. The power they held in the conflict regions, on both occasions, appeared to be underestimated. Furthermore, the UN also was unable

¹¹ www.justiceafrica.org Dr. Alex de Wall 'Class and Power in Stateless Somalia'. August 1996. Accessed 20th Jan 2006.

¹² www.justiceafrica.org Dr. Alex de Wall 'Class and Power in Stateless Somalia'. August 1996. Accessed 20th Jan 2006.

to prevent the ‘divide to rule tactics used by clan leaders and ethnic leaders in the two conflicts.’¹³

Humanitarian intervention in Somalia and Yugoslavia was very prominent, playing an influential role in the conflict. In Somalia, aid organisations had been present since the Ogaden conflict, especially UN organisations such as the UNHCR. The incidence of NGO’s increased following the collapse of the Barre administration and the commencement of UNOSOM 2. [Caused by, the indirect killing of 25 Pakistani UN Peacekeepers at Aidid’s radio station, while supervising the dispatch of humanitarian aid]. ‘MSF has been working in Somalia since 1986. The terrible build up of slaughter and famine that eventually produced the American led and UN backed military intervention followed by a multiplication of clan factions struggling for local power. MSF started appealing for medical and food aid early in 1992.’¹⁴ In both Yugoslavia and Somalia, a major stumbling block for the UN peacekeeping forces was how they should approach the task of supporting the aid organisations. In Somalia, General Thomas Montgomery talked of the strategic dilemma in presenting forces for supporting aid or focusing on fighting the Somali militia’s to regain control. Similar problems are apparent in Yugoslavia but, are dealt with in a slightly different way; with specific UNPROFOR and NATO forces being designated to “bodyguard” the distribution of aid. The presence of aid organisations in some cases, actually resulted in UN casualties such as the instance at the Mogadishu radio station where peacekeepers supporting aid distribution were ambushed and slaughtered. ‘I lost a colleague who was on his first mission with the Red Cross and he was 28 years old

¹³ www.hrw.org. Africa Watch March 7, 1993 Vol. V, Issue No. 2 Somalia. Beyond the Warlords. The Need for a Verdict on Human Rights Abuses. Accessed 13th January 2006.

¹⁴ www.msf.org Bare bone facts about Somalia. An MSF briefing document. Accessed 9th January 2006.

and they'd come to steal money and food, and they got nervous, they thought he -- someone was going to go and tell the Americans, and they pulled a trigger and blew his head off.¹⁵ In Yugoslavia, UN convoys often received heavy mortar fire while escorting aid in the Krajina.



Fig 8. UN aid convoy entering town in Bosnia

Possibly the most significant problem faced by UN-U.S. peacekeeping forces was the nature of the UNSC mandates. It is well documented that in both conflicts especially Yugoslavia, that as resolutions “ratcheted-up” peacekeeping to peace-enforcement; the forces left on the ground could not fulfil their new mandates. Peacekeeping and enforcement differ for reasons such as composition of forces. New mandates as seen in both conflicts require more complex command structures and possible forces with different capabilities. This, as seen in Yugoslavia, involved the removal of one set of troops to deploy another. Along with composition of forces, new mandates may require increased armament which often causes great difficulty. In Yugoslavia, there

¹⁵ Article taken from: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/dale.html>
Interview with Khalil Dale. Accessed 20th December 2005.

are many cases of NATO troops having to paint their tanks camouflage to fit the new peace-enforcing mandate instead of the UN blue helmet peacekeeping mandates.

Ghali in particular in, 'Agenda for Peace' mentions the shortcomings of the UNSC mandates in both conflicts mentioning how UN peacekeepers can be placed in danger by mandates which are incompatible with operational realities¹⁶. An example from Somalia would be the change from Resolution 794 to the next Resolution 814; which called for an increase in size and nature of forces along with the commencement of UNOSOM 2. Concerning Yugoslavia, Resolution 740 called for Serbian leaders to accept the UN peace plan. The next Resolution 749, established the deployment of UNPROFOR. (See Appendix 8)



Fig 9. NATO troops entering Sarajevo.

¹⁶ [www.ubisnet.un.org A/47/277 - S/24111. 17 June 1992 An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. Accessed 13th January 2006.](http://www.ubisnet.un.org/A/47/277 - S/24111. 17 June 1992 <u>An Agenda for Peace</u>, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. Accessed 13th January 2006.)

Conclusion

From the research carried out, the questions that have been laid out in the method of this report have been answered. Firstly it is clear that; following the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Bush was determined to cement the position of the United States as the hegemonic power. What is not as clear, are his reasons for initially choosing to intervene in Somalia, rather than Yugoslavia. The research appears to show that Bush took the decision due a moral commitment as described by Ambassador Oakley. Other sources were more doubtful of his reasons, and a general feeling at the time was that Bush took the easy option, pressuring the UN into mandating the U.S. presence in Somalia.

In evaluation of the peacekeeping operations, both seemed inherently flawed. These flaws are clear from the research, and are apparent in both conflicts. It is clear from the research that Somalia can not be regarded as a military success. On the other hand, Yugoslavia had several of the flaws that resulted in the failure of UNOSOM, but eventually was more successful. The US-UN had to leave Somalia at extreme cost after bargaining for the release of the hostage Michael Durant. (See appendix 5).

In conclusion, both conflicts later affected the behaviour of the UN and how willing it was to become involved in such conflicts. Furthermore, the problems that caused the difficulties in the two conflicts affected US foreign policy. This can be seen in the way they dealt with Haiti and also the lack of US-UN involvement in the genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994.

Bibliography

Internet Sources

www.cdiis.org (Centre for Defence and International Security Studies) Accessed 22nd December 2005
www.cds-kd.org Accessed 22nd December 2005

www.empereur.com/somaliaus.html Article; Why did the Bush Administration Decided to Intervene in Somalia? Accessed 20th December 2005

www.fao.org Accessed 13th January 2006

www.geocites.com/pentagon Background information on General Mohamed Farah Aidid. Accessed 20th January 2006

www.hrw.org Accessed 13th January 2006

www.hwproject.tufts.edu/ (Humanitarian and War Project) Article; The United Nations and Civil Wars. Edited Thomas G. Weiss. Accessed 21st December 2005

www.icrc.org Accessed 13th January 2006

www.jcs.mil Accessed 9th January 2006

www.justiceafrica.org Article; Dr. Alex de Wall 'Class and Power in Stateless Somalia'. August 1996. Accessed 20th Jan 2006.

www.msf.org. Accessed 9th January 2006.

www.millercentre.virginia.edu/scripps/digilibrary/prezspeeches/ghbush/1990. Accessed 2nd February 2006

www.nato.int Accessed 9th January 2006

www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm Accessed 9th January 2006

www.ndu.edu/inss Article; Peace Operations in Somalia. Authors David Bentley and Robert Oakley. Accessed 22nd December 2005

www.pbs.org/frontline/ambushinmogadishu.html

www.psywarrior.com/somalia. Article; Psychological Operations in Operation Restore Hope. Accessed 20th December 2005

www.un.org Accessed 12th December 2005

www.un.org/peace Accessed 12th December 2005

www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpkoindex Accessed 12th December 2005

www.un.org/documents/ Accessed 12th December 2005

www.unbisnet Accessed 12th December 2005;

- A/47/277 - S/24111. 17 June 1992 **An Agenda for Peace**, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. Accessed 13th January 2006.
- S/26393 11th March 1992, Report of the Secretary-General. The Situation In Somalia. Accessed 13th January 2006.

www.unhcr.org Accessed 13th January 2006

www.unicef.org Accessed 13th January 2006

www.wfp.org/english Accessed 13th January 2006

www.who.int Accessed 13th January 2006

UN Resolutions and Documents

During the research project the UN Documentation Centre website (www.un.org/documents) in order to access the following UNSC resolutions in relation to Former Yugoslavia and Somalia. The SC Resolutions range from 713-959. An example can be seen in Appendix 8.

Non-Internet Sources

F. Cameron, *US foreign policy after the Cold War; Global hegemon or reluctant sheriff*. Second Edition, New York, Routledge

Richard Caplan, *Post-Mortem on UNPROFOR*. London, Brassey's for Centre of Defence Studies 1996.

Michael J. Durant, Edited by Steven Hartov. *In the Company of Hero's*. England, Bantam Press 2003.

James Gow, James D.D. Smith, *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping; European Security and the Yugoslav Wars*. London, Brassey's for the Centre of Defence Studies 1992.

Mike Horan, *Eyes Over Mogadishu*. USA, Xlibris 2003.

James Mayall, *The New Interventionism 1991-1994; United Nations experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History*. Fifth Edition. New York, Pearson Longman 2005.

Edgar O'Ballance, *Civil War in Bosnia 1992-1994*. Hampshire, Macmillan Press 1995.

Robert G. Patman, *Securing Somalia; A comparison of US and Australian Peacekeeping during the UNITAF operation*. Institutt For Forsvarsstudier. IFSInfo 6/1997.

Knut O. Sundnes, *Peacekeeping; War With other Means? A UN Medical support in a Balkan sideshow*. Institutt For Forsvarsstudier. IFSInfo 4/1996.

Appendix

1. The national flag (Fig 1.) is a five pointed star, with each point representing one of the centres of Somali population. Three remained outside the republic; the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, the north-eastern province of Kenya (up to the Tana River) and Djibouti on its north western border. These areas were of dispute during several boarder wars and most notably Somalia and Ethiopia went to war over Ogaden.
2. Aidid, born in 1934, began his military career in Italy under the tutelage of the right wing security agencies in order to support an Italian assault on former colony Ethiopia. During the era of co-operation with the Soviet Union Aidid was trained in Moscow by the KGB, about military strategy and intelligence techniques. He was also leader of the Habr Gidr sub clan (itself part of the larger Hawiye clan). Hussein Mohamed Farah, son of Aidid, migrated to the U.S. when he was 14 years old. He stayed 16 years in the nation and became a naturalized citizen, and later a U.S. Marine. Two days after his father's death, the Habr Gidr clan selected him to become the new president of Aidid's self-proclaimed republic. Hussein Mohammed Farah is seen by the West as a chance of improvement for the relationships between them and Somalia.

When asked about his Marine days, he replied: "Once a Marine, always a Marine whether dead or alive."

3. There were seven main aid organisations that present in both Former Yugoslavia and Somalia. These were UNICEF, WFP, WHO, FAO, UNHCR, MSF and the ICRC. This last organisation was the most prominent in both conflicts. In one case an International Committee of the Red Cross worker was the main negotiate for the release of American pilot Michael Durant.
4. PBS Frontline News Agency provided interview with Admiral Adam Jonathan Howe, Colonel Dr. Kenneth Allard, UN Deputy Commander in Somalia General Thomas Montgomery, UNITAF Commander General Anthony Zinni, as well as accounts of U.S. Rangers of varying rank. Other accounts include U.S. politicians such as the Deputy Chief of mission to the U.S. Embassy Walter Clarke, ICRC workers and even officers in the SNA (Somali National Alliance) controlled by General Aidid.
5. Michael Durant, CW4 Blackhawk helicopter Master Aviator in the 160th SOAR (Nightstalkers). He participated in operations in Vietnam, Panama, Iraq and Somalia. During a routine "hostage pick up mission" during Operation Restore Hope, his helicopter Chawk Super 64 was shot down. His story is documented in the book 'In the Company of Hero's'. This source was important in obtaining an insight into American peacekeeping on the ground and the role of ICRC workers.




Fig 10. Time Magazine receive interview with Michael Durant while in captivity.

6. European actors such as the EC (later the EU) and the CSCE were originally very involved in the Yugoslav conflict in order to increase the legitimacy of a highly integrated European Community/ Union. Later NATO takes over from these organisations.
7. The Olympic Hotel mission was an attempt indirectly to capture General Aidid. The U.S. military using a combined ground force of Rangers and Delta Force, along with the 160th SOAR to capture SNA officers and Aidid if possible. The details of the mission are well documented in Mark Bowden's book 'Black Hawk Down'.
8. Example of a UNSC Resolution that has an increased mandate. The resolution (837) follows the ambush of Pakistani soldiers at a radio station by General Aidid's militia:



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/837 (1993)
6 June 1993

RESOLUTION 837 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3229th meeting,
on 6 June 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 and 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992,

Gravely alarmed at the premeditated armed attacks launched by forces apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA) against the personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) on 5 June 1993,

Strongly condemning such actions, which directly undermine international efforts aimed at the restoration of peace and normalcy in Somalia,

Expressing outrage at the loss of life as a result of these criminal attacks,

Reaffirming its commitment to assist the people of Somalia in re-establishing conditions of normal life,

Stressing that the international community is involved in Somalia in order to help the people of Somalia who have suffered untold miseries due to years of civil strife in that country,

Acknowledging the fundamental importance of completing the comprehensive and effective programme for disarming all Somali parties, including movements and factions,

Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

93-33232 (E) 060693

060693

/...

Condemning strongly the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the USC/SNA, to incite attacks against United Nations personnel,

Recalling the statement made by its President on 31 March 1993 (S/25493) concerning the safety of United Nations forces and personnel deployed in conditions of strife and committed to consider promptly measures appropriate to the particular circumstances to ensure that persons responsible for attacks and other acts of violence against United Nations forces and personnel are held to account for their actions,

Taking note of the information provided to the Council by the Secretary-General on 6 June 1993,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Strongly condemns the unprovoked armed attacks against the personnel of UNOSOM II on 5 June 1993, which appear to have been part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate as provided for in resolution 814 (1993);

2. Expresses its condolences to the Government and people of Pakistan and the families of the UNOSOM II personnel who have lost their lives;

3. Re-emphasizes the crucial importance of the early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions, in accordance with paragraphs 56-69 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993 (S/25354), and of neutralizing radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II;

4. Demands once again that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament (S/25168, annex III);

5. Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks referred to in paragraph 1 above, including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;

6. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to inquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved;

7. Encourages the rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II contingents to meet the full requirements of 28,000 men, all ranks, as well as

/...

equipment, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report of 3 March 1993 (S/25354);

8. Urges Member States to contribute, on an emergency basis, military support and transportation, including armoured personnel carriers, tanks and attack helicopters, to provide UNOSOM II the capability appropriately to confront and deter armed attacks directed against it in the accomplishment of its mandate;

9. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution, if possible within seven days from the date of its adoption;

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Paths of Research in Political Science

Research Project

UN Peacekeeping operations in Somalia and the Former republic of Yugoslavia: A qualitative text analysis of how American involvement was transformed under a UN mandate from peacekeeping, to war fighting, in both Somalia and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

Candidate: 200407047