

Klein, Sartre and Imagination in the Films of Ingmar Bergman

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
Dan Williams



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1

The Imagination: Bergman, Klein and Sartre

And every picture – every one of my pictures are dreams.

– Ingmar Bergman¹

In *Fanny and Alexander* (1982–1983), Helena Ekdahl reacts with dismay to her daughter-in-law's suggestion that they should both act in August Strindberg's *A Dream Play*:

Emilie Ekdahl: I'd like you to read a new play by August Strindberg.

Helena Ekdahl: That nasty misogynist!

Here, Ingmar Bergman distances himself from Strindberg, one of his great inspirations. Helena's statement retains its force as a warning from Bergman that Strindberg was flawed in his attitude towards women. Yet, moments later, as *Fanny and Alexander* concludes, Helena reads to her son the following lines:

Everything can happen. Everything is possible and probable. Time and space do not exist. On a flimsy framework of reality the imagination spins and weaves new patterns. (August Strindberg)²

The final words demonstrate that Bergman extracted core ideas from Strindberg without slavishly following his representation of gender. The final lines are significant, not just as a conclusion to this film but as an expression of Bergman's belief in the ultimate value of imagination throughout his work.

In *Fanny and Alexander* imagination is a unique and powerful force. Intermittently verisimilitude is punctured by Alexander's visions of his dead father as a ghost. When Isak rescues the children from the bishop,

an apparently magical agency is introduced, which allows the children to be momentarily in two places at the same time, and this agency develops as Alexander meets the mysterious Ishmael. This magical agency may or may not have a metaphysical cause, but appears to be directly related to Alexander's capacity for seeing beyond the immediately perceptible world. Thus, *Fanny and Alexander* demonstrates how imagination is not only an abiding concept for Bergman but also how he can utilise this as a structural element with his narratives. Then, near the end, with the reappearance of the bishop, his stepfather, the imagination is presented as a haunting power, a disturbing image that reveals Bergman's complex approach to the imagination.

Researching this book, I set out to explore Bergman's belief in the power of imagination, asking initially whether he holds a belief akin to the sentiment of the Strindberg quotation in *Fanny and Alexander*. Although Strindberg is a key influence, it became clear to me that Bergman's work and ideas suggest a wide range of possible interpretations. Although the library of Bergman appreciation, research and criticism already revolves around the power of his imagination as an auteur, exploration of Bergman's ideas on imagination, in relation to other artists and thinkers, emerged as a subject for further investigation. As a consequence, I am concerned not only to explore Bergman's ideas in relation to philosophy and psychoanalytic theory but also to focus more specifically on the way his films include elements that put particular stress on the process of imagining. The close analysis of films in this



Figure 1.1 *Fanny and Alexander*, Cinematograph/Svenska Filminstitutet/Sveriges Television 1/Sandrews/Gaumont/Personafilm/Tobis Film, Palisades Tartan Video. At the end of the film, Alexander is still gripped by his imagination

book, will attend to the structural significance of sections that represent metaphysics, dreams, nightmares and visions. It will also mean considering the way cinematic language and narrative orchestration are used at other points to signify a world beyond, which is not transparently observable to all the characters of the diegesis even though it may be accessed by an individual character such as Alexander. A good example of *mise-en-scène* used to this effect is the appearance of death as a figure for the knight in *The Seventh Seal* (1956).

Also central to Bergman's focus on imagination is the creative use of off-screen elements, which cannot be directly observed by character or viewer, ranging from creative use of off-screen cues to more infamous examples such as the miracle at the end of *The Virgin Spring* (1960). This episode, discussed as part of Chapter 5, may signify imagination or a metaphysical intervention by God, an ambiguity to which I will return. Bergman's need to step beyond a reality strictly dependent on observation must also recognise the significance of memory, a mental faculty that is closely associated and can overlap with imagination. Thus, I include flashbacks alongside other elements that divert us from a linear narrative anchored in observation of the present. This is particularly apparent in, for instance, Bergman's use of a form of imaginative flashback in *Wild Strawberries* (1957), in which the main character enters his own memory as an observer. Simple cause and effect linear narratives are significantly diverted or interrupted at key moments in Bergman's work, thus signifying his focus on the imagination. Because he also maintains narrative fluency, these disruptions appear less experimental than avant-garde film-making, but the appeal to imagination is very pervasive, ranging from flashbacks that represent character reflections to the way off-screen space is used to make the audience think beyond that which is immediately given.

The attention to sequences or elements foregrounding imagination will be tied in with a wider enquiry. A scholar who has already written about imagination in Bergman's work in relation to a broader context is Marilyn Johns Blackwell, who focuses in the final chapter of her book, on a number of sequences from films, including *Wild Strawberries* and *The Seventh Seal*, which represent characters' imagining. In an inspiring and instructive way, Johns Blackwell considers how these sequences contribute to the representation of gender.³ For my analysis, it is equally important to recognise how Bergman relates sequences concerned with his characters' imagining to the rest of the narrative in which they are situated. It is necessary to investigate Bergman's approach to imagination at the level of meaning because it is often figured as a significant

value in his work. That is not to say imagination is automatically seen as beneficent. After all, the figure of death in *The Seventh Seal*, and the final appearance of the bishop in *Fanny and Alexander* introduce Manichean division into the imaginary realm. Like the miracle in *The Virgin Spring*, these phenomena appear to be ambiguously placed on the borderline of metaphysics and imagination, carrying connotations of a power beyond human agency. However, I want to explore the idea that for Bergman the imagination does ultimately carry potential for redemption in humanist terms. Here we enter the debates about Bergman as a philosophical director and his relationship to religion. While there is an enormous range of intellectuals and artists who champion the power of the imagination, this book focuses on a specific comparison between Bergman and the work of the psychoanalyst Melanie Klein and the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, who are both humanistic thinkers. The comparison of Bergman's films with ideas from these thinkers is intended as an exploratory association and an original contribution to understanding how film theory can approach his work, 68 years after his film career was launched with the script of *Frenzy* (1944).

In 1985, subsequent to completion of *Fanny and Alexander*, Bergman declared that this was his last film.⁴ The retrospective decision to conclude his career with a film partly inspired by his own childhood testifies to Bergman's understanding of himself as a director dealing with personal material. By this stage in his career the discipline of film studies had fully emerged in higher education. The evolution of the subject involved enormous appreciation of the work of directors due partly to the publication of *Cahiers du Cinéma*, a significant agent in the development of Bergman's international reputation. However, the development of film studies as an academic discipline also gave rise to a reaction against the auteur theory through the emergence of semiotics, structuralism and post-structuralism, as theories applied to cinema. The questioning of authorship itself was already apparent in the 1960s, and coincided with a relative decline in Bergman's reputation as a groundbreaking director. And yet, critical work on Bergman has rarely strayed away from an emphasis on his authorship. Indeed, as Bergman made various returns to film-making after his self-declared retirement, including *Saraband* (2003), authorship had recovered some of its credibility in the discipline, and this is reflected in more recent work on Bergman. For example, the collection of essays *Ingmar Bergman Revisited*, published in 2008, introduced many new ideas into Bergman research, but did not seek to challenge the very concept of authorship. Instead, this was deployed in a wide-ranging and discursive fashion across the essays.⁵

In this introductory chapter I am concerned to set out general points that provide the context for specific analyses of Klein, Sartre and individual Bergman films. I will begin by showing how three auteurist responses to Bergman's work, from the 1950s onwards, challenge a view of Bergman restricted to a thematic world view full of angst and metaphysics. Instead, we find that critics as diverse as Jean-Luc Godard, Peter Cowie and Thomas Elsaesser move beyond this stereotype to highlight Bergman's cinematic qualities, and indicate an interest in relating his films to a broader context. This context varies, including references to other film-makers, culture in general, philosophy and psychology. These responses are admittedly not indicative of research on Bergman's relationship to Swedish and Scandinavian culture, but do give an indication of the way Bergman relates to a more generalised European intellectual context. Following consideration of points from these critics, I will provide an introductory overview of the careers of Klein, Sartre and Bergman to convey the correspondences and differences between them. After giving overviews of their work I will sketch in a political and intellectual context that suggests a degree of convergence in their ideas about society and culture, which I describe as 'humanistic'. I will go on to consider how the work of Jacques Lacan, in particular, but also structuralism and post-structuralism, in general, involved a strong turn away from the humanistic philosophy of imagination found across the work of Klein, Sartre and Bergman. In order to sharpen this contrast I will briefly resume the work of two critics of 'the structuralist turn', Arthur Marwick, and José Guilherme Merquior.

In Chapter 2 I will concentrate on the development of Klein's ideas, with some further application to a Bergman work that has been considered of great interest for psychoanalysis and psychology: *Wild Strawberries*. The following chapter will concentrate on Sartre and conclude with analysis of a Bergman film that shows a strong awareness of the tension between the individual and external reality: *The Seventh Seal*. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are devoted to extended analysis of three Bergman films. The aim here is to explore the relevance of Kleinian and Sartrean ideas whilst focusing more intensively on film style and narrative form.

Culture, existentialism and psychoanalysis in Bergman criticism

Bergman criticism has rarely focused extensively on social and political factors, but a need to relate his work to ideas of culture, history, psychology and philosophy is frequently apparent. No one, to my knowledge,

has explored more than a passing affinity between Bergman's and Klein's work. Nevertheless, there is a significant history of psychoanalytical responses to Bergman's work including elements in Robin Wood's book in 1969, a key auteurist reading of the director's films, and Frank Gado's Freudian study of the director's entire filmic output.⁶ Existentialism, like psychoanalysis, figures frequently as a reference in Bergman's reception, but sustained book-length application of this theory is relatively uncommon. Examples of the discussion of existentialist ideas in relation to Bergman include Birgitta Steene's analysis of *The Seventh Seal*, and Jesse Kalin's argument for the significance of Martin Heidegger (as opposed to Sartre) in understanding selected Bergman films.⁷ Passing references to Sartre can be found across writing about Bergman, including, for instance, his interviews, but this is frequently a shorthand for evoking an idea of Bergman's world view rather than a sustained analysis of the applicability of Sartre's ideas. Nevertheless, the concern to reference society and culture found in the work of critics and theorists focused on Bergman's authorship suggests the potential for further analysis of cultural influences, including existentialism and psychoanalysis. Three examples, the criticism of Godard, Cowie and Elsaesser, suggest the potential of placing Bergman in a broader cultural context that should include reference to existentialism and psychoanalysis.

Having raised searching questions about Swedish society in his early works of the 1940s, Bergman's reputation became significantly more internationalised in the 1950s and elicited a passionate following amongst film critics. In 1958 Godard writes more of a celebration of Bergman's films rather than an analysis. For Godard, *Summer with Monika* (1953) is an inspiration for modern film-making, but he also writes enthusiastically about the range of the director's output.⁸ One can see why Godard enthuses about the moment in *Summer with Monika* when the Harriet Andersson character addresses the audience directly. As Godard points out, here is a disruption of the diegesis, an innovation used subsequently by the French New Wave directors, including Godard himself. The latter celebrates the spontaneity and lack of formula in Bergman's work so that he suggests the audience may love one film and be confused by the next. Godard loves the way Bergman transforms his narratives with flashbacks, speaking of 'l'importance primordiale du « flashback »'.⁹ For Godard, Bergman's work demonstrates improvisation in stunning contrast to the more studied approach of other admirable auteurs. Godard emphasises Bergman's authorship as a cineaste, writer and dramatist, saying that

as an 'homme de théâtre', Bergman adapts the work of others, but as an 'homme de cinéma, il entend rester seul maître à bord... Bergman crée *ex nihilo* aventures et personnages'.¹⁰

There is recognition of Bergman's originality in relation to tradition – the way in which he has adapted many great plays of Scandinavian literature by such artists as Henrik Ibsen and Strindberg – and in relation to other contemporary directors. Godard argues that Bergman's work is distinguished from other directors, including Robert Bresson and Luchino Visconti, because he uses a personal starting point.¹¹ Although, the method of evaluating a director's work, through comparison with other film directors, is employed here rhetorically, it is clear that Bergman's style is favoured by Godard, because it is personal and bears comparison with the ideas of existentialism. That is, we have the idea of creativity as a very spontaneous form of invention. For Sartre, as we shall see, the self is confronted by nothingness. In Bergman's case the laws of the traditional forms are, according to Godard, subverted through pure invention. Godard thinks that Bergman reduces traditional frameworks to nothing before he reworks their elements. Godard conveys this approach using the rhetoric of modernism and existentialism, and the love of art that is judged to be throwing away the rule book. The individualistic, existential ethos comes through further, as Godard emphasises Bergman's dedication to an individual reality: 'On est toujours seul; sur le plateau comme devant la page blanche. Et pour Bergman, être seul, c'est poser des questions'.¹²

For Godard, Bergman's films are a creative transformation of preceding tradition. Godard refers to *Summer Interlude* (1951) and the way in which the flashback structure opens up a narrative that has a mythical dimension and a modernist sense of time. He also refers to a moment in this film when he says that through just one look in the mirror Maj-Britt Nilsson is transported: 'comme Orphée et Lancelot à la poursuite du paradis perdu et du temps retrouvé'.¹³ Bergman, according to Godard, creatively draws on a range of artistic influences (Guy de Maupassant, Germaine Dulac and Man Ray are cited) that are not restricted to his preoccupation with Scandinavian drama.¹⁴ Thus, Godard's response to Bergman evokes existentialism and modernism, in his celebration of a spontaneous transcendence of existing norms.

Peter Cowie is a film critic who championed Bergman's work in Britain in the 1960s. In 2004 Cowie returns to Bergman's significance in relation to radical developments in film culture. Cowie identifies Bergman as the key cutting-edge director of the 1950s. 'Bergman excited the

imagination of critics, audiences and film-makers alike, more than any director of the fifties...'15 Cowie notes how Bergman's films were represented by influential commentators:

French critics such as Jean Béranger and Jacques Siclier wrote about Bergman tapping into the fifties *Zeitgeist*, and how the dread of nuclear Armageddon explained the fervour with which *The Seventh Seal* was embraced.¹⁶

Cowie, however, focuses on specific qualities of Bergman's work such as the use of flashbacks and the complexity with which women were represented.¹⁷ He argues that these elements set the Swedish director apart from his contemporaries just as much as his vision of society. Nevertheless, Cowie still retains a discursive sense of Bergman's engagement with society. He refers to Bergman's range of subjects in this period, which significantly move us away from the stereotype of an angst-ridden auteur behind *The Seventh Seal*. As Cowie indicates, the stereotype was crucial in developing Bergman's international reputation, and therefore may have led some audiences to be unaware of his other work. Cowie sidesteps a narrow version of auteur theory in other ways, highlighting the talented team that Bergman worked with through the 1950s; the way the films changed in the 1960s with Sven Nykvist taking over from Gunnar Fischer as cinematographer; and through a comparison with Federico Fellini's interest in showmanship, demonstrates shared traits with more mainstream entertainment cinema.¹⁸

For Cowie, Bergman's film-making represented a new type of psychological cinema, with which other directors such as Michelangelo Antonioni also became associated. Cowie is struck, in particular, by the fact that Bergman included in his films questions and themes that had previously been explored in the context of other art forms. Cowie argues that:

Bergman broached his metaphysical themes with disarming skill, daring to ask fundamental questions – both for himself and of his audience – that one associated more readily with poets and novelists, or painters such as Rembrandt and Goya.¹⁹

This captures one of the reasons why interest in Bergman's work has endured. Its status as high culture can also be read as a popularisation of high culture – part of the trend involved in claiming that popular works

could reach the level of traditional masterpieces, which emerged forcefully in 1960s culture.

Cowie suggests that the appeal of uncertainty in the work of various film directors in the 1960s was a cultural phenomenon, with 'anxiety' a key topic: 'Uncertainty replaced the doughty dedication to post-war recovery and emancipation'.²⁰ This extends the idea of ambiguity as a formal quality of the works (explained in David Bordwell's account of art cinema),²¹ to give a sense of Bergman's work engaging with contemporary society. The influence of existentialism and psychoanalysis accords with his questioning sensibility. Although this sense of uncertainty was combined with radical political commitment in the case of directors such as Pier Paolo Pasolini, Bernardo Bertolucci and Andrzej Wajda, it also had an effect on Bergman and was vital in his reception. Bergman, like other prominent directors of the 1950s and 1960s, such as Antonioni, was seen as representing alienation.²²

Thomas Elsaesser is more immersed in post-1960s critical theory than Cowie, but his discussion of Bergman still retains elements of auteur theory, the significance of a modernist aesthetic and film history. Two articles by Elsaesser introduce some of the key issues in the director's films, suggest the need to re-evaluate Bergman's work and point ultimately to the relevance of a philosophical understanding.²³ Elsaesser refers to Bergman's book *Images* and as a response to this notes some of the key aspects of Bergman's style. Elsaesser observes that Bergman himself is not so revealing about his style, but does disclose certain points such as his preference for black and white over colour. Elsaesser is disappointed that *Images* does not include discussion from Bergman about camera-work and a significant element of film style which Elsaesser highlights: namely the way Bergman creates 'complex fluid action spaces'. Elsaesser also wanted more from Bergman's book on the use of the close-up in his work and the soundtrack.²⁴

Elsaesser makes it clear that interpreting Bergman has moved on from exclusive concern with the director's existential and religious themes, and also the theme found elsewhere in art cinema: the opposition between reality and illusion. Bergman achieved critical acclaim and acquired funding from Svensk with films dominated by such themes. However, Elsaesser speculates that it may be that Bergman's international reputation also developed because his films were known for liberal, explicit and sometimes shocking treatment of contemporary life.²⁵ As Elsaesser notes, our reading of Bergman is determined by numerous contextual factors, and should be extracted from various rigid forms of category and stereotype, including the stereotype of Bergman as the voice of

Nordic gloom, and Bergman as a national monument. These ideas have partly arisen, it is argued, due to the economics of world cinema and the need to use authorship and an idea of national cinema to achieve a niche in the market.²⁶

Elsaesser discusses the need to place the director in a context, including his relation to a form of introspective awareness revealed through external cues. He observes the dialectic between inner and outer reality, and discusses how this is introduced in *Persona* (1966). At the beginning of this film Elisabet Vogler loses her power of speech on the stage. She turns from looking at the theatre audience to looking in the direction of the camera and thus in effect, as Elsaesser points out, the film audience. Bergman condenses the relationship between cinema and theatre into a silent movement by the character, using this ultimately to represent a psychic movement from outer world to 'an inner revelation of being', 'emotional reality'.²⁷ The film shows that her public self, like her stage self, is related to an inner self. This inner self, like the backstage in a theatre, is hidden from the audience. As Elsaesser puts it, 'just as the business that habitually goes on backstage in a theatre is necessary in order to produce the "show", so the chaos of one's inner self may well be the necessary precondition of one's active "social" life...'²⁸ Elsaesser argues that Bergman uses the backstage metaphor for the relationship between internal reality and social reality in other films, such as *Smiles of a Summer Night* (1955) and *Sawdust and Tinsel* (1953). For Elsaesser, Bergman demonstrates how cinema can explore the phenomena of psychic reality, which are not amenable to perception or language.²⁹ Of course, both perception and words are crucial to *Persona*, but more fundamental is the focus on the dialectical movement between inner and outer reality. Thus, despite qualifications to the image of Bergman as an auteur defined by existential and psychological themes, Elsaesser's account of Bergman suggests that within his work the core concern is of a philosophical/psychological nature, and seems to touch on the concerns of existentialism and psychoanalysis. Indeed, the potency of the scene from *Persona* leads Elsaesser to argue that Bergman's exploration of psychic reality can, at key points, reach beyond the theories of psychology and psychoanalysis:

In his best moments, Bergman manages to render palpable a sense of indeterminacy such as it has rarely existed in the cinema since the great silent European cinema of the 1920s (the films of Murnau, Lang, Dryer): not psychological, nor psychoanalytical, but 'phenomenal'.³⁰

Although Godard, Cowie and Elsaesser are concerned with Bergman's cinematic qualities, and they do not refer directly to existential philosophy or psychoanalytic theory, their observations suggest that these fields remain critical alongside an awareness of the diversity of cultural influences on Bergman's films. As Elsaesser's observations convey, Bergman's interest in silent cinema and theatre must be included in our appreciation of his ability to represent psychic depth, and the dialectic between inner and outer worlds. A comparison with Klein and Sartre offers the potential of bringing together diverse ideas about existential and psychoanalytical elements in Bergman's work. In the course of this study I will note ways in which any simple idea of Bergman as the locus of all meanings in his films is qualified, including the way we must take account of his collaborators. However, I accept that we cannot dispense with a focus on Bergman as the organising centre of his work. Contrasting and comparing Bergman's output with the work of Klein and Sartre, I will investigate and explore whether these three figures converge in their ideas about imagination.

The central focus on the imagination is not intended as a return to the romanticist mythology of the artist as creative genius. On the contrary, Klein, Sartre and Bergman are firmly situated within a modernity which insists that the relationship between the artist and external forces is a critical issue and that both sides of this dichotomy must be given weight. If we take Bergman as an example of this it is clear that, at certain times in his life, he holds the opinion that art must be subjected to serious questioning. This is apparent in different Bergman interviews including, for instance, his discussion of *Persona*. Bergman mocks his own character's argument that art can be therapeutic and suggests that art is marginal in its political effect and that artists are elevated, too frequently, by their audience. However, his analysis of his own work also involves contradictory views, which prevent us seeing his viewpoint as straightforward or cynical. He seems to say that it is up to the audience to decide about therapeutic or other values in the work. When asked if it is 'legitimate' for an audience to use art in this way Bergman replies, 'if they can, it's marvellous'.³¹

Klein

Writing of Klein, Julia Kristeva observes, 'beneath the apparent self-assurance of this woman, who became the leader of a school of thought, lay an exceptionally close relationship with anxiety, both in other people

and herself'.³² Kristeva goes on to make a comparison between Klein and the philosopher Hannah Arendt:

both of whom emerged from secular Jewish worlds, appropriated Christian philosophy, Enlightenment humanism, and contemporary science in a uniquely critical and highly personal way.³³

Here are two reasons to look at Klein's work in a broader context: her personal understanding of anxiety and her absorption of perspectives from philosophy and science. Fundamental to her place in this book is the idea that Klein provides an alternative to other ideas because of the significance she attaches to imagination. This, however, must be clarified at the outset. Klein puts emphasis on the presence of something like imagination in the infant from birth, but she calls this 'phantasy'. *The New Kleinian Dictionary* begins the definition of unconscious phantasy by stating that 'unconscious phantasies underlie every mental process and accompany all mental activity'.³⁴ The term 'phantasy' has created confusion and given rise to different interpretations. James Strachey, a key early explainer of psychoanalytic theory, is said to give us 'the definitive exposition' of this concept, differentiating 'fantasy', meaning 'caprice, whim, and fanciful invention', from 'phantasy' meaning 'imagination, visionary notion'.³⁵ However, as the authors of *The New Kleinian Dictionary* note, many analysts, let alone readers, have equated phantasy with fantasy, as the latter is defined by Strachey.

Klein was born in 1882 in Vienna.³⁶ Janet Sayers explains that Klein's personal life was event filled and traumatic. Her sister Sidonie died when she was young. Later, in her teenage years, her father died, and this was followed by the loss of her beloved brother Emmanuel, an art student who encouraged her to write fiction.³⁷ Klein started analysis with Sándor Ferenczi in 1912, and his interest in child analysis led her to analyse her own son.³⁸ Sayers argues that Klein's analysis of her own son and her ensuing work with children 'shifted psychoanalysis from Freud's instinct-based approach to one that was more alert to children's inner images of the relations between others and themselves'.³⁹

Klein became separated from her husband after World War I, another personal factor informing her understanding of human problems. Moving to Berlin in the 1920s, she developed her ideas on psychoanalysis alongside other pioneers of the discipline and amidst an increasingly forceful clash between the ideologies of communism and fascism. In her first book, *The Psychoanalysis of Children*, of 1932, her analysis of her son is included alongside other case studies and theory, although he is given

a different name. After this, when she was living in London, her reputation as an analyst developed through the 1930s. However, she experienced further emotional loss again with rejection from a daughter and the loss of a son through an accident on a mountaineering holiday.⁴⁰ The importance of Klein's personal life to her work is made clear by the fact that she followed her experience of loss by working on a talk for a meeting in Lucerne on the subject of depression.⁴¹

To analyse one's own child would clearly be controversial today. Klein's emphasis on analysing children shocked contemporaries in the psychoanalytical movement. A very important theoretical divergence had already emerged in the 1920s between her approach and that of Anna Freud. This conflict of ideas split the psychoanalytical movement, leading to a major debate between the followers of both women in the 1940s. Sayers summarises, 'She [Klein] rejected Anna Freud's claim that children are too closely involved with their parents to entertain phantasies about them'.⁴² Sayers goes on to account for Klein's divergence from Anna Freud by showing that Klein felt that analysis had to engage with, and liberate, children from negative phantasies internalised prior to the Oedipus complex:

Freeing children from inhibition accordingly depends on exposing and reducing the harshness of these figures rather than strengthening them, as Anna Freud advocated, in seeking to reinforce the child's superego.⁴³

Klein's central ideas of the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position developed from her earlier work. She described on the basis of clinical examples the way in which, prior to the Oedipal phase, the child transfers love and hate onto the parental figure, re-internalises these emotions in phantasy and then projects these phantasies outward again. This process describes how the child from the beginning of its life is torn between oscillating states of love and hate. The instinctive pull of the child towards that which it deems as good is challenged by fear of attack and physical invasion. For Klein, this state begins with the mother's breast as an object that may be imagined as good or bad. It can thus be related to feeding, but is not strictly determined by this because of the over determination played by the child's projection of meaning onto this content. Klein first introduced the paranoid-schizoid position formally as a concept in 1946, using it to bring together observations from her work up to this point. In 1946 she summarises the key idea underlying this position as follows: 'The vital need to deal with

anxiety forces the early ego to develop fundamental mechanisms and defences'.⁴⁴ This involves the child categorising thoughts and feelings in a Manichean dichotomy and resorting to extreme patterns such as assumed omnipotence or debilitating fear. *The New Dictionary of Kleinian Thought* provides a summary of Klein's key concept as follows:

paranoid-schizoid mental states play an important part throughout life. The chief characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position is the splitting of both self and object into good and bad, with at first little or no integration between them.⁴⁵

This paranoid-schizoid position is, according to Klein, necessary, but also must be overcome or transcended. The depressive phase is used by Klein to discuss how the child moves beyond the paranoid-schizoid. Again, this occurs very early in an individual's life, beginning in the first year, but continues to reappear at different points. In effect, for Klein, it is a continual possibility of mental life. It is through the depressive position, and a transcendence of it, that Klein provides a narrative of integration and redemption based on a primitive concept of compassion. I will look at examples from Klein's writing about this concept in Chapter 2, and its relevance to cultural criticism and film analysis, but here let us note again a contemporary summary of the 'depressive position', which conveys a key element of Klein's concept:

If the confluence of loved and hated figures can be borne, anxiety begins to centre on the welfare and survival of the other as a whole object, eventually giving rise to remorseful guilt and poignant sadness, linked to deepening of love.⁴⁶

Klein's work made a decisive intervention in psychoanalytical theory. As Sayers puts it:

In describing this process she launched her theory of what she called 'projective identification', involving not so much projecting instincts from within us on to others, as Freud had described, but projecting and identifying with others on the basis of putting into them loved and hated figures from within us.⁴⁷

Thus, Klein's work points to an imaginary world that informs projection and can be altered and cultivated to improve projection. As a consequence, it also continually reaffirms an inevitable instability of the ego

and, like Freudianism, challenges some of the key assumptions behind rationalist discourses. Klein describes the infant's internal imaginary world in terms of 'internal objects', a difficult and controversial idea. An appealing feature of this concept is its representation of the role emotion plays in constituting the internal world, a perspective which compares with the way Sartre and Bergman challenge an exclusively rational or linguistic account of subjectivity.

As David Macey notes, there is a lack of scientific evidence for Klein's claims about childhood.⁴⁸ However, her work set up a significant divergence from Freudianism and played an influential role in the development of psychoanalysis through object relations theory. There is no evidence that either Bergman or Sartre read or understood these developments. Nevertheless, in Klein's emphasis on the dangers of a superego, we can see both an updating of Sigmund Freud's work on this concept and an idea which corresponds with Bergman's representation of individuals tormented by authority figures, either real or imagined. Sartre also takes the struggle against authority as an issue that is simultaneously highly subjective and related to external determinants.

Klein's emphasis on children's play as a source of understanding of the psyche is distinctive, and historically significant in the development of child psychology. Throughout Bergman's work we find sensitivity to the subjectivity of children and young people. The concept of 'play' runs alongside that of imagination and can be used to consider the social implications of actions ignored by adult sensibility. Klein found the expression of intensely negative emotions in the play she witnessed, but also, through the concept of the depressive position, she paved the way for constructive recognition of the child's sense of morality.

Klein's work was very empirically based and sometimes shockingly direct. Thus, Lacan criticised Klein's crude deterministic account of certain observations of child's play⁴⁹ but, as already stated, this work became a foundation for a major development in psychoanalysis. It offers the possibility of less emphasis on Oedipal development and more account of the child's relationship to his/her environment, even though Klein herself remained completely committed to Freud's concept of the Oedipus complex.⁵⁰ Thus some defenders of Klein emphasise her proximity to Freudian concepts and argue that her work resists reduction to a psychology centred on the ego.⁵¹ It is indisputable that, for Klein, therapy seeks to integrate the ego, whilst mental illness and neurosis stem from the ego in crisis. However, through the central role given to what Klein calls phantasy, which I see as a contribution to the understanding of imagination, she fully recognises how the ego may be

assailed by forces that are deep and that require interpretation as well as observation.

Connected to this emphasis on interpretation and the depths of the psyche is Klein's distinctive emphasis on the significance of the maternal. This approach has not always been welcomed, and was criticised by Anna Freud and her followers for the failure to analyse the actual roles played by mothers.⁵² However, in the context of psychoanalysis it provides an enormous counterpoint to Freudian and Lacanian emphasis on the structural power of the father as a real person and as a concept. Of course, the structural significance of the maternal in Klein does not necessarily provide a wide-ranging feminist alternative to Freudianism, but there is an interesting correspondence with the powerful position of women in a large number of Bergman's works, albeit in various roles from mothers to femme fatales. In Sartre's work we find recognition of the maternal most strongly in his autobiographical and literary biographical work, including his analysis of Gustave Flaubert's relationship with his mother.⁵³

Having moved to Britain in the 1930s, Klein worked continuously until her death in 1960. During this period she continued to be a specialist focusing on the experience of her clinical practice and developing her focus on the mother. At key points we can see how a more social perspective emerges from this material, including her analysis of such phenomena as criminality, art and the dangers of envy and jealousy. I will return to this broader perspective in subsequent chapters as Klein's work is developed and applied to Bergman's films.

Sartre

A year after Sartre's birth in 1905 his father died, leaving the young Sartre to be brought up by his mother, and influenced by his patriarchal grandfather. Later, Sartre became deeply resentful of his stepfather. Sartre's 1963 autobiography, *Words*, recalls his childhood, including the way he became an intellectual, with his grandfather's books dominating his imagination. Sartre sees himself as someone drawn to an abstract intellectual and imaginary universe even before he could read. As he puts it:

A Platonist by condition, I moved from knowledge to its object; I found ideas more real than things, because they were the first to give themselves to me and because they gave themselves like things.⁵⁴

Whilst continuing his early attraction to intellectual existence Sartre, as a reader, was taken, in his childhood, by action adventure stories,⁵⁵ one origin for his later emphasis on heroic individual commitment as a fundamental philosophical principle.

At school Sartre was already highly imaginative, writing stories inspired by the detective fiction he adored and acting out the films he saw at the cinema with his mother. As David Drake records:

At local venues as well as the bigger picture houses they watched melodramatic adventure films, many of their features borrowed from popular literature: the rescuing of damsels in distress, the dastardly machinations of the villains and the courage and daring of the heroes.⁵⁶

According to Drake, Sartre's early fiction, written after he left school, already reveals a number of themes and preoccupations that return later, including a strong awareness of self-deception as a psychological process and contempt for the bourgeoisie. Drake emphasises how Sartre moved beyond the simple moral binaries of the fiction he loved as a child, and in its place emerged a fascination with the lack of certainty in human affairs. As Drake tells us:

Life, he observed, was nothing but contingency. He was struck by the contrast with what happened in the cinema. In films everything has a significance and contributes to the story, which has a beginning, a middle and a (usually happy) end. In life, on the other hand, there is no necessity.⁵⁷

While Sartre's early adult life reveals his precocity and intelligence, there is also a disturbing unstable element at work. Sartre's study of philosophy during the 1930s involved some time spent in Berlin on a scholarship, a situation which brought him into contact with fascism. Sartre developed his ideas about the individual's responsibility in the face of a world in which political action could appear absurd in its futility. He became preoccupied with the terrible nature of 'freedom' that confronts the individual consciousness. His early work on the imagination can be regarded as bound up with this problem of responding to the negative, annihilating quality of consciousness that goes with the possibility of freedom. At the same time this work is influenced by his non-conformist lifestyle, such that during his work on the imagination he felt negatively affected by his experiments with mescaline and the resulting

hallucinations. Nevertheless, *The Imaginary*, published in 1940, four years after Sartre wrote it, is still of interest, particularly when considered in relation to his subsequent work.⁵⁸ It shows Sartre concerned to differentiate his idea of imagination from one based on an empiricist philosophy of perception. Yet, at the same time, he wishes to show why the imaginary is not a romantic netherworld, or a metaphysical realm, but one in which consciousness may discover its own power and freedom. Although the positive force of this argument is not explicit in this early work, it remains a consistent feature through Sartre's complex career. His novel published in 1938, originally called *Melancholia*,⁵⁹ and ultimately named *Nausea*, explores the theme of individual freedom, encapsulated by the alienated consciousness of a protagonist overwhelmed by his discovery of contingency.

In another early work of philosophy, *Transcendence of the Ego*, written in 1936, we see an approach that shares some qualities with post-structuralist deconstruction.⁶⁰ Sartre, whilst heavily indebted to Edmund Husserl, challenges the latter's emphasis on the unity of consciousness, arguing in effect that the ego must be continually recreated. This early work, along with Sartre's account of the emotions written in 1939, is relevant to the relativism and emotional intensity that we find across Bergman's work, but we also have to note how Sartre chose not to dismantle the heritage of idealist philosophy, a point confirmed by his wartime philosophical masterpiece, *Being and Nothingness*.

In this work Sartre developed his insights on freedom, using an elaborate philosophical discourse that was both original and strongly influenced by idealism. Here we find his development of the concepts of the 'for-itself' and the 'in-itself'.⁶¹ While Sartre gives weight to the material world's independence through his notion of 'being-in-itself', he retains an opposition with consciousness, conveying the independence of the latter and its inherent intentionality with the term 'for-itself'. In-between these states, 'bad faith', involves consciousness denying its nature and potential as something which is 'for-itself' and thus reducing the self-activating process of consciousness to a fixed state: consciousness becomes an 'in-itself'; it becomes like a thing. These concepts signify a profound split in human consciousness, but it is wrong to immediately assume that Sartre is irredeemably pessimistic about the possibility of synthesis in human consciousness, and following on from this that he is pessimistic in relation to morality, political commitments and aesthetic value. Sartre retains the sense of agency conveyed in the idealist tradition, including the Cartesian emphasis on personal reflection as a starting point for philosophy, and the Kantian philosophy

of the transcendent power of conceptual reason. Perhaps even more significant is his continuing engagement with the Hegelian and Marxist understanding of dialectical relationships. This engagement suggests that progress must be sought through greater awareness of conflict within the individual and in society.⁶² All these influences from philosophy count, when we weigh up Sartre's position against the challenge of structuralism and post-structuralism, because the continuing presence of elements influenced by idealism signifies a dogged commitment to a notion of meaningful and accessible individual decision-making.

Undoubtedly, Sartre's philosophy is complex and not always consistent. *Being and Nothingness* also reveals the influence of Søren Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche. Their work leads Sartre towards a complex understanding of subjectivity in which high and elusive standards accompany meaningful individual action. The individualism of these thinkers is reflected in Sartre's insistence that the individual must overcome self-inflicted concepts of deterministic causation. In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre infamously does not tell us what constitutes good faith, but we may suppose that it must involve authenticity, a concept derived from Heidegger. Nevertheless, the continuing presence of the other idealist thinkers in Sartre's philosophy points to a more socially engaged sense of subjectivity. This was to become apparent in Sartre's Kantian-influenced polemic about humanism following World War II, *Existentialism Is a Humanism*, and in his Hegelian influenced engagement with Marxist dialectics in the post-war period.

Sartre's awareness of the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent Nazi occupation of France coincides with development in his ideas. During the war he was released from a German prisoner of war camp. Back in Paris he initiated a resistance group involving close associates.⁶³ At the same time his career developed in a way, according to Drake, that avoided outright confrontation with the Nazi occupier even though he managed to smuggle his resistance ideals into his work.⁶⁴ His work during the war continues his preoccupation with individual 'freedom', but also moves towards articulating how we should respond to this freedom. The Occupation reinforced his awareness of freedom as the fundamental issue that confronted humanity, but it is a philosophical conception of freedom quite distinct from the economic ideology of capitalism. Sartre makes it clear in his *War Diaries* that his experiences in the war led him to recognise that freedom must be placed in context:

To be authentic is to realize fully one's being-in-situation, whatever that situation may happen to be.... This presupposes a patient study

of what the situation requires, and then a way of throwing oneself into it and determining oneself to 'be-for' this situation. Of course situations are not catalogued once and for all. On the contrary, they are new each time.⁶⁵

István Mészáros traces the way morally committed politics became a growing emphasis of Sartre's work during the 1950s. Mészáros sees a line of continuity alongside transformation. In the increasingly political nature of Sartre's work from *Existentialism is a Humanism* in 1945 to his involvement in struggles against imperialism in the 1950s and 1960s, Mészáros finds a transition 'from self oriented subjectivity' to a more mature philosophy of moral commitment.⁶⁶ Even when he sought a synthesis with Marxism, Sartre sought to maintain the significance of individual autonomy.⁶⁷ As Mészáros indicates, Sartre's early philosophy of the imagination does not disappear. It returns most explicitly, for instance, in his hope that the rebellions of 1968 would involve 'imagination in power'. Mészáros quotes from Sartre's work on Flaubert:

A man is like a leak of gas, escaping into the imaginary. Flaubert did so perpetually; yet he also had to see reality because he hated it, so there is the whole question of the relationship between the real and the imaginary which I try to study in his life and work.⁶⁸

According to Mészáros, Sartre regards Flaubert as someone who makes a choice to escape into the imaginary, and this is ultimately contrasted to moral engagement with social conditions. For Sartre, the abiding concern is with the problematic of freedom and how it is constituted internally in the face of external conditioning. Sartre suggests that the imaginary must be reflected on for its potential as a negation of society, but also critically because of its potential for self-deception. Mészáros quotes Sartre as saying in 1969, 'I would today accord to freedom the small movement which makes of a socially conditioned social being someone who does not render back completely what his conditioning has given him'.⁶⁹ For Mészáros, Sartre's individualistic understanding of subjectivity and social determinism is problematic, but Mészáros recognises how Sartre, from the 1930s to his death, is focused on maintaining a degree of unity in his idea of subjectivity. Discontinuity resulting from external social forces is internalised by the individual.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Sartre is drawn in his later career to biography, as Bergman is drawn to the personal confessional mode, and as Klein worked on abstract theoretical issues with her own children.

More explicitly than the other two, and partly because of his immersion in continental philosophy, Sartre is a dialectical thinker, whose thought continually probes contradictions faced by the individual. This again is a point that Mészáros develops effectively. With Sartre we see a commitment to the freedom of imagination and a recognition of why this faculty should not be idealised, but situated in a realistic context. This is relevant to Bergman because of his attraction to representing subjectivity, alongside a critical awareness of external causes and constraints.

Bergman

Bergman was born in Uppsala in 1918.⁷⁰ He was brought up in a strict religious household, and his father was a pastor who was appointed, early in Bergman's life, as a religious minister for the king. In Bergman's autobiography of 1987 he starts by describing the punishment he received as a child. This included his being made to wear a skirt, and more seriously physical punishment: 'After the strokes had been administered, you had to kiss Father's hand, at which forgiveness was declared and the burden of sin fell away, deliverance and grace ensued'.⁷¹ Bergman also describes how he was punished by being locked in a cupboard, an experience that was made worse when the maid made him think there was 'a creature' hiding in the cupboard and it would eat his toes.⁷² These anecdotes explain Bergman's preoccupation with themes of shame, humiliation and the power of imagination. Very clearly he turns to these incidents and reworks them. His 1968 film *Hour of the Wolf* involves the main character's describing his terror as a child locked in the cupboard and his fear of an imaginary creature. In *Fanny and Alexander* the evil stepfather appears to represent, in grotesque form, some of the actions of Bergman's father, described in *The Magic Lantern*.

Throughout Bergman's work we find a gallery of flawed and disturbed male protagonists. For example, in his first screenplay for Alf Sjöberg's *Frenzy* in 1944, there is a focus on the conflict between a teenage male protagonist and a tyrannical male teacher, while Bergman's first film as a director, *Crisis* (1946), which was adapted from a radio play, concerned a charismatic but tragic male protagonist, Jack, who commits suicide. Bergman's flawed, and intermittently dangerous, men do not preclude a noted concentration on a sensitive male hero in his early films, for whom he frequently used the actor Birger Malmsten. One of Bergman's earliest films to receive extensive critical acclaim and make notable use of a melancholy narrative premise is *Summer Interlude*, celebrated by Godard, in which the lead character is a young woman played by

Nilsson, who remembers the summer when her boyfriend, played sensitively by Malmsten, was tragically killed in an accident in an idyllic island setting. This narrative of young love set in the Swedish archipelago compares with *Summer with Monika*, made two years later because the latter also explores the theme of a youthful romance on an island near Stockholm.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the actor who emerged as a powerful lead for a number of Bergman works was Max von Sydow, playing roles that can be construed as at least partly expressive of the director's personal feelings, including *Hour of the Wolf*. Bergman's preoccupation with the flaws of a male authority figure, and his concern to project either sensitive or more introspective male characters, is related to his ongoing spirit of questioning. In his questioning of self-evident male authority and concern with the absence of God, expressed so famously by von Sydow's knight in *The Seventh Seal* and in other works such as *The Virgin Spring*, Bergman appears to gravitate towards existentialism as an alternative. This is the position he conveys in his famous lengthy interviews with Stig Björkman, Torsten Manns and Jonas Sims made at the end of the 1960s, and published in English in 1973. In these interviews Bergman describes how he shed his belief in religion in the early 1960s.⁷³

In relation to broader historical influences it is also important to recognise, as Vernon Young points out, that Bergman was born at the traumatic historical moment of the end of World War I, developed his adult consciousness during the World War II, and launched as a film director in its aftermath.⁷⁴ We need to take account of Sweden's neutrality in both wars and Bergman's early political confusion. He discusses in his biography his adolescent attraction to fascism on a visit to Germany as an exchange student. He discusses how the revelation of Nazi atrocities filled him with guilt about his own early enthusiasm for Adolf Hitler: 'I did not realize until long afterwards that I was guilty by association only'.⁷⁵ After the war, amidst tensions in a Gothenburg theatre between different sides of the conflict from Sweden and Germany, Bergman could not talk about his mistakes regarding fascism. Shame about his early political sympathies appears to have made Bergman steer away from overt political content, but this is something that he realises was a mistake: 'I did not mention my aberrations and despair, but a strange decision slowly matured. Politics – never again! Of course I should have made an utterly different decision'.⁷⁶ Perhaps Bergman did not completely suppress his new-found political awareness. The argument that Bergman's films have a pervasive questioning of oppressive authority structures has been made by Johns Blackwell. She brings

together Bergman's critical approach to father figures and religion with a critical approach to dominant structures in society. This subversive stance is connected, by Johns Blackwell, to Bergman's early experience of seeing his father work at the king's court.⁷⁷ She complements this observation with the suggestion that Bergman represented motherhood sympathetically in a range of films because of his close relationship with his own mother and also because of his early experience with Swedish silent cinema. Johns Blackwell states:

In part because of the influential writings of the feminist Ellen Kay, there developed in Sweden in the early part of this century a kind of 'renaissance of motherhood' that was played out in, among other arenas, the silent films of the era...⁷⁸

Certainly, emotion and personal experiences are a more self-evident influence on Bergman's creativity than external political structures. Young refers to the anxiety of Bergman's youth, including at the age of 19, significant romantic disappointment, and disillusionment with religion 'at nearly the same time, though Bergman is unable to place the event – his memory for the chronology of those years is by now confused – he also lost by death a very close male companion'.⁷⁹ The themes of romance, bereavement and mourning, which developed into such a major theme in *Summer Interlude*, may owe their setting to the summer which Bergman spent on the Swedish islands, at the age of 19, when, as Young tells us, he was rejected by a girl whom he loved.⁸⁰ There appears to be an imaginative condensation of romantic and mortal loss in this work, which indicates how Bergman reworks his own anxieties through film.

The use of location and the setting of the Swedish archipelago, in some of the early works, reinforce the point that Bergman is concerned with love from a romantic aesthetic perspective. However, the emphasis on nature, passion and imagination is continually problematised in his work by the representation of psychological conflicts. His lyrical treatment of Swedish landscapes has to be counterbalanced against his notable experimentation with a wide range of mise-en-scène, including treatment of industrial settings (for instance in *Port of Call* (1948)). By the time we get to *The Seventh Seal*, the beautifully lit landscape is pervaded by death, and nine years later with *Persona*, a beautiful but bleak landscape is the backdrop to psychodrama. This signals, as Eric Hedling has argued, Bergman's difference from a Swedish tradition for nostalgic heritage cinema in which the landscape is represented as a

national treasure, and as a site for a sense of coherence at the level of national identity.⁸¹ For Bergman, the landscape may be beautiful, but also it is continually a site of conflict, implicated in personal and sometimes social struggles.

Bergman's biography details his early obsession with theatrical illusion and, closely connected to this, his early love of cinematic make-believe. Maaret Koskinen records how Bergman played with his own film projector and puppet theatres in his childhood, thus creating his own imaginary worlds.⁸² References to his childhood are repeated in a number of films, including references to a toy cinematograph in *Prison* (1949) and *Persona*, two films that are amongst his most disturbing works. As well as these personal concerns Bergman's internationalism is evident in his preoccupation with philosophical themes, and his representation of ambiguity, in a style which affords comparison with other 'auteurs' of the European art cinema. In a special edition of the Swedish film magazine *Chaplin*, Koskinen develops the argument convincingly that despite disparate Swedish influences Bergman's work transcends its natural roots. This, she argues, is the result of work, which is 'a peculiar mixture of the abstract and the concrete, the metaphysical and the realistic'.⁸³ Koskinen argues that to explain Bergman's work through Swedish culture alone does not sufficiently recognise how Bergman's work is an 'addition' to the existing cultural reality, rather than a 'substitute' or 'parallel', and how right from the beginning of his career he gravitated towards a European literary tradition and universal themes.⁸⁴ The danger of overemphasising Bergman's internationalism has also been widely recognised. Scholarship on Bergman has sought to recover some of the more specific cultural meanings of his work issuing from Sweden and Scandinavia in general, as Steene notes.⁸⁵ Scholarship on Bergman has also sought to recognise the interplay between Bergman's work in cinema and his equally prolific theatrical career and his work as a writer and a producer. The theatre-film relationship is crucial to understanding his art, including the confessional quality of the dialogue, versatile switching between different genres that include comedy, and the influence of Strindberg.

Whilst recognising the significance of localised influences, this book is premised on the idea that the humanism emerging from Bergman's work, in form and content, and its comparison with Kleinian and Sartrean ideas, has not been fully explored despite the frequent assumptions that Bergman relates to psychoanalysis and existentialism. Relevant to this is the recognition of Bergman's diversity as an artist, including the interplay between his experience of theatre and his openness to different

film styles. By way of introduction, it is best simply to describe Bergman as an experimenter, or bricoleur, who drew on a wide range of styles and remarkably forged a unique and unified style. The focus on two films which fully established him as an icon of European art cinema, *Wild Strawberries* and *The Seventh Seal*, and which have received extensive critical analysis, potentially obscures the way he incorporates theatrical techniques and multiple filmic influences across his other films. In particular, I want to highlight his continuing respect for silent cinema. His love of the theatre and silent cinema inform the way Bergman thinks, and directs, and are very significant in an account of the value he places on imagination.

In relation to Bergman's adult life, his own psychological crises, including a number of broken marriages and his visit to hospital due to a nervous breakdown that preceded *Persona*, indicate the very real foundations of his psychological themes and, hence, the relevance of opening up comparisons and contrasts with Kleinian theory. However, just as important to understand is that his life as an artist was extremely social and productive, with almost continuous involvement in theatre and film. Bergman's regular work with highly talented actors and actresses across film and theatre, and other members of the production teams (such as his cinematographers) allowed for a continuity that fostered creative excellence. From his biography we expect the themes of loss and anxiety to appear in his films, but we can also recognise how his creativity presents a dialectic between romantic melancholy and a more dynamic and optimistic creative spirit. This combination led to his dominance of Swedish cinema and success at an international level.

Klein, Sartre and Bergman: connections

A general overview suggests that each of these figures brought traumatic personal issues into their work. This supports a widely accepted cliché that in some sense suffering is necessary for inspiration, creativity and insight. However, this is the starting point for recognising a deeper convergence, one that can be related to the Kleinian understanding of modernism developed by Esther Sánchez-Pardo. She writes:

Modernist art and literature, with their emphasis on spatialization and the relevance of forms, reveal a troubled aesthetic state pervaded with melancholia.... Klein echoes a modernist concern with the precarious and contingent character of the analytic vocabularies available and more widely with the nature of representational discourse itself.⁸⁶

This perspective is useful because it relates the apparent focus on traumatic content with the formal innovation of modernism and a broader cultural context developing most intensely from World War I onwards. Bergman, Klein and Sartre seek the means of recovery through and from melancholia. This occurs either at the level of ideas, clinical practice and philosophical reflection or through narrative and character development. They share what has been called a culture of modernist melancholia, but also a humanistic search for progress. The shared philosophy is humanist because there is a real sense in which each figure seeks positive values beyond localised boundaries and thus invokes a sense of universality. This is apparent in Klein's model of reparation, in Sartre's search for an existentialist ethics and politics, and in the presence of a degree of narrative resolution in many Bergman films alongside their emphasis on melancholy themes and disjuncture. Although this notion of a shared humanist philosophy may involve debate and disagreement with various commentators who stress the pessimism of each of these figures (for instance, Gado's account of Bergman's films⁸⁷), it is necessary to consider how recovery and renewal are represented or constructed by Klein, Sartre and Bergman even when this is oblique or in question.

Another point of comparison is that across the work of Klein, Sartre and Bergman there is an emphasis on psychological depth and reflection, which extends to a more critical engagement with their society. Klein is more concerned with a vision of psychic depth than other psychological practitioners, as can be seen in her challenge to uncover the unconscious of children and her opposition to theories that have no sense of the unconscious. For Klein, reflection must grasp the dynamics of unconscious phantasies in order that progress can be achieved. Sartre, in contrast, challenges the Freudian concept of the unconscious. However, Sartre maintains an emphasis on the efficacy of individual reflection, and this is where he establishes a depth of subjectivity, which brings him into conflict with empirical and positivistic theories, and, in the 1960s, structuralism. Bergman's cinema is more concerned with reflection through introspective dialogue and psychological themes, thus contrasting with the action-based cinema of some Hollywood films in particular. Through reflection Bergman characters often interrogate their own lives and histories, a classic example being the ruminations of Isak Borg in *Wild Strawberries*. This concern with reflection and depth relates to a broader historical context and position. All three individuals were significantly influenced by the horror of World War II, the questioning and reflection in the post-war aftermath and the constructive optimism of the post-war rebuilding.

A sense of critical engagement with post-war developments can be read across their work. For instance, Klein's concept of the paranoid-schizoid has been used to criticise the nuclear arms race and to criticise and conceptualise, as Ian Parker puts it, 'the cultural dynamics that keep this war drive on the move'.⁸⁸ Furthermore, Klein's work has been considered from an explicitly political perspective, as Julia Kristeva notes:

Some critics emphasize her theory of the negative and the importance of the death drive and of the disruptive forces that call to mind the image of the anti establishmentarian and the rebel when they do not descend into the figures of the paranoid person or the quietly schizophrenic egotist.⁸⁹

This indicates Klein's faith in the liberating powers of the imagination as well as the dangers of delusion, obsession and other psychological complexes. Kristeva notes that Klein's work:

did not focus on the political aspects of the madness which tainted the twentieth century. At the same time, even if she shielded herself from the horrors that surrounded her, Klein's analysis of private psychosis, whether in children or in adults, helps us to identify the most deep-seated mechanisms that – along with economic and ideological influences – paved the way for the destruction of psychic space and the annihilation of the life of the mind that threatened the modern era.⁹⁰

Sartre becomes politicised from the period of his imprisonment in World War II, and in the post-war period is an active contributor to anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggles. Nevertheless, opinion is mixed on the identity of Sartre's politics in the latter stages of his career, as he tried to synthesise Marxism and politics. Frederic Jameson offers one side of the argument when he argues that Sartre can be considered as part of 'the new left', which incorporated cultural critique.⁹¹ Whatever the interpretation of Sartre's involvement with Marxism, it is clear that he became increasingly engaged with social and political issues.

Bergman seems completely removed from such activism. His work includes some soap commercials when he needed to earn a living at the start of the 1950s,⁹² and his sophisticated comedies of this decade reveal his attempt to win an audience.⁹³ However, these works show that he was broad-minded enough to experiment with different modes of film-making whilst seeking to get sufficient funding. The fact that he

did not migrate to Hollywood is an indicator of his orientation outside a more consumer-focused film industry. This is notable, particularly given his struggle with budgets if not the enduring support of the Swedish film industry.⁹⁴ Bergman discusses how his flirtation with fascism in the 1940s, as an impressionable teenager staying in Germany, made him move away from political subjects subsequently, but he also discusses how *Shame*, made in 1968, was motivated by continuing thoughts about World War II and the threat of Nazism. This work also suggests a critical engagement with contemporary politics. *Shame* was made before the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia and the intensification of the conflict in Vietnam. Bergman makes clear that he would have made the film differently if these events had already occurred, which shows, perhaps surprisingly, his willingness to respond to, or take account of, political upheaval in this instance.⁹⁵

The concern with depth and its significance for reflection on society in Klein, Bergman and Sartre can be contrasted with the increasing emphasis on surface and anonymity which is associated with the expansion of consumer culture and post-modernism. Klein, Sartre and Bergman are concerned with the same signs of alienation and conformity, which concerned a range of liberal and leftist intellectuals. The work of Klein, Sartre and Bergman connects to the critical analyses of late capitalism including the critique of mass society found in the work of the Frankfurt School. In the case of Bergman, this does not lead to an obvious ideological position. Of relevance here is Jörn Donner's argument that Bergman's work responds to a society, Sweden, that was extremely advanced in terms of economic security, and thus even more vulnerable to issues concerning the 'inner life'.⁹⁶ In this sense, Bergman's work confronts a loss of ideology. Nevertheless, even if this context prevails across Bergman's work we also find issues of equality and disempowerment. Some of Bergman's early works, influenced by neo-realism, demonstrate a marked concern with the alienation of young working-class characters from their society. In other works we find expressive and powerful treatment of alienation, including a striking awareness of injustice and challenges faced by his female protagonists.

Meanwhile, the politics of Kleinianism have been highlighted by Michael Rustin, who argues that British psychoanalysis in the post-war period, including the influential Kleinian stream, was defined by a progressive cultural agenda. In his essay 'Lacan, Klein and Politics', Rustin argues that this and related sections of British psychoanalysis are 'defined to some degree in opposition to the values of a merely materialist or power-seeking society'.⁹⁷ Another Kleinian theorist, C. Fred

Alford, brings together Kleinian and Frankfurt School theory. Meanwhile in Jameson's *Post-modernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* the theories of structuralism and post-structuralism are implicated in the development of depthless culture partly because of their failure to attend to history.⁹⁸ A crucial question, then, which arises in relation to a humanist focus on the power of individual imagination is whether this is more successful than structuralism in maintaining awareness of historical forces. This question can only be dealt with through the focused analysis of individual works, which will follow in subsequent chapters. Despite concentrating on the role of imagination, I will also explore the relevance of political and social connotations in the work.

The challenge of structuralism and Lacan

The sense of a humanistic convergence between Klein, Sartre and Bergman is reinforced when we look at the contrast offered by structuralist theory. In the late 1950s, Sartre was a cult figure, Klein had strong claims to being Freud's successor and Bergman was considered to be at the forefront of creativity in world cinema. These reputations did not disappear. However, by the end of the 1960s, the constituency of each figure had been diminished, and a critical factor in this was the turn against the individual subject conveyed by structuralist theory. Structuralist critiques of the auteur theory challenged the way in which the work of Bergman, Klein and Sartre had been appreciated. As Merquior notes, the structuralist Claude Lévi-Strauss explicitly challenged Sartre's existentialism.⁹⁹ Also, as Rustin makes clear, British critical theory gravitated towards Lacan rather than Klein and the object relations tradition.¹⁰⁰

Lacan's work was influential across the fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy and cultural studies. Of particular relevance here is that it had a critical influence on post-1960s film theory. Susan Hayward argues that the beneficial influence of Lacan on feminist film theory is particularly evident in relation to film noir and women's films because Lacanian and post-Lacanian critics have been able to show how women who refuse to 'mirror' the desires of the male are perceived as posing a threat or disruption to male-controlled society. She suggests that Lacan with his theory of the unconscious as a language exposes the illusions imposed on images by patriarchy.¹⁰¹ In Laura Mulvey's seminal article on visual pleasure the illusory unifying effect of the patriarchal regime is explained, specifically using voyeurism and fetishism as key structural concepts.¹⁰² There is a complex history of film theory here, and, clearly, Lacan's willingness to challenge any conception of individual autonomy can inform

a critique of individual films. However, we should also note how key elements of the structuralist perspective conflict with the intentions and ambitions of Klein's, Bergman's and Sartre's humanism.

Lacan opens his 1949 address with his attack on René Descartes' philosophy of the cogito. Here he refers to the Cartesian legacy and the belief that the foundation of knowledge is self-reflection. His is an attack on the illusion of a unified I. As an alternative to Cartesianism, and more specifically as an innovation within psychoanalysis, Lacan provides his early formulation of the mirror phase, suggesting that the infant overcomes a sense of internal fragmentation and disunity with a specular image of him/herself, in which unity of the ego is attributed to unity of the body. He writes:

The fact is that the total form of the body by which the subject anticipates in a mirage the maturation of his power is given to him only as a *Gestalt*, that is to say, in an exteriority in which this form is certainly more constituent than constituted, but in which it appears above all in a contrasting size (*un relief de stature*) that fixes it and in a symmetry that inverts it, in contrast with the turbulent movements that the subject feels are animating him.¹⁰³

According to Lacan, then, this mirror image transcends its apparent origin outside the subject and offers an imaginary sense of autonomy, onto which the subject will cling through the subsequent trials of the Oedipal phase and its interrelations with others. Lacan's intervention has cultural implications, and he pays tribute to the surrealists for recognising the illusory sense of unity in images:

I have myself shown in the social dialectic that structures human knowledge as paranoiac why human knowledge has greater autonomy than animal knowledge in relation to the field of force of desire, but also why human knowledge is determined in that 'little reality' (*ce peu de réalité*), which the surrealists, in their restless way, saw as its limitation.¹⁰⁴

Later in the address, Lacan turns against existentialism as a philosophy. He recognises that the latter has grasped a sense of negativity which ego psychology plays down or excludes:

But unfortunately that philosophy [existentialism] grasps negativity only within the limits of a self-sufficiency of consciousness, which,

as one of its premises, links to the *méconnaissances* that constitute the ego, the illusion of autonomy to which it entrusts itself.¹⁰⁵

This explains, according to Lacan, why the freedom that existentialism offers is so contradictory, and perversely pessimistic, believing in 'a freedom that is never more authentic than when it is in the walls of a prison'.¹⁰⁶ We are still here at an early stage in Lacan's career, and later his work became more defined by structuralism as he developed the idea that the unconscious is structured like a language. Since semiotics was starting to play a part in film theory in the 1960s, the conjunction of psychoanalysis and semiotics in Lacan's work proved an attractive foundation for many film theorists, as Geoffrey Nowell Smith notes.¹⁰⁷

Klein and Sartre do not give carte blanche to the autonomous Cartesian human subject, but they introduce innovative ideas of human agency. For Klein the infant's recognition of the mother and other internalised objects through the depressive phase provides a model for greater synthesis of the ego. This is a significant foundation for linguistic development and is morally desirable in its projection of a form of compassion for the other. For Sartre, freedom is not forever dependent on the 'prison' to which Lacan refers in his address, but remains a horizon for analysis. Klein and Sartre do not champion Cartesian reflection, but they provide new perspectives on the inward gaze, which detaches this idea of the self from all-consuming narcissism. This relates directly to Bergman's films in which characters are regularly found in introspection. A Lacanian perspective offers insight into the fragmentation that some Bergman characters experience, and a critique of the illusions of autonomy by which others are beset, but this perspective does not provide an accessible model for recognising patterns of integration and individual self-realisation that accompany Bergman's introspective protagonists.

On the whole, Klein, Sartre and Bergman simply do not engage with the challenge that emerges through structuralist theorists such as Lacan. Their continued assumption of a level of individual agency is supported, however, by a range of theorists who have challenged the structuralist intervention, precisely on its elimination of ideas of the individual.

Marwick's critique of structuralism and post-structuralism

In tracing the intellectual history of the 1960s Marwick charts the rise of structuralism and also links this to post-structuralism. Reading through Marwick's summary of the views of key structuralist thinkers we return frequently to the way in which ideas of individual autonomy

are challenged. This is evident for Marwick from Roland Barthes' essay 'The Death of an Author', and in Lévi-Strauss' insistence on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure. Marwick summarises Saussure's argument as follows:

Words, he argued, can only have meaning within the entire language system of which they are a part; they derive their meaning from their *difference* from other words. This language system, he asserted (there is certainly nothing in the way of proof), is external to human beings, arising instead from the power structure of society.¹⁰⁸

Marwick does not really explore here whether Saussure took sufficient account of social influences on language. However, Marwick's historical account reminds us that a recurring dominant theme in a range of structuralist theories is the attack on a coherent idea of individual agency. Work that was influential on the subject of film studies, as it became academically institutionalised in the 1970s, included Saussure's semiotics, Lévi-Strauss' insight that anthropology could be analysed as language,¹⁰⁹ and the thinking of other structuralists and post-structuralists, ranging from Michel Foucault to Lacan. Lévi-Strauss in his book *La Pensee Sauvage* made 'an undisguised attack on Sartre'.¹¹⁰ Lacan decided that 'subconscious desires are not those of the individual "subject" but of the (bourgeois) power structure of the society to which the subject belongs'.¹¹¹ Further on, Marwick notes that:

Foucault also joined in the attack on the bourgeois notion that any significance attached to the individual human 'subject' or historical actor. Only the modern 'human sciences' put the individual 'human subject' at the centre of things; Foucault suggested that this had not always been so, and would not long continue to be so.¹¹²

One can argue with Marwick's generalisations, which seek to extract the common-sense meaning from these radical theorists. One might also argue with his point that these theorists remain uncritical of Marxism and that this is why they continue to emphasise the dominance of bourgeois ideology over the individual. However, Marwick's account is useful in indicating the broad differences between this intellectual trend that became so prominent in the 1960s and the ideas and practice of the figures who are the focus of my book. Marwick sees the structuralist and post-structuralist movement as an example of 'cultural extremism', in which fairly consensual ideas about how individual agency must be

placed in context are transformed into new absolutes about the weakness and fictional nature of the individual agent. He writes:

They pushed their conclusions to ultimate extremes. Thus the sensible observation that all human activities are in some way *influenced* by the society or culture within which they live becomes the dogma that all such activities are socially or culturally *constructed*. The sensible observation that readers, or audiences, often bring their own perceptions or imaginings to bear on the 'text' they read (novels, etc.) or watch (films, etc.) becomes the dogma that texts are autonomous, that there is no author. The sensible observation that language is very important to the way in which we frame our thoughts, and that most of what we know comes, not from direct observation, but from someone else's writing or speech, becomes the dogma that everything is *constructed* within language.¹¹³

Merquior's critique of structuralism

Merquior's critique of structuralism pinpoints how the eclipsing of the individual was not a foregone conclusion given the antecedents of structuralism. As Merquior points out, structuralism, despite its own history, including roots in the work of Saussure and Czech and Russian formalism, was primarily an intellectual development in France in the 1960s. Merquior opens his critique of this intellectual development by emphasising how it displaced and opposed Sartrean existentialism. Structuralism opposed the placing of individual consciousness at the centre of theory.¹¹⁴ According to Merquior, existentialism, through Heidegger in particular, had romanticised the Cartesian notion of the centrality of consciousness. But Heidegger did this in a way that placed consciousness under the sway of Being (as Merquior puts it, in Heidegger's work existentialism is 'nourished' by 'quasi-religious needs').¹¹⁵ With Sartre, the cogito becomes more centrally identified with freedom or the possibility of freedom, but also, as Merquior argues, existentialism and Sartre in particular, with his work on Marxism and existentialism, took increasing account of history. For Merquior, the structuralist argument against existentialism involved a fundamental opposition to history and humanism.

Merquior argues that in the development of structuralism we find not only an overlap with the ideas of other philosophies (for instance, regarding the arbitrariness of the sign, a key tenet of Saussure's structuralism, he finds comparison with diverse philosophies going back

to Plato) but also instances in which a greater emphasis on historical context is included. Merquior refers to the success of Jan Mukařovsky in retaining a sense of 'the phenomenological accent on the "intentional" status of the aesthetic object', whilst developing a '*semiological*' mode of analysis.¹¹⁶ Merquior makes the case that Mukařovsky's recognition of the significance of intentionality in art made him more acutely aware of the way the norms governing the artwork are affected by social and historical transformation.¹¹⁷

Merquior uses the case of Mukařovsky to reiterate the need for cultural theory to recognise individual intentions. This argument is relevant here because Klein, Sartre and Bergman go much further in elaborating on the significance of the individual's intentions against the context in which they operate. It is their core preoccupation with imagination that underlies the insistence that the individual can achieve a degree of transcendence in relation to his/her circumstances. It is worth noting here the point made by Mészáros, who argues that Sartre, throughout his career, was preoccupied with the constraints and limits on freedom.¹¹⁸ This preoccupation is also evident in the way Klein tracks the conflicts rooted in the psyche, and in Bergman's representations of psychological conflict, but each retains a belief in the possibility of liberation through the imagination.

I have referred to Marwick's and Merquior's criticisms of structuralism because this allows a stronger appreciation of the intellectual convergence of Bergman, Klein and Sartre. This involves retaining a significant emphasis on individual agency through the activity of the imagination. At the same time each figure takes on contextual factors that challenge and conflict with any notion of subjectivity as sovereign, and the imagination is not represented as a power operating in isolation. All three figures develop their ideas within specialised fields, drawing on the influence of others.

In Chapter 2 I will consider the ideas of Klein and her followers, before exploring how this work can be applied to Bergman's films through the example of *Wild Strawberries*. Chapter 3 will concentrate on Sartre's early work, *The Imaginary*, and consider how it is significant in relation to some of Sartre's better-known philosophical ideas developed during and after World War II. I will then explore the relevance of these ideas, and existentialism in general, for Bergman's work through the example of *The Seventh Seal*. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 I will concentrate on three films from distinct parts of Bergman's career *Summer with Monika*, *The Virgin Spring* and *Hour of the Wolf*. In Chapter 4 this will be preceded by a brief overview of three more films from the early part of Bergman's career.

The intention of these chapters is to explore how Kleinian and Sartrean ideas can be incorporated in close analysis. This involves integrating key points from these theorists alongside a methodology specific to film studies, including analysis of cinematic elements such as camera-work and lighting, and recognition of narrative structure and character development.

Kleinian and Sartrean ideas must now be explored more fully. As these ideas are applied in later chapters we will also gain a stronger understanding of how they are relevant to detailed analysis of selected Bergman films, and in the process we will see how Bergman's work evolved from his early experiments with style and narrative in the 1940s.

2

From Freud to Klein, and *Wild Strawberries*

Melanie Klein's significance rests partly on her application of psychoanalysis to children, evident in her earliest work, but throughout her career we find consistency and evolution in the development of her ideas relating to an internal object world for children and adults alike. Most of Klein's writing refers to examples from her practice and involves formulation of her key concepts, often in relation to Sigmund Freud. Klein rarely applied her ideas to a wider context, but there are some writings on culture, including notes for a review of *Citizen Kane* (1941).¹ The relevance of Kleinian thinking for culture rests on its conception of art as a practice that is capable of articulating great negativity for both the artist and the viewer through an understanding of the imagination that is, ultimately, constructive and benign. This vision of an imaginary world operating from birth will be explored further by considering the application of Klein's ideas to film and, in particular, *Wild Strawberries*, one of Ingmar Bergman's most psychoanalytic films. The latter offers comparisons to Klein's preoccupation with the death drive, and the representation of a cathartic process, in which the lead character models a process of psychic transformation and integration.

Applying Klein's ideas to art and film undoubtedly raises methodological issues because of her immersion in psychoanalytic practice and discourse. The elaboration of Kleinian ideas by her contemporaries and theorists dedicated to her ideas is a necessary resource for the application of her ideas to culture. Throughout the chapter I will call on points made by Kleinians including Joan Riviere, Adrian Stokes and Hanna Segal, as well as more recent accounts of the theory. To start with, I will focus on how Klein's ideas build on the work of Freud. In addition to the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position, introduced in

the previous chapter, key concepts in Klein's work include those of the inner world, introjection, projection, splitting and envy.

The Kleinian concept of the internal world structured by unconscious impulses is one that requires clarification at the outset. As Klein's fellow analyst Riviere says, for many people the idea that an individual internalises other people or objects is difficult to accept.² Riviere explains that this is partly because this inner world represents the 'unknown' and is thus encountered with apprehension. She also argues that we are more conscious of the threat posed by internal figures at the expense of recognising good elements that have been introjected.³ More important for this chapter is the idea that Klein continues to represent an understanding of the psyche that can throw into question and challenge preconceptions about the individual, and by extension their social world. The appeal of the Kleinian model for analysing Bergman's work rests on its ability to provide a model of integration whilst simultaneously maintaining a vision of negativity. In other words the goal for both Klein and Bergman is not an unequivocal good object, but instead they value awareness and recognition of the way in which good and bad are intertwined. In Klein's case, understanding this vision requires analysis of her response to Freud.

Klein's development of Freudian ideas

Klein's adherence to Freud is apparent throughout her work and includes her development of Freud's later work on the death drive. From the outset, she uses Freudian ideas about sexuality in the analysis of both children and adults. We also find that Klein includes some reflections on the implication of psychoanalytic ideas for the understanding of creativity and culture. An early example of Klein's response to both Freud and her interest in culture is evident in her 1923 essay titled 'Early Analysis'. Here she picks up Freud's account of Leonardo da Vinci. She notes how Freud's analysis draws attention to da Vinci's phantasy of a vulture descending on him in his infancy. Klein follows Freud in relating this to da Vinci's early memory of his mother and 'a condensation of Leonardo's early infantile sexual theories'.⁴ Klein goes on, inspired by Freud, to emphasise that da Vinci did not become fixated on the meaning of his infantile sexual theories about this experience. 'In Leonardo's case not only was an identification established between nipple, penis and bird's tail, but this identification became merged into an interest in the motion of this object, in the bird itself and its flight and the space in which it flew.'⁵ Thus, Klein agrees with Freud that artistic activity can

take the fascination of sexual fixation and transform this into a creative response to other external phenomena.

In the same essay Klein discusses the case of a patient, a 13-year-old boy called Felix, who is unconsciously fixated on material developed by his imagination, as an infant, of sounds connected to sex. Klein makes it clear that these sounds may have been real or imaginary. However Felix is able to overcome the fixation as he discovers a passion for music. Klein notes the progression in Felix's interest from enhanced critical awareness of music to a stage at which he might have risked composing music himself. Klein is not overtly idealistic about this and recognises that it depends on his talent, but she suggests that there is a process leading to the release of this talent which also involves his confidence in assuming the 'paternal role' of the 'composer'.⁶ These examples illustrate Klein's early interest in Freud's theories of sexual sublimation and its relationship with creativity.

Klein's continuing adherence to Freud is apparent throughout her work, including her essay of 1929, 'Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and the Creative Impulse', which was written before she formally developed her key concepts of the paranoid-schizoid position and depressive position.⁷ In this essay she refers to Freud's work on early anxiety situations for the baby. She builds on this to convey her conviction that these situations have been revealed by children in her analysis but are also manifest more widely in culture and represent a fundamental dynamic in human nature. Klein illustrates this through her discussion of an opera in which a child destroys the objects around him. For Klein, this destruction corresponds to a primitive attack on the child's internal world, in which the primary objects are the mother's body, the father's body and a union of the parents. Klein argues that this fundamental destructive anxiety is symbolised by the objects which the child attacks, and that as a necessary consequence the child experiences a paranoid fear of reprisal, which is played out in the opera through the coming to life of the objects he has attacked. The same danger is posed outside in nature as animals and objects threaten him. The child, however, overcomes his anxiety through love and concern for a wounded squirrel. For Klein, the child's empathy and concern for nature begin with his transcendence of the violence he has committed initially in phantasy against the maternal body, which is now sublimated as various objects and animals.⁸

We also find here the emergence of Klein's difference from Freud in relation to the concept of superego. Freud had developed this concept to account for the child's internalisation of the parents but, primarily,

the internalisation of the father as an authority figure. For Freud, this is the key to repression, and thus a key area for analysis of internal conflict. Klein essentially takes this a stage further so that the internalised parents are potentially much more threatening, evoking threats of reprisal for infantile phantasies that are present from the beginning of the child's life and that precede the Oedipus complex. This primitive archaic form of the superego does not have the social content associated with Freud's conception of the fully developed superego necessary for obedience to social norms. The primitive superego theorised by Klein carries the threat of annihilating the child completely, thus giving the death instinct a primacy over the castration anxiety on which Freud placed such emphasis.

Much later in her career, Klein summarised her divergence from Freud as follows:

The threat of annihilation by the death instinct within is, in my view – which differs from Freud's on this point – the primordial anxiety, and it is the ego which, in the service of the life instinct – possibly even called into operation by the life instinct – deflects to some extent that threat outwards. This fundamental defence against the death instinct Freud attributed to the organism, whereas I regard this process as the prime activity of the ego.⁹

Klein distinguishes herself from Freud in her belief that the ego is necessitated at an early stage of development by the struggle with the death instinct. For Klein, the ego is threatened by the death instinct through bad objects, which are internalised or projected, whereas for Freud the death instinct is more like a drive towards oblivion. Alford's comments are instructive on this:

whereas both Freud and Klein set Eros against Thanatos, life against death, for Klein there is no nirvana principle, no connection between the hatred and aggression of Thanatos and the peace and absence of stimulation that Freud writes of in *'Beyond the Pleasure Principle'*.¹⁰

Alford notes how Klein's theory of the death instinct troubled many of her supporters, but in the end, according to Alford, Klein differs from Freud because of her emphasis on the way in which negativity is 'integrated'. As Alford puts it, 'As the individual matures, the destructive elements of the self are split off and regained, over and over, until greater integration comes about.'¹¹

Klein's colleague, Riviere, is instructive on the relevance of Freud's work to the Kleinian focus on the death drive. Riviere suggests that Freud recognised a major cause of the death instinct in his emphasis on dependency in childhood such that fear of losing the love of one's parents is equated with the possibility of annihilation.¹² Riviere, however, follows Klein in placing the death drive more centrally than Freud:

We cannot escape the conclusion that an intense fear of dying by active aggression or passive neglect is a fundamental element in our emotional life, is as deeply rooted in our unconscious minds as life itself and is barricaded off from conscious experience by every known mechanism of defence.¹³

For further understanding, Riviere refers the reader to work by Klein and Paula Heimann, another associate of Klein.

Abraham's influence on Klein

Klein was not just influenced by Freud in relation to the death instinct but also by her own analyst, Karl Abraham, who had argued that the infant is struck by both 'benign' and 'destructive' traits.¹⁴ Abraham related the latter to the point at which the child develops teeth. This triggers a number of sadistic phantasies that go beyond biting. Meira Likierman tells us that:

Abraham redescribed the Freudian oral and anal stages as propelled by archaic relating mechanisms of preserving or expelling, and this was a significant addition to Freud's view that they were merely propelled by blind, pleasure-seeking drives.¹⁵

This is a very important source of Klein's emphasis on the aggression of the infant. Likierman argues that it threatened to make Klein's work convey an idea of human nature as flawed from birth (the idea of 'original sin'). However, Likierman also points out that Klein's adoption of Abraham's ideas led her to seek to balance this picture. Likierman argues that this becomes apparent as Klein's work progresses:

From 1935 onwards, she was to suggest that benign and destructive tendencies are not neatly separated in discrete developmental phases, and that it is simplistic to view the infant as proceeding from sadism to goodness. Klein was ultimately to conclude that destructive

and loving impulses coexist from the beginning, living in continual conflict, and it is through this that a human mental life is shaped.¹⁶

Likierman comes back to the influence of Abraham on Klein by pointing to the way he listened so acutely to his patients. Thus, he picked up on the way in which mental life was structured by emotional relationships, as well as by the pure quest of the instincts. So, Abraham is a significant influence on Klein because, like Freud, he is a forerunner of object relations theory, and the understanding that the origins of emotional relationships lie in an inner world that emerges as early as the pregenital phase. Freud introduced the ideas of 'introjection' and 'projection' to account for the patient's inner world and narcissistic disorders. However, according to Likierman:

Freud did not integrate his thinking on these mechanisms into a broader vision, nor did he link them to infantile mental development. And while Abraham was much more aware of these possibilities, his was also a half-glimpsed version of early mental life, and it was left to Klein to integrate all the available thinking in a full object relations theory.¹⁷

The depressive position, melancholy and mourning

In her analysis of Maurice Ravel's *L'Enfant et Les Sortilèges*, Klein accounted for a sense of emotional pity as a primitive and fundamental emotion involved in the infant's psychic life in her early work. This was a consistent idea throughout her work. In her 1940 paper 'Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States', she elaborates on the work of reparation achieved by the individual, from infant to adult, by referencing Freud's work 'Mourning and Melancholia'.¹⁸ In this essay Freud had taken melancholia as a 'narcissistic disorder' and explained it more fully through contrast and comparison with mourning. Freud argues that in both states the individual internalises a loved object:

If we listen patiently to the many and various self-reproaches of the melancholic, we will be unable to avoid a sense that the most intense among them often have little to do with the patient himself, but may with slight modifications be adapted to another person whom the patient loves, has loved or is supposed to love.¹⁹

Freud suggests that a condition in which the conscience obsessively directs reproaches against its own person is paralleled by cases of pathological mourning in which the individual is simply unable to make any progress through grief. However, for Freud most mourning is a process that allows transformation, whereas melancholia is more intractable. As Freud states:

the causes of melancholia go beyond the clear case of loss through death, and include all situations of insult, slight, setback and disappointment through which an opposition of love and hate can be introduced to the relationship, or an ambivalence already presented can be intensified.²⁰

For Freud, the mourner's progress beyond debilitating grief is overcome through a form of 'reality' testing such that the real absence of the lost person is accepted, and not denied through the phantasy of the internalised object, but melancholia can be more resistant to this reality testing.

Klein picks up Freud's emphasis on reality testing to overcome mourning, but argues that this is a process that extends to early infancy. She writes:

My contention is that the child goes through states of mind comparable to the mourning of an adult, or rather, that this early mourning is revived whenever grief is experienced in later life. The most important of the methods by which the child overcomes his states of mourning, is, in my view, the testing of reality.²¹

For Klein, the child's inquisitiveness and desire to know are intimately linked to a process of mourning, and these impulses are elevated into an instinct. In her earlier work, the destructive possibilities of this instinct were recognised alongside its place in normal development but, as Klein's work progresses, further emphasis is given to the contribution of this instinct to the individual's development. Discussing Wilfred Bion's work after Klein, Michael Rustin emphasises how Klein's ideas about an 'epistemophilic instinct' were highly influential for the idea that a caring environment is necessary for the child to develop his/her curiosity and engagement with reality.²² Klein's stress on the need for a balance between greater knowledge of external reality, a kind of reality recognition, and its internalisation through imagination is a useful foundation for analysis of film texts which mix realist and anti-realist strategies.

Returning to the study of melancholy and mourning, it should be noted that Klein's account differs from Freud in the greater emphasis on how mourning repairs the inner world. Thus, the divergence between Klein and Freud on mourning and melancholy has been summarised as follows:

Freud sees the melancholic as burdened internally with an object that cannot be relinquished, whereas the mourner manages to let the object go and is thus able to form new attachments. Klein's more complex conception of the inner world allows a view of the mourner as able to reinstate the lost loved object internally, in a more real and separate form, strengthening rather than depleting the ego in its task of forming new attachments.²³

For Klein, reality testing allows greater coexistence between the internal and external realities of the subject. The individual is seen as restoring an internalised lost object but also an inner world that precedes this. Ultimately, the restoration of an internal object refers to infantile introjection of the parents.

In normal mourning the individual reintrojects and reinstates, as well as the actual lost person, his loved parents who are felt to be his 'good' inner objects. His inner world, the one which he has built up from his earliest days onwards, in his phantasy was destroyed when the actual loss occurred. The rebuilding of this inner world characterizes the successful work of mourning.²⁴

Splitting

Klein's paper of 1946, 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms', is notable for its explanation of the paranoid-schizoid position, already explored in her earlier work, including its relationship with the depressive position. From the beginning of life the infant's phantasies, according to Klein, involve denial of perceptual reality with ideas of omnipotence, idealisation and fears of persecution.²⁵ Referring to her earlier work Klein states:

I enumerated various typical defences of the early ego, such as the mechanisms of splitting the object and the impulses, idealization, denial of inner and outer reality and the stifling of emotions.²⁶

Klein uses the concept of splitting to discuss how the infant seeks to expel or deflect painful experiences. In the appendix to this article

she refers to the significance of Freud's analysis of the case of Daniel Schreber, a judge whose memoirs record his descent into psychosis. Klein uses the Schreber case as a significant example of a patient who exemplifies the process of 'splitting'. The concept of splitting reinforces the understanding of a dynamic in Klein's thought in which the inner world, from the earliest age, is characterised by a process involving division and negation, introjection and projection. The transference between inner and outer reality is a process which Klein believes can be productively returned to, and assessed through the reparative strategies of the depressive position and subsequent emotional development. The drive to unity is notable, but does not detract from the recognition of the inevitability, and indeed necessity of splitting in all psychological development, as well as its manifestation in the delusions of psychotic patients like Schreber.²⁷

Destructive instincts

In her 1955 paper, 'Envy and Gratitude', Klein focuses on how these emotional states in particular are related to the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions.²⁸ Here, the idea of envy as a destructive emotion is connected to the infantile envy of the breast, thus qualifying the significance of penis envy as elaborated by Freud. Klein challenges and displaces emphasis on the authority of the father and patriarchal symbolism. For Klein, 'Envy is the angry feeling that another person possesses and enjoys something desirable – the envious impulse being to take it away, or spoil it.'²⁹ She relates this to the baby's experience at the breast. This is summarised by Segal in her account of Klein's work: 'Since the infant idealizes the breast in phantasy, when he is deprived he assumes that the riches he attributes to the breast are enjoyed by the breast itself.'³⁰

Paraphrased, the distinction between jealousy and envy that is important for Klein, is that the former involves anxiety about the loss of an object, whilst envy desires what the other already has and seeks to destroy the other's enjoyment of his/her object.³¹ Klein uses cultural references to support this definition of specific negative impulses. She refers to Othello and comments that William Shakespeare does not always seem to differentiate between envy and jealousy.³² Segal helps us understand the distinctions which are important for Klein: 'Envy is more primitive than jealousy; it arises in a part-object relation and is not related to a triangular situation. Jealousy is a more sophisticated feeling belonging to the Oedipal triangle'.³³

Segal shows how Klein's ideas relate to her concept of the paranoid-schizoid position, and beyond this Segal also shows how Klein's work develops Freud's ideas about the authority of the superego:

Envy attacks the good object and, by projection and fragmentation, makes it bad: therefore it produces a state of confusion between good and bad, which is at the root of many psychotic confusions... The more the good internal object is destroyed, the more impoverished the ego feels, and this in turn increases envy. The projection of envy onto the object gives rise to an envious super-ego.³⁴

From Ruth Kjär to 'On Identification': Kleinian theory and creativity

I turn now to look in more detail at the application of Klein's ideas to culture. We have seen how she took an interest in Freud's account of da Vinci in her essay 'Early Analysis', and how she related Ravel's opera to a process of repairing damaged objects in her 1929 essay. The idea of art as therapeutic is key in the development of Kleinian art theory by her contemporaries such as Ella Sharpe, Marion Milner and Riviere; and subsequent theorists including the analyst Segal and the art historian Stokes.³⁵ Klein's 1929 essay also illustrates how depression can be related to the creative impulse, with discussion of a case in which a woman, the painter Ruth Kjär, discovered her artistic impulse after being struck with melancholy. The transformation of Kjär was recounted, Klein tells us, by her friend Karion Michaelis. The change occurred after Kjär had been overcome by sadness coinciding with, and apparently caused by, the appearance of an empty space left on her wall after the removal of a picture which had been lent to her. As Klein says, 'The blank space on the wall caused her to forget her beautiful home, her happiness, her friends, everything.'³⁶ However, Kjär then discovered her own creative impulse, filling the space with her own work. It was as if she was suddenly addressing the emptiness inside herself, actively repairing her internal world instead of simply purchasing another external object. Kjär's paintings included 'an old woman bearing the mark of years and disillusionments'.³⁷ According to Klein, Kjär had not just decided to address her internal world, but this manifested the desire to repair damage inflicted on her mother as an infant, a destructive impulse retained by the unconscious.

The Kleinian theory of art involves recognising the intimate relation between destructive, fragmenting impulses and the possibility

of synthesis and unification achieved through depression. Thus, the recovery from depression is connected to the recovery from the destructive impulses contained in the paranoid-schizoid phase. Segal elaborates that the artist, like the psychoanalytic patient, is engaged in confronting his/her inner pain and anxiety, and in seeking to repair this inner world.³⁸ This path should not be taken too literally, as might be suggested by the Kleinian emphasis on restoring the internalised parents, or at a more primary level the mother's breast as a good internal object. While Kjær's art had some correspondence at the level of content with the figure of her mother, the burden of this approach to aesthetics is to recognise how inner feelings of well-being, on the one hand, and conflict (hate, destruction and fear), on the other hand, are transferred to internal and external objects. This idea builds on Freud's notion of sublimation, in which the individual must find substitute objects for destructive and damaging impulses. Klein pays intense attention to the way in which creativity is necessary in order for the individual to overcome the damaged inner world.

Klein returns to the analysis of a cultural text in her paper 'On Identification',³⁹ which elaborates her work 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms'. 'On Identification' is an account and an analysis of Julian Green's contemporary novel, *If I Were You*, translated into English in 1950.⁴⁰ In this story a young man makes a pact with the Devil which gives him the possibility of becoming other people. On the one hand, the story may be taken as a terrifying account of unstable identity, and a giddy journey of the protagonist into a vampire-like persona. On the other hand, one can extract from this story a more positive sense of how the self is formed through mediation with other people: it is a parable which shows how the protagonist learns from his nightmarish journey through other selves. Klein is predisposed to this kind of balanced response. The analysis clearly reveals her reworking of Freudian ideas and the application of her key concepts to a narrative text.

Klein derives a balanced reading of the novel partly because she relates it to her emphasis on the importance of 'integration'. At one level the protagonist's quest is futile because it involves a series of substitutions for his real needs. He becomes various people, but these transformations do not address the primary source of his unhappiness. The primary problem, according to Klein, is a threat directed at his relationship to an internalised 'good object'. In joining with the Devil, Fabian takes on negative characteristics, which negate and damage his internalised goodness. According to Klein, he is launched on this quest because of frustration in his relationship with both parents. The Devil represents,

then, his most negative and self-destructive impulses, and the impossibility of full integration is an explanation of why Fabian eventually dies. However, Klein also sees hope in the story. Fabian dies happily with reparative feelings towards mother and father, thus achieving a level of integration. Klein argues that in the course of the novel Fabian is 'working through the depressive and paranoid-schizoid positions', and she goes on to say on the same page:

As a result of overcoming the fundamental psychotic anxieties of infancy, the intrinsic need for integration comes out in full force. He achieves integration concurrently with good object relations and thereby repairs what had gone wrong in his life.⁴¹

Klein's account emphasises the relevance of infantile states throughout the narrative. For instance, she discusses an episode in the novel in which the protagonist is intoxicated by a woman who serves in a bakery. Klein uses Freudian concepts to analyse the situation. She refers, for example, to the way in which the situation is Oedipalised. Fabian-Fruges (this has become his name because he has already adapted another person's identity) is consumed by his desire for the woman, and cannot bear to watch her intimacy with another man, which Klein relates to the concept of the primal scene. Alongside these concepts, however, we also have Klein's characteristic emphasis on the primacy of the relationship to the mother. Take, for instance, her remarks:

I believe that the whole shop turns in his mind into the feeding mother. He is engrossed in looking at a large basket of fresh rolls and stretches his hand out towards them when he hears a woman's voice asking him what he wants.⁴²

Here, again, a significant narrative action is seen to express a fundamental structure familiar from Klein's other writings. She stresses that Fabian's frustrations, which lead him to trample the bread and to his compulsive eating, represent 'anal-sadistic attacks', and 'cannibalism' and 'oral-sadistic impulses' directed towards the mother's body.⁴³ Klein places these destructive impulses alongside one another. Thus, as Segal explains, Klein takes up the Freudian chronology of oral and anal stages of development prior to the Oedipus complex, but she moves away from the idea of a strict division between these phases.⁴⁴ Instead of this chronology, she ultimately places these impulses within the framework afforded by her concepts of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive

positions. While she makes us aware of the Oedipal aspects of Fabian's meeting with this woman, Klein's primary emphasis is on a deluge of different destructive impulses that can all ultimately be understood as manifestations of the paranoid-schizoid position.

Klein situates the Oedipus complex in a fluid way that recognises its manifestation alongside the earliest destructive impulses, with the complex emerging more fully after the child has passed through the depressive position. Failure to pass through the depressive position is likely to result in more severe Oedipal trauma because the child is unable to respect the autonomy of the parents onto whom love and hate are projected. Klein emphasises 'envy' and 'jealousy' as the dominant passions to be recognised in the early stages of the Oedipus complex. She relates Fabian-Fruges' 'passionate jealousy of the man who he believes possesses the baker-woman at night'⁴⁵ to more primitive destructive impulses. Essentially what Klein is describing are the protagonist's self-destructive impulses towards his internalised 'good object' – the mother's breast, and following this, the mother herself. Klein's theory entails recognising how in the depressive position a sense of guilt about aggression can lead to a transformation of bad objects so that these become a source of self-knowledge.⁴⁶ Her emphasis on the initial identification with the mother can be understood as a picture of an internal source of well-being in the child that takes many forms of imaginative association and transformation. All the qualities which, according to Klein, follow from successful early object relations – trust, hope, a sense of goodness and well-being – can be abstracted from her hypotheses about infantile imagination.⁴⁷ This means that the idea of identity and goodness is predicated on an internalised relationship to external desired objects.

Klein notes the ambiguity of the ending of the novel: Fabian regains his former self, who had been asleep in bed for three days, before he dies. Klein comments:

Perhaps the author intends us to take the whole story as representing Fabian's phantasies during the illness preceding his death? This would imply that all the characters were figures of his inner world and again illustrate that introjection and projection were operating in him in closest interaction.⁴⁸

For Klein, then, introjection refers to the way in which aspects of another person are internalised, but this may involve achieving characteristics that had previously been projected. She recognises the to and fro of the

personality involved in releasing qualities onto other objects, and people, and holding external qualities within. Having described this process she emphasises the way in which Fabian as a character 'literally leaves his self and enters into his victim'.⁴⁹ Thus, for Klein, the final integration of Fabian's emotions is so significant that the ending can be viewed as revealing that the whole story was situated within his psyche, and is, in effect, a parable about the process of splitting and integration.

Kleinian theory and Bergman's *Wild Strawberries*

Klein's praise for Green's novel focuses on his ability to convey universal unconscious psychic processes. However, she does not argue that Fabian and the Devil are two sides of the author's personality. Instead, her understanding of how the text is created from the unconscious avoids a transparent psychoanalytical diagnosis of the author's expression, and leaves open the question of how extensively the processes expressed in the story are relevant to the readers. In effect, Klein maintains an implicit respect for the autonomy of artists because she does not offer an interpretation of the author's personality. However, she does evaluate this work positively because it displays sensitive expression of processes normally locked in the unconscious. In this way, value is placed on the artist's ability to engage with his/her inner world and find the resources for the imaginative elaboration of universal processes.⁵⁰

The Seventh Seal, which preceded *Wild Strawberries*, established Bergman's reputation internationally as a director aspiring to express universal themes of death and anxiety in a highly symbolic form, and as a sophisticated exponent of melancholy. These are the films which appeared to create Bergman's status as an auteur for art house audiences around the world. While *The Seventh Seal* personifies death, *Wild Strawberries* begins with the elderly protagonist apparently haunted by dreams of death. As we shall see, it is not just the presence of death, as a theme, which evokes comparisons with Klein's work but also the film can be related to the metapsychology which surrounds this concept in the work of Klein and her followers. The dominant theme of the film is not, in fact, death, but the troubles of Isak's life, as a whole, with particular attention to his failure to find greater emotional and imaginative contact with others. The film begins with a monologue of Isak's thoughts, which he is writing in a diary:

Our relations with other people mainly consist of discussing and judging our neighbour's character and behaviour. For me this has

led to a voluntary withdrawal from virtually all so-called social intercourse.

The anxiety around ideas of death is part of an underlying emotional torrent about life that emerges intermittently in the film through access to Isak's imagination in the forms of dreams and memories. *Wild Strawberries* relates to Kleinian ideas at a structural level, as well as the convergence around death and inner conflict. Like the story analysed by Klein in 'On Identification', *Wild Strawberries* is a narrative about the instability of identity. In contrast to Green's story, the film has a realist focus on consistency in Isak's self-understanding, but the use of imaginative shifts into his subjective world throws his secure identity into chaos, just as happened to Fabian through his encounter with his victims. We do not see Isak transformed into other people, but we do see how his relationship to others is buried in the past, and this continues to emerge in unpredictable, startling form. Like Klein's diagnosis of the resolution in Ravel's opera and like Klein's account of the reparative process in her case studies, Isak must face up to his imaginative world.

The structure of the film with its alternation of Isak's internal world and external reality is significant as stream-of-consciousness cinema, and it has been duly noted how Bergman is influenced significantly by Strindberg in this respect.⁵¹ This structural patterning of the narrative is also known more generally through modernism, and a wide range of possible comparisons are possible. A silent film which clearly had a big influence on Bergman was Victor Sjöström's *The Phantom Carriage* (1921).⁵² The pattern of moving between inner and outer worlds also compares, I would suggest, to the Kleinian emphasis on the interplay between the infant and his/her first objects. Bergman appears intuitively to represent some of the processes described and analysed by Klein, including the significance of phantasy as an expression of emotional, internal conflict and ultimately as a resource for self-understanding. Bergman, like Klein, recognises, through the character of Isak, a deep-rooted negativity, akin to Klein's all-encompassing concept of the death drive that takes various forms, and includes imagining his own death. Furthermore, in his preoccupation with subjectivity Bergman could be said to raise issues that surround narcissism. An initial clue to this is present in the fact that the protagonist's initials are those of the director, and we should also note that Bergman explained the film in relation to himself.⁵³ As Jörn Donner puts it, the film involves a 'journey towards the center of the ego' by Isak Borg.⁵⁴ In the early nightmare sequence this journey within is figured directly, as Isak meets his double in a

coffin. In keeping with the development of ideas about narcissism by Freud and Klein, we find that the subjective world that confronts Isak in his nightmare is not just represented as an indulgent departure from reality, but instead, despite the film's 'mellowness', angst is a fundamental constituent of the subjective reality.⁵⁵

Klein focused on splitting within introjection and projection, but we can also see that the term 'splitting' is appropriate for the division between the inner and the outer as separate worlds. The whole of *Wild Strawberries* can be regarded as a process imbued with 'splitting', signified by the disruption of the ongoing narrative with Isak's imaginings and memories. As Robin Wood points out after Isak's nightmare:

actual encounters, further dream, daydream-cum-memory (for Isak 'remembers' scenes at which he wasn't in fact present) – are like the pieces of a jig-saw that Isak, jolted by his own subconscious sense of human failure (the dream) to a new vigilance, must learn to put together in order to pass through self-awareness to salvation.⁵⁶

It is worth noting here how Riviere in her application of Kleinian theory to literature makes the connection between dream and memory, a fusion that defines Isak's inner world: 'It can be said perhaps that the nearest a normal person, at any rate in Western culture, comes to conscious realization of his own inner world is through the process of memory.'⁵⁷

The dreams and memories in *Wild Strawberries* go against the grain of a narrative structure built around Isak's collection of a special 'jubilee' award, which honours 50 years since his graduation, and the physical journey he makes to collect this award in Lund. The content of the subjective sequences convey that the source of conflict is deeper than a few bad memories of actual events. Despite the verisimilitude of Isak's memories, expressed through dreams, these recollections are more significant as an expression of Isak's emotions contained within his inner world. As Riviere stresses, memories contain, above all, significant emotional experiences.⁵⁸ Isak's emotions include his desires and his regrets, and the subjective sequences which reveal these emotions are echoed by conflicts and divisions in his conscious world as he travels to Lund.

In the early nightmare sequence, Isak dreams of a walk in the city, in which he is persecuted by an anonymous agency that heralds his death. This sequence conveys a frenzy of destruction and ominous signs in the form of objects carrying a mysterious threat. These threats evoke Klein's concept of the paranoid-schizoid because Isak feels that he is

being assailed by the world itself, and this negativity resides inside his psyche. In the nightmare, a stranger whom he meets is revealed as a mannequin that falls and bleeds profusely in the street. Isak looks at a clock, noticing that it has no hands, and then looks at his own watch and notices the same impairment. A carriage with no driver is revealed, carrying a coffin and careers before Isak, with a wheel spinning off and crashing into a lamp post. The carriage releases the coffin, which contains a figure who is revealed to be Isak's double, dressed in the clothes he will wear for the ceremony in Lund.⁵⁹ The double appears to draw Isak into the coffin. In sum, the dream expresses his fear of his own mortality at the age of 78, but also appears to reanimate a deep-rooted anxiety. Bergman, like Klein, focuses on a fear of annihilation, which is elemental. As Frank Gado notes, the screech of the carriage wheels which carry the coffin sound like a baby's cry,⁶⁰ which suggests that Bergman is drawing on ideas of infantile anxiety. More than this, he is connecting the fear of death to Isak's complete personal history. As Riviere argues, 'when one fears one's own death, it is all that one will lose, one's "life" – in both senses – one's present breath of life, and one's "past life" out of which one's identity is constituted'.⁶¹ It is in keeping with this understanding that the film involves Isak's turning from his immediate fears of death to the way his past has been constituted through relations with others. Whilst some of the symbolism of the opening is taken up later in the film, the abstraction of the nightmare symbolism also means that Bergman leaves space for the audience to find their own connections.

The nightmare sequence has often been praised for its innovative form: surrealist imagery, sound effects, including at one point Isak's amplified heartbeat, and the high contrast of the black and white cinematography, which recalls the Gothic expressionism of silent cinema. Here we should note how Kleinian theory has been adopted to analyse artistic form. Stokes argues that:

negative expressions may figure successfully in art only if there is present as well a reparative nucleus: one sign of it, we have said, is a richness or excellence attributed to the medium: perhaps not to medium but at any rate to art in general. Indeed, it is because there is excellence in art's succinctness and pattern that some trends which are usually inhibited can so freely be displayed: this is part of the bringing together, of a coalescence that provides an emblem to the difficult organization of the ego. Art is a powerful means for the harmless expression of aggressive trends.⁶²

Stokes' argument relates to existing theories of art, including emphasis on the power of form to find expression through a specific medium and also the potential of art for sublimating violence. What is most relevant for understanding this nightmare sequence is his understanding of these aesthetic ideas in relation to the concepts of Kleinian metapsychology. Stokes argues that the artist is involved in repairing lost and damaged objects as in the depressive position, but also that form must convey more elemental, manic processes, which for Stokes are connected back to the infant's first experience of the breast. For Stokes, art must achieve self-containment through control of form and connect beyond this with external reality through less controlled expression. Acknowledging the impact of social context and artistic tradition, Stokes feels that the most fundamental contact with the external world signified by art is a sublimation of the infant's earliest experience in the paranoid-schizoid phase. Whilst the art work as a whole harmonises and placates destructive impulses, in places it should give full expression to destructive impulses. The terror and screeching of the wheels in Isak's nightmare suggest that he experiences a manic sense of attack. The unpredictable images and sudden changes in angle reveal chaos at the level of form. At the same time the distinctive aesthetic properties of this sequence, including its elemental connection to the film medium, conveyed through overexposure, provide a sense of control and unity. Across the film, the episodes focussed on Isak's subjectivity show how fantasies can be gratifying and terrifyingly animate, but these episodes also exhibit Bergman's control over the film medium in their stylised departure from the realism of the ongoing story.⁶³

The film continues with the story of Isak's journey to Lund. In preparation for this we see his dependency on Agda, his housekeeper, and his conflictual dialogue with her. There is a sense of humour in the presentation of Agda mocking Isak whilst caring for him. Then Marianne appears. She is Isak's daughter-in-law, who has been staying with him, and they travel together in the car to Lund. As with Agda, we see that Isak has an argumentative relationship with Marianne, who accuses him of egotism and a lack of feeling. Thus, the dialogue and the development of the narrative build on Isak's initial monologue and the nightmare sequence, to suggest that his inner self is not immediately as sympathetic as we may suppose from his appearance as a slightly frail and lonely old man. We understand that his relationship with others involves conflict, but also carries the potential for greater mutuality.

When Isak decides to stop at a house where his family lived in the summer, he experiences a daydream in which he returns to his past,



Figure 2.1 *Wild Strawberries*, Svensk Filmindustri, Tartan Video. Isak's brother courts Sara at the wild strawberry patch

appearing as an omniscient onlooker. The scene begins as Isak returns to the wild strawberry patch outside the house. This is the location in which, as Isak remembers, his brother Sigfrid seduced his cousin Sara. Isak relives this scene from a voyeuristic perspective, unseen by the others. The key point is that the return to the strawberry patch evokes Isak's feelings of jealousy and loss, as Sigfrid displaces Isak in Sara's affections. This sequence also establishes Isak's passivity as an onlooker, and this is understood as a displacement of his emotions.

From a psychoanalytic perspective, the symbol of the wild strawberries has been understood in various ways. Sheldon Bach's analysis bears the hallmarks of Kleinian theory: 'The strawberry patch here represents the maternal breast to which one returns with a sense of familiarity and where one feeds, falls asleep and dreams.'⁶⁴ Bach does not focus on this symbol as a sublimation of the sibling rivalry which Isak remembers, but rather Bach goes on to argue that the symbolic content of Isak's phantasies involves anxiety about the parental couple and childbirth. Bach's argument is supported by the way in which the film finishes, with Isak's

nostalgic image of his parents. This is a tranquil, serene image distant from the abstraction and chaos in the nightmare sequence and Isak's painful memories of his loss of Sara. In the initial daydream, Isak as a boy and his father are not seen because they are by the riverside fishing and have not heard the call to the breakfast table, whilst in the film's climax the parents magically appear in Isak's thoughts and salute him. Thus, the attainment of a nostalgic grasp of the past is more complete. Whilst Isak's return to the past uncovers painful emotions, including jealousy of his brother, the imagery of this daydream and the finale are, relatively speaking, more realistic than the initial nightmare, and signify the possibility of greater integration of Isak's subjective world. This fits with the idea that the individual makes progress through recovering painful emotions and, ultimately, through developing a more realistic idea of the parents' presence in the inner world of memory and emotion. It is striking that in this film Bergman intuitively envisages resolution in a manner that corresponds with Klein's account of the parents as the key internal figures who must be restored in the subjective world. Nevertheless, this idea of the parents should not be taken too literally, and we find that both Klein and Bergman understand that any object may be transformed through imagination to become a potent motif in the inner world.

The wild strawberries can be understood as a key symbol in Isak's sublimation of past desires and emotions. Here, it is an image that cues the recovery of the past but also confrontation with past losses. It is a poignant image of sensuous pleasure which also suggests transience. This is consistent with the cultural connotations that, as Elizabeth Cowie notes, have been attached to wild strawberries as a motif in Swedish culture, in which they have carried associations of innocence as well as the passing pleasures of the Swedish summer.⁶⁵ Furthermore, as Philip and Kersti French explain, in Swedish culture there is a traditional idea that every child will discover his/her own special area in the form of a 'wild strawberry patch'.⁶⁶ As Cowie comments, in Isak's dream the strawberries are 'spilled'.⁶⁷ The conjunction of a narcissistic reverie of the past and a sense of destructive loss is focused on through the motif of the fruit. Bergman's interest in this symbolism is also seen in some of his other films, in which the Swedish summer is a significant narrative setting, and in his specific use of wild strawberries to represent innocence in a dangerous world in *The Seventh Seal*.

Wild Strawberries proceeds to depict some of the causes of Isak's inner anxiety. The initial daydream progresses as Isak, an invisible visitor from the present, observes the laughter and gaiety of others at his family

gathering, at the breakfast table, to celebrate his uncle Aron's birthday. His mother is an authoritative presence, but fails to control the chaos which ensues after the flirtation between Sara and Sigfrid is revealed. Next Isak witnesses, in the hallway, Sara's reflections on why she is torn between himself and Sigfrid. From this scene we gain an understanding that Isak is too serious compared with his brother. However, the diagnosis is not precise because what drives the film here is emotion as much as analysis, and in particular a turn to the past that echoes the ideas of melancholy and mourning foregrounded by Klein. Isak himself speaks of his memories in relation to these concepts, introducing the daydream by saying that he feels 'a trifle melancholy' and concluding it by saying 'I was overcome by a feeling of emptiness and mournfulness'. These feelings can be judged from Klein's theory as part of Isak's recovery of his damaged inner world. The possibility of development and change within this emotional landscape depends on the interplay between his conscious and unconscious worlds.

The striking way in which these worlds overlap is confirmed when Isak wakes from his daydream to meet a young woman who is the double of his childhood sweetheart, Sara. Played by the same actress, Bibi Andersson, the second Sara, who lives in Isak's childhood house, engages him in a playful, flirtatious conversation and he agrees to give her and her two male friends a lift to Lund when he continues the journey with Marianne. The second Sara is like the recovered object, discussed in psychoanalytical accounts of mourning, the imaginative process that Klein believes is essential in the transition towards greater integration. The mirroring of the internal and the external world is developed further because Sara's two male companions echo the rivalry of Sigfrid and Isak for their cousin Sara. Bergman's narrative technique develops the skilful interweaving of these relationships but also the dynamic of underlying impulses that dominate Isak's psyche, including his fascination for the childhood sweetheart Sara, and his anxieties about achieving reciprocal and fulfilled relationships with others. The conflict between the two young men, Anders and Viktor, is presented in ways that are humorous and philosophical as they argue about the nature of reality, but these echo a more acute sense of conflict in relationships, initially signified by Isak in his remarks, at the start of the film, about the difficulty of relations with others, and in the revelation of his feelings of rivalry with his brother Sigfrid.

The physical journey on which the narrative is based is a structure which encompasses Isak's acquisition of knowledge and insight. However, it is not exclusively Isak who gains in understanding but also

other characters, including Marianne. Both characters harbour melancholy secrets, which are brought out into the open through the course of the film. The sense of melancholy is juxtaposed to a playful gaiety represented by Sara and her two male companions. Humanistically, the film conveys that a tragic current, which can be compared to Klein's death drive, is dispersed through a range of relationships and phenomena. Tragic destruction is signified as an impersonal, accidental force when Isak's car collides with another, but the negativity, which the film focuses on, is located inside the characters. Everyone survives, and it is made clear that the crash does not after all signify the malign power of chance and accident. Instead, the incident creates a momentary sense of an impersonal destructive force and foreboding before transferring this sense of negativity into the representation of the couple whose car crashed into Isak's. The couple with whom Isak collided are the Almans. Following the accident, Isak gives them a lift because of the damage to their car. This provides an opportunity for Bergman to show that this couple represent a different kind of annihilation, tied to self-destruction in their competitive, failing marriage, with a strong emphasis on the heartless egotism of the husband. The competitive element is striking and was a feature of human nature that Klein related to destructive infantile emotions.⁶⁸ Eventually Marianne insists that they leave because they present a bad example to the young fellow passengers. The Almans depart, confessing their shame. However, the negativity is balanced by a reparative element. As Gado notes, the Almans provide a comparison with other failing relationships depicted later in the film.⁶⁹ Marianne's relationship with Evald and Isak's relationship with his wife are, thus, tied in with the theme of a psychological strife under the surface of this civilised society.

When Isak stops at a garage in an area where he worked as a young doctor, the garage attendant is overjoyed to see him and shows great respect for the work he did in that area. The garage attendant, played by Max von Sydow in an unusual cameo role, suggests to his wife that they should name their baby after Isak. This digression in the plot looks ahead to the empathy involved in the film's resolution, drawing on the caring side of Isak's work to show that he is not always as egotistical as Marianne has alleged. It is also a cue for Isak to look confused, realising that this was a point in his life when he achieved more in his contribution to other people, a point well illustrated by Sjöström's masterful, understated, but expressive representation of momentary bewilderment. However, even here the negative pole of the film's emotional dialectic is lurking in the background. As Gado points out, we learn later that at this time Isak's wife was having an affair.⁷⁰

The emotional substratum of the film moves towards equilibrium in the ensuing scene. Having stopped their journey for a meal, Isak sympathises with Anders in his argument with Victor about God. Over the meal, Isak recites a poem about a loving divine presence, and the others join him in reciting this well-known verse.⁷¹ Certainly this can be viewed as part of Isak's journey to a more integrated state of mind, capable of reparation and empathy towards others, and expresses Bergman's intimacy with religious belief. However, the scene is not a resolution. Its impact is qualified by its place within the overall structure of the film and the abstract, imaginative quality of the poem's lines addressed to an unknown friend. According to Harvey R. Greenberg, Isak is not here expressing religious conviction, as Sara suggests, but 'a painful conversion'.⁷² Isak tells the others that he must visit his mother who is nearby, and Marianne asks to join him.

When Isak and Marianne arrive at his mother's house there are ominous dark skies. During this scene there are repeated medium close-ups of Marianne observing the interaction between mother and



Figure 2.2 *Wild Strawberries*, Svensk Filmindustri, Tartan Video. Isak recites a poem at lunch

son. These register that Marianne understands that Isak's emotional coldness derives from his mother, and that this also explains the alienation of her husband, Evald, Isak's son. Marianne's observation of Isak and his mother contributes to her emotional understanding of her own husband's inner world and by implication her own. It is important for the viability of Kleinian analysis to recognise the emphasis on reciprocity between increased knowledge of the external world through observation, for instance, and integration of the individual's inner world. This scene is a further example of the way the progress of the narrative corresponds to an increased sense of realism allied to greater integration of inner and outer worlds. This occurs progressively through the film as Isak in particular becomes more self-aware about his past disappointments and their emotional implications. In this case, the move to integration occurs as Marianne's understanding is extended through perception. Although Marianne's perception is presented as an isolated moment, and at this stage her thoughts are not conveyed to the audience, her subjectivity gains a stronger foothold in the narrative, alongside the focus on Isak's consciousness.



Figure 2.3 Wild Strawberries, Svensk Filmindustri, Tartan Video. Marianne watches intensely as Isak meets his mother

The scene has been criticised for the negative representation of Isak's mother.⁷³ However, the attention paid here to Marianne's subjectivity undermines the idea that this is a completely male-centred narrative. Bergman, like Klein, strives for a 'universal' level. While the possibility of achieving universalism is obviously open to question, it has to be acknowledged that in this scene there is a clear attempt to signify complexity, interiority and a more general, shared plane of experience. Marianne is projecting her own concerns, however insightful and justified. We should understand that she, like Isak, is a character in a state of flux. This sense of uncertainty is maintained to the end of the film, as Marianne and Evald's relationship is unresolved at the climax. Returning to the representation of Isak's mother, it can be observed that, although her character conveys emotional coldness, the narrative momentum does not present this as a revelatory cause behind Isak's emotional difficulties. Instead, there is still an element of mystery maintained in this scene as the mother shows Isak her father's watch, which has no hands. This is a haunting reminder of Isak's nightmare, and thus connects with a broader sense of alienation. The mother has a chilling presence and an arrogant appearance, but in the brevity of the scene, and the symbolism of the clock, we are given the impression that both she and Isak are lonely characters, and that the lack of emotional warmth in their lives is bound up with a wider context.

According to Klein, the development of greater integration is not a linear process with a clear-cut end. The paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions reappear throughout the individual's life, although with less ferocity if the depressive position has been successfully experienced. All the characters in *Wild Strawberries*, and not just Isak's mother in particular, who only appears in cameo, live in the shadow of an emotional deficit, even if their world appears to be one of bourgeois civility. Underneath even the closest family relationships there is turmoil, ultimately encapsulated in a force that is antithetical to life. Bergman is not so focused on establishing a single origin for the malaise that affects Isak, but rather suggests that in a way, these problems are integral to life, including a sense of loss that can be accentuated through loneliness and/or ageing and frustration in a marriage.

Shortly after the visit to his mother's house, Isak's third flight into subjectivity is developed through another daydream, which provides the most complex presentation of his inner anxieties and is charged with a range of painful psychological issues. Falling asleep as Marianne is driving, Isak dreams again that he is at the wild strawberry patch

where, as a 78-year-old, he meets the Sara of his childhood. This is no reverie. The narcissistic submersion of painful realities is dramatised and exposed as she holds up a mirror and asks him to confront the truth as she declares her love for his brother. The sequence goes on to combine loosely associated episodes foregrounding Isak's pain and humiliation.

We see Sara nursing her sister's baby beneath a dark, melancholy night sky. When Isak follows and looks on at the empty cot, the theme of his loss is expressed through the imagery. He proceeds to look on from outside the house at Sara and Sigfrid, who are in evening dress. She has taken Sigbritt's baby safely inside and plays the piano before embracing Sigfrid. Isak looks on and turns the pain of this perception inwards as he pierces his hand on a nail in the wall. Next, the sequence extends to the subject of his career as, bizarrely, he is ushered into the building by Alman, the failed husband of the car crash. Now, Alman is an authoritative patriarchal figure testing Isak on his proficiency as a doctor with the young characters, Sara, Anders and Viktor in the audience. When Isak is asked to treat a female patient, he pronounces her dead, but then she is revealed to be a double of Berit, Alman's wife, who throws back her head in manic laughter. Alman gives the verdict that Isak is not only incompetent but also lacks the human qualities to be a doctor. He then leads Isak to a space in the woods which is lit like a stage by the moonlight, in which they witness a scene in which Isak's wife, Karin, meets her lover. Isak sees how the lover overpowers his wife, but also how she throws her head back in laughter, like Berit did on the operating table. Karin then declares that if Isak is informed of the incident, he will be full of forgiveness, but she adds that this is meaningless for her because he lacks human warmth. As Alman says, this scene is a direct replay of a situation witnessed by Isak in 1917, which he retains as a clear, distinct memory.

These events develop the focus on Isak's self-destructive impulses evident in the earlier scenes. However, in his melancholy reflection there is a confused move towards greater self-awareness. The accusations against him delivered by Alman are self-evidently the product of an overpunitive and unjust authority. Following Klein's account of the need to recognise and then transform a punitive superego, we can allow that there is perhaps a sense of cathartic release, a working through of the depressive position, in the flickering awareness that Isak's persecution is excessive. The verdict from Alman that Isak is 'guilty of guilt' refers to a world in which conflict lurks underneath appearances, but is also absurd. Isak's anxieties have become less rooted, transferring

associations between his conscious awareness of the faults of others and the idea of self-inflicted chastisement from his inner world. The sequence reinforces the horror of Isak's nightmare at the beginning of the film, but it also moves towards a more explicit and realistic understanding of the negativity that haunts Isak. However, the most significant shift occurs in the scene that follows.

Isak wakes to see Marianne, who has stopped the car and is smoking. She tells Isak of her problems with Evald, and this is conveyed with a flashback. The theme of death returns in this scene as Evald responds to Marianne's news about her pregnancy by saying that he wants nothing to do with bringing up a child. He states that for him the purpose of life is death. Isak is troubled by this, and listens anxiously as Marianne explains the situation and how she will not give in to Evald's wish that she abandon the baby. Here is a key point in the film's thematic development as the possibility of new birth is counterposed to the various intimations of death and emotional coldness. However, the most important development is that Isak displays empathy for Marianne's predicament. This is a turn away from his desire to cut off emotional relationships and a turn outwards from his concern with lingering hurts and recriminations.

At the end of this scene as Sara, Anders and Victor present Isak with flowers, the light fades and Isak turns into a spotlight, a theatrical moment in which the realistic aesthetic of Isak's conscious life is overtaken by the stylisation associated with his dream world. This involves a stylistic and dramatic expression of the convergence between Isak's inner and outer worlds, setting up the climax in which Isak's formal triumph at the award ceremony is juxtaposed with the achievement of warmer and more intimate relationships with Agda, Marianne and Evald. This is also expressed also by the way the young people serenade Isak before he goes to bed. The internal transformation is registered by Isak. His internal monologue explains that he has learnt from the day just at the moment we see him collect his award. Admittedly this transformation maintains some ambiguity. Isak, for instance, only suggests that he can perceive causality in the day's events, without elaborating in depth on his emotions; Evald does not commit to Marianne's baby even though the couple seem to be close; and Agda refuses Isak's request that they talk to each other less formally. However, this lack of resolution can be seen as part of a commitment to realism against contrived resolution, and Isak's final dream, which he explains as his way of going to sleep, conveys, as I have said, a tranquil image of his parents and a significant change from his nightmare of death.

Critical responses to *Wild Strawberries*

This chapter has illustrated the relevance of Kleinian ideas to *Wild Strawberries*. At the same time it is necessary to engage with the critical idea that this focus on an inner world is in some respects a limitation. Various critics have considered the issue of whether *Wild Strawberries* is sufficiently negative in relation to its content. There is not the space here to survey the range of critical responses, but I wish to note several points that have implications for the Kleinian theory advanced in this chapter. Even Wood, who provides a very insightful and appreciative commentary on the film, conveys a degree of criticism in relation to Bergman's subsequent achievement with *Persona*:

In retrospect it [*Wild Strawberries*] looks on one level almost *too* complete, too self-contained in its jig-saw structure, to stand as an adequate response to the stresses of the contemporary world. Though far removed from Art for Art's Sake, it is perhaps more satisfying as a Work of Art than as a record of fully lived experience.⁷⁴

Wood wonders 'whether Bergman was working from the whole of himself?'⁷⁵ Gado argues in contrast that the film can be understood as a quest by Bergman for reconciliation with his father. He suggests that the ending shows Bergman is split between his alienation from his father – rendered through Evald's continued detachment from Isak – and an attempt to flee from this into an imaginary resolution.⁷⁶

Maria Bergom-Larsson provides a reading which is ambivalent on the basis of the film's psychoanalytical content. She notes that the film has been called 'a psychoanalysis', referring to Donner's interview with Bergman, and observes that in the film the 'tone is far more conciliatory' towards the father than, for instance, the anger against the father figure expressed in Bergman's first script, *Frenzy*.⁷⁷ Her overriding argument about Bergman's treatment of patriarchy is, however, that he is unable to free himself from patriarchal structures, including 'his image of God' 'except in a few isolated cases, when we encounter a critique which is often perspicuous but completely atomistic, never structured'.⁷⁸ Despite this Bergom-Larsson acknowledges that in *Wild Strawberries* 'the analysis' of the father is 'more penetrating and psychologically profound' (than in the earlier aggression against patriarchy in films such as *Frenzy*).⁷⁹

Johns Blackwell also shows ambivalence about the film in relation to the representation of gender. She praises one scene in particular, that in which Isak's wife is seen to reveal that her infidelity was caused by his

lack of love for her. Only at this point, according to Johns Blackwell, does the film fully question a patriarchal representation of gender. For Johns Blackwell, women are forced throughout the film to fit into a male conception of them. 'Almost all the women in the film cohere into maternity: even Agda the housekeeper nurtures her employer'.⁸⁰ Johns Blackwell goes on to argue that:

The female body is almost exclusively a site of potential or frustrated maternal plenitude for the male. That in *Wild Strawberries* the legacy of coldness and death, elsewhere in Bergman attributed to the father, is associated with the mother is a case of a projection of the failings of the father onto the mother in order to save the father so that the son might be reconciled with him.⁸¹

Finally, in relation to critical responses we should consider Bergman himself, who has explained the film in different ways at different times. In *Images* he corrects this and reinforces the sense of melancholy narcissism, stating not only that the initials refer to himself but also that the words Isak and Borg connote 'ice' and 'a fortress' respectively. Bergman looks back quite critically at his psychological motivation for the film:

The driving force in *Wild Strawberries* is, therefore, a desperate attempt to justify myself to mythologically oversized parents who have turned away, an attempt that was doomed to failure. It wasn't until many years later that my mother and father were transformed into human beings of normal proportions, and the infantile hatred was dissolved and disappeared.⁸²

The criticisms just noted challenge the Kleinian reading developed in this chapter. Wood suggests that we must turn instead to *Persona*, because too much integration in the artwork blocks off engagement with social issues. Gado denies the efficacy of the catharsis in *Wild Strawberries* due to underlying antagonism against the father. Both Bergom-Larsson and Johns Blackwell put more emphasis on the film's sublimation of patriarchal authority than the idea of a creative sublimation of the death instinct. Bergman himself suggests that the film is constrained by its lack of realism in relation to the representation of his parents.

These are significant points to take into consideration. However, we can still reaffirm the achievements of *Wild Strawberries*. We have seen how the film, like Kleinian theory is concerned with the complex development of narcissism in all its manifestations. The integration that is

so central to the film's aesthetic achievement is not total. The meta-psychology that is conveyed through imaginative sequences engages with a range of conflicts that apply beyond Isak Borg, making him in effect a kind of everyman figure. Although clearly constructed from the perspective of a male character, much of the film represents his subjectivity in crisis. Furthermore, other perspectives are developed through the assertive actions of female characters, including Marianne, Agda and Isak's wife. The Kleinian argument suggests that criticism as well as the work itself must recognise the power of both genders in the construction of the imagination.

Bergman clearly sought to continue developing new ideas about film-making after *Wild Strawberries* and moved further away from the ideas about religion that he had accepted from his familial upbringing. However, as the Kleinian analysis suggests, already in *Wild Strawberries* the reflection on his parents is subjected to sublimation and reworking, to such an extent that the image of tranquillity at the end is an isolated symbol and not representative of a dominant theme. Thus the Kleinian approach should be complemented by recognition of the degree of openness in the text, including Bergman's creative decision to use the famous Swedish film director Sjöström as his lead actor.

Donner moves towards a more socially engaged version of the humanistic understanding of *Wild Strawberries*, putting across the idea that in Bergman's work we see the transition to a more individualised society and the internal and spiritual issues that arise:

Swedish literature from the 1940s on accentuates the spiritual transformation [Donner includes a relative decline in religion as part of this transformation] by leaving behind all the collective philosophies to which the authors of the 1930s still were attracted. As an artist, B[ergman] becomes extraordinarily representative of the change, a victim of the time, and simultaneously its interpreter.⁸³

In this engagement with the psychology of individualism and its difficulties Bergman finds common ground with the Kleinian focus on the way the inner self emerges through a history that is social and emotional. *Wild Strawberries* explores and exposes the fear of death and ties this into a wide range of relationships including those experienced in infancy and old age, in the family, and between strangers. We have seen how the issues of loneliness and humiliation are countered through a focus on more empathic and emotional understanding. I have also drawn attention to the contribution to Kleinian theory of distinctive elements

including the Kleinian theory of art put forward by Stokes, which resists the idea of too much integration.

The debate about integration and about the gendered politics of the film remains nuanced and open to further argument. It is wrong to reduce all Bergman's work to one theoretical framework, given his range of influences. Kleinian theory itself does not necessarily have this ambition, as it has largely been developed within psychoanalysis, and only intermittently applied to culture. So can it be mixed with other philosophies of imagination? Alford makes an interesting argument from within Kleinian theory, suggesting that we can use the achievement of integration within an artwork for comparison with the phenomenon of resolution in our own society. This clearly depends on the spectator gaining a sense of freedom as he/she responds to and judges the text.⁸⁴ As we turn to Jean-Paul Sartre for another model, we will find points of convergence with Kleinian concepts, but also a different emphasis on the individual's engagement with society. Just as it has been psychoanalysed, *Wild Strawberries* has been interpreted in relation to existentialist thought. Birgitta Steene, for instance, comments that:

Every time Isak steps out of the car, he in a sense steps into a world that challenges him to commitment. All of his experiences during the trip from Stockholm to Lund dramatize the existential view which is the film's philosophical core: that life is not a matter of merely being a spectator or submitting it to cold analysis.⁸⁵

This echoes the concern of Kleinian theory to achieve a departure from cold analysis, as encapsulated in Isak's repressed emotional life. This search for an engaged response to external reality is also apparent in Bergman's other breakthrough film of the period, *The Seventh Seal*, with its focus on the existential predicament of a knight in a hellish world. The following chapter will consider the evolution of Sartre's ideas on imagination and the power he attributes to emotion before considering how these ideas can be applied to Bergman's *The Seventh Seal*.

3

Sartre's Theory of Imagination and *The Seventh Seal*

Sartrean and Kleinian theories provide an account of human nature which foregrounds internal division and negation. It is helpful here to recall how Jean-Paul Sartre's best-known work of philosophy, *Being and Nothingness*, employs the concepts of the 'for-itself' and the 'in-itself' to distinguish two modes of being. As a starting point we can see that the 'for-itself' refers to consciousness, and the 'in-itself' refers to matter. However, Sartre's theory is more complex than this. For example, consciousness may assume an idea of itself as being thing-like, of a fixed and determinate nature. Sartre challenges this as a form of false consciousness, an evasion of freedom and a denial of the truth contained in the very concept of the 'for-itself'. However, this does not mean that consciousness can deny its inherent relationship with the 'in-itself'. We cannot deny material factors, including the self's relation to the body. For Sartre, in *Being and Nothingness*, we must understand the internal relationship between the 'for-itself' and the 'in-itself'. Thus, negation is placed at the heart of being, and the Sartrean model, like Kleinian theory, believes that knowledge requires engagement with an ineradicable division within human nature.¹

There seems, nevertheless, to be an immediate gulf between Sartrean and Kleinian theories on account of Sartre's opposition in *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* and *Being and Nothingness* to the Freudian concept of the unconscious. Sartre insists in *Being and Nothingness* on the power of the individual's self-consciousness. He writes, 'If we reject the language and materialistic mythology of psychoanalysis, we perceive that the censor in order to apply its activity with discernment must know what it is repressing'.²

This belief in the power of consciousness is articulated through Sartre's criticism of a state of mind, which he calls 'bad faith'. I will return to

this well-known concept later in this chapter. Critics believe that Sartre concentrates on free will at the expense of recognising social influences, which can impact on the subject without his/her awareness. His individualism has been viewed as extremely problematic for a sense of social context. Michael Rustin, for instance, argues from a Kleinian perspective that Sartre fails to appreciate the full significance of the individual's place in society. Rustin argues that Lacanian theory and Sartrean philosophy share a view of the individual as isolated, while Kleinian psychoanalysis shows the individual's immersion in a social reality from infancy.³

Sartre is indeed preoccupied with an individualistic perspective, and, for this very reason, his work represents an alternative perspective on Bergman's films. Bergman is concerned with the mysteries of the psyche, but he is equally focused on conveying the alienation of individuals in society. *Wild Strawberries* relates to this because the narrative connects Isak's inner world to social experiences. Also, as already discussed, in *Wild Strawberries* Bergman uses the idea of death as a cue for reflection on life. Sartre engages with this issue in *Being and Nothingness* through his dialogue with Martin Heidegger's ideas about death. The language in the book suggests that Sartre accords it the same centrality as Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein, stating, 'death haunts me at the very heart of my projects as their inevitable reverse side'.⁴ However, Sartre does not believe that the concept of death delivers the truth of our existence, but rather it demarcates a boundary. Sartre insists, 'Death is not an obstacle to my projects; it is only a destiny of these projects elsewhere.'⁵ This philosophical reflection relates to Bergman's representation of individuals who establish their own 'projects' in the shadow of death. The significance of this theme is reinforced when we recognise that Bergman's international reputation was really boosted, one year prior to *Wild Strawberries*, with *The Seventh Seal*, in which death is personified. In this film a medieval knight who has returned from the Crusades with his squire finds a brutal society. The knight is preoccupied with the apparent absence of God and haunted by the figure of Death, but strives to combat this threat psychologically and through action. This subject matter and its treatment led Andrew Sarris to declare that *The Seventh Seal* 'is perhaps the first genuinely existential film'.⁶

In this chapter I will explore the relationship between Sartrean theory and Bergman's work by focusing on Sartre's early philosophical book on the imagination: *The Imaginary*. This work has received less attention than *Being and Nothingness*, but arguably it paves the way for key ideas in the latter. Sartre's approach to imagination is better known through his

own creative work including, notably *Nausea*, and his work as a cultural theorist and critic, including *What Is Literature?*. Both of these works afford points of comparison and contrast with his early philosophical study of the imagination. Sartre's work on the imagination actually begins with a short early work, *The Imagination: A Psychological Critique*, published in 1936, but this is followed by *The Imaginary* (also called *The Psychology of Imagination*), first drafted in 1937, but published in 1940. Peter Caws points out that:

It was in the second and unpublished part of *Imagination* (i.e., precisely the first draft of *The Psychology of Imagination*) that Sartre, according to Simone de Beauvoir, 'crystallized the first key concepts of his philosophy: the conscious mind as *tabula rasa*, and its capacity for annihilation (*néantisation*)'.⁷

In his early work on the imagination, but also his other early work on emotion and on the ego, Sartre challenges the idea of an inner world as conceived by a range of philosophers and psychologists. This is the beginning of Sartre's distinctive approach to the human condition. The particular interest of *The Imaginary* lies in the way that, using a phenomenological method, he distinguishes imagination as a distinctive attitude of consciousness. I will consider how his theory is developed through a range of examples, which rely on his own self-reflection, and how he is engaged in a debate with other philosophers and psychologists. By focusing on imagination, Sartre's theory compares with the Kleinian emphasis on phantasy. Both theories recognise the power of imagination in contrast to rationality and the causal power of external influences. However, as noted a moment ago, there is a significant gulf between these two theories. Sartre's rejection of the unconscious, through insistence on the reality of individualised consciousness, may be interpreted as a failure to fully acknowledge social reality. While accepting some legitimacy behind this argument, I will explore the alternative view that Sartre's theory of imagination recognises the place of consciousness within social existence, albeit filtered through an individualistic perspective. Following a study of *The Imaginary*, I will consider why commentators on Sartre's work have thought that his early reflections on the imagination are useful for a theory of art and culture. I will explore how across his work we find examples which complement and help develop his work on imagination. This broader sense of Sartre's philosophy of imagination is useful when turning to cinema, Bergman's work and the case of *The Seventh Seal*, in particular.

The Imaginary

As Dermot Moran points out, the first section of Sartre's *The Imaginary* is called 'The Certain' because René Descartes is an important influence.⁸ Like Descartes in his *Meditations*, Sartre puts his faith in reflection and self-awareness. Sartre believes that these are important sources of knowledge that must be defended against positivistic forms of science. Like Descartes, he begins with that which he thinks he can be certain of. Nevertheless, Sartre is well aware of the problems with Descartes' philosophy. As an alternative to Descartes' philosophical conclusion, in which pure consciousness and God provided the foundations of knowledge, Sartre draws on the work of the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, and yet Sartre also argues that it necessary to move beyond Husserl.

The imaginary phenomena to which Sartre refers are often images in the usual sense of the word, but also include other kinds of phenomena: fictional ideas, ideas about people who exist but are absent, hallucinations, dream imagery and external images like paintings and photographs. Sartre also refers to examples of aural imagination, and it is clear that he wishes ultimately to relate his observations to art in general. His initial agenda involves commitment to the insights of Franz Brentano and Husserl, both of whom understood consciousness as defined by intentionality. Following these thinkers, Sartre argues that all examples of consciousness involve consciousness of something, and thus consciousness is defined by its intention towards something other than itself. Sartre aims to show that imagination is like other examples of consciousness in that it also is defined through its intention towards something other than itself.⁹ One of the key subjects for attack in *The Imaginary*, and in Sartre's preceding work, *Imagination: A Psychological Critique* (1936), is what he calls 'the illusion of immanence'.¹⁰ This phrase refers to a mistake that he locates in a range of theories which appear to suggest that the object of an image is, in some way, reproduced within the image. We can see how an idealist philosopher such as Bishop George Berkeley may be guilty of such an approach, because for him existence is dependent on perception. As Beata Stawarska puts it, 'Sartre targets Berkeley's idealism for having reduced transcendent objects to their mode of appearance, and so reduced the objective world to subjective impressions.'¹¹ However, it is less clear how this applies to empiricist philosophers such as David Hume, who is also a target of Sartre's criticism.

Hume, in fact, gave imagination a very prominent role, as Gerhard Streminger has demonstrated with reference to Hume's key works. Streminger shows how Hume held imagination responsible for mistaken metaphysical ideas, but also gave it an extremely positive role in unifying disparate elements in experience. Streminger provides a range of examples, which illustrate Hume's paradoxical treatment of the imagination, informing us that:

While in the first book of the *Treatise*...the ideas of imagination cannot yet attain the vivacity of memories and experiences, in his later writings Hume already regards it as 'certain we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination'¹²

One of Hume's most famous examples is that of 'the golden mountain'. However, as Streminger points out, according to Hume there are some things we cannot imagine such as "'a mountain without a valley.'" ¹³ The example of the golden mountain illustrates a creative role for imagination, while the example of the mountain without a valley suggests a constraint.

In order to understand Hume's account of imagination, and Sartre's criticism of it, we must return to Hume's theory of the mind, in which he divides consciousness into impressions and ideas. The former are acquired directly through perception and consequently are more vivid than memories, ideas about objects or people who are absent or fictitious, and ideas like that of the golden mountain. However, for Hume all ideas are derivative of impressions and ultimately causally dependent on the channel of perception. Thus, imagination creates an image like that of the golden mountain by synthesising discrete impressions from experience.¹⁴ In *The Imaginary*, Sartre challenges this equation of the mental image with an idea derived from experience. For Sartre, this equation is a widespread fallacy, propelled by the idea that images are always, however weak, copies of real objects.

Psychologists and philosophers have mainly adopted this point of view. It is also that of common sense. When I say that 'I have an image' of Pierre, it is thought that I presently have a certain portrait of Pierre in consciousness. The object of my current consciousness is precisely this portrait, and Pierre, the man of flesh and blood, is reached only very indirectly, in an 'extrinsic' manner, only by the fact that he is what the portrait represents.¹⁵

According to Sartre, theories which suggest that mental images are portrait-like objects conflict with our understanding of the nature of consciousness:

Without doubt, the illusion of immanence was always left implicit. Otherwise it would have been understood that it was impossible to slip these material portraits into a conscious synthetic structure without destroying the structure, cutting the contacts, stopping the current, breaking the continuity. Consciousness would cease to be transparent to itself; everywhere its unity would be broken by the inassimilable, opaque screens.¹⁶

Even when imagination conjures up an image that does not correspond to an object of perception such as the golden mountain, impressions are given a formative role by Hume, who argues that the imagination freely rearranges and transfigures elements from perceptual experience. In contrast to Hume, Sartre sees the example of images that depart from perceptual experience as a clear indication that the imaginary is a distinct realm. In this, he draws on the influence of Husserl. As Stawarska indicates, Sartre turned to Husserl's example of a flute-playing centaur in *The Psychology of Imagination*.¹⁷ Sartre insists that we must follow Husserl's argument that this image is the result of the creative intentionality of the imagination, and thus detached from the influence of the empirical world and its impact on perception. The import of Sartre's argument can be expressed as follows: in trying to tie imagination to empirical data, in a strict pattern of cause and effect, philosophers like Hume have put the issue of origins before a phenomenology of experience, and have thus failed to recognise the autonomy of imagination. In endorsing Sartre's criticisms of the conventional views on imagination, Anthony Manser comments, 'The philosophers appear to have talked as if there were a central notion of mental picturing which had little or nothing to do with other things called imaginative'.¹⁸

As already noted, Hume's theory suggests that we recognise the image by the inferiority and weakness it has in contrast to perception. For Sartre, the mental image is limited, but this is not because it is a secondary form of perception or because it has been derived from perception. Instead, Sartre argues that these limitations are inherent to imagination itself and are apparent when we reflect on the nature of images.

Sartre goes further than Hume then in asserting the limitations of imagination and says that we have a strong awareness of the imagined object as something different from the perceived object:

Every consciousness posits its object, but each in its own way. Perception, for example, posits its objects as existing. The image also includes an act of belief or a positional act. The act can take four and only four forms: it can posit the object as nonexistent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere; it can also 'neutralize' itself, which is to say not posit its object as existent.¹⁹

Sartre refers to our awareness that the mental image may apply to something that has been invented, or may refer to our idea of a person or object that is missing from a location. He talks about his tangible sense of Pierre's absence when, for instance, he is not sure whether a figure walking towards him is Pierre or not. For Sartre, the mental image may also refer to our image of someone or an object, which we picture in a different locale from ourselves. The final form that Sartre attributes to the image concerns a level of self-awareness in which we are aware of imaginative capacity before an object materialises. In this case we have a spontaneous sense of the negation of perceptual content. Sartre is poetic on this point and suggests the possibility that, in this form, consciousness intuitively connects with past experiences whilst maintaining a creative, spontaneous intentionality towards the present and the future:

The consciousness appears to itself as creative, but without positing as object this creative character. It is thanks to this vague and fugitive quality that the image consciousness is not given as a piece of wood that floats on the sea, but as a wave among the waves. It feels itself to be consciousness through and through and homogenous with the other consciousnesses that have preceded it and with which it is synthetically united.²⁰

Thus, Sartre's work conflicts with theories that seek an exclusively factual or empirical basis for knowledge. He recognises different levels of consciousness, describing the form of consciousness above as 'nonthetic' consciousness of itself.²¹ This means that he is talking about an internal, 'implicit', pre-reflective sense of one's own consciousness, which is distinct from self-consciousness in the sense of reflecting on our own thoughts.²² Sartre believes that the spontaneous nature of this form of pre-reflective consciousness is conveyed through a metaphor of movement, 'waves'. In sum, although he recognises the limitations of imagination, Sartre also conveys its independent qualities.

'Image, portrait, caricature'

Sartre turns to three related, but divergent examples of imaginative consciousness: a mental image, a photographic portrait and a caricature in relation to the example of a friend, 'Pierre', which, he tells us, share the characteristic of attempting to make present a subject who is absent. In making the subject present they substitute the sensation of presence that would be provided by perception. Sartre suggests that psychology would normally distinguish the mental image as more subjective than the portrait. He accepts that the image will lack the detail found in a photographic portrait, but argues that the latter will lack the expressive qualities of the subject captured in the caricature. He says, 'something that was lacking in the photograph, life, expression, is clearly manifest in the drawing: I "regain" Pierre'.²³

Sartre points out that many theorists would regard the mental image as a different type of phenomenon from the photograph and the caricature. However, Sartre's phenomenological method involves searching for points in common between different states of consciousness. All three ways of imagining their subject share certain characteristics. In each example, consciousness is involved in the intention of creating the imaginary object. Clearly, the intentionality may vary or even be difficult to uncover, but Sartre insists that consciousness must play a critical role in creating the meaning of the absent Pierre, even when he is presented as a photograph or caricature. We must create this meaning by transcending the ensemble of sense data.

if that photo appears to me as the photo 'of Pierre', if, in some way, I see Pierre behind it, it is necessary that the piece of card is animated with some help from me, giving it a meaning it did not yet have.²⁴

Another example used by Sartre is that of a different caricature, in the form of a female performer, Franconay, impersonating a well-known jazz singer and performer, Maurice Chevalier. Sartre talks about how the consciousness of the spectator may oscillate between perceiving obvious discrepancies between the image of the performer and that which is imagined:

The imitator is small, stout, brunette; a woman, she imitates a man. The result is that the imitation is *approximate*. The object that Franconay produces by means of her body is a feeble form, which can always be interpreted in two distinct ways: I am always free to see Maurice Chevalier as imaged, or a small woman pulling faces.²⁵

Sartre talks of the way in which consciousness must synthesise the materials presented, suggesting that cognition and imagination act together.²⁶ The spectator may cognitively grasp the point of the impersonation before acquiring the image, which the performance elicits. He also recognises how emotion may play a part in the imagining of Chevalier. Since the latter is well known, Sartre perceived him before Franconay's performance, and this was accompanied by a certain 'affective reaction' (perhaps enjoyment of his performance). This emotional response may be brought back to life in the imagined Chevalier:

the affective sense of the face of Chevalier will appear on the face of Franconay. It is this that realizes the synthetic union of the different signs, it is this that animates their fixed dryness, that gives them life and a certain depth.²⁷

This allows Sartre to recognise more fully the 'expressive' nature of imagination.²⁸ While he talks about the 'spontaneity' of imagination, Sartre is clear that there are situations in which the spectator is in a hybrid state and the object of consciousness is 'neither fully perception nor fully image'.²⁹

The analogon

However, there is still the problem of determining whether Sartre is denying any form of representation within consciousness.³⁰ Sartre uses the term 'analogon' to describe the way imagination grasps something that is not a derivative from reality, but instead is a set of details which allow imagination to constitute its object. The analogon is the prop or medium for this activity. As such, it may be used to refer to the image as external object or as immaterial psychic content. Sartre states:

I will say in consequence that the image is an act that aims in its corporeality at an absent or nonexistent object, through a physical or psychic content that is given not as itself but in the capacity of 'analogical representative' of the object aimed at.³¹

This explanation replaces an idea of passive representation with a more active sense of the mind's capacity for imaginative creation.

In the case of images that are external objects, imagination invests the material of the object with its own subjectivity. In the case of immaterial mental images, imagination also reaches beyond the surface content.

In all cases imagination strives towards a signified subject. In all cases the intention behind the creation of the analogon signifies a radically different orientation from that involved in perception or cognition. External objects may become the props for the imagination at any time. In these instances, we can recognise, says Sartre, that:

The two worlds, the imaginary and the real, are constituted by the same objects; only the grouping and the interpretation of these objects varies. What defines the imaginary world, as with the real universe, is an attitude of consciousness.³²

Sartre is keen to outline the limitations of this act: how it cannot compete with the world's complexity, and how the transformation of imagined objects and people is a precarious business in which consciousness intervenes and may not be able to realise its full intentions.³³

Discontinuity and emotional projection in the imaginary

An example which Sartre provides, to illustrate the fragmented, discontinuous nature of the imagination comes in his riposte to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's claim that he could 'produce a flower as a bud, make it grow, blossom, open, close, shed its petals, etc'.³⁴ Sartre replies to this claim:

Without doubt, one can indeed make a top hat appear, and also the figure of Pierre. Perhaps one sees them simultaneously, perhaps one can even see Pierre's face below the top hat. But what one can never see as imaged is *the effect* of a top hat *on* Pierre's face.³⁵

For Sartre, the actions of the imagination have to be complemented by reflection in order to achieve unity, and he backs this up by referring to the way in which a painter will step back from his work to observe it from a different perspective.

Further on, Sartre takes up another example, which concerns desire. Mental images of food may respond to the desire to eat, and reinforce this desire. Sartre argues that we should not make the mistake, which he attributes to the illusion of immanence, of believing that the hunger stems from the images of food. These images resulted from the hunger. Hunger brought the imaginary food into the mind. The consequent images are a medium for this desire. They are determined subjectively and should not be regarded as even a secondary cause of the hunger.

Also, we should note that there are secondary, emotional, responses to the imaginary. In these responses, affective schemata come to the fore simply as a result of a second-hand account of a particular event. This is evident in another example which Sartre gives: when someone responds to hearing of a terrible event by exclaiming his/her distress with emotion that is unconvincing. Again Sartre's emphasis is on an example in which subjectivity dominates the response of the individual and constitutes how he/she takes up a particular imaginary scenario.³⁶

Sartre accepts that the imaginary can have a transformative effect on the emotional element that constituted it:

One could not therefore deny that my hunger, my sexual desire, my disgust underwent a significant modification while passing through the imaging state. They were concentrated, made more precise, and their intensity increased.³⁷

Sartre's account of the way emotion works in imagination is closely tied to his view of the way emotion works in perception. He argues, in relation to the latter, that we may project feelings onto an object through perception. He then suggests that we may have the impression of these feelings being caused by the object, so the emotion appears to be confirmed by the external source. This exchange between emotional projection and the object of perception can become an elaborate pattern of exchange back and forth: 'each affective quality is so deeply incorporated in the object that it is impossible to distinguish between what is felt and what is perceived'.³⁸ With the imaginary object, however, emotion is projected onto something which is fundamentally empty so that, according to Sartre, the irreal object can become simply the reflection of the subject's feeling: 'Feeling therefore feeds on its own reflection.'³⁹

Thus, Sartre's account of the imaginary ultimately recognises how external phenomena influence the content of imaginary experiences. Yet he does not seek to invoke a definitive set of causes or sustain a surreal idea of the imaginary as a completely spontaneous mode of consciousness. Instead, he focuses on the phenomena and experience which reveal emotion intersecting with imaginary content. Sartre also approaches the issue of how we may be gripped by an imaginary experience despite its unreality and suggests that psychological knowledge can inform our understanding of extreme states of delusion in which the imaginary takes over.

The conclusion of *The Imaginary*

In the conclusion, Sartre reiterates his central point. Referring again to his mental images of Pierre in a different location, he states that 'This fundamental absence, this essential nothingness of the imaged object, suffices to differentiate it from the objects of perception.'⁴⁰ Sartre also spells out his opposition to a deterministic form of psychology: 'For consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able to escape from the world by its very nature, it must be able to stand back from the world by its own efforts. In a word, it must be free.'⁴¹ For Sartre, imagination is a continuous possibility, a 'surpassing' of the 'real', an idea which he compares to Heidegger's concept of 'surpassing'.⁴² Imagination does not enter into nothingness, but must reduce the real to a temporary nothingness in order to bring forward the content that was previously absent. Extending this to the spectator's understanding of an artwork, it is clear that the imagined object for the spectator will be determined by his/her consciousness of the formal intentions that he/she finds in the work.⁴³

Sartre gives further examples to illustrate the distinctive mode of imaginative consciousness. He argues that in his enjoyment of a particular symphony, the imaginary object remains the same despite different performances. For example, he might judge a poor performance of the symphony as a less successful 'analogon'.⁴⁴ For Sartre, our imagined symphony is more than the symphony performed in the present, but the former is still connected to the latter. One could say the present symphony cues us for the imaginary. In evaluating Sartre's argument, Mary Warnock makes the point that we may feel he has simply dressed up what we know from common sense 'it might be objected, there is nothing very surprising in the conclusion that imagination differs from perception in that the objects of the latter are real while those of the former are not'.⁴⁵

However, Warnock defends the originality of Sartre's work:

Imagination has been *redefined*. All the definitions which made it a kind of thinking, or a kind of peering at mental entities called images, have been rejected. It has been redefined as the mode of consciousness of an object, ... which entails the bringing into fleeting existence of an appearance which fades at once to nothingness ... Man's ability to imagine things, which, of course, was never in doubt, is now shown to be connected, in its essence, with his ability to choose.⁴⁶

The relevance of Sartre's philosophy of imagination to his other work

It remains necessary to briefly consider some points from other works by Sartre as a context for applying his theory of imagination to cinema and Bergman. In *The Transcendence of the Ego*, Sartre argued against the idea that the ego is a fixed object-like entity.⁴⁷ This perspective led him to challenge even Husserl, whose theory included the concept of a transcendent ego. For Sartre, phenomenology has to recognise how the ego is continually recreated from the flow of an impersonal consciousness. Similarly in *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, Sartre criticises psychologists who talk of emotions as purely physical manifestations, and questions the idea of emotions as fixed states.⁴⁸ For Sartre, emotions are bound up with consciousness and as such reveal the intentions of subjects in relation to reality. This view is repeated in *Being and Nothingness* when Sartre states:

the empirical psychologist, while defining man by his desires, remains the victim of the illusion of substance. He views desire as being *in* man by virtue of being 'contained' by his consciousness, and he believes that the meaning of the desire is inherent in the desire itself. Thus he avoids everything which could evoke the idea of transcendence.⁴⁹

Sartre's determination to resist fixed programmatic accounts of the self, imagination and emotions has been interpreted by some as a forerunner of post-structuralism. In *The Imaginary*, Sartre noted the way imaginary experiences resist continuity, and how hallucinations differ from perceptions because they signal the disintegration of subjectivity.⁵⁰ However, Sartre remained keen to insist on the reality of the individual as an integrated unit. His vision of the fragility of individual identity is developed extensively in *Being and Nothingness*, in which it is clear that Sartre does not aim for a total dismantling of subjectivity. Internal negation is at the heart of Sartre's philosophy in *Being and Nothingness* so that subjectivity is inherently liable to division, but still can be understood as a coherent unit.⁵¹

The intricate balance between a deconstructive approach and one that maintains a sense of the individual as a coherent unit is present in Sartre's well-known discussion of bad faith in *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre's examples of bad faith include the example of a woman who leaves her hand intertwined with that of a flirtatious man, despite her

indecision about responding to his seductions. She engages the man's potential to speak in a high-minded form of love. As Sartre puts it:

She draws her companion up to the most lofty regions of sentimental speculation ... And during this time the divorce of the body from the soul is accomplished; the hand rests inert between the warm hands of her companion – neither consenting nor resisting – a thing.⁵²

This example shows how bad faith involves refusing the possibility of choice, such that the body, or in this case a part of the body, appears to signify a final decision which has not actually been made. The hand becomes object-like because it fails to represent the uncertainty and continuing evolution of the woman's consciousness in relation to her suitor. Another famous example concerns the waiter whom Sartre describes in evocative terms. According to Sartre, the waiter fails to express his freedom as consciousness 'for-itself': 'He applies himself to chaining his movements as if they were mechanisms ... he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things.'⁵³ The waiter seeks to give his role the substance that Sartre reserves for being 'in-itself'. As we know, for Sartre consciousness can never coincide with being 'in-itself', and thus, as Sartre observes the waiter's movements, Sartre recognises the intentionality, the striving for definition: 'He is playing, he is amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café.'⁵⁴

Sartre's examples read like intensely imagined, literary or cinematic, episodes. We may see the woman's hand in close-up, and we may imagine the waiter as a clearly defined character of the subplot. These individual moments provide insights into the human situation in general. Humans in any situation may conceal their freedom through objectification of the body. As Sartre's account of the relations between self and other indicates, this objectification can be projected onto someone else. In any situation a person may seek to limit his/her freedom through the fastidious playing of a particular role or dogmatic adherence to a fixed identity. Sartre compares the waiter's situation to that of a child who plays a game. For Sartre, the waiter 'plays with his body in order to *realize* it', but Sartre also compares the waiter's situation to that of many different jobs in which the public are served, ranging from the grocer to the soldier.⁵⁵

As Gary Cox highlights, Sartre is not simply discussing self-deception but rather understanding how an individual may constrain his/her freedom through self-definition.⁵⁶ The example is complicated, as

Cox points out, because the waiter could conceivably be understood as transcending bad faith. This is because he knowingly plays his role. For Sartre, bad faith can be overcome, but only when we attain awareness of the tension between our freedom to choose and the resistance provided by the external world, a tension which emerges in potentially intersubjective situations. Sartre becomes aware that he can become like the waiter if he recognises the waiter's imaginary representation. Describing the waiter's performance, Sartre says, 'It is a "representation" for others and for myself, which means that I can be he only in *representation*.'⁵⁷ Thus, the waiter becomes an analogue animated by Sartre's intention to imagine himself as a waiter:

I can be he only in the neutralised mode, as the actor is Hamlet, by mechanically making the *typical gestures* of my state and by aiming at myself as an imaginary café waiter through those gestures taken as an 'analogue'.⁵⁸

Using the concept of the analogue/analogon and figuring in imagination as a mode of consciousness essential to both the waiter and the empathic onlooker, Sartre regards understanding of 'the other' as a process potentially imbued with dramatic role playing, a process defined by movement and creation. This contrasts with an account of the relationship between self and other which relies on fixed roles or identities, and which is also at odds with a nihilistic sense of complete disintegration in meaningful human relations.

Emotion is centre stage, in Sartre's philosophy, caught up in the flux of consciousness. In *Being and Nothingness*, he gives a special place to anguish as a response to the realisation of the freedom of the 'for-itself'. He argues that his ideas are in accordance with the work of Søren Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and the idea of anguish at which he arrives through these thinkers is distinguished from fear. In anguish, we turn towards the self. Anguish accompanies the recognition that either in the future or in the past we hold responsibility for our decisions.⁵⁹ The centrality given to this can be compared to the Kleinian focus on moderating the anxiety of the paranoid-schizoid phase through mourning and melancholy in the depressive phase. Anguish in this sense has constructive potential. Christine Daigle argues convincingly that Sartre's representation of anguish involves understanding this emotion in opposition to bad faith. If bad faith is a denial of one's own freedom, anguish represents an advance because it involves recognition of this freedom.⁶⁰ Daigle indicates that Sartre's account of the relationship between bad

faith and anguish reveals a movement towards an ethical philosophy of authenticity.⁶¹ Emotions and consciousness are interdependent and inseparable from human relations.

The analysis of the relations between self and other is complemented by the development of a more dialectical conception of imagination, which is resistant to metaphysics, in Sartre's post-war work. In *What is Literature?*, based on his articles in *Les Temps Modernes*, he envisages literature as a relationship between writer and reader. In this, he rejects the Kantian idea of art as 'finality without end',⁶² in favour of the more circumscribed notion of literature as a relationship between two creators: the reader and writer. In the Kantian philosophy, the reader has the freedom to play through his/her experience of the artist's creativity, but in Sartre's revision of this, the reader has a responsibility to recreate the imaginative world suggested through the artwork. He writes:

the Kantian expression 'finality without end' seems to me quite inappropriate for designating the work of art. In fact, it implies that the aesthetic object presents only the appearance of a finality and is limited to soliciting the free and ordered play of the imagination. It forgets that the imagination of the spectator has not only a regulating function, but a constitutive one. It does not play; it is called upon to recompose the beautiful object beyond the traces left by the artist. The imagination cannot revel in-itself any more than can the other functions of the mind; it is always on the outside, always engaged in an enterprise.⁶³

Sartre's conception of the reciprocal relationship between artist and reader is supplemented by his emphasis, in *What is Literature?*, on the need for a historically informed self-awareness of the artist's identity. Sartre provides an overview of historical developments in French literature.⁶⁴ He argues that his generation has been deeply marked by the horrors of fascism and the concentration camps, and writes, 'Satan, Maritain once said, is pure. Pure, that is, without mixture and without remission. We have learned to know this horrible, this irreducible purity'.⁶⁵ He goes on to talk about torture, but the key point theoretically is that Sartre recognises how the horrors of the World War II challenge the idea of a recuperative, redemptive dialectic. Like the recognition of the death drive by Klein and the underlying sense of negativity in *Wild Strawberries* and *The Seventh Seal*, a malignant force is identified by Sartre as a part of human nature. Nevertheless, he stresses that the agenda for

his generation involves reflecting on the contingency and uncertainty of their situation:

In short, if we wished to give an account of our age, we had to make the technique of the novel shift from Newtonian mechanics to generalised relativity; we had to people our books with minds that were half lucid and half overcast, some of which we might consider with more sympathy than others, but none of which would have a privileged point of view either upon the event or upon itself.⁶⁶

Thus, Sartre is inspired by the idea of locating meaning in the midst of the world and retains a belief in progress, dependent on a creative negativity that transcends the destructive forces in the human situation:

In so far as literature is negative it will challenge the alienation of work; in so far as it is a creation and an act of surpassing, it will present man as *creative action*. It will go along with him in his effort to pass beyond his present alienation towards a better situation.⁶⁷

What Is Literature?, like Sartre's *Existentialism Is a Humanism*, expresses a constructive optimism after World War II, drawing productively on his pre-war philosophising about the imagination and contingency.

Sartre and cinema

Scepticism about the relevance of Sartre's ideas to film studies is suggested by two specific comments. The first is from Gilles Deleuze, who notes that Sartre's book *The Imaginary* does not include an account of films.⁶⁸ The second challenge comes from Eric Rohmer, who compares Sartre unfavourably to the film critic André Bazin:

Bazin introduced a new *metaphysical* dimension (we can use the word, as he did so himself, though at the same time he was careful not to play the philosopher) or, if one prefers, a *phenomenological* approach. Sartre's influence was, as he said, a decisive factor in his career. We can admire the disciple's subsequent independence from his teacher.⁶⁹

The quotation from Rohmer acknowledges, at least, that there is a line of influence from Sartre to film theory through the work of Bazin. This is a development discussed by Dudley Andrew in his book on Bazin. Andrew explicitly emphasises the role of the ideas in *The Imaginary*:

the book that changed Bazin's whole cast of mind, a book that he bought immediately and underlined heavily, was the 1940 study called *The Psychology of the Imagination*. This book provided the final foundation block for Bazin's theory of film.⁷⁰

As Andrew spells out, the basis for the influence of this book on Bazin was Sartre's account of the special place of art, as an autonomous activity of the imagination. For Rohmer, concern with cinematic specificity is the advance signified by Bazin and neorealism. However, Sartre is not prepared to essentialise the nature of cinema, something, which Rohmer and Bazin appear to do in different ways. For Bazin, the unique qualities of cinema are given special status over other forms of imagination. For example, he conveys the idea that the theatre audience and the film spectator are radically different because of the different forms involved 'Illusion in the cinema is not based as it is in the theater on convention tacitly accepted by the general public; rather, contrariwise, it is based on the inalienable realism of that which is shown'.⁷¹

Here, Bazin appears to make assumptions about both the theatre audience and the conventions adopted by film-makers, arguing that cinematic illusion has a more inherent connection with reality. At other points, however, Bazin openly acknowledges the limitations of realism and enthuses about the way theatre and film can be creatively combined.⁷²

Andrew casts some light on the question of how Bazin deviated from Sartre when he states 'Sartre's ideas pose a great problem for the photographic arts because, in his view, all image-making must be the intentional act of consciousness, whereas photographs can be snapped automatically'.⁷³ Two pages later Andrew adds, 'Sartre had said that beauty is an attribute only of the imagination and not of the world, but the naturalist in Bazin could not accept this'.⁷⁴

We have seen enough of the tensions in Sartre's theory and the apparent contradictions in Bazin's work to recognise that Andrew's comment does not capture the whole picture. For Sartre, imagination involves engagement with the world, while Bazin thinks that cinema has a special ability to communicate the world's beauty. The idea that Bazin corrects Sartre's subjectivism masks the philosophical limitations of Bazin's work. This is most apparent when Bazin insists on the inherent relationship between cinema as a medium and realism. Consider, for instance, Bazin's belief in the special properties of cinema in the following passage from 'The Ontology of the Photographic Image': 'The

objective nature of photography confers on it a quality of credibility absent from all other forms of picture making'.⁷⁵

There is a marked comparison between Bazin and Sartre in the idea of film as a material process that allows imaginative engagement with external reality. The medium provides access to a transcendent apprehension of the real. However, Sartre's concept of the analogon is an attempt to steer away from any sense that the object of imagination is directly caused by external reality and is dependent on perception. Bazin appears to make cinema this kind of object. Sartre, in contrast, accentuates the otherness of imagination and its intentionality in constituting images of the world.

Through his emphasis on negativity Sartre signals the tension between reality and imagination. For Sartre, imagination is a different mode of consciousness, which suggests that it is more compatible with anti-realism, magic realism or an overtly subjective expressionist aesthetic. Nevertheless, we do not have to go this far in marking a divergence from Bazin. We have seen the situation is not simple, because in Sartre's philosophy imagination is not sovereign, but plays a role along with perception, emotion and cognition. Ultimately, the imaginary is situated within a social context. Whilst art is valued as a prime instance of imaginative work, we also find the imagination playing a part in daily life. The significance attributed to imagination and the abstraction accorded to it through the concept of the analogon does not pave the way for a celebration of art for art's sake. Sartre's insistence on imagination as an integral and distinct attitude of consciousness means that ambiguity is a necessary quality of consciousness, and not the preserve of one art form or indeed of an elite artist with special gifts. Although Bergman has something of this status, the parallels between the foregrounding of imagination in Bergman's work and Sartre's passionately democratic philosophy of imagination are revealed by looking at *The Seventh Seal*, the film which really established Bergman's reputation as an allegorical film-maker.

The Seventh Seal

The film has been widely interpreted as expressing existential ideas. For example, Sarris relates *The Seventh Seal* to the fashionable interest of the 1950s in 'the anguished self-consciousness of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche'.⁷⁶ Sarris suggests that 'Bergman's depiction of a church painter and his representations of death typifies Bergman's concern with the role of art in transcending the existential limits of life'.⁷⁷

The idea that Bergman is influenced by existentialism is also expressed in Birgitta Steene's analysis, aptly titled '*The Seventh Seal*: An Existential

Vision'.⁷⁸ She notes that the film opens by depicting the isolation of the knight and Jöns, his squire, and mentions the way in which the direction incorporates religious references. Starting with a soundtrack of a church choir, the opening scene also includes a voice reading 'a brief passage from the Revelation of St John the Divine'. However, the knight 'fails to understand its message'.⁷⁹ While the film draws on Bergman's knowledge of and interest in Christian scripture, it also, as Steene shows, subjects the certainties of Christian faith to imaginative uncertainty. This is apparent in the style of the film, which resembles 'a medieval allegory'.⁸⁰ As Steene points out, Bergman subverts this form through the emphasis on 'doubt' and the absence of 'an orderly universe', whilst the redeeming power of God is replaced by a sense of God as 'enigma'.⁸¹ She argues that the knight and his squire represent two responses – one sceptical, the other spiritual – to a shared situation in which God appears to be unreachable,⁸² and comments, 'Yet, both the knight and Jöns are conceived as moral agents, and in this ambivalence Bergman establishes his affinity with existentialist philosophy and its tenet that we must live as though we had free will'.⁸³

Other critics have considered whether Bergman transcends the bleakness of Sartre's existentialism. Robert Lauder, for example, explicitly accounts for Bergman's 1968 film *Shame* using Sartre's ideas, but argues that *The Seventh Seal*, despite its similarities with *Shame*, offers an alternative because it includes a sense of hope through the representation of the family of travelling artists as a symbol of the Holy Family, and the significance of the knight's relationship to this family.⁸⁴ Lauder is not alone in pondering Bergman's relationship to Sartrean philosophy from a position which perceives the latter as overly pessimistic, if not as nihilistic. Jesse Kalin, for instance, entertains the idea that Bergman's work can be compared to Sartrean ideas, and then goes on to argue that there is a decisive difference. Kalin insists that there are differences, at least of degree, in the way the two authors approach freedom and morality:

First, certainly in *The Flies*, Sartre describes, and advocates, a conversion – to truth, to responsibility, to authenticity. But in existentialist texts it is never clear that this is more than a formal commitment to freedom as such, more than acting in the terrible awareness of the utter groundlessness (arbitrariness, absurdity) of one's situation and choice... For Bergman, there is good and evil in the world, in its (our) very nature. One's second chance is not just (or really) for an 'authentic' life but for a better one, in which one becomes a better person.⁸⁵

Kalin's argument provides an interesting platform for contrast and comparison of Bergman and Sartre in terms of ethics but, concentrating on *The Seventh Seal*, I will focus on whether there is a comparison between the film and Sartre's ideas of imagination.

We must start with Bergman's reflections on the film in *Images: My Life in Film*. The title of this book immediately suggests a point of comparison. Bergman reveals, in relation to a range of his films, how particular mental images inspired him. With *The Seventh Seal* he remembers that the film was based on a one-act play, 'Wood Painting', which he wrote as a teacher for drama students before he became a film-maker. Bergman says that this play was based on 'visual memories from my childhood'.⁸⁶ He recalls how as a child he was captivated by images in his father's country church, a point that Steene emphasised in her analysis of the film. Quoting from his earlier autobiography, Bergman says, 'Like all churchgoers have at times, I let my mind wander as I contemplated the altarpieces, triptychs, crucifixes, stained-glass windows and murals.'⁸⁷ These images led him to the images of *The Seventh Seal*, including the knight who plays chess with Death. Bergman goes on to mention music that inspired the film, Carl Orff's *Carmina Burana*, itself 'inspired by medieval songs written by minstrels...during the years of the plague and the bloody wars'.⁸⁸ We should also note Bergman's comments on the presentation of Death. Bergman describes the decision to represent Death as an unusual hybrid, a risky move, which succeeded: 'Bengt Ekerot and I agreed that Death should have the features of a white clown. An amalgamation of a clown mask and skull.'⁸⁹ In particular this was a victory for the idea of eliciting imaginative vision from the audience. As with Sartre's example of the caricature and the portrait, part of the fascination lies in the ambiguity of the image, the fact that the imaginative apprehension teeters on the edge of a more mundane perception. It is not just interest in ambiguity which suggests a comparison between the philosopher and the film-maker. Looking at the initial scenes of the film, we find that key ideas from Sartre's study of the imagination are applicable. There is a sense that images have an independent power, and a play on the representation of the unseen and the absent is central to the film's creative development.

The Seventh Seal represents a range of characters, but centres on a knight and his squire who return to Sweden after the Crusades. The initial shots reveal how Bergman foregrounds imagery and symbolism before establishing the narrative. Momentous music begins, whilst the screen is still black, before orchestrating the dramatic appearance of the sunlight as a distinct compositional element. The first shot depicts a



Figure 3.1 *The Seventh Seal*, Svensk Filmindustri. Tartan Video. The film begins with sunlight

startling patch of sunlight amidst the cloudy skyscape, whilst the second shows a bird of prey hovering in the sky, a suggestion of death below. Through the *mise-en-scène* Bergman hints at symbolic meaning to be revealed later, while an anonymous male voice reads from *Revelations*.

Drawing on the Sartrean study of imagination, we can say that the film invites the audience to enter an imaginary world in which their perception is merely the preliminary process before they arrive at a fully imaginative attitude of consciousness. The film already suggests that a meaning will be attributed to this engagement with something beyond perception through the authority of a religious textual citation. However, as the narrative begins with the introduction of the knight, Antonius Block, and Jöns, his squire, the ambiguity of the relationship between the real world and the imaginary is maintained. The characters themselves experience and demonstrate this dichotomy, giving the audience an omniscient perspective on the relationship between the imaginary and reality in the diegetic world. The interest of the audience in the subjectivity of both characters is elicited by their first appearance sleeping on a beach. Without representing the characters' dreams,



Figure 3.2 *The Seventh Seal*, Svensk Filmindustri. Tartan Video. Death appears, theatrically

a dreamlike atmosphere is created by the representation of their drowsiness. The idea that the knight has access to an imaginative dimension is suggested, because when Death suddenly appears before him on the beach as a figure in a black cape, this is registered as a private experience because the squire is still asleep.

In his initial conversation with Death, the knight testifies to the strength of his mind over his body, refusing to submit to the idea that he must immediately accept his own demise. The idea of an ambiguous overlap of different realities is presented through the image of a chess set sitting beside the knight, which later in the scene is superimposed over the sea-scape in the background. The image of the chess set introduces the narrative idea of the knight's contest with Death – they will play chess to determine whether the knight can avoid his own death – but at a more philosophical level this image emphasises the juxtaposition of the knight's subjective world (it is a private contest) and the external world shared with the squire and the other characters which, in this case, is represented by nature (the sea).

The knight's subjective visions are not, however, the only manifestation of an imaginary dimension. In the following scene, as he rides with Jöns, the latter stops to approach a hooded figure, only to be confronted with a skull. They are riding through a land plagued by death, but in reporting his meeting with the skull, Jöns adopts a metaphorical perspective, telling the knight that the gentleman was most eloquent in his speech despite his silence. This draws attention again to the imagery of death. Throughout the film, it is clear that Jöns represents a materialistic perspective, in contrast to the knight's preoccupation with the enigma of God's silence, but right here at the beginning of the story, we recognise that Bergman references the squire's imagination as well as that of the knight. For Jöns, the skull means that he can imagine a gruesome death and has a sense of the horror in the society to which they are returning.

Next, we are introduced to the troupe of performers asleep in their caravan in a tranquil sunlit setting. When Jof, a father and a juggler, awakes he enjoys alone his vision of the Virgin Mary playing with her child. Jof's seduction by this vision is conveyed as he rubs his eyes in disbelief and then wakes his wife, Mia, to report what he has seen. Here, the dialogue reveals her scepticism, but also her reaction that some of his 'visions' are about good and some about evil, and some are more real than others. At this point we are reminded of the symbolism introduced earlier, as a collaborator of Jof and Mia, the actor Skat, places the mask of a skull on his face to recite lines from a forthcoming production. This image of the skull echoes the image of the 'well-spoken' skeleton whom the squire addressed. The imaginative linking of the two narrative strands is extended visually when the knight and squire ride by in the background. Jof and Mia are transfixed by the beauty of their baby, Mikael. Jof has a vision that Mikael will achieve a juggling trick which defies reality by keeping a ball suspended in the air. We are also given the impression that Jof's imaginative vision extends to his wife, as the return of heavenly music from his vision accompanies Jof's turn towards her at the end of the scene.

In the next scene, the squire talks to the church artist who paints the Dance of Death on the walls of a church. The images are realistic, according to the artist, who talks in detail about how the plague has led to horrific suffering, but the squire imagines these horrors. Meanwhile, the knight meets Death again, this time disguised as a priest. The dialogue provided by the knight's confession to this imposter reveals the knight's fear about God's absence; however, again this is represented through the themes of a gulf between imagination and reality. The former is

represented negatively, as the knight states, 'How I live in a ghost world enclosed in my dreams and imaginings.' He is tormented by his inability to remove his image of God, whilst suspecting that the latter is an object, 'an idol' made from his own 'fear'. The knight's self-reproaches reveal the relevance of Sartre's insights into the role of emotion in imagination as a compensation for reality's failings. However, the knight's introspection brings anguish to the fore. The knight has a heroic quality because he is facing at a psychological level the negativity that pervades his society. Sartre's idea of imagination as a cue for freedom is evoked as the knight musters himself again for his confrontation with Death. Looking at his hand, the knight relishes that he is still alive, a physical being fully engaged in a challenging confrontation with Death, a project in which he finally hopes to achieve a 'meaningful action' in the face of nothingness: 'This is my hand. I can move it. My blood gushes in it. The sun is high in the sky. And I... I Antonius Block am playing chess with Death.'

Imagination is thus explicitly represented through the characters of the knight and Jof, but also through other characters, including Jöns, and through the focus on particular images and sounds from a third-person perspective. Although it can be argued that the visions of the knight and Jof are intended to represent metaphysical insights, it is clear that Bergman does not wish to suggest that the subjective world of the knight and Jof can transcend the reality of the world that surrounds them: a society of the Middle Ages dominated by plague, violence and persecution. The overriding theme of the knight's visions of death is the absence of God, while Jof is portrayed partly as a naïve dreamer. Both the knight and Jof are aware that the imagined scenarios that emerge for them encompass a dialectic of presence and absence. The figure of Death whom the knight meets is initially present only to him, unseen and unheard by the other characters. Jof is transfixed by the beauty of his vision of the Virgin Mary and child, but is mocked by the others when he speaks of this. In both cases, the subjective visions involve a negation of the world, as the knight and Jof perceive it. The knight searches for an alternative to the apocalyptic world that surrounds him, through his struggle with the figure of Death. Although Jof's vision echoes the bliss of his family life, the vision is removed and represents an escape from the actual dangers he faces. Like Sartre, Bergman is keen to reassert the contingency and absurdity of the world that challenges his imaginative protagonists and other characters, including women burnt as witches and the persecution of Jof because of his role as a creative performer. The brutal reality reveals the limitations of his characters' imaginative lives. However, the theme of imagination is extended because the brutality of

the society appears to be dictated by a malevolent imaginary, in which demonisation, sadism and masochism prevail. The third-person narration, that is the array of stylistic devices ultimately controlled through the direction, used to represent the diegetic world as a whole, is itself an imaginative force, one that suggests an authorial vision.

Initially, there appears to be no narrative link in terms of action between the visions of the knight and Jof. This means that the imaginary itself is foregrounded and not subsumed by the narrative pattern. It calls for a thematic response from the audience. However, a narrative synthesis of the different plot lines emerges. The knight meets the family in an idyllic scene in which he is offered wild strawberries and milk. The knight is forced to leave to take up his private challenge, playing chess away from the others, but realises that Death also threatens the family. Bergman plays with the convergence of the different lines. Later in the film, Jof thinks he sees the knight and Death playing, and realises that they must flee despite Mia's disbelief. Following this point, when there is a virtual convergence of the visions of Jof and the knight, the latter performs his



Figure 3.3 The Seventh Seal, Svensk Filmindustri. Tartan Video. The Knight joins Mia and Jof for a picnic of wild strawberries

heroic act of knocking over the chess pieces, which diverts Death from the escape of the family. This narrative action focuses on the importance of intentionality (the knight's decision) and action (the knight's heroics are doubled by the actions of the squire in rescuing a girl). The society is in the grip of a physical disease, but also a spiritual malaise which can be interpreted as 'bad faith' in an extreme form, including superstition, mechanical brutality and self-inflicted pain on the body, as shown by a group of flagellants. In contrast, the knight and his squire offer a limited form of transcendence, even though they cannot finally escape the clutches of death. Their limited success is not achieved through rationality, but through imagination and action.

The film's other plot lines are skilfully integrated with the story of the knight's journey home, including the subplot involving Lisa, Plog and Skat. Despite the horror of Skat's denouement, a humorous element pervades the antics of these characters. When Death kills Skat by sawing down the tree in which he is hiding, there is a strange mixture of horror and absurdity. The film's range significantly incorporates humour, which extends to the casting of Nils Poppe, a famous Swedish comedian, as Jof.⁹⁰ The suggestion of absurdity also corresponds to Sartre's philosophy since recognition of nothingness and the contingency of life may produce a sense of absurdity as well as of anguish. The humorous element in Bergman's cinema is not always recognised and is a suitable subject in its own right, but here it reinforces the sense of his overlap with Sartrean thinking. In fact Bergman more than Sartre expresses absurdity at different points in his work but, nevertheless, like Sartre he remains committed to a more complete and holistic exploration of issues arising from our awareness of life's contingency.

The conclusion appears at first to represent a transcendence of social reality through imagination in an entirely negative sense. The figure of Death is now rendered triumphant. The representation of a boundary between the material world and the knight's subjective vision collapses as Death takes over the life of the knight and his entourage. Nevertheless, the ending of the film is more nuanced and ambiguous than this. We should remember here that Sartre insists on the range and diversity of imagination, and that he emphasises breaks between the imaginary and other modes of consciousness. At the end of *The Seventh Seal*, we are confronted by not just the triumph of Death but an insistence on a plurality of individual perspectives. When the knight's entourage meets Death, his appearance cues a sense of different imaginations at work. The squire answers the door, but does not see the visitor, either because the squire is so focused on the material world or because Death

is hiding (in keeping with his character as the gatekeeper to absolute nothingness, but also one might say, in keeping with his fondness for games). His arrival inside the building is anticipated through sound and an intense point of view of the empty corridor from the perspective of the peasant girl rescued by Jöns from the thief, Raval (a villain who had also tormented Jof). The girl's gaze is dominant in this scene, looking intently up towards Death. Then each character introduces him-/herself with formality, as if now they have all accepted their loss of freedom, before the girl articulates the simple truth: 'Now it is finished'. There is a match cut from the peasant girl's face, as she looks up at Death in awe, to Mia, in the countryside with her family, whose expression conveys complete innocence about Death's triumph. We are given the sense of two complete independent states of consciousness, whilst retaining the suggestion of an imaginative linking of the two women through the graphic match. Now, Jof looks to the horizon and sees the knight's entourage dancing with Death on the hill-top.

The image of Death and his followers dancing reinforces the idea that the film's truth lies within the image, which Bergman initially discovered on the walls of his father's church. Jof's vision departs from the third-person narration of the previous scene because he sees Skat as a member of the dancers instead of the peasant girl.⁹¹ While the ending does not involve the radical disjuncture between perception and imaginary evoked by Sartre's account of various examples in *The Imaginary* such as the portrait, and the mental image of an absent person, it does suggest a disjuncture between different subjectivities. The polyphonic qualities of the film noted by Donner can be compared with Sartre's insistence on a multiplicity of dream worlds rendered at its most extreme by pathological imagination. In fact, as Stawarska has shown, Sartre was influenced by Pierre Janet's theory of obsessive imagination, but using phenomenology Sartre sought to distinguish between instances of the imaginary guided by suspension of disbelief and hallucinations.⁹² Here, Jof could be said to experience a hallucinatory vision. Although the difference between Jof's vision and information given in the preceding scene is one of detail, this slender discrepancy allows space for the spectator's imagination to join the polyphony of different perspectives, guided by a form of omniscient knowledge about the construction of the text.

In the ambiguity and incoherence of the finale we can see that the film itself is a product of imagination for the viewer, an analogon, which the viewer must transform into his/her own vision. This possibility has been encouraged by the representation of an oscillation between reality and the characters' visions throughout the film. The audience is

encouraged to move between different levels of reality and ultimately to face, head-on, the vision of the director. In this way, a sense of reality is reasserted against the power of the imaginary world. From the Sartrean perspective we can understand Bergman's purpose in the ambiguities here. The degree to which the narrative remains open to interpretation is justified as a means for eliciting an active response, leaving open the possibility for the viewer to extract his/her own meaning. The subject of how audiences respond to films has been the subject of a massive range of theorising and debate since the inception of media studies. In this particular case, it is clear that Bergman, like Sartre, believes in the autonomy of an imaginative exchange between artist and audience.

4

From Three Early Bergman Films to an Analysis of *Summer with Monika*

The last two chapters have argued that Melanie Klein and Jean-Paul Sartre work with concepts specific to their respective disciplines. Nevertheless, points of convergence are apparent in the application of these ideas to Ingmar Bergman's films. Both theories focus on the imagination as an aspect of human nature that must be understood in its own right. At the same time, both theories observe and emphasise a relational process in which the imagination is related to other aspects of human experience. We have seen how emotional elements are given a primary role by Klein but also in Sartre's thinking.

Both theorists provide an account of imagination that is elemental: in Klein's case through her theory of infantile imagination, and in Sartre's case through his phenomenology of imaginary experience. However, it has been striking that the application of both theories to Bergman's films involves a strong awareness of the value of integration, a significant alternative to the emphasis of Jacques Lacan and post-structuralism on instability and illusions of coherence in the text. In Klein's case this emphasis on integration is based on her theory of the depressive position and reparation, whilst in Sartre's case we have seen, drawing on Beata Stawarska, that he recognises the need to distinguish aesthetic experience from pathological imagination. Both theories seek to develop a complex account of subjectivity, but one that values the idea of coherence at the level of individual experience, and this applies to their evaluation of works of art. At the same time, we saw that both theories insist on the significance of the interaction between the imagination of the individual and external reality so that a tension between these elements remains. This is particularly apparent in Klein's account of the epistemophilic instinct, in which knowledge about external reality is recognised as a powerful force driving

the development of the individual, and in Sartre's insistence that the 'for-itself' and the 'in-itself' are two distinct modes of being. These distinctions carry over into recognition in both Kleinian and Sartrean theory such that imagination is ultimately understood as related, if not reduced, to a social context. In *Wild Strawberries*, we saw how the introspective world of an elderly doctor is connected to a wider picture of relationship conflicts, isolation and angst under the surface of an affluent bourgeois society. In *The Seventh Seal*, we saw the representation of a society in which fanatical religious beliefs are accompanied by extreme violence, including persecution of women and a marked intolerance of creativity and art.

Close examination of the Kleinian and Sartrean theories also reveals key points of divergence. Klein's account of the imagination involves the concept of internal objects in the psyche, whilst Sartre distances his theory from any theory that suggests external objects are replicated inside consciousness. Furthermore, as noted already, Sartre attacks the idea of the unconscious. The possibility remains that Bergman intuitively draws on ideas relevant to both perspectives. Different works in the Bergman oeuvre catch the eye as particularly relevant to the theories in question. For example, Bergman's film of 1951, *Summer Interlude*, is strongly expressive of a cathartic process based on mourning in which a young ballet dancer remembers the tragic death of her boyfriend. In this film, the flashbacks, highlighted by Jean-Luc Godard as a key form of expression for Bergman, are used to explore the presence of the past in the dancer's subjective world through her memories of key events. Another film, *The Magician*, made in 1958, appears to be more relevant to Sartre's ideas. This work explores the situation of a showman, Albert Vogler, whose magic show is subjected to interrogation by a sceptical scientist and the authority of the local aristocrat and police commissioner. Set in the nineteenth century, the film shows how Albert and his troupe trick their audience. This film acknowledges that the magician is a skilful manipulator of the imagination of his spectators, and it also critiques the cynical establishment, including the scientist's devotion to instrumental rationality. In its awareness of artifice *The Magician* interrogates appearances in a manner akin to Sartre's exploration of the imaginary and bad faith, and includes Albert's self-doubts as subject matter. Without going into further details of *Summer Interlude* and *The Magician*, it can be seen that some works in Bergman's career show an affinity with psychoanalytic themes, while others are closer to an existentialist preoccupation with the way the individual creates meaning and how this is understood in a social context.

However, my intention is to apply Kleinian and Sartrean ideas together in relation to Bergman's work. The differences between these theories are reduced when we consider that Klein's theory of internal reality remains quite distinct from the theory of internal representation that Sartre was critiquing. Due to Klein's use of the unconscious as a key concept, the individual's internal world is understood as a mobile and intangible space characterised by fluctuating emotions. The presence of internal objects is only understood through the dynamic of therapy and the dynamic of interaction with others and not as fixed reproduction of empirical realities. We can also note that Sartre shifts his ground somewhat to allow for the influence of determination beyond the grasp of individual awareness and that various elements in Sartrean thought can be interpreted as compatible with Freudian thinking.¹

In other words, both Sartreans and Kleinians place emphasis on a process of transformation in which the imagination is centre stage, but must be understood in relation to its situation. I am not suggesting that the theories are synthesised and reduced into one, because they each retain their own particular sensitivities and concepts, but they can be explored in combination to reveal the range of individual Bergman films. In doing this we should recognise that both theories aspire to situate the analysis of art in the wider context of their account of human nature. In this way they avoid reducing art to a discussion of the artist's mastery of techniques specific to his/her medium. Imagination is understood as more than the individual's talent in a specialised field. At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that neither theory incorporates or engages with the specific concepts of film. These include key concepts ranging from *mise-en-scène* to camerawork and the organisation of time and space in the narrative.

Just as Klein and Sartre are influenced by specialists in their respective fields, Bergman draws on and reworks different cinematic, dramatic and literary influences. Much has been written about Bergman's work in relation to these influences.² My readings of selected films will complement existing work, but will also aim to provide an original contribution by incorporating and integrating ideas from Klein and Sartre in the textual analysis. The films selected provide a cross-section of Bergman's work, which allows for further reflection on Birgitta Steene's overview and categorisation of Bergman's films.

The films that I will consider in this chapter, *Music in Darkness*, *Port of Call*, *Prison* and *Summer with Monika*, are all placed by Steene in a category entitled 'Films from the Forties and Early Fifties. Focus: The Young Couple'.³ The film I will explore in Chapter 5, *The Virgin Spring*,

is placed by Steene in the category 'Religious or Existential Quest Films of the Fifties and Early Sixties, Often with Male Protagonists', along with several other films that include *Wild Strawberries* and *The Seventh Seal*. *Hour of the Wolf*, which will be analysed in Chapter 6, is placed by Steene in the category of films called 'Exploring the Role of the Artist/and or Directorial Persona'. Steene has three remaining categories: 'Early Family or Marriage Films, Often with Women as Central Characters'; 'The Haunting Past: Memories and Nightmares'; 'The Family Saga'. Clearly, Steene includes a significant appraisal of Bergman's historical development in these categories, but they do not all correspond to historical periods. Furthermore, there are thematic comparisons between the films in the different categories. We have already seen that *Wild Strawberries* is concerned with the haunting past even though it is also a film which revolves around an existential quest. In sum, the reason I mention Steene's categories is to make it clear that, while the films I analyse are not representative of Bergman's career as a whole, they do represent an intriguing cross-section of thematic and historical development in Bergman's work, and have specific qualities in common with other works in this oeuvre.

The role of imagination in three early Bergman films

While some of Bergman's better-known films such as *The Seventh Seal*, *Wild Strawberries* and *Persona* have been given the status of complex works resonant with psychoanalytic and philosophical meaning. There has been less discussion of his early films in the same fashion. However, turning to three of Bergman's early films, we can see that before he achieved significant critical success he was making films in which imagination is given a structural and thematic role, through sequences that disrupt the spatial and temporal linearity of narrative, and through an evaluative emphasis on the power and redemptive qualities of imagination for his characters.

Music in Darkness

Music in Darkness, made in 1948, was Bergman's fourth film as a director.⁴ As Steene points out, the title in Swedish, *Music I Mörker*, has 'alliteration and cadence', which evoke the significance of music in the film more poetically than the English translation, and particularly the early American translation of the title, which only focused on the lead character's blindness (*Night Is My Future*).⁵ The film shows immediately Bergman's interest in including a sequence that steps outside the

verisimilitude of the narrative in order to represent a character's internal state. After a terrible accident on an army training ground, resulting in blindness to Bengt (played by Birger Malmsten), the film's protagonist, a dream sequence depicts his inner world. Bergman reworked the novel by Dagmar Edqvist to shift the emphasis to character psychology.⁶ Steene informs us that Bergman's focus on the psychological issues facing Bengt contrasted with the novel's concentration on the theme of romance transcending the division between the middle-class hero Bengt and the servant Ingrid (played by Mai Zetterling).⁷

Although Bengt moves on from his initial trauma to pursue his fortune as a pianist, the thematic treatment of his struggles with his disability can be read as evoking a more general fragility in human nature and the impossibility of retaining a masterful, egocentric dominance. The theme of vulnerability is also pursued in Ingrid's struggle against class boundaries. The surrealism of the dream sequence, early in the film, is most effective because of the skilful way it is related to the rest of the narrative, and brings to mind the Kleinian purpose of integrating elements of the unconscious through social interaction. Sartre's preoccupation with the contingency of the ego is also relevant here because the instability of the self is conveyed through Bengt's struggles, following his accident, in which a greater sense of agency is only achieved after significant internal and external transformations, including many depressing setbacks caused by the intolerance in society.⁸ Bengt's recognition of Ingrid transcends perception. His imaginative insight is matched by a scene in which Ingrid's intuitive awareness that he is in danger leads to their final reconciliation. This appears to be a magical resolution, but it maintains the focus on imaginative awareness in the characters that was introduced so traumatically in the dream sequence representing Bengt's blindness.

Music in Darkness was subsequently dismissed by a range of commercial mainstream critics as lacking seriousness.⁹ However, it illustrates not only Bergman's early interest in representing character subjectivity, but also, when placed alongside his next film, *Port of Call*, we can see how much he experimented with a range of styles from melodrama to documentary-style realism.

Port of Call

Port of Call, made in 1948, was directed from a script almost completely written by Olle L  nsberg,¹⁰ and it differs from many other Bergman works, including *Music in Darkness*, in its inclusion of some documentary-style representation of the shipping industry and the culture of

its workers in the Swedish town of Gothenburg.¹¹ The film begins with a montage-like sequence of visual perspectives on the industrial setting devoid of *dramatis persona*, and then focuses on the central protagonist, in this setting. He is Gosta, a sailor who has returned to the harbour from his travels. The emphasis on character and context is interrupted by the violent and sudden suicide attempt of a young woman who jumps into the harbour to drown herself, and whom Gosta saves. The film goes on to explore mental instability in the woman, Berit, but extends this to encompass different aspects of society and characters, including Gosta himself, who is overtaken by self-hate and depression towards the end of the story, and the shocking story of a friend of Berit's who has an abortion. The opening reveals the intention to deal with a range of social issues, from life in the docks to suicide, using a form of realism. At the same time, there is a clear focus on subjectivity as manifested through the self-destructive nature of Berit's suicide attempt.

Gosta's rescue of Berit is a heroic moral action. Through the film Gosta retains this status, but this is complicated by his attraction to the woman he has saved. Bergman explains this psychological complexity partly as a result of Lansberg's screenplay, with its sophisticated representation of the character's emotions.¹² Flashbacks are used to deepen our knowledge of Berit as she recalls her troubled past as a child hearing the arguments of her parents. When she feels compelled to tell Gosta honestly about her past, another flashback is used to convey her turbulent history with her authoritarian mother, who arranges for her to be sent to the penitentiary, as well as her search for an escape from the family home with a succession of two boyfriends.

Instead of being just an analysis of the way parental conflict impacts on a child's consciousness, the film condenses this material to suggest that the internalisation of conflict and division can eat away at a person to the point where the violence is directed inwards. Klein's emphasis on the effects of a punishing superego parallels the way Berit struggles with her authoritarian mother and the authority figure of the social worker. Klein's theory also applies to Gosta. When he learns the truth of Berit's history, he cannot consume his anger about her relations with other men. His equilibrium is disrupted, and his relationship to Berit as a good object in his psyche is apparently destroyed through envy. Against this psychological turmoil the industrial setting provides a context, which contains stabilising elements – a reality outside the strife of the family – and elements that elaborate the existing conflicts, including the violent competition between men for the attentions of Berit.

There is an uplifting ending in the manner of Hollywood, but this is not because the characters have conquered all that threatens them. Instead, there is a strong sense of reconciliation with a transient notion of the present, and an acceptance of having to live with the past and difficult issues, which will continue. Critically, the union of the couple is only made possible after Berit's crisis around a decision in which she must give information to the authorities about an illegal abortionist who operated on her friend. Berit is reluctant to divulge the information because she sees no good intentions in the authorities, who interrogate her, but this is just one more fixed state, like her self-destruction that she has to rise above to find a degree of personal freedom. Berit foreshadows a whole range of female characters in Bergman's work who strive for autonomy at a psychological level.

Prison

Bergman's next film as a director, *Prison*, is an early example of his attraction to a more philosophical style. The story brings together three plot lines. In the first, a retired teacher, Paul, visits his ex-pupil, Martin, who is directing a film. Paul has recently been released from an asylum and reveals his ideas for a film in which the devil controls reality. Paul specifies that this requires no extraordinary catastrophes to take place since life itself is hell. In the second plot line, Martin's friend, Thomas, a journalist, explains his idea for an article based on his meeting with a 17-year-old prostitute, Birgitta Carolina. The third line of action concerns this young woman and her exploitation by a pimp, Peter, who is also her fiancé, and his sister. They force Birgitta Carolina to let them get rid of her baby. The second and third plot lines come together after a further morbid twist when Thomas tries to persuade his girlfriend, Sofi, to enter into a suicide pact. Not knowing that she knocked him out, he mistakenly believes she was successful, and he wanders the street like a lost soul, meeting the equally bereft Birgitta Carolina. Both characters are in a state of mourning and melancholy. A shift to an overtly imaginative register represents their night together in an attic-like space, with a *mise-en-scène* that conveys Bergman's fascination with childhood imagination, including a toy cinematograph. The imaginative register develops further with Birgitta Carolina's dream as she re-experiences male violence and the death of her baby in surreal and symbolic form. In this way, the film appears to confirm the gloomy premise provided by the retired teacher at the beginning of the film.

Commenting on the way the film uses realism in the story of the young prostitute, but also develops a style that is 'abstractly representative and

at times purely allegorical',¹³ Maaret Koskinen draws attention to the influence of the Swedish literary culture in the 1940s, and quotes Jörn Donner in identifying the preoccupation of this culture with writers such as Albert Camus, Franz Kafka and Sartre. Koskinen goes on to say that this interest in what Donner calls 'a Sisyphus, a K, a suffering Mankind' became an integral part of Bergman's work and is also evident in his later works such as *The Seventh Seal*.¹⁴

Vernon Young believes that critics discussed the film's existentialism, but failed to recognise the film's weaknesses. 'French Existentialism was in the air; more than one interpreter found it irresistible to quote, from Sartre's *No Exit*, "Hell is other people". More than one has continued to find it irresistible. Yet, obviously Bergman had not credibly proven that Hell was other people.'¹⁵ Young's comment downplays the efforts of both Bergman and Sartre to engage the audience in critical reflections on their society through allegorical elements. However, as Young notes and as Bergman makes clear, his original title for the film was *A True Story*.¹⁶ Bergman explains that the title was intended as an ironic treatment of a particular kind of story in newspapers, but that he was required to change it by his producer, to the fashionable-sounding title of *Prison*:

Prison came to be seen, through no fault of its own, as a film typifying the 1940s. This had to do not only with the title but with the fact that because Tomas, played by Birger Malmsten, is a journalist and author, he is presumed to be active in the literary circles of that decade.¹⁷

This film can be related to the cultural current of pessimistic existentialism in Swedish society at the time. It can also be accused of self-indulgence, with Bergman's self-reflexive commentary occurring early in the film and with the way in which the middle-class male journalist is reunited with his girlfriend at the end. However, these responses are challenged by the way Bergman seeks to elicit an active questioning response from the audience. When he discusses *Prison*, in his book *Images*, he refers to Birgitta Carolina as 'a soul', and the intimacy of camera-work and perspective suggests that the film seeks a spiritual dimension through the narrative of her suffering.¹⁸ A theological message is never explicitly developed because it seems clear that Bergman places more emphasis on challenging the audience. In an interview he explains that he made the film intuitively to convey his sense of a deep-rooted and 'incomprehensible' problem of evil rather than a metaphysical notion of the devil.¹⁹

Bergman's existentialism and foray into the inner world of his characters in *Prison* reveals his ambition to take on metaphysical themes. However, the film also demonstrates his interest in combining imaginative representation of character subjectivity and a more 'realistic' grasp of external social elements, which are shown to be the cause of alienation and disempowerment. This combination of interests continues when we turn to the film he made in 1953, *Summer with Monika*.

The application of Kleinian and Sartrean ideas to *Summer with Monika*

In Bergman's early films he frequently uses the formation of a couple as a basis for exploring subjectivity. Bergman's later films would intensify the focus on the inner world. He was not consciously influenced by Klein, but his interest in psychoanalysis is manifest in a focus on latent emotional forces of desire and destruction. Klein, as we have seen, provides a powerful account of how the infant internalises objects which it regards as hostile. Anxiety is produced by this sense of the enemy within, and the baby desperately looks for good objects to replace this negativity. This vivid account can provide a comparative text for any narrative, which focuses on the struggle between an individual or individuals, and a corrupting or hostile environment. For our purposes, the key feature from Klein that should be adopted is that of internalisation. Whilst a significant strand of psychoanalytic theory has focused on the formation of the couple in film narrative, Klein's theory with its focus on the death drive provides a complementary emphasis on the way characters are threatened by external forces from which they seek to escape through the processes of projective identification and splitting. In this analysis of *Summer with Monika*, I will consider how the film conveys the alienation of the protagonists, how they project onto each other, and how they split off from the social environment.

In common with the Kleinian perspective, Sartre focuses on the inner life, but conceptualises internal struggle as a conscious battle for authentic knowledge against bad faith. As Jonathan Webber reminds us, bad faith means a battle to maintain a sense of self that is unfixed, not objectified.²⁰ This kind of transcendence can only be fully achieved in the Kleinian schemata when the individual passes through the depressive position and consequently recognises the ambivalence of the other. There is a strong parallel here between Sartrean and Kleinian thinking in the way that progress is achieved through recognition of the other's autonomy. For Sartre, part of the struggle against bad faith involves recognition by

consciousness that it is part of society.²¹ Thus, the struggle for authenticity is against objectification in all its forms, and is not confined to the individual's internal transformation. In *Summer with Monika*, the struggle against bad faith can be seen in the way the principal protagonists resist the roles that are expected of them in society. This becomes even more provocative when finally Monika resists her role as mother and wife, an issue which I will return to later in this analysis. It should be noted that Sartre, in common with other existential writers, believes the struggle can only be fully captured from a first-person standpoint.²² There is always an asymmetry between the self's authenticity/bad faith and the other/external reality. Before applying these ideas to the text, we should consider whether they involve a conception completely at odds with the views of Bergman himself.

Bergman has said about *Summer with Monika*, 'I have never made a less complicated film.'²³ He is referring here to the spirit of freedom in which it was shot. Also of relevance is his emphasis on the 'genius' of Harriet Andersson and the moment in the film when she looks directly at the lens.²⁴ Bergman attributes the originality of this moment to Andersson. Although he is not correct in saying that this was the first moment in cinema in which this was done, we can understand his tribute to his actress.²⁵ This moment also relates to his skill as a director. This shot provides an intense focus on subjectivity and conveys the asymmetry between first-and third-person accounts.

The story, with its culmination in Monika's betrayal of Harry, has been regarded by some critics as simple and conventional, spiced up by the erotic performance of Andersson, as well as the dynamics between Bergman and this actress.²⁶ Frank Gado puts forward the argument that the narrative is 'slight'.²⁷ However, this point of view ignores the complexity in the evolution of the relationships. Throughout the film a strategy of symbolic representation is developed alongside a 'realistic' style. From the Kleinian perspective, this is critical. Reparation cannot be achieved without the creation of a symbolic reality, and Kleinians have evaluated works of art by considering how intensively this process is achieved. A symbol which is clichéd, or predictable, may completely fail to address the intensity of emotion which from the Kleinian perspective is at stake in artistic creation.²⁸

Although the film has a refreshing directness, its quality depends on a complex development of artistic expression, the cueing of an imaginative response from the audience and a thematic insistence on the imagination of the key protagonists. Both of these elements allow a distinctive focus on emotion to evolve. For Sartre, art's capacity to explore emotion

is important because imagination is the key to unlocking consciousness from bad faith – the belief that freedom does not exist. We will see how Monika and Harry choose to defy a world in which they feel their spirits are deadened – a world of bad faith. At the same time, it is clear that the rebellion is not just viewed as the subjective response of Monika and Harry, but in fact the neorealist aesthetic of openness continually reminds us that this drama unfolds in a relatively complex social setting, so issues of gender, class, age and hierarchy are foregrounded at different points.

We have seen in the previous chapter how the concept of intentionality lies behind Sartre's phenomenological method and theory of imagination. Although Sartre does not provide a model for textual analysis, the clear implication is that analysis of art must look for the author's intentions. This is borne out by the subsequent influence of Sartre's work on film criticism on the *Cahiers* group, including André Bazin. *Summer with Monika* was elevated by these critics, precisely because they felt it was an authored work.²⁹ Elsewhere in the world, the film was mainly known for the performance of Andersson.³⁰ However, it seems that the *Cahiers* group and their practice of reading the author's intentionality into expressive film form played a leading role in the development of Bergman's reputation internationally.

For Sartre, the key counterpart to his emphasis on intentionality in the work of the artist is his recognition of the role of subjectivity in the reception of the work. This was seen, for example, in Sartre's account of the portrait discussed in the previous chapter. As Thomas Flynn reminds us, for Sartre, art is valued as an exchange between different consciousnesses that are free:

The artwork, for Sartre, has always carried a special power: that of communicating among freedoms without alienation or objectification...In his *The Imaginary*, he speaks of the portrait "inviting" the viewer to realize its possibilities by regarding it aesthetically.³¹

In the case of *Summer with Monika*, a comparable philosophy is accompanied by elements which suggest a critical response to society. This is partly explained by the source material (a novel), but also the way Bergman is inspired by film-makers, including the style of neorealism and specifically Roberto Rossellini. Jacques Aumont makes this comparison, although he suggests that across Bergman's work we find a whole range of film styles. For Aumont, it is important that Bergman uses these styles in an autonomous way (he does not elevate one over the other).³² The

point behind the Rossellini comparison rests on the use of a realistic style that, nonetheless, aims to cultivate the free, imaginative role of the viewer. Rossellini famously achieved this with the use of gaps in the narrative, as in the theft of the soldier's shoes in *Paisa* (1946). Discussing *Summer with Monika*, Aumont notes the value placed on exterior location and the use of long take, a conjunction that Bazin understood as a basis for an active response from the viewer.³³ We will see that Sartre's belief in the value of reader response, like that of Rossellini and the neorealists, is implicitly endorsed by the ambiguity and indeterminacy of meaning at various points in *Summer with Monika*.

The dual emphasis on the free imagination of the viewer and the artist means that Sartre's work can be regarded as distinct from those analyses which pinpoint a fixed and determinate vision in the work of an artist. Sartre, in effect, provides the basis of an alternative to structuralist and Lacanian analysis, both of which can be criticised for eliminating intentionality in the work. The phenomenological method involves tracing authorial intention in the work without pinning this to a fixed vision.³⁴ This method, with its focus on how a viewer's response is actively elicited by the film-makers, allows us to see instances, throughout the film, in which it is necessary to go beyond what is directly given, and instead posit something that is more actively imagined.

Analysis of the film: the opening

In the first shots, the absence of voice-over and dialogue elevate the documentary images of the Stockholm waterside from factual background to something more meaningful. The images can be said to await the meaning provided by the audience. For a Swedish audience, perhaps, they are recognisable, while for other audiences these shots introduce the location. The opening sections demonstrate an awareness of social context. With a documentary style, the sequence continues with a montage of dissolves representing the Stockholm waterside, in the early morning, including industrial elements. We see a warehouse and cranes, while working boats are moored in the harbour. Other elements in the landscape are also visible: a church spire to the left of one shot, and faintly in the background of another a solitary barque moves across the harbour. The underlying purpose is poetic: expanses of water that will be significant later as the protagonists escape the mainland; light playing across the water in juxtaposition with the solid, but distant coastline; silence which is only interrupted after several shots, when we hear an industrial boat off-screen. This opening demonstrates how

the film brings a romantic sensibility to the representation of a local, contemporary landscape. In the tradition of romantic poetry, it suggests that the landscape is an emotional resource, a potential counterpart to character subjectivity. However, we should not take this point too far. For Bergman, like Sartre, all material can be animated by imagination, so nature is not given an exclusive role in their work.³⁵

The development of enigma through a lack of dialogue is maintained with the representation of Harry. Since information about him is restricted at this stage, we have to intuitively sense his character. Following the opening montage of the waterfront, the credits sequence continues with a series of dissolves, and we are made aware of character and time being represented, as the individual shots show different stages of Harry's journey across the city on bicycle. He is surrounded by traffic, with the noise surrounding his character. Thus, the film establishes a style in which the gap between the subjectivity of the character and the external world is signified. Evoking character subjectivity and realistic landscape rather than focusing on more plot-centred material paves the way for the later dislocation between the character and his external world. This will be because Harry will look for an alternative to the reality of his social existence through his emotional identification with Monika, and their escape to the island.

In a film which is in some respects a gentle story of young lovers, it is unsurprising that the world around the characters is presented as, at this stage, relatively benign. The next space is introduced with quiet observation of social interaction peripheral to the main line of the story. A man closes the door to a shop and exchanges greetings (through removing of their hats) with another man, who walks into the space of a courtyard, following a carriage, which carries a strange assortment of bric-a-brac. This world of the itinerant trader and his cart is one of business and polite custom. The sound of bells is eclipsed by an accordion. Sartre's emphasis on the role of imagination provides a perspective on why these elements are in the film, and this includes the possibility of different interpretations dependent on the context of the audience. The film also moves towards greater representation of a social world, but at the same time, this social world is set-up as a stage in which the subjectivity of the main protagonists will take over. We can only really understand the initial investment in the background when looking back on the story's thematic development after seeing how the narrative moves on, in particular the separation of the couple from society. At this stage, the social detail delays and contextualises the couple's first appearance, and carries a slightly whimsical, dreamy

momentum alongside the sociological observation. The incorporation of poetic licence into observation of the everyday brings to mind again Rosellini's works of Italian neorealism as well as other developments in European art cinema, such as French poetic realism.³⁶ The fact that equilibrium is expressed through the background details is significant for the level of formal integration achieved at the end of the film – a critical point from the Kleinian viewpoint, which places so much emphasis on reparation achieved through integration. From the beginning, Bergman trusts in an aesthetic notion of synthesis, which provides a counterpoint to (rather than an escape from) irresolvable social conflicts.

Everything seen thus far is pushed towards the background as Monika appears for the first time. A man who is seen leaving his shop walks past the mirror and adjusts his hat, leaving Monika shown in medium shot in the mirror with head slightly bowed. Thus, her appearance is indirect and mediated by context and the mirror. The social background and Monika's appearance are orchestrated with great attention to a partial meaning that must be completed in the imagination of the viewer. Although the absence of dialogue is crucial, the use of gaps in the text can be found also in the way in which space is organised between shots. The impact of Monika's first appearance is intensified because the arrangement of space is disorienting in the lead-up to this. We do not know where we are in relation to the previous shot when she appears. The lack of visual and aural clues intensifies the mystery of her appearance amidst the social context. At this point, we may become more aware that the film is not just a realistic account because the symbolisation is more overt, with the use of the mirror as frame. We can see here the Kleinian insistence on the way in which symbolism is central to the making of art. For Kleinians, art is inherently symbolic and thus must create at this level through the given material, even if this material is realistic or naturalistic.³⁷ The Sartrean fascination with an autonomous imaginary level open to the viewer's interpretation is also vividly represented here. Using Sartre's categories, we can say that the mirror image evokes Monika's *imagination* of herself rather than her being just an object of *perception*. It is as if her image is independent of reality and conveys her dreams. In turn the viewer projects onto this image, conscious already that it is an image for Monika and not simply a perceptual experience. There is ambiguity around Monika's personality, which is immediately evoked by this introduction with its emphasis on imaginary levels which transcend perceptual data – Monika's imagination of herself and the viewer's response to this.

Monika turns away from the camera and walks with the group of men into a cafe, with the last man, previously seen at the beginning of this section, bowing and lifting his cap to allow her in first. The whole effect is that of a theatrical exit, and this provides a further contrast to the everyday normality of the opening sequences. We also have to note that the deployment of a single take here, including action in depth, creates a rhyme with the finale of the film, when Harry is shown with their baby, looking into the mirror, with the cafe door in the background.

Harry turns towards the camera, but his gaze towards the audience is revealed as a contemplation of the past, and it cues Harry's visual memory of Monika on the island. Thus, the rhyming of two shots – Monika's look in the mirror, and Harry's look in the mirror – dispersed across the film, concentrate the expression of meaning on the figure of Monika. She is present, but imagined in the mirror in the first one, absent but imagined in memory in the latter. All of this might be interpreted as support for the view that Bergman is playing with a representation of the woman from a male perspective as an unknowable other.



Figure 4.1 Summer with Monika, Svensk Filmindustri, Tartan Video. Monika is introduced, looking into a mirror



Figure 4.2 *Summer with Monika*, Svensk Filmindustri, Tartan Video. Harry gazes into the mirror at the end of the film

However, this misses the complexity of Monika's character, including the directness that evolves through her actions and later through her notorious look towards the camera. The potential of Monika as a source of meaning for the rest of the text can be gauged by the range of connotations produced in her initial appearance in the film. Monika's point of view of her own image in the mirror brings us closer to her character. This initial appearance also presents gender differences (we see the man in the background adjust his hat before she raises her lipstick and then decides not to use it), through the contrasting content in different pockets of the *mise-en-scène*. The visual information in this sequence also conveys generational differences. The elderly gentleman who ushers Monika into the cafe contrasts with the more middle-aged characters who we see tyrannise Harry with their concerns over work efficiency.

The dreamworld of the couple

The initial meeting between Monika and Harry is marked by spontaneity as their intentions are driven by emotions and imagination.

The initially cryptic spatial organisation in this section of the film is minimised because continuity is re-established as Harry reappears. The spatial disorientation that had prevailed is contrasted with the elements which now provide continuity, including Monika's presence in the cafe, to convey the idea of romantic destiny as Harry and Monika meet. The camerawork progresses from an omniscient viewpoint in which we see Monika sitting with her back to Harry while he is in medium close-up. The key dialogue, which follows, requires that both characters are in medium close-up. The initial set-up also provides continuity through the symbolic quality of the characters' physical positioning. Monika's back to the frame continues the sense of her appearance in the mirror, initially latent and withheld. Harry's appearance in the cafe is static, contrasting with his movements as he travels across town, but continuing the idea of his solitary existence. Thus, a build-up of associations at the visual level creates anticipation of the moment when these characters speak to each other. This enhances the sense that they only focus on each other, a phenomenon that relates to the Kleinian concept of projective identification whereby the world is coloured by one's subjective phantasies to the exclusion of other detail.

After introducing herself with 'Got a match? I can't find mine', Monika's lines carry the most potent meaning in this meeting. She is suddenly outrageously utopian: 'Spring has come. Let's clear off and travel and see the world.' Monika shows little respect for work and shares her dissatisfaction with the conditions: 'This winter I thought my arse would freeze off.' Finally, as the camera gets closest, she asks, 'Have you seen *Song of Love* with Garbo?' Key elements from Bergman's previous work are here, including, foremost, the idea of the isolated lovers and their desire to escape drudgery. It is as if we are moving into a self-sufficient world structured by their imagination, with Monika taking the lead. The more conventional idea is here too: in Sweden, the Spring is so important because the Winter is so cold. Also, emerging strongly we have the idea of a different reality signified by film, a discourse that will continue through the rest of *Summer with Monika*. The complexity of this imaginary world is a central preoccupation that can only be understood through some scrutiny of the way filmic elements are arranged across the film as a whole, as we saw with the rhyming mirror shots. All the filmic elements, including spatial organisation and dialogue, build a pattern in which some individual elements can be appreciated more deeply through their symbolic relation to other moments in the film. Whilst the linking of different elements creates harmony, the continuous possibility of gaps and fractures conveys how precarious

coherence is in this imaginary realm. This is why the film conveys more than one imaginary level, referring to the world of cinema and also mixing realism with a sensibility that reaches beyond the observation of the physical world. Kleinian and Sartrean insights into imagination provide a conceptual parallel with the representation here because both of these theorists emphasise how imagination leads representation and, in doing this, negativity is a fundamental element. Shifting between realism and theatrical *mise-en-scène* creates imaginary coherence in the idea of romantic destiny, but it also leaves open the sense that annihilation of the romance is possible. As Klein's work shows, finding the good object does not insure well-being because it sets up binary opposition with all that is rejected and intensifies the threat of this other reality. At the same time, as Sartre shows us, intentions carry responsibility, and in the reconciliation of two subjects in love, the balance between them can be easily disrupted.³⁸ As Monika and Harry meet, there is already an indication that Monika's actions will determine what will happen to the couple.

While Monika's dominance is related to her willingness to imagine an alternative to their drab daily existence, Bergman also focuses on Harry's subjectivity, which is juxtaposed with the bad treatment he receives at work. At the beginning we saw how he was represented as a solitary figure in the industrial landscape. Before Harry returns to the shop floor, we see the attitude of the other workers towards him. The signs are here of a social critique of power relations in the workplace, although this remains schematic. Harry's immediate colleague/manager (his role is not entirely clear) is chivvied by another man, who never speaks directly to Harry. The man campaigns for pressure to be put on the boy to be more efficient. Another worker shouts through his complaints that Harry is not back from his coffee break. This conveys the idea that work targets are organised unfairly along a chain of command, with pressure put on the youngest worker. The anxiety about work targets is strong, whilst the slightly absurd theatrical staging, used for instance in the continual interruptions of the man lifting the shutter, is also striking.

Harry's alienation from this set-up is developed further in the following scene. Here we can see that he is only thinking of Monika. Out on his bike, at the traffic barrier, he gazes ahead dreamily, unaware that he is holding up the traffic. When he moves on, the camera rests momentarily on the blank space that has been vacated. This is a small sign of empathy for Harry's state of mind, resting momentarily on absence and the lingering sense of detachment from the routines and duties of work. Harry's gaze into the distance is another instance of frontal staging,

whereby the camera concentrates on a character as if he is looking directly out and beyond the audience. There is no attempt to contextualise the space fully. This style parallels the way theatrical monologues achieve intimacy between a character and the audience. The film does not reproduce theatrical conventions, but adapts these into a cinematic style. The lingering of the camera at this moment associates the character's dreaming with a slower tempo that contrasts with the anxieties of his workplace. The act of projective identification is foregrounded because the character's imaginary world is seen as a temporary escape from his material surroundings.

The idea of an imaginary escape is developed further as Monika and Harry go to the cinema. The date film is melodramatic, and the snippet we see involves two well-dressed characters. The woman tells the man he may kiss her but they will never meet again. Monika's tears and gaze suggest her total projection into this romantic tragic scenario. Meanwhile Harry is detached from the movie, yawning, but he also looks with anxiety towards Monika. When the lights come on the camera-work focuses on the couple, and this continues through their exit. It is as if they are separated and are like somnambulists in the dark, slightly awkward, still possessed, by the movie in Monika's case, and its significance as part of the date in Harry's case. Harry is anxious, but Monika thinks beyond to the glamour of the film. Bergman's *mise-en-scène* shows here how cinematic fantasy is reproduced in the world outside the film they have seen, as Monika's attention is drawn briefly to a lighted shop window, which is like the glowing cinema screen. The imaginary world of the film was not an innocent beyond, but one with connotations of status, signifying the possibility of commercial exchange, the pervasive capitalist mode of transformation.

Typically, this political element is only hinted at. An industrial image, this time of a tower against the darkened sky, punctuates the focus on Harry and Monika, before a cut to them, sitting in medium close-up. This juxtaposition of an exterior location and an intimate interior is typical of the film's assimilation of different elements, ranging from a keen eye for a physical environment to immersion in the private drama of the characters. In subsequent chapters we will see how Bergman maintains and intensifies these concerns in more psychological works. The romance of Harry and Monika incorporates a self-referential element by referring to the film just seen. Like the woman in the movie, Monika is in charge. After they kiss she evokes obsessive passion, saying, 'we are crazy about each other'. However, the lighting was more stylised in the movie. Monika's face is highlighted, but the surroundings are

in darkness, which is a reminder of the couple's precarious position in society. The concentration on Monika's playful expression contrasts with the solemn atmosphere of the movie they have seen which further illustrates the spontaneity she represents. When Monika suggests that they move on due to the cold, it is revealed that they are outside, and an atmospheric landscape takes over as the signifier of romance.

Elements of melancholy and mourning

Kleinian theory preserves a focus on artistic intentionality and artistic form,³⁹ and gives art a privileged role. Art, however, must according to the Kleinian view deal with depression as well as joy. Since art is a symbolic activity, emotions will be expressed in a manner that is inevitably indirect but, whatever the genre, Kleinian theory stipulates the necessity of the depressive phase for achieving successful artistic expression. Nicky Glover provides a succinct summary of this:

As in psychic health, there must be an awareness of *both* aspects. All successful (authentic) art must embody the deep experience of the artist – that is, his depression, whose working-through lies at the heart of all artistic creation. Indeed, it is not unusual to find that deeply moving art often stirs feelings of both rapture and melancholy.⁴⁰

For Kleinian analysis, there is a sense of loss or damage that must be repaired. This can be compared with an emphasis in film theory on the way narratives work to resolve an underlying equilibrium or sense of lack. However, it is necessary to reiterate key differences involved in the Kleinian approach. In the latter, the sense of loss is attached much more directly to the emotional experience of the artist and the spectator. Disequilibrium is not thought about as fundamentally an ideological effect or as an inherent expression of a reality that the film, in some way, denies or escapes from.⁴¹ Instead, as we see in the art criticism of Richard Wollheim, there is a focus on primitive emotional states for the artist and the spectator, which are ultimately related to the infant's relationship to the mother and to the quest for a constructive development of subjectivity. Great value is placed on transformation of loss through creation and the possibility of a creative response to the work of art, including an active participation in the text's value. While other Bergman films like *Wild Strawberries* are permeated by a sense of loss and emotional damage from the past, in *Summer with Monika* this is more implicit. However, it is still significant. We learn that both Harry and Monika as young adults feel

a sense of alienation that has been caused by unhappy family histories. This becomes more explicit as we see Monika's dissatisfaction at home, and in the scene which reveals Harry's loss of his mother through an early death. In this scene we see how *mise-en-scène* is used to evoke melancholy and how this is juxtaposed to the plight of the young lovers.

Monika attempts to replace the lost maternal affection and support, as she playfully comforts Harry. The emphasis on maternal loss is emphasised further when Harry's father returns, interrupting the intimacy of Harry and Monika. Instead of an Oedipal conflict, we have a focus on the pathos of the father, still emotionally ravaged by his wife's death. The staging of this scene develops this theme. The father enters, remaining in shadowy light as he crosses the room, passing the framed photograph of his wife. The couple in the foreground, Harry and Monika, are not just being pitted against a hostile environment but also one in which fate is hostile. Whilst the attack by Lelle, Harry's contemporary and rival for the affections of Monika, which follows shortly after this, can be read as part of an Oedipal struggle, it also shifts the focus onto peer rivalry in the struggle for the possession of Monika. Lelle is a young person and not identified with the existing power structure, but in his threat to the couple's unity, and his conflict with Harry, Lelle is objectified as a destructive element. He shows the impossibility of Harry and Monika completely expelling the negativity of their society.

Existential rebellion

As we saw in the previous chapter, for Sartre imagination must negate. It is an independent force not determined by perception, but this does not mean it is nihilistic. Autonomy of imagination is apparent in the characters of Harry and Monika. They are both dreamers. The introspective, destructive element in Harry's rebellion against his work is signified at a symbolic level as he allows a decanter to drop to the ground. Gado notes the way in which Bergman's style incorporates a subjective element into this example and throughout the film in a way that was inspiring for the *Nouvelle Vague*.⁴² The decision to leave society and head for the isolation of the island is an imaginative decision which negates and transcends the alienation the couple experience in society. The decision to flee to the island is symbolic and throws the reality of the society into abeyance. Like one of Sartre's acts of imagination, in which negativity is an essential part of the process, the island only comes into being because the society disappears. Aumont notes how important rebellion against society is in this work and relates it to the earlier Bergman films about

young alienated protagonists.⁴³ As with these other films, happiness is difficult to achieve. The island is 'other', a new world, but the progression to it is doomed because the couple have not fully confronted the destructive elements incorporated in the previous situation. In particular, the threat from Lelle, a character who attacks Harry from jealousy and molests Monika, remains, representing the paranoid-schizoid reality of a society permeated by division and conflict, which the couple try to escape. Lelle is the most threatening figure for Harry, but his animosity is part of the oppressive social norms from which they run away. Although paranoia may seem too extreme as a term, it is evoked because after the sudden violence represented by Lelle, his threat is made latent. Part of the innovation of Klein's thinking lies in showing how the paranoid-schizoid is part of everyday life and only full-scale reparation can achieve liberation. Therefore, physical escape is not enough. For Sartre, liberation is also a momentous challenge, and the couple do not achieve this. Bergman's work implicitly confirms Kleinian and Sartrean analysis of the difficulties facing liberation from social constraints.

For critics of Sartre, his emphasis on intentionality is a fallback on ego psychology,⁴⁴ but Sartre does not necessarily fit into this box. His work on the imagination alerts us to the way imagination and other modes of consciousness share the possibility of rebellion. As Betty Cannon makes clear, free will, for Sartre, may be guided by emotion and/or imagination, as well as reason.⁴⁵ More fundamentally, it is important to recognise that Sartre's notion of freedom evolved with a distinction made between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness. In this film the rebellion of Harry and Monika has a pre-reflective, spontaneous quality. The film does not map out a set of goals which they seek to achieve through an ego-centred process of reasoning, but instead the emphasis is on their creativity in negating their oppressive circumstances. The bravery of choosing an indeterminate future rather than complying with an established order is central to the Sartrean account.⁴⁶

Correlating with Sartre's philosophy of consciousness is his specific emphasis on the difference between first-person and third-person accounts of experience. Matthew C. Eshleman makes this clear in his argument against the mistaken view that Sartre's account of freedom is indistinguishable from an acceptance of chance as the ultimate background for our decisions. For Sartre, the first-person consciousness is at some level unique:

By an essentially first-person experience, Sartre means an experience (a) necessarily dependent upon our awareness of it, which (b) cannot

be directly apprehended (intuited) by other observers. Thus, first-person experience is unlike many *objects* of experience, which exist independently of our awareness of them and can be straightforwardly examined by multiple observers, like material objects large enough to perceive through the senses.⁴⁷

In other words, for Sartre subjectivity, at some level, resists complete translation and is most directly expressed by the individual concerned. Rather than being nihilistic, or problematic, this feature of his philosophy provides a basis for ethics because it insists that any moral judgements applied externally to a situation must be balanced against available first-person testimony. Sartre, more than other existential philosophers like Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger, continually attempts to connect this ontology of subjectivity with social analysis and social justice. Bergman exploits the disjuncture between different narrational viewpoints, to the extent that his films implicitly critique the collapsing of first-person experience into a third-person objectivity.

Escape to the island

Summer with Monika provides good examples of Bergman's interest in exploring variations in first-person and third-person narration, and his reluctance to let the latter subsume the former. While the film opened with the omniscient narration of the waterside, suggested by long shots from different perspectives, the departure of Harry and Monika for the island is presented with apparently subjective camera work. Aspects of the narrative are left vague as the couple escape the mainland in his father's boat. Contextual information from the story is minimised to facilitate identification with the subjectivity of the couple. For example, we do not see the reactions of their parents to this flight, and the latter remain marginal to the narrative. Instead, the focus is on the couple's experience. Echoing the style of the opening sequence, the shots reveal landscape rather than character, but the narrational viewpoint overruns into the subjectivity of the couple because the visual perspective during this journey appears to be that of the characters. The subjective viewpoint of the couple is suggested (by the camera's position approximate to Harry and Monika's position on the boat), although this is not actually confirmed, eliciting a more active interpretation from the viewer and conveying the enigmatic irreducibility of a subjective perspective. The sudden revelation of the open water suggests their newly acquired freedom. All dialogue disappears to be replaced by isolated sounds.

The style is relatively simple, almost documentary-like, continuing the aesthetic allegiance with neorealism, but we can also recognise in the combination of realism and subjectivity a precursor of the intense subjective world developed in later works, reaffirming that Bergman's films are always sensitive to private experience. The extended sequence of the escape to the island thematically conveys the couple's escape from an oppressive social reality and cannot be reduced to the idea of Monika's luring Harry away from security. The reliance on imagery without words is complemented by the lack of specific time references until Monika awakes on the island looking at a clock. As noted in the discussion of *The Seventh Seal*, Bergman explained some of his work through his interest in particular images, and this passage also illustrates his willingness to let imagery take over at specific points.⁴⁸

Although the island is initially an idyllic escape, it becomes the location for the development of conflict already represented in the film. As we saw in Chapter 2, according to Klein, the death drive is manifested in a range of behaviour, including greed, jealousy, hatred and violence. Klein's bleak view of human nature insists that development is inevitably accompanied by these negative states. The love affair between Harry and Monika is juxtaposed with external threats, principally in the form of Lelle and the oppressive work environment, which Harry has to endure. Kleinian ideas alert us to the way that in their love affair Harry and Monika find in each other a substitute for the negativity foisted on them by other external sources. Kleinian theory uses the binary opposition of good and bad objects directly in relation to primordial emotional states, and there is an emphasis on the dialectical development of these states. Harry and Monika find solace in each other, becoming good objects for one another, and this is reinforced through their rejection of the society, but they cannot, according to Klein's insights, find a resolution to their difficulties until they confront and integrate the external negative threats. The Kleinian perspective recognises how the death drive is located in society as well as being a psychic force. We can observe this as Lelle intrudes on the couple's idyllic isolation. In the build-up to this, a solemn, eerie foreshadowing of future events is conveyed with lingering shots as the lovers' boat disappears into the horizon. The long take helps express that this is the last moment before Lelle returns unexpectedly to reintroduce conflict. While Harry and Monika play innocently, Lelle appears suddenly. His point of view replaces that of the omniscient observational long shot. Jealousy and destruction are introduced into the romantic isolation of the couple. The fight with Lelle has a theatrical quality with its exaggerated physical movements and

lack of dialogue. The fact that Monika makes the vital blow by hitting Lelle with a saucepan undercuts but does not eliminate the idea that this could be a fight to the death.

Shortly after the fight scene, the representation of Monika centres on her response to becoming pregnant. On the island we witness how Monika's actions become more desperate. This is another point that demonstrates how a psychological emphasis on Monika's subjectivity is combined with social observation. When, shortly afterwards, Monika leads the foray into a middle-class house in search of food, physical movements are again foregrounded. Harry and Monika have been separated on the grounds of the house when Monika is apprehended, clinging to a large slab of meat. Throughout this scene there is an absence of point-of-view camerawork but, nevertheless, we are aligned with the camera movement that responds to Monika's actions, and this is very pronounced when she struggles to escape from the family. This is a style distinct from the norms of Hollywood cinema in which identification with a character is more reliant on point of view.

There was a suggestion of absurdity as well as a connotation of real violence in the struggle with Lelle. The element of absurdity returns because Monika's presence in the bourgeois setting is so incongruous. Her savage rejection of any communication with the daughter maintains a theme running throughout the film whereby all character interaction is problematic. Monika's autonomy is central to this theme. When she escapes from the family, the camerawork is used to simply track her movements through the wild area adjacent to the house. In this passage, alongside the construction of suspense, there is a focus on her subjectivity, which culminates in a montage of natural elements, including an owl from Monika's point of view. This sequence belongs to a tradition dedicated to evoking the position of primitive characters outside society, and may have influenced François Truffaut's choice of subject matter in *L'Enfant Sauvage* (1970). Truffaut's enthusiasm for *Summer with Monika* had already been demonstrated by, for example, his inclusion of a picture of Monika in *Les Quatre Cent Coups* (1959). The meaning of primitive imagery in *Summer with Monika* is, however, not transparent. At one level, the passage represents Monika's descent into a savage state, mirroring the violence perpetrated by Lelle. However, this is not made explicit because the film does not have the same focus on cause and effect as a classical narrative. Klein's writings about envy, jealousy and greed provide a perspective on the action here. While jealousy, according to Klein, is driven by a sense of loss (the other has taken or threatens my possessions), envy suggests a primal descent into desire for what the other

possesses. Monika moves towards this primitive state.⁴⁹ On the one hand, Monika can be seen as trying to achieve a lost equilibrium necessary for survival. On the other hand, her mental state seems so desperate that it lacks this basis. She shows greed in a way that is completely justified by her precarious state, but her actions also gravitate towards the form of greed that Klein believed was so destructive – an insatiable desire. The reason Monika gives for her desperate actions is the need to feed herself in a state of pregnancy. In the end, we see how this need is complicated by her cavalier existentialism. She desperately needs physical support, but is unwilling to conform in the same way as Harry.

Monika's abandonment of Harry

The couple argue desperately as Monika becomes helpless. When they are reconciled, the feeling of reparation is unconvincing, and this does not address Monika's rejection of the world, to which they must return. The return journey to the mainland echoes the journey out with ellipses, through shots representing the sea and surroundings as they travel in to Stockholm. On this occasion, shadowy light expresses an ominous atmosphere, but it is varied and delicate, maintaining a fragile state of transition. The final act of the film develops the balance between splitting and integration already set in place. Harry succeeds in achieving integration because he finds a sympathetic workplace, an outcome foreshadowed in the benign depiction of the workers congregating around the cafe, in the first part of the film. More significantly he is not destroyed by the loss of Monika. In contrast, Monika shows an opposing side of the situation since she takes on, in Kleinian terms internalises, the negativity located in society. She becomes identified with the external world that threatened their happiness before.

This point leads to the debate about whether Monika is an existentialist heroine. Monika embodies a resistance to definition, thus in Sartrean terms, negating determinism, and vanishes from the text. However, as Cannon makes clear, Sartre does not celebrate freedom divorced from all conditions:

If, for whatever reasons, I desire to escape my facticity, I may fall into the dishonest position of claiming that I am absolutely free in the sense of being able to do or be anything whatever or in the sense of having no connections with my past self. The dreamer who constantly expects a 'new tomorrow' and the schizophrenic who completely ignores reality are examples of this form of bad faith.⁵⁰

Cannon explains that the concept of bad faith is used to criticise a consciousness that suffers the illusion that freedom is absolute, as well as one that believes that this freedom does not exist. Monika's hedonistic freedom embodies the first of these variations. Bergman intends to make this ambiguous, and so we are left with both the impression of a powerful independence in Monika's actions and, at the same time, the text demonises her abandonment of Harry and the baby. By taking on the story of female rebellion, Bergman brings to the fore the potential for rebellion and destruction in any relationship. Today, it is easy to recognise the deficiencies of the film's gender politics in its apparent criticism of Monika's hedonistic, selfish abandonment of her husband and baby through her infidelity with Lelle, but we can also see why this film maintains a progressive reputation. Monika resists final definition, and is played with great charisma by Andersson. The social context of her rebellion is brought to the fore, including her alienation as a young mother (even if this is represented unsympathetically), the apparent corrupt influence of urban life, and the loss of innocence precipitated by the violence of Lelle.

Sartrean analysis values the ability of a character to rise above his/her circumstances, but beyond this, Sartre's development and advocacy of an existential psychoanalysis provides the possibility of a more complete response to the film. Sartre seeks a form of integration through his own specific model of psychoanalysis, which involves reflection on past actions and events whilst avoiding objectification of this material.⁵¹ Harry goes through a comparable process as he casts his mind back to his time on the island. The film-making gives this moment enough ambiguity such that it does not signify unequivocally nostalgia or regret, but rather an engagement through imagination with the past and emotion. The economy of the film-making prevents any further elaboration, and thus maintains the sense of existential relation specific to Harry.

The much talked about image in which Monika looks directly at the audience is the key moment of this final act and the film as a whole. Quite rightly, responses have highlighted this self-reflexive moment and the way it cultivates Monika's ambiguity. This image also shows imagination as part of a process, which means engagement with absence, as Sartre argues, since shortly after this Monika disappears, only to reappear as a memory in Harry's imagination. This image of Monika looking at the camera also returns us to her initial appearance as an image in the mirror, which strongly evoked an imaginary level beyond perception. In both images she is strikingly framed. Now Monika becomes a

portrait framed by the film. This illustrates how the imagination may be drawn into the projection of emotional characteristics that are not self-evident within the image. We are invited to imagine Monika's personality, her treachery, insolence and independence. The emotion here is foregrounded because this is the moment in which she signifies her autonomy and thus signifies Harry's loss. The startling immediacy of this image as a result of Monika's look at the camera and its autonomous position as a result of her subsequent disappearance also provide rich material for psychoanalytic interpretation. It is as if the image provides a direct route to the unconscious for film-maker and spectator. As Esther Sánchez-Pardo reminds us, the development of the snapshot and its cultivation as a moment in film was seen by the theorist Walter Benjamin as a new way of accessing unconscious optics. For Sánchez-Pardo, the isolated, fragmented image cultivated by modernism pursues this sense of fascination with emotion that is outside narrative control. As Benjamin stated:

Evidently a different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked eye – if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a space consciously explored by man... The camera introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses.⁵²

To be sure, the image of Monika differs from the snapshot in various respects, but it is also comparable to the effect identified by Benjamin because it signifies a kind of immediacy that is startling compared with the rest of the film, a sudden random visual access to Monika as subject. Bergman, throughout his work, in collaboration with his cinematographers, uses portraits and close-ups as moments which possess a strong level of autonomy, a force of their own which is not dependent on what precedes or follows in the narrative. This allows the viewer to imagine a character's emotions more intensely. As we saw in Chapter 3, Sartre challenges our ideas about the representation of character interiority. His theory demands that we consider interior states dynamically in relation to intentions, motivations and the external cues for these phenomena. Sartre's theory accords with the way *Summer with Monika* presents the enigma of Monika's motivation, but also signals that this relates to a social context. As in *Wild Strawberries* and *The Seventh Seal*, Bergman's images are incorporated very skilfully within the narrative, but at the same time they have an independent subliminal quality like that which Benjamin identifies in the snapshot.



Figure 4.3 *Summer with Monika*, Svensk Filmindustri, Tartan Video. Monika looks towards the audience

Sartre's theory of the look not only discloses power relations but also intersubjectivity, and thus conveys the magical element of this moment, which was so fascinating for the directors of the *Nouvelle Vague*. Sartre also helps us understand the narrative dislocation with his scepticism in *Being and Nothingness* about romantic love, the impossibility of reconciliation between two subjects and the inevitable asymmetry involved in social relations, manifested in this case through the look. However, as already suggested, Sartre's apparently pessimistic account of social relations is not the full story of his philosophy – it is merely the ground for a more authentic existence – and in this corresponds with the movement between paranoid-schizoid and depressive relations as tracked by Klein.

Monika is restored at the end of the film as a subject in Harry's memory. This flashback exemplifies the power of phantasy and imagination as these powers appear to be involved in Harry's wishful recall of Monika on the island. The image of Monika connotes more than just a remembered perception, signifying Harry's emotional relationship with Monika and their past. The film respects this power rather

than seeking for solutions in the realm of perception. Sartre is fascinated by the freedom of the imagination to overcome temporal and spatial distance. Although he believes that perception is a more vital source of knowledge than imagination, when reality represents a lack for consciousness, imagination can still disclose emotional knowledge.⁵³ This is apparent in a fairly obscure piece of Sartrean writing from early in his career entitled 'Faces', in which Sartre displays the same sensibility as Bergman in his fascination with the sheer emotional force that lies behind the visual appearance of a face. In her article about Sartre and magic, Sarah Richmond draws attention to this example of Sartre's writing, in which it becomes clear that the face of the 'other' is not exclusively a threat or an object.⁵⁴ Sartre's dialectical philosophy allows us to recognise the positive force of Monika's final appearance as image, after the apparently destructive close-up of her enigmatic face.

The emotional power of the imaginary is consistent with Klein's argument that phantasy contributes to knowledge, including the organisation of time and space. Sánchez-Pardo argues that this is a distinctive characteristic of Kleinian theory, which explains its affiliation with various examples of modernism. Like modernist art, Kleinian theory recognises the value of juxtaposing different fragments in a way that breaks continuity. For Klein, this means greater recognition of psychic material that is submerged in the rigid oppositions imposed by binary thinking. Focusing on the issue of spatial representation in modernism, Sánchez-Pardo notes that 'Space in Kleinian theory is not something that has to be conquered but something that must be experienced in all its complexity. It is also a space that is empty enough to allow the (lost) object to emerge'.⁵⁵

This is precisely what happens at the end of *Summer with Monika* as the space of the island is represented allowing Monika to return in Harry's imagination. This image is melancholic because Monika has disappeared, but it is also constructive because it allows repressed emotion to be expressed. Thus, both Sartre and Klein lead us back to a fuller examination of how this image is integrated into the film. Whilst it can be read along Freudian lines as wish fulfilment of the male psyche, it is also implicated in a complex patterning that runs through the narrative, evoking symmetry and asymmetry as part of the imagined restoration of loss, and carries the possibility of insight alongside its obvious nostalgic qualities.

A possible problem with Kleinian theory, already noted in relation to *Wild Strawberries* in Chapter 2, is that it ends up endorsing a conventional morality through its emphasis on integration. Thus, Monika is

demonised because she does not achieve the end point of reparation. In this sense the Kleinian approach appears to be at one with a particular reading of the film, which emphasises its conservative social message. Against this we need to recognise greater complexity in the film and in the theory. Firstly, the theory can be credited with revealing how the reparation narrative is constructed from a male perspective. However, secondly we need to remember that Klein's theory does not regard the depressive position as a straightforward end point. In Klein's vision we never attain this as a state of equilibrium, but continue to experience the oscillation between emotional splitting and polarised desires on the one hand, and recognition of the other as an autonomous, emotional being on the other hand. Klein recognises that the paranoid-schizoid is an integral part of development. It cannot simply be defeated through rationality, but has to be experienced emotionally, and art offers the possibility for this. Thirdly, we have the sense developed from the Sartrean perspective of Monika as partially a representative of freedom and transformation.⁵⁶

Bringing these theories together, we can see that, for Bergman, Monika ultimately embodies ambiguity, rather than a completely inaccessible otherness, as might be read into Freudian accounts of femininity. *Summer with Monika* builds on the emotional complications and stylistic experimentation observed in Bergman's earlier work. Despite its realist style, it also looks ahead to the ambiguities of more overtly symbolic works like *Wild Strawberries* and *The Seventh Seal*. Perhaps even more clearly than these later works it reveals that ambiguity is not just a formalist value pursued for its own sake, but involves engagement with social and ethical issues. Sartre, Bergman and Klein are all convinced that engagement with social reality is enriched by art that accommodates ambiguity. Thus in their work we find a valuing of catharsis which differs in emphasis from both Aristotelian and Brechtian models. In contrast to such models, a combination of Kleinian and Sartrean insights suggests that the audience are not distanced from *Summer with Monika* as they might be through Aristotelian pity or Brechtian distanciation. Instead we are engaged by a process, which lacks certainty in its conclusion due to the enigmatic agency of Monika as a figure in Harry's imagination. Bergman filters his portrayal of Monika through the consciousness of his male protagonist, but arguably reaches a more universal level when we consider how imagination and emotion are foregrounded in the narrative as a whole and as part of the viewing experience.

5

Revenge and Reparation in *The Virgin Spring*

The Virgin Spring, released in 1960, depicts the rape and murder of Karin, daughter of Töre and Märeta, by wild goatherds, as she seeks to take the Virgin's candles to Mass on the day of Christ's sacrifice. The film was based on a Swedish thirteenth-century ballad, 'The Daughter of Töre in Vange', of which there were many previous versions in countries that spoke Romance languages.¹ Birgitta Steene points out that the version used in this film had a particularly Swedish identity because only in Sweden was the theme of Christian redemption added to the story.² Ingmar Bergman had been interested in the story since studying at university, and had even considered writing a ballet based on it, but finally worked with Ulla Isaksson's film script.³

Despite generally positive reviews in Sweden, *The Virgin Spring* met with anxiety in the editorial of a Swedish newspaper, which built on the scandal already introduced by the censorship of the rape scene in the American version.⁴ When Olof Lagercrantz, in the editorial, criticised the film itself as well as the reviewers who had praised it, a debate ensued for a month.⁵ The film won an Oscar for Best Foreign Film, but subsequently received a mixed response from critics and historians writing about Bergman's work.⁶ One way in which the film was later praised was for its historical veracity. Geoffrey MacNab writes, 'With relatively limited resources and a budget that was extremely modest by Hollywood standards he had managed to recreate the medieval world in an utterly convincing fashion.'⁷ Some of the most sympathetic analyses of the film, such as that produced by Robin Wood, praise the combination of a realistic style and symbolic elements.⁸ On the one hand, Wood observed the use of symbols in the film, such as 'the mystical number three' used in a number of ways: the three goatherds, the three dead men heard by the beggar, the three branches felled by Töre. On

the other hand, Wood appreciated the representation of material reality: 'the sense of life lived close to the basic physical realities, with little to soften or screen...Physical experience is consistently vivid'.⁹ This viewpoint contrasts with the generally negative reaction to this film described by Laura Hubner: 'Bergman's popularity plummeted across Europe and America. *The Virgin Spring* was loathed as *The Seventh Seal* had been loved.'¹⁰

Hubner also indicates that the film's status was in fact part of a wider picture. For instance, she points out that the criticisms were directed at Bergman's other films in this period, *The Face* of 1958 and *The Devil's Eye* of 1960.¹¹ Hubner shows that there was a backlash against Bergman's use of symbolism, but comments that, in fact he had made diverse kinds of film before this spate of allegorical works. Summarising the reaction against the symbolism, which various critics thought tired and pretentious, Hubner quotes Penelope Gilliat from the *Observer* in 1961: 'Bergman is still sowing his wild strawberries and symbolic devices abound.'¹² In contrast to this critical backlash, my analysis will side with the sympathetic critics like Wood and argue that the film's interest lies in its creative combination of 'realistic' elements with a more imaginative symbolic style. In order to do this, it is necessary to look in detail at the stylistic organisation of the film, which includes elements already noted in Bergman's films: a style that draws on a range of cinematic influences, including silent cinema; an understanding of how elements held in common with theatre, including mise-en-scène and acting, can be used to the greatest effect; and a commitment to the idea of the open text, which was traced in previous chapters to André Bazin and the Sartrean concept of imagination. Various commentaries and elements of film theory will contribute to this positive re-evaluation of the film.

David Bordwell's analysis of the art cinema provides a useful starting point for contextualising the film. Bordwell's focus on narration involves the close analysis of film form. In his account of the art cinema, he states, 'The art cinema motivates its narratives by two principles: realism and authorial expressivity.'¹³ This provides an initial match with the idea that *The Virgin Spring* is a combination of realism and, in the eyes of the negative critics, overwrought symbolism, in which Bergman repeats his own formula. Bordwell explains that in the 'art cinema', realism included use of 'real locations', 'contemporary alienation' and, in various examples, a notably overt treatment of sexuality. 'Most important, the art cinema uses "realistic" – that is, psychologically complex – characters'.¹⁴ With *The Virgin Spring* we will see how stylistic elements are designed to produce 'psychologically complex characters'.

Bordwell also insists on the significance of 'ambiguity' in the art cinema. While this does not seem completely apposite for *The Virgin Spring*, because the latter appears to have a more directly religious message than other Bergman works, closer analysis reveals that this religious message is open to debate. One analysis which notes a certain amount of ambiguity is that of Marc Gervais, who enthuses about the spirituality of the conclusion, and then suggests that this may be the voice of Isaksson rather than Bergman:

Bergman may well have had misgivings all along about the film's lacking a voice steeped in contemporary irony, the Christian affirmation ringing out so strong that it excludes the Sartrean pole of the existentialist dialectic. We may indeed be hearing far more of Ulla Isaksson's voice than Ingmar Bergman's.¹⁵

Gervais is one of many who locate elements of ambiguity, unconscious and conscious, in this film's finale. At the end viewers may be confused as a spring magically appears apparently in response to Töre's address to God. Steene also recognised mixed values, describing the film as 'a strange hybrid of a film, in which psychological modernisms – as for instance the Freudian approach to Märeta...jar with the director's ritual conception of the story'.¹⁶ Appreciation of ambiguity in the text is usefully supplemented by the concepts of alignment and affiliation used by Murray Smith to analyse the way a text cues a moral response as part of the viewer's imaginative and emotional engagement. Smith distinguishes between alignment, which refers to the viewer's proximity with a character (through point-of-view shots, for instance) and allegiance, which describes our moral evaluation of the character. The latter means that the film affords the viewer an opportunity to think of the film world as a social microcosm such that an assessment can be made of how one character compares to another, and although this may be affected by alignment, it does not have to be. As Smith explains, 'To become allied with a character, the spectator must evaluate the character as representing a morally desirable (or at least preferable) set of traits, in relation to other characters within the fiction'.¹⁷

This perspective puts content on an equal level with form as part of the film experience. Characters are made more or less sympathetic by, for instance, their actions towards others. In *The Virgin Spring*, the revenge taken by Töre against the goatherds involves significant alignment with him. We witness his close relationship to his daughter, we have knowledge about the terrible crime before he does, we are given a

close view of his emotional response when he discovers the truth and we are given a fully detailed account of his preparations for the revenge. In following his actions, formal mechanisms such as camera angles focused on his movement produce a strong alignment. However, Töre's decision to kill the young boy is designed by Isaksson and Bergman to challenge our allegiance with his revenge quest, and this emerges through Töre's guilt and his relationship to other characters, including the young boy he kills.

Smith's concepts of alignment and allegiance can accommodate much of the ambiguity in the film, but in the precise attention to the way a cognitive response is elicited from the viewer, we may miss the symbolic undercurrents of this work. For a number of critics, psychoanalytical theory has a particular purchase on this film. For example, Wood says when discussing the final outcome of the narrative, 'The motivation behind Töre's revenge is slightly suspect, let alone the morality of the action: haven't the goatherds done to his daughter what he subconsciously wanted to do'.¹⁸ Through the analysis I will show how Kleinian theory adds to this focus on desire and the Oedipal scenario. I will argue that the story of redemption can also be understood as a process of reparation. As in the case of *Summer with Monika*, it is important to recognise how stylistic variation and ingenuity deepen the emotional reach of this reparation. Kleinian theory, as we have seen, recognises that ambiguity may play a very important role in overcoming rigid Manichean boundaries of good and evil. In other words, a recognition of ambiguity can express a more mature state of mind, and as such has great potential for transcending polarised thought patterns.

The analysis will include observations of the lighting patterns in this work, which create a rich level of ambiguity. The usual starting point for analysis of the lighting is to note how Sven Nykvist replaced Gunnar Fischer as Bergman's cameraman for *The Virgin Spring* and went on to create with Bergman a more realistic style of lighting.¹⁹ Fischer had been very successful in incorporating symbolic lighting effects, but in this, Nykvist's second film with Bergman, we can notice a symbolic level as patterns of light and shade connote a synthesis of morality and emotion that invites interpretation. The bright sunlight in which Karin is attacked makes the crime more startling, while Töre's slaughter of the goatherds is carried out at dawn, with deep shadows conveying a sinister half-light that fits with his actions. Nykvist and Bergman do not replicate the cliché of light signifying goodness, and shadows as threatening, but instead evoke shifting ideas of purity and evil whilst maintaining realistic motivation for the lighting effects. Thus, moral evaluation is made

part of a process, not represented as a given and not symbolised through melodramatic imagery.

Kleinian theory appreciates that the narrative must achieve coherence not at the level of wish fulfilment as in 'the happy ending', but instead through an aesthetic range brought into harmony to allow a more significant release of negative emotion. A fine example of aesthetic analysis informed by this sensibility is Richard Wollheim's analysis of Pablo Picasso's work, which argues that Picasso sought to balance a concentration on the power of the eye with a focus on representing 'touch' through, for example, depictions of shape and texture.²⁰ Bergman's work is also concerned with achieving an internal balance that, nevertheless, allows the full expression of disequilibrium. A striking image, which is relevant here, is that of Töre, who, having murdered the boy, holds his hands in front of his face, asking for God's judgement.²¹ This conveys the theme of Töre's split between paganism and Christianity, but also has further significance. The focus on Töre's hands is consistent with a close attention to physical acting throughout the film. Just as we find a fluid exploration of light and dark, disequilibrium and balance are expressed through the representation of the body as a complex source of meaning alongside other stylistic elements such as point of view and dialogue. The creative orchestration of different elements in patterns of alternation, repetition, echoing and foregrounding found throughout Bergman's work compares to the Kleinian belief in formal coherence and patterning as a medium for catharsis.²² The complexity is related to the artist's need to release emotion, which in turns offers the viewer a cathartic experience.

I will argue that, as with *Summer with Monika*, understanding this film as an expression of reparation involves recognising the representation of social conflict and injustice. We are drawn into a theatre of power relations within the family structure. More than in the Freudian model, but in a way that Melanie Klein attends to, the symbolic significance of the mother is expressed. Social conflict and the position of motherhood come together in the role of Ingeri (played by Gunnel Lindbloom). This character, and her marginalisation, are striking additions to the original ballad and create a psychological context for the representation of the goatherds' crime. As Steene informs us, another significant change was that the miracle arose after the revenge, whereas in the ballad it is immediate: 'They severed then her lovely head/A spring welled up upon that stead.'²³

The rape and murder scene in *The Virgin Spring* appears to signify pure evil. For the period in which it was made it is a very direct representation

of rape and murder. It aims to capture the horror in the original ballad through the level of visual detail. Nevertheless, it is not as brutally direct as the original. The self-conscious legendary quality of this crime reworked for the twentieth century suggests that Bergman and Isaksson were aiming for a symbolic statement about evil. For this reason, Klein's discussion of evil in *Othello*, and Jörn Donner's argument that *The Virgin Spring* is a film dealing with the presence of evil in twentieth-century Europe are relevant. Isaksson, the screenwriter, said that ultimately she wanted to inspire sympathy for all the characters, a clear invocation of the concept of reparative ethics. As Steene notes, Isaksson stated that, 'The three criminals are not totally evil. On the whole we emphasise that the spectators have pity for all the people in this film.'²⁴ This can be compared to the humanistic ambition of Klein's writing about criminal psychology, evident in her statement that 'One of the great problems about criminals, which has always made them incomprehensible to the rest of the world, is their lack of natural human good feelings; but this lack is only apparent'.²⁵ Here, Klein sets out her belief about how criminality involves a distortion and deflection of positive instincts.

Even if the viewer is armed with a humanistic understanding of the origins of crime, the presentation of the murder scene in *The Virgin Spring* could still leave him/her in such a state of revulsion as to endorse Töre's revenge. This is a prime example of the film's ambiguity, its possibility of different readings. The Kleinian model and the link between Ingeri and the crime mean that one possible reading is to understand the crime in relation to the unconscious phantasy of an attack on the maternal body. Klein supplements Sigmund Freud's emphasis on the power of male sexuality (the phallus) and its displacement by arguing that there is even more obsessive unconscious obsession with the maternal body and its incorporation of/invasion by the phallus. This obsession is manifest in the enigma and neglect surrounding Ingeri's pregnancy, Ingeri's demonic fascination with the possibility of a sexual violation of Karin, the symbolism of the toad in the bread and the psychotic combination of lust and violence from the elder goatherds. The focus on the maternal body in Kleinian theory suggests that we should link these elements in the text. A focus on integration leads to a subtle appreciation of the myriad ways in which this unconscious phantasy may be shaped through art to provide catharsis and self-realisation, the latter being a process that parallels the freedom that Jean-Paul Sartre invokes as an authentic response to alienation. It could be argued, however, that Sartre's work leads to a stronger understanding of the social context of the violence depicted, because of a stronger focus on individual motivation in the characters.

As noted, Gervais sees a curious mix of existentialism and the religious expression from Isaksson, but it is Donner who focuses more on the social message of the text. Donner, in his sympathetic response written in 1962, says he thinks that this is a work that represents destructive social forces in a way that shows the influence on Bergman of European modernists such as Sartre, as well as a range of Swedish intellectual influences.²⁶ The psychoanalytic and existential elements represent instability in this historical setting. Donner argues convincingly that we need to look beyond the historical realism and consider this as a work that raises questions relevant to the world in which it was made. At the stylistic level he is critical of the dialogue, but praises the impassive camerawork in the rape scene, which he feels successfully maintains the impersonal voice of the ballad. Donner also suggests that the use of static camera and long take involves Bazinian openness so that the viewer must play a more active role in interpreting the material. Donner argues that:

The remarkable thing is that of all B[ergman]'s films *The Virgin Spring* comes closest to the European experience of evil. As a parable of our time's destructive forces, the film is more successful than several of B[ergman]'s tales of the present.²⁷

Donner is not just talking about the representation of Swedish society, but instead, at a very general level, about the trauma of twentieth-century European history. Donner argues that due to Bergman's lack of direct experience of the horrors of war, which directly influenced the work of European intellectuals like Sartre, he needed the artifice provided by a medieval context. For Donner, the relevance of existentialism lies in the representation of social conflict through the plight of individual characters. He makes a contrast between Bergman and Bertolt Brecht, arguing that the chief difference lies in the former's focus on the individual's inner world, which is nonetheless expressive of alienation from contemporary society.²⁸ We can see how this relates to Sartre's insistence on intentionality, a phenomenological underpinning of his belief that subjectivity is, in some way, irreducible. In his lecture *Existentialism Is a Humanism*, Sartre argues that it is precisely this subjective isolation that we all share and that thus forms an important platform for morality.²⁹ There are some key moments in *The Virgin Spring*, which are particularly evocative of the existential focus on isolation, including Töre's angst-ridden speech to God.

Paisley Livingston's work proves insightful here. He analyses specific images in Bergman's work, which relate to Sartre's theory of shame

because the character shown looking in the mirror experiences a sense of exposure before the onlooker. Livingston argues that Bergman is preoccupied with the primacy of a very similar emotional state to shame, frequently manifested as humiliation. Drawing on Bergman's comments in an interview, Livingston points to the director's belief that shame and humiliation can lead to a vicious circle, which institutionalises violence. In the interview Bergman stated, 'The person humiliated asks himself constantly how he will be able, in turn, to humiliate someone else. It is one of the most terrible poisons that exists today.'³⁰ Livingston also says that this humiliation can be part of a process of reorientation to society and suggests that both Sartre and Bergman recognise this bridge from individual experience to social reality.³¹ Livingston argues that for Bergman, the artist has a particular affinity with the emotional experience of humiliation. This is certainly supported by other Bergman films, such as *The Seventh Seal*, in which Jof the performer is publicly humiliated because the society fails to appreciate his alternative values. Due to his own experience of trying to win the audience and his identification of humiliation as a pervasive and destructive phenomenon in human relationships, Bergman articulates the social problems involved in this phenomenon and occasionally expresses the terms of a solution. Livingston writes:

Attempting to find alternatives to the various masks of humiliation, Bergman rejects the illusion of individualism and implies that a genuine realization of self occurs not in a flight from others but within the context of a community.³²

A parallel humanistic concern with the possibilities for progressive development allied to acute observation of alienation is part of the Kleinian tradition with its emphasis on achieving the ethics of the depressive position. Furthermore, C. Fred Alford's argument that Kleinian aesthetics encourages the viewer to compare the resolution of a narrative with his/her own situation applies here, and corresponds with Donner's argument that the rape scene in *The Virgin Spring* is shocking in order to provoke the audience into reflection on their own society.

Ingeri's plot/Karin's journey

In the opening scene, shadowy light is deployed to heighten mystery and the intensity of Ingeri longing for the intervention from the pagan Norse god Odin.³³ As Ingeri lights the fire, the flames are like a hell being

raised. Ingeri looks continually beyond the space into the abstract space of her imagination, but also to check whether she is alone as she tries to summon her god. There is a balance between the sense of Ingeri's inner world, including her pregnancy, and her dreams of Odin's assistance, with the observations of her external surrounding. The integration of diverse elements in this scene provides a guide to its expressive range. The off-screen sound of the cockerel is used to signify the external setting and the hour in a way that engages the viewer's imagination, whilst Ingeri's look brings us back to the immediacy of her subjective experience. The intensity of Ingeri's gaze is matched by her posture as she grasps the pole in her prayer to Odin.

The juxtaposition of Ingeri's imagined off-screen deity and the medium close-up at the start of the second scene, which depicts a statue representing Christ's sorrow on the cross, conveys conflicting metaphysical ideas. The juxtaposition means that the figure of Christ seems momentarily to fill the imaginary space with which Ingeri communicated. As a result, the internal conflict of two different beliefs is suggested at the level of image. In these opening scenes we are presented with a culture in which anxiety and obedience to a religious authority are key elements. Töre and Märeta are first shown as penitent in their appeal to the Lord. The atmosphere of submission is dramatised as we witness Märeta's urge to pour hot candle wax across her arm as a sign of her respect for Christ's suffering, and Töre's intervention to restrain her. According to Donner, the film represents Töre's difficulty in living with his Christianity,³⁴ and on this reading, part of the thematic tension resides in the representation of religious values in transition – Töre is an early convert to Christianity who reverts to more primitive beliefs in the revenge he exacts later in the story. Whilst the idea of conflicting religious systems is a key theme, from a psychoanalytic perspective we can see a comparison between Ingeri's beliefs and the Christianity of Töre's community. For Freud, the concept of the superego is an internalised authority figure that may be personified by God or another powerful figure such as the patriarch.³⁵ Looking again at the opening sections of the film, one experiences not so much the contrast between Ingeri's paganism and the Christian devotion of Töre and Märeta, but rather the comparison. In both situations the appeal is to an authoritarian master. This is conveyed partly through character movement. Ingeri looks up with a passionate face, searching for 'service' from Odin. In the succeeding scenes she carries out her chores ritualistically, her body directed by a system of rules she does not control. Töre and Märeta move ritualistically, devout in their belief system, whilst their faces are pensive.³⁶

Klein focuses acutely on the impact of the superego on the infant. In 1934, using her research on infancy to discuss adult criminality, she wrote:

In the early sadistic phase, which every individual normally passes through, the child protects himself against his fear of his violent objects, both introjected and external, by redoubling his attacks upon them in his imagination; his aim in thus getting rid of his objects is in part to silence the intolerable threats of his super-ego.³⁷

For Klein, anxiety is related to a threat from both an external and internal authority. It appears that Ingeri invests in the internal authority of Odin because she has been punished and victimised. Reduced to a slave status and ostracised, her response at the level of imagination is to a god who will produce even more punishment, but visited upon Karin. This reinforces the idea that Odin is a rival superego figure to both the Christian God and the paternal authority figure of Töre. Since Karin has the aura of the fairytale princess, Ingeri's hatred incorporates what Klein and Freud identified as the death drive, an externalisation of internal hatred in direct opposition to the beauty of Karin, who is the main source of pleasure for her religious parents.

Sartre's analysis of power relations accords with this psychoanalytic analysis. As Livingston showed, in Sartre's account of the look, in *Being and Nothingness*, alienation is created by the internalisation of the other. What is most relevant here is the role that Sartre assigns to shame. As Tarja Laine puts it, 'For Sartre, it is through the experience of shame that the subject is revealed to him – or herself as existing for others.'³⁸ For Sartre, a key to the experience of shame is that one is seen by the other, and this feeling of being watched is translated into an awareness of shared humanity: being-with-others. Shame can be said to have an ontological status: it lies at the foundation of being. Although shame becomes much more significant later in the transformation of the young goatherd, Ingeri, Töre and Märeta, it is evident at the beginning as the characters submit to an external authority. This is a shame culture in which the characters feel that they are overseen by the vision of a meta-physical authority. The screenwriter and Bergman challenge this with a more compassionate form of shame in the conclusion to the story, reworking the Christian theme of tragedy and redemption. As Klein explains in the passage quoted above, and very regularly throughout her work, emotions take hold at an unconscious level, and this impacts on the individual's imaginative world, but also on his/her perception of

external reality. Ingeri's emotions are governed by her imagination, but also are the result of what she perceives, and this leads her to change as the narrative progresses. Thus the combination of realism and an imaginative symbolic style serve the psychological exposition.

Gado's psychoanalytic reading argues that Ingeri is related to Bergman's own sense of guilt. Ingeri's progression towards shame about her hatred repeats, according to Gado, a continuous theme in Bergman films, in which characters play out an abiding sense of guilt related to sexual impulses. As a favoured child, Bergman suffered this sense of shame acutely translating this feeling into his characters, both male and female.³⁹ But the film also represents a wider sphere than Bergman's psyche. Ingeri was added by Isaksson to the story of the original ballad,⁴⁰ providing stronger ideas of social and cultural conflict. Ingeri is in conflict with the rest of the household, who shockingly ignore her pregnancy. This is clearly a theme deliberately introduced by Isaksson, who previously worked with Bergman on *Close to Life* (1958), which is about three pregnant women in hospital, and the subject in *The Virgin Spring* is handled skilfully so that the viewer is left to recognise the prejudice rather than hearing this overtly voiced. Ingeri is represented as wild, a lower form of being, with reminders of the savage state reached by Monika in the film of 1953.

The introduction of the main characters creates an awareness of the power relationships in Töre's household. When the members of the house gather for the evening meal, the pictorial style echoes a religious tableau.⁴¹ The reverence of this shared space is undermined by the underlying sense of conflict manifest in the marginalisation of Ingeri, who is present like a Judas, and yet who is also like a grateful member of a slave class. Töre controls the situation, but there are intimations of an underlying instability. Töre's wife is haunted by the past and by nightmares, while Karin is talked about as a precious symbol, but one that might be tainted by proximity with her foster sister.⁴² The idea of religious purpose as the main source of hope is evident, as Märeta concurs with Töre's decision that Karin should embark on a journey with the sacred candles.

The degree of alignment with Ingeri in the first half is striking, but our allegiance is gradually transformed as the narrative progresses so that the character becomes more sympathetic. In the first half of the story, the character of Ingeri is partly represented as a villainess, and emotionally we appreciate her hate and venom directed towards her foster sister. Ingeri's story is just one plot line in the film, but we gain special access to her private thoughts from the outset of the film, as she summons



Figure 5.1 *The Virgin Spring*, Svensk Filmindustri, Tartan Video. Frida and Märeta are in the foreground, with Ingeri at the back

Odin. As the story unfolds, the viewer realises something, that the characters being represented are innocent of, namely, Ingeri's malevolence towards Karin, including her decision to place the toad inside her sister's bread. The viewer's access to the consciousness of Ingeri is intensified when we share her visual perspective. However, the alignment is not always presented straightforwardly. For instance, early in the narrative we realise that Ingeri is observing the mother and Frida, a more senior servant, in conversation about Karin, but this is conveyed by showing Ingeri in the background, rather than through her point of view.

This shot conveys Ingeri's marginalisation, whilst cueing our awareness of her jealousy and hostility to Karin, as the two women discuss the latter. Smith draws a distinction between films in which the allegiance is didactic and those in which it is more gradual or subtle.⁴³ The initial interplay between Töre and Märeta belongs to the more gradual variety of allegiance because it shows that each has protective feelings for their daughter. The presentation does not necessarily privilege Töre or Märeta as more or less sympathetic for the audience. Similarly, the presentation

of Karin, with first her mother and then her father, refuses to convey a major conflict on which we are invited to take sides, but there are indications, on the one side, that Karin is spoilt and, on the other side, that she has a free and playful spirit. As the story evolves, the emotional complexion of the film becomes complicated.

In addition to intimations of incest, the film deliberately leaves hidden the circumstances behind Ingeri's pregnancy, and why she is Karin's foster sister. The whole sense of a traumatic past about which the viewer cannot attain omniscient knowledge contributes to the psychoanalytical dimension. The focus on the present means the past is experienced as a set of emotional repercussions. The initial issue facing the family is Karin's late rise on the day. There is an explicit sense that she has already transgressed, with her dancing the previous night responsible for her late rise, and will face her father's anger. Märeta conveys to her daughter the disapproval of Töre, but Karin, with a sense of conviction, responds that her father will understand when he sees her in the magnificent dress reserved for the special occasion of her journey to the church. Thus, understood psychoanalytically, Karin seeks to establish herself as a valued object, for the male gaze in particular.

The father's response is genuinely caring, but male desire for Karin erupts in a massively destructive fashion in the later rape and murder, and this leads to the father's violence towards the perpetrators. Thus, we can interpret the chain of events that link male desire and violence towards women. The theme of male violence and power is echoed in Ingeri's worship of Odin. The suggestions of an incestuous relationship and the assertion of male power convey a Freudian scenario in which patriarchal power is dominant. This Freudian perspective is a matter of interpretation, and perhaps the biggest reservation about it is the weight given to the role of the father. In fact, although Wood provides a Freudian reading, he is perhaps more convincing when he simply asserts that in *The Virgin Spring*, 'good and evil are like subterranean streams, potent, determining matters of life and death, but invisible and mysterious. No one is pure'.⁴⁴ This observation is closer to Kleinian theory, in which unconscious development is seen as a process in which the subject is overtaken by projections of good and evil and must work through this to recognise ambivalence and ambiguity.⁴⁵

Kleinian theory provides a useful extension of the focus on desire and the Oedipal scenario. The attention to primitive needs related to the mother and the first experiences of food can be compared with the emphasis in this film on Töre and Märeta's home as a source of nourishment for an extended family. Early in the film, Ingeri is instructed to

prepare the milk, which then sits centre stage at the morning meal. As already noted, despite the nourishment everyone receives, under the surface there is a disturbance signified by Ingeri's discontent as well as other signs of emotional trauma. This is carried forward to Ingeri's decision to secretly insert the toad into Karin's bread. In medieval life, the toad symbolised the devil but also sexuality.⁴⁶ This contamination of the food is vital to the film's meaning since the rape and murder are linked to, if not caused by, the toad's appearance. In Kleinian theory, 'introjection' is a crucial concept, which conveys the process of internalising both good and bad objects.⁴⁷ The toad, hidden inside the food, demonstrates this process, and so, it could be said that, the way is paved for psychosis and the evil is externalised. Thus, Ingeri's primitive appeal to Odin and the spell she hopes to achieve with the toad appear to succeed.

Klein's emphasis on female agency is also relevant. In this story, female actions are immediately central through the prominence given to Ingeri. As Peter Cowie notes, her character retains a sensuality.⁴⁸ Ingeri's hostility to Karin is wrapped up in feelings about how her own sexuality was exploited by the male-dominated world. On their journey Ingeri confronts Karin, arguing that she too will receive the effects of male desire as a destructive power. Ingeri is a victim of the patriarchal society, but has been cast aside, and she asserts that Karin cannot escape the same fate through allusion to Karin's flirtation with various men. In this way female desire is incorporated as an element into a story which is fundamentally about the demonic possibility of violence related to male desire.

Klein's discussion of envy provides further understanding of emotions represented in the film.⁴⁹ As noted earlier, envy, according to Klein, is one of the most destructive emotions, surpassing jealousy. While the latter is resentment about what the other possesses, envy, in the view of Klein, goes much further in its destructiveness. The other's possession of goodness must be destroyed. Märeta ascribes this aim to the devil, as she combs her daughter's hair. Asked by her daughter why she talks of the devil, while Töre does not, Märeta says, 'Because he is the seducer of the innocent. He strives to destroy all goodness'. This appears to be a premonition of the attack on Karin and develops the theme of moral and psychological debasement, characterising the devil in a manner akin to Klein's account of envy.

A key example for Klein is the character Iago in William Shakespeare's *Othello*. She draws attention to the way Iago finds it disgusting to look at love between other people (Othello and Desdemona), but in its place yearns and schemes for a debased alternative.⁵⁰ Iago's envy parallels

Ingeri's hatred towards Karin. This is conveyed as we are aligned with Ingeri's point of view, as Karin meets one of the men with whom she danced the previous night, a man who may be the father of Ingeri's child. Karin could be accused of stirring envy in Ingeri at this point through her flirtation, but also Ingeri appears to be projecting her emotions onto Karin, even willing the archetypal princess figure towards an obscene alternative to the innocent affection she displays. Ingeri wants the sexuality of Karin's relationships with men to become explicit and believes that in this process Karin will suffer. In this way her project compares with that of Iago as she seeks to 'contaminate' her rival's mind, leading to 'deterioration'.⁵¹

We also have to take into account the Kleinian awareness of how paranoid-schizoid processes, including envy, may be surpassed by a greater appreciation of ambiguity in the other. Iago is a key example for Klein because he is incapable of this development, as Robert Caper explains: 'Iago is perhaps unique in Shakespeare's work because he lacks ambivalence and ambiguity and seems therefore more like a representative of pure, malicious envy as a psychological force – a part object – than like a real human being'.⁵²

Ingeri therefore is ultimately quite different from Iago. She simply appeals to a metaphysical entity instead of cultivating the envy in Karin that she herself feels. The film shows the projection of envy, which in the case of *Othello* is hidden behind Iago's efficacy as a villain, instead of being dependent on a supernatural entity. It is clear that Ingeri has doubts and anxiety about her malevolent wishes towards Karin. Meanwhile, Karin's class privilege raises questions about how Ingeri was marginalised in the first place. For Klein such emotions develop through social interaction, fuelled by processes of projection. Desperate about her own pregnancy and its circumstances, Ingeri appears to displace her own internal problems onto her vision of a pagan metaphysical retribution against her foster sister, thus inflicting harm on the parents and the social order from which she is ostracised. The *mise-en-scène* reinforces the contrast between the sisters: Ingeri's poverty in her plain clothes and the special status of Karin in her dress, which Märeta tells us 'was stitched by fifteen maidens', signifies the contrast between their different religious faiths and their social status.

The imaginative and open-ended qualities of the film lay the ground for the transformation of Ingeri and ultimately the existential crisis of Töre. Diverse aspects of the style contribute to the aesthetic distance from the original ballad. The dialogue plays an important part in this opening up of characterisation in place of the direct economical omniscience of

the original ballad. In the latter we are told, 'First she was three herds-men's wife/Then she gave up her young life/They took her by the golden birch/and placed her against a branchless.'⁵³ In contrast to this focus on the event, a whole world of subjective nuances is introduced in the lead-up to the crime. Karin agrees to make the journey to church, telling her mother, 'How demurely I'll ride to Church. And Tawny's hooves will trot as though on a pilgrimage'.

Karin has a playful air and a dreamlike naivety. In this, she parallels other young characters in Bergman films who express a different existential reality because they make us aware of their unique perspective.⁵⁴ Here, it is as if Karin is momentarily the narrator, but her power and independence will be crushed by the savage reality that she cannot anticipate. In other parts of the dialogue we can also find a pattern of talking that contrasts with the single omniscient voice of the original ballad, turning the characters themselves into intermittent storytellers. Treating his daughter with affection, Töre teases her with the punishment she should receive for her audacity in challenging his authority: 'I'll ride to the mountains with this wicked maid and imprison her in the mountain for seven years. When she is chastened I'll take her back.' Here Töre's speech echoes that of a storyteller, whilst taking the story into the first person. In the scene that follows, the beggar who has travelled beyond the homestead responds to Frida in the mode of a storyteller: 'A bird on the wing finds food. A bird on the roost dies. I've seen women and churches.' Here he is justifying to Frida his decision to flee the town, a brief allusion to some form of persecution about which we learn no more.

In these examples the dialogue provides a background, but also opens up a different perspective from the historical authenticity of the *mise-en-scène*. The cumulative effect of this, self-conscious, storytelling speech links the medieval setting to a more modern sense of narrative and narration. This relates to Sartre's insistence on the central role of subjectivity in creating meaning. Isaksson made clear her desire to inject realism into the story through the dialogue, but these fragments also show an interest in modes of stylised, subjective narration that are different from the quest for verisimilitude.

Another key to the film's style is the *mise-en-scène* of the Swedish countryside and dwellings inhabited by Töre and his household. The landscape and setting for the main part maintain an impressive verisimilitude, although even an ardent fan of the film like Donner is critical of some of the interiors.⁵⁵ However, the historical authenticity of the detail is not an end in itself, but inevitably contributes to the representation

of emotion and social context. Despite the patriarchal authority of Töre, his household is not one of massively accumulated wealth and resources. The harshness of the setting is exemplified early on when we see Ingeri travel between the different buildings of this establishment, which are poised on a dramatic slope covered in thick mud, a graphic presentation of the farm's modest status. When Karin and Ingeri set forth, the landscape is in contrast magnificently expansive. As they leave, the beggar/storyteller's words evoke the idea of legendary journey. Shown in long shot, we see the forests stretching into the distance, glowing in the sunlight. At this point the film appears to fit the mould of a classic National cinema in which landscape is a heritage background.⁵⁶ Given the earlier intimations of foreboding, the freedom offered by the sunlit countryside, at this stage, appears only to be a temporary counterpoint to the evil that will emerge from it.

The Kleinian preoccupation with restructuring Manichean patterns through emotional development parallels the aesthetic patterns developed through lighting in *mise-en-scène*. Throughout the opening sections of the film, intimations of purity, on the one hand, and foreboding, on the other, are conveyed in such a way that the viewer cannot be sure where goodness and security lie. The collaboration between cinematographer and director is evident in the shifts in lighting engineered in some of the early scenes. After the flickering shadows, which surround the characters in the first scenes, bright light is introduced as Frida releases a group of chicks that she is protecting in her dress and declares that they symbolise life. We cannot think about the optimism of the bright light here outside the context of a world that already seems troubled. Perhaps both Bergman and Nykvist draw on their respective experiences of religious upbringing in their inclination to incorporate Manichean oppositions in the lighting schemes, but they are also both committed to avoiding cliché.

Ambiguous lighting is significant as Karin is raised from bed by her mother. The bright light here contrasts with the shadows surrounding Ingeri in the previous scene. However, Karin's status as the fairytale princess is slightly undermined by her arguments with Märeta about the previous night, and her mother is concerned that she may lose her purity. Karin herself shows signs of narcissism, gazing at her image in the water and asking her mother not to block the light. The shadows of the mother and Karin in this scene are not pronounced, and Karin stands brightly lit as her mother straightens her daughter's hair. However, when her father arrives and agrees to Karin's request that Ingeri join her on the journey, shadows are cast across the face of both Töre and

Karin. Although care is taken to naturalise this with the accompanying *mise-en-scène*, a mood of uncertainty is evoked through this light. The film-makers do not seek the sense of inevitable doom that might seem appropriate to the authoritative voice of the ballad's narration. Instead, as the film progresses, we are engaged more strongly by the moment, by possible and contingent shifts of meaning suggested through the lighting patterns.

The journey through the Swedish landscape conveys directly the mood of uncertainty, already represented by the lighting and dialogue as the women travel into the forest. Despite the realism of period recreation, the journey follows a dreamlike path towards the evil forces that await. This point can also be extended to the soundtrack, which accumulates three elemental sounds. These include a mixture of diegetic and non-diegetic sources. As the women travel past the lake, we hear the sound of the cuckoo, gentle flute music and the sound of the water.⁵⁷ Throughout the film, imaginative allusion, beyond what can be seen, is used in conjunction with a realistic style. As we approach the violent attack on Karin, it might be asserted that this principle is abandoned, but the transition from a more expressive style to a reserved realistic detachment is used as a strategy to maximise an imaginative engagement with the material from the ballad.

As the journey continues, the relationship between Karin and Ingeri becomes more melodramatic. Karin demonstrates more empathy than other characters in asking Ingeri about her pregnancy, the first time this is mentioned. Ingeri, however, is concentrated in her hostility and verbally tries to undermine what she sees as Karin's haughty belief that she can escape predatory men. Karin responds by slapping Ingeri's face. The fragmentation is intensified as they arrive at the house of a one-eyed man, with the sudden appearance of a crow, in close-up, screaming to the camera. This Bergmanesque motif (a crow is used in similar fashion in other works such as *The Magician*) contributes a sinister symbolism, while the one-eyed man is introduced looking out at his visitors, from his abode daubed in animal skins. Following the representation of his point of view, the man suddenly appears in frame, taking Karin's horse. As Ingeri watches Karin cross the water, her face registers extreme anxiety, caused by guilt for her appeals to Odin. As she rushes across the stream, the imagery of water foreshadows the final transformation of consciousness achieved through the miracle of the spring. At this stage, however, Ingeri is still divided, unable to articulate the danger except through a fairytale mode of primitive superstition, saying, 'The forest is so black. I can't go on.' Karin departs, arranging for Ingeri to stay with the old man

for rest. When he asks whether Ingeri is in labour, her melodramatic response, 'No, much worse', suggests a spiritual malaise brought on by her evil wishes directed towards Karin. From Ingeri's visual perspective, we see Karin receding into the striped shadows and sunlight in the forest, whilst the space she occupied is filled by bright light.

Having accepted the man's offer of assistance Ingeri finds herself in the strange space of his abode, sitting on a throne-like chair, with water streaming in the background and a water gate in the foreground. Her expression returns to an awareness of metaphysical horror. The man talks to Ingeri now as if he has godlike power: 'I hear what mankind whispers in secret and I see what it believes no one can hear.' He seems to offer the pact with evil that she desired from Odin. Ingeri's look off-screen echoes her appeal to Odin in the first scene. She wonders about the off-screen sound of thunder, and the man tells her that it is 'the sound of three dead men riding north'. Rather than maintaining a narrative distance, the film-making includes subjectivity because the sound of hooves is heard alluding both to metaphysical presence and to Ingeri's subjective state of belief in these evil powers.⁵⁸ The man now appears far more sinister with his collection of strange objects, including human and animal body parts. These, it seems, will be used for a primitive abortive operation on Ingeri or to cast a pagan spell. She is suddenly gripped by fear as he starts to hold her, and expresses her anxiety that he has made a human sacrifice for Odin, the very event that she appears to have called for.

The theme of Odin's power shows again the grip on Ingeri's imagination of a powerful authority figure, now embodied by this man. For Klein, the paranoid-schizoid position involves such fierce attacks on the body in imagination that it is split into parts. Thus, through her apprehension of a human sacrifice, Ingeri becomes more conscious of destructive power. The concept of projective identification is relevant because in this scene we see how the individual casts his/her apprehension of evil onto the 'other'. The man appeals to Ingeri that they have long known each other. This expression of intimacy is like the action of a cult follower, but also conveys the idea that in their shared worship of Odin, the man and Ingeri are no longer independent people. Ingeri's resources for expelling this invasion are stretched. There appears to be no resource of goodness for her to counterpose to this fate. For Klein, anxiety is inevitable in the struggle to overcome an obsessive consciousness of being invaded by evil, and this is manifest as Ingeri breaks free. The film-makers clearly focus on the issue of gender here since the man's actions convey the theme of violence against the female body. This theme does

not become puritanical because we are being presented with a process in which the focus is on the control of sexuality by male violence, rather than sexuality itself. The lack of puritanism is evident in the focus on Ingeri herself, her sensuous appearance and her emotional actions. The way in which this scene edges beyond dramatic verisimilitude towards a more surprising representation is confirmed when Ingeri escapes, and the drama is presented in a confusing manner such that the man's face is suddenly in the foreground nearby, but passive like a totemic mask. As Ingeri rushes to reach Karin, the anticipation of tragedy is developed. Ingeri rushes after her foster sister, oblivious of the threat to her own child as she crashes through an area of woodland, thick with small plants and trees. From this we gain a greater sense of panic about the tragedy that will happen.

The murder of Karin

In the critical response of the Swedish newspaper editor, Olof Lagercrantz, to *The Virgin Spring*, there was an anxiety that the film-makers were substituting sensationalism for art.⁵⁹ From a Kleinian perspective, however, this scene is an integral element of the film's representation, which implicates Ingeri and, if the interpretation is stretched further, the father and mother in the understanding of the crime. By refusing to fully deconstruct Ingeri's paganism, the film makes the psychological context of the crime more complex. Ingeri's envy sits alongside the violence, lust and material craving of the goatherds. For Kleinian art theory, it is vital that art becomes more serious than play, even though the latter already contains the key ingredients of artistic creativity.⁶⁰ Thus, the crime juxtaposes Karin's playful naivety with the violent instincts of the goatherds, and this work of art forces us to think beyond the confines of wishful subjectivity. Perception is reasserted as the apprehension of material reality which imagination failed to grasp. Karin and her parents in the trance of their religious subjectivity failed to anticipate the dangers of her journey. We will see how the camerawork draws on a realist aesthetic of long take, long shot and static camera position to create a detachment, which allows the viewer to reflect on the deadly situation that leads to Karin's death.

At the same time, the focus on intentionality is crucial for the morality of the scene. Whilst we can see that the goatherds are poor and live outside the benefits of society, as represented by Töre's establishment, the preoccupation with their actions and the intent behind them means that Bergman and Isaksson appear to share Sartre's conviction that, despite

contextual factors, humans are always, at a certain level, responsible for their actions. As Sartre asserts, 'Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism.'⁶¹ At the beginning of *Existentialism Is a Humanism* Sartre explicitly contrasts his viewpoint with the naturalism of Émile Zola, because he argues that an existentialist novel, unlike a naturalistic one, will confront the viewer with the responsibility of individual actions.

The goatherds are initially seen in the background of a shot. Immediately they are defined by their perception of Karin passing in the distance. One of the brothers runs forward into medium close-up, so that as we perceive his face in closer detail the intensity of his gaze towards Karin is registered. When he moves forward and out of shot, the other two goatherds come to occupy the position he has just held, reinforcing the idea of the look and their vantage point as a dramatic action in itself. The shot which follows shows Karin in profile on her horse reposing as the sun falls on her face. Her state of rest rhymes with the brothers' fixed viewing positions in the quality of stasis, but no other shots are offered to contextualise the spatial relationship, contributing to the enigma of how the brothers will advance. Here, Bergman's style draws on key components of cinematic form established during the silent era. Follower and followed is one of the most formulaic narrative structures, which was dynamically used through the development, in the silent era, of rhythmical cross-cutting and has been used ever since. In this case, dramatic involvement is developed using this technique, but there is close attention to the locale, which contrasts with the theatrical-like interiors, seen at other points in the film, such as the one-eyed man's house from which Ingeri escaped. The goatherds creep up on Karin using their knowledge of the forest terrain. We see them look down again from high above as she passes below a hill. The camera position replicates the high angle, but is significantly detached from their visual perspective. Here, alignment is not confused with affiliation. Condensation of the action means that the goatherds appear suddenly, passing Karin from the opposite direction, rather than creeping up from behind. Thus, they give the appearance of meeting her accidentally. The moving camera, which alternates between her perspective and theirs, serves to create the irony that she is the one who stops, tricked into believing that they are innocent passers-by. In this way we are made more aware of their devious intentionality.

Despite the emphasis on intentionality, the dialogue contributes a symbolic layer of meaning, which complicates the focus on materialistic forces of aggression and lust with reference to family relations.

When Karin's attention is caught by the goatherd's instrument, one of them explains that it belonged to his father, adding, 'who got it from his father's father'. The goatherd exploits Karin's pity for them, and she becomes more maternal, wondering about who cares for them. The theme of sharing food is also reminiscent of the family picnic in *The Seventh Seal*, in which death haunts the idyll. Klein's concern with the way the baby's nourishment is invaded by psychic conflict parallels Bergman's awareness of how the basic need for food is transformed by powerful forces that overcome the symbolic meaning of food as spiritual nourishment. The brother without a tongue seems to inspire Karin's maternal instincts, in particular, but this also brings to the fore Bergman's fascination with the range of meanings that can lie behind non-verbal communication.

Karin is still lost in a fairytale-like reverie, in which she jovially regales the brothers with exaggerated stories of her father's wealth and her family status. The air of menace is introduced very suddenly so that it appears to break completely with this discourse. Karin innocently tells the brothers that they might be under the spell of a witch. There is a cut to Ingeri, who looks on from a distant vantage point, her eyes expressing her intensity. As if her spell is enacted, suddenly medium close-ups of the goatherds looking intently towards Karin register their malign intent. The abruptness of the juxtaposition with Karin's discourse of privilege demonstrates that her fanciful words mean nothing in this situation and, yet also, it is as if the brothers are setting out to attack and destroy this privileged princess, reiterating the theme of Ingeri's envy.

The goatherds are not obedient to any rule or law. In this, the film convincingly represents medieval savagery. Further meaning is added through the folkloric dialogue. Again, the magic number three is present as the fair-haired articulate goatherd translates three questions to Karin from the blackbearded, tongueless goatherd. The sinister double meaning of the sexualised address to 'her lady' suggests that the goatherds' attack is accompanied by a consciousness of inverting Karin's princess-like status. In the manner referred to in Klein's analysis of *Iago*, there is a desire on the part of the villain to spoil the beauty they perceive. Thus, in effect, there is the suggestion of an attack on the dominant social order from these violent outsiders, including Ingeri, whose intentions are ambivalently directed towards eliciting the murderous action. The psychoanalytic theory of violence as developed by Freud and Klein is also relevant here because of its insistence on understanding the relation between aggression and libido. Klein follows Freud and argues that sadism is a fusion of the life and death instincts.⁶² The goatherds are

driven by specific materialistic aims, but also the nature of the crime is made more shocking because of the combination of sexual assault and murder. The deadly fusion of different instincts is made manifest because they all attack her together. This is a reworking of the medieval ballad, which did not concentrate on the rape. Perhaps Isaksson and Bergman cannot help but intimate a psychoanalytic exploration of the relation between crime and desire and, as Donner suggests, they sought to shock a contemporary audience into reflection on the problem of evil.

A criticism, on the release of the film, was that the aestheticisation of this scene was particularly problematic.⁶³ However, close attention to the role of the virtually silent soundtrack, the use of cross-cutting, carefully chosen *mise-en-scène*, camerawork and cinematography are vital here. Analysis of these stylistic elements shows how the film-makers' intention is to engage the imagination, whilst depicting the viciousness of the attack in a realistic fashion. The medium close-ups reveal the changes in expression of the goatherds which alarm Karin, who loses her playful spirit. She asks the youngest goatherd to cut the bread, returning to the innocence associated with food. The blackbearded goatherd picks up the knife, suggesting that the crime is imminent, an action which Karin sees with rising anxiety. At this point the youngest goatherd drops the bread, and the toad leaps out. The alternation of shots shows the toad gleaming and alive, with Ingeri advancing to look on from a closer position, and each of the goatherds looking at Karin and the toad. This alternation returns the emphasis to the evil symbol. The act of looking contrasts with the physical struggle that ensues, and the revulsion encapsulated by the toad's sudden appearance sets the mood for the crime. However, this symbolic creature also complicates the message. Whilst the signs are that the crime is driven by material instincts, the symbolic level is also explicit. All are transfixed by the toad, so it can be understood as a catalyst for the crime as Ingeri intended. Psychoanalytically, we can understand her insertion of the toad in the bread as representing a poisonous invasion which catalyses the destructiveness of the attack on Karin's body. When Karin attempts to leave, the fair-haired goatherd takes control of her horse, and as she moves in the other direction, the blackbearded goatherd blocks her route. As she tries to escape through the branches of a fallen tree, all the brothers jump on her.

The sexual assault by the brothers is shown in a number of medium long shots with some variation of angle motivated by the action. Nothing can be heard apart from the sound of the struggle. When the youngest is cast off, he immediately tries to return, but stops transfixed by the sight in front of him. Shadow is cast on his face as his look is juxtaposed with

the struggle and with another shot that shows Ingeri, now traumatised. The rural setting remains an important pictorial element, a backcloth for the horrific crime. The *mise-en-scène* of rural tranquility provides a detachment from the crime, in contrast to Ingeri's face, which expresses her traumatic involvement. The stone, which she seems to eat while watching, signifies her desire to attack the goatherds, but this is arrested by her traumatic fascination with the spectacle. When she drops the stone, her face expresses abject resignation, a realisation that Karin's status as the sacred virgin has been destroyed. The shots showing Ingeri, and the boy looking, mark the beginning of remorse, and a pattern of reparation, in which expression and actions reveal guilt felt by these protagonists, and their imaginative sympathy for the victim. These moments illustrate how reparation goes beyond individual awareness of culpability, and reorients the individual to a social reality.

Aware of how the film was criticised by some for its sensationalism, Donner defends Bergman's impassive use of the camera as a response to the original detached tone of the ballad. At the same time, Donner argues, in effect, that this is film-making which carries the Bazinian ideals of neorealism forward because a detached camera style and observation of social reality are infused with a more subjective individualistic sensibility.⁶⁴ This focus on subjective experience ultimately gravitates towards despair through the characters of Ingeri and the boy. However, before this, the final stages of the assault involve the imaginative use of naturalistic light, and it is notable that the final blow is heard but not seen. At the same time we see the economic motivation behind the crime as Karin's body is ransacked.

The talking goatherd threatens the boy that he must guard the goats while the elder ones leave the scene. Unexpectedly, a shot up to the sky reveals snow falling, which is related but not aligned to the boy's point of view, as we see him look up in the following shot. Thus, a shift in mood is orchestrated through *mise-en-scène*, representing a sudden change in the environment. Klein's account of internal pain, as something the subject will feel compelled to expel, explains how the boy's emotional state is manifested through nausea. The camerawork accentuates the focus on the boy's reaction, showing in extreme close-up his face turn towards the body that lies on the other side of the tree. This turn echoes the final turn of Karin's head. Memory, a key part of subjectivity in other Bergman works and closely related to the imagination, starts to play a vital role in the boy's response to his surroundings. The deathly quiet throughout the scene focuses attention on the boy's reaction and the idea of an internal response, which leads him to throw some handfuls

of earth over the body. Vernon Young observes how the sudden and unexpected introduction of light snowfall at this point represents 'a few flakes of benediction'.⁶⁵

This is a striking moment of attempted reparation, but whether there is a sign of divine intervention remains ambiguous. For Sartre, authentic self-realisation involves loss, which he describes using the concept of abandonment, a recognition of our isolation from the guidance of others.⁶⁶ This is relevant because the boy is thrown back on to his own resources. The sense of being, detached now from the guidance of external causes, parallels the Kleinian concept of an imaginative reach beyond the struggle for domination to a more empathic understanding of external reality. The snow falling introduces the idea of the external reality's existence independent of human subjectivity, but this enhances the boy's loneliness. Bergman and Isaksson might be happy for this experience to be understood in a more religious fashion as a foreshadowing of the miraculous appearance of the spring at the end of the film, but the scene also expresses how the boy embodies existential isolation, which for Sartre is the starting point of authentic self-realisation.

The most explicit continuity is now conveyed through the representation of the boy's inner experience. Gaps in the narration leave this open for the spectator to respond to, rather than focusing precisely on cause-and-effect development. Therefore, despite the threat to the boy by his elder brother that he must stay with the goats, he is more moved by his dread of the body and runs away. Existential dread overcomes temporarily a command from the superego. The outcome of this is elided, and suddenly, in dreamlike fashion, the three goatherds are at the gate of Töre's establishment. The focus on the boy during this section of the film contrasts with the representation of his brothers. From a Kleinian viewpoint, the two elder goatherds have been possessed by destructiveness to such a degree that it is as if they have lost all their subjectivity. They are still driven by a symbolic understanding because they have the motivation to travel, carrying their new material possessions, but this is just a mechanical operation dictated by the savage reality that appears to dictate their actions. Although they appear to be free of the moral dictates of the superego, in fact, their actions externalise their experience of a savage world. This logic is pursued by the film through the depiction of Töre's revenge.

The meeting at Töre's gate contains elements of realism in the way the relationship between a medieval farmer and the outsiders is represented as one controlled by power. Töre's character demonstrates authority and leniency, but the overriding impact is symbolic. The

murderers are immediately facing the patriarch, a set-up which demonstrates how this film differs from a more conventional adventure action drama. Throughout Freud's and Klein's writing, we know there is a very distinctive awareness of pressure within the family structure. This psychoanalytic preoccupation is present, at least in a varied form, in this narrative. Instead of a quest by Töre to find his daughter – a second journey in the narrative – there is instead a compression so that now the goatherds, strangely unaware that they are at Karin's home, occupy a place rather like being children to Töre and Märeta.

The ambiguous signification of the goatherds as sons/outsideers parallels the trials and confusion for subjectivity that Klein and Sartre chart in their focus on processes of internalisation and externalisation. The focus on the boy's inner world emerges most strongly because of the simple directness of the film-making. *Mise-en-scène* conveys the memory of the crime, whilst the parents are clearly unsuspecting of these three guests. For example, the mother sits knitting from a large bundle of material that resembles her daughter's hair, a prop inspired by the ballad. When the storyteller suddenly narrates the story of the May Queen who did not return, the boy's head turns nervously to his brother. Töre's return into the room and the mother's inquiring glance convey Karin's continued absence. When the goatherds are invited to the supper table, the image repeats the earlier meal in its evocation of the Last Supper. Now, Ingeri is not present, but Judas-like guilt is manifested through the boy's anxiety. To the words of the prayer he moves nervously, recognising perhaps the prayer spoken by Karin. The boy's nervousness is kept in check, as he is gripped by the blackbearded goatherd. Bergman's preoccupation with close-ups of the face is central to the representation. Unlike the earlier supper scene, this one involves point-of-view shots, dominated by the perspective of the young goatherd. The boy looks at the mother, father and Frida, and their expressions reinforce his sense of foreboding. They are like tyrannical superego figures to him, but he has not internalised the savagery of his elder brothers, and cannot contain the anxiety evoked by the memory of the meal with Karin, and the subsequent crime, which leads to his sickness.

The maternal care for the boy offered initially by Frida accentuates the way in which he is split off from his brothers.⁶⁷ For Klein, splitting is an inevitable psychic process. The elaboration here of a different mentality from that occupied by the murderers appears to be embedded in the boy's own feeling of shame. When Frida offers the simple answer that the Lord is merciful, the boy's mind continues to reel with troubled thoughts, although a contemplative air is coexistent with this anxiety as

he gazes up from his bed. As Marilyn Johns Blackwell has noted, the bed is a crucial prop in Bergman's work.⁶⁸ It is like a platform and used as a pretext to convey a dreamlike elaboration of subjectivity. The boy's gaze up, like that of Ingeri, and his look at the snow, suggest metaphysical presence, a contemplation of the world beyond human action. A specific religious interpretation is elaborated as the storytelling beggar looms over the boy, narrating a metaphorical account of fear and punishment in hell. Whilst religious, it is striking that beggar includes similes to convey his philosophy, and the boy's contemplation of these words can be read as a flight of imagination. The image of hell is conveyed more as imaginative description than as a strict, biblical threat.

Töre and Märeta's conversation in the next scene alludes to recrimination and past traumas. Märeta's anxiety is expressed through the contorted tension that takes over her hands, gripped in prayer. The physicality of Birgitta Vallberg's acting as Märeta continues in the following scenes, which lead to the discovery of the criminals' guilt. She hears a sound off-screen reminding us of Karin's cry and perhaps, further back in the film, the cry of the crow. Suspense is conveyed by the darkness of the passage in which she passes the storyteller, who conveys that the goatherds are attacking the boy. Active maternal concern for the boy remains an essential element even when Märeta is on the verge of discovering that her daughter is dead. The intensity of emotions is realised slowly, using a long take, as Märeta touches the blood on the boy's face. Preoccupied with this, apparently wondering whether the same people committed violence against her daughter, she walks back. In an attempt to placate her anxiety, the light-haired goatherd offers the dress. Märeta's response is marked by her downcast eyes, which absorb the true significance of this object. The dress is in some ways a peace offering designed to allay the mother's suspicions of violence. As such, however, it is an unsuccessful reparative act. The materialistic nature of this offering is marked as Märeta says that her husband will decide a fair price. This links the process of economic transaction, which dictates the goatherds' actions, with the father's decision to exact vengeance. Märeta conveys a mixture of feeling as she reveals to her husband the evidence. However, the single action of throwing the dress on the bed and telling him about the bloodstains (which we do not see) focuses us on her motivation for revenge.

Töre's revenge

In this section, Max von Sydow's acting and the stylistic elements that have been used creatively throughout the film are combined to give a

masterful representation of the intensity with which the father avenges his daughter's death. Livingston argues persuasively that violence in Bergman's films is ritualistic and that the director is preoccupied with the parallels between such a ritual and art.⁶⁹ Although Livingston leaves *The Virgin Spring* out of his account, this scene is a perfect example. Despite the suspense, greater attention is paid to the emotional content and the way in which Töre's ritualistic actions convey a single-minded purpose, a performance that must be enacted drawing on an enormity of inner strength as well as physical strength. First, Töre confronts Ingeri. Ingeri's confession is ignored, and she is simply instructed to assist him in his preparations by getting the knife. This expresses the idea of ritual, after which he washes vigorously, using the branches of the tree, a meticulous preparation, like an actor getting ready for his performance. During the preparations, the sound of dawn birdsong, along with the faint light of this hour, contributes to the atmosphere. This includes a personal element from Bergman, who frequently expressed his feeling that the early hours have a special significance in their capacity for horror (Bergman refers to this time as 'the hour of the wolf', as will be seen in the next chapter). The scene with the birch tree is like the moment when the boy was alone and it snowed. It carries a sense of the individual's isolated existence in the universe/natural world. It is also important that Ingeri is present as the assistant at other moments in the preparation and that Märeta is present during the killing. As noted before, Bergman's films often show a character preoccupied in a subjective state but witnessed by another. However, what occurs in these scenes is not a sense of shame before the other but rather a diametrically opposed effect, namely the witness plays a role in confirming the individual's quest because he/she is emotionally complicit with his sense of purpose.

The quietness of the hour contributes suspense. As Töre enters the room in which the goatherds sleep, the sound of the door is isolated, and when he steals across the room we may contemplate what will happen if they awake. When he reaches the other side, he simply sits and then plunges his knife loudly into the table. This gesture foregrounds not just his confidence but also the ritualistic nature of his actions. A quick attack on the goatherds in their sleep is not his desire, but rather the catharsis of an execution in which they fully face his wrath. Töre embodies the strength, and ferocity, which Ingeri appeared to desire from Odin, and this comparison is strengthened because the knife is adorned with a Norse-like handle. As he waits, the juxtaposition of conscious intent and dream reality is suggested as the goatherds sleep. The struggle when they awake is brief, demonstrating Töre's supremacy. The focus on a

bodily confrontation is accentuated through close camera shots, which then yield overtly symbolic images. The blackbearded goatherd is shown after his death, face inverted (an image used elsewhere by Bergman).⁷⁰ The light-haired goatherd struggles hard so that both he and Töre are shown in close-up in the flames of the fire, an example of how realistic *mise-en-scène* is combined with a symbolic representation to represent hell. When it comes to the boy, a different tone is expressed. He runs to Märeta, who tries to protect him, but Töre in his fury grabs the boy and he is thrown against the wall, a blow which kills him. Töre bends over the body and shakes the boy, his face cast in shadow and the boy's lit. Töre's look switches between the bodies of his victims and his hands, as he clenches his fists, and closes his eyes.⁷¹ His lips quiver, and his face is fixed in a state that suggests some disbelief. 'God have mercy on me', he says. Märeta runs and kneels over the boy. The sense of shame that emerges in this action scene complicates the catharsis of Töre's victory. The skill in the acting and the *mise-en-scène* is not to spell out this shame, but instead to signify it as a stirring within Töre that is minimally represented through his physical movements and expressions. Equally, the lighting continues to play with the fluidity of a realistic range of shadows and illuminations whilst incorporating the suggestion of a moral code of good and evil. When the characters emerge outside into the morning light, the catharsis of Töre's success is undercut by the solemnity, and the long shot shows the household in a state of shock. Töre, however, continues to be purposeful, having insisted that they must search for Karin's body.

Now the journey is repeated, but this time there is a variation of the elements. For instance, again, we see the crow next to the one-eyed man's dwelling, but from a different angle. The whole household walks, but the use of medium close-ups focuses on the state of shock and grief rather than the landscape depicted in the original. The dialogue is minimal. Märeta's speech builds on the earlier allusions to a dysfunctional family, traumatised before the death of Karin, saying, 'I loved her more than God. Then she turned to you and I began to hate you. The guilt is mine.' Töre's reply is that the guilt is shared. This scene, as a whole, then, involves the transition to a spirit of Christian redemption through a shared sense of shame and Töre's insistence that he will build a church for God on the spot on which Karin lies.

The Christian sentiment gives the film a thematic coherence so that the psychological strife and the crime are united behind the theme of a desire and hope for a more benign authority. However, the expressiveness is focused on physically manifested angst. When Ingeri leads

the parents to the body, they both bend over her outstretched figure in love, contrasting with the lust shown by the goatherds in the assault. Töre tears himself away to express his dismay to God. This is primarily a physical expression focused on his hands, as if to say that the material world is damned without some divine intervention. When the spring emerges next to Karin's head, which her parents hold, there is no further dialogue. Close-ups of Töre and Märeta are used to convey their awe at this miracle, whilst Ingeri is shown in medium shot receiving the flowing water as a cleansing force. Märeta is calmed by the miracle and brings water to Karin's blood-stained face. With very little non-diegetic sound in the film, the use of music marks this moment as an elevation from the tragic events of the material world, and the camerawork is used to depict the response of the household and, from an aerial position, their shared reverence for God's intervention.

This scene involves expressing serious doubts about the power of God. It seems to fit with Bergman's questioning of the religion with which he grew up. As Töre says to God, 'You saw it. The innocent child's death and my vengeance. You permitted it. I don't understand you.'



Figure 5.2 *The Virgin Spring*, Svensk Filmindustri, Tartan Video. Töre's anguish as he addresses God



Figure 5.3 *The Virgin Spring*, Svensk Filmindustri, Tartan Video. As her parents move Karin's body, a spring appears

The commitment to building the church and the introduction of the choral hymn on the soundtrack, nevertheless, present a religious resolution. Despite all the emphasis on psychological forces and embodied consciousness, the conclusion defers to faith and metaphysics. This seems to be the clearest reason why Bergman talked negatively about his own work, not just saying it was a poor imitation of an Akira Kurosawa film but also highlighting the religious element as inadequate with 'a totally unanalyzed idea of God' and criticising 'the introduction of a therapeutic idea'.⁷² 'the idea of making something out of the old folk-song 'Herre Töre of Vänge's daughter' was a sound one. But then the jiggery-pokery began – the spiritual jiggery-pokery'.⁷³

This is damning self-criticism, but Bergman does not analyse the complexity of the work. Another statement from Bergman, in a different interview, is more useful here and somewhat contradicts the above self-criticism:

In *The Virgin Spring* the welling of the spring was not meant as simply the tidy expression of a religious miracle. The spring was the medieval

symbol of the water of feelings. I didn't see how it was possible to allow the picture to end without the spring, for if the father had merely gone home and there had been a great silence, there would have been no release for the feelings of the people of the story, nor for those of the audience.⁷⁴

The adoption of the spring motif therefore has various levels. In addition to religious sentiment and concern with narrative catharsis, Bergman was inspired by the real spring located in the churchyard of Karna in Östergötland. It may be concluded that the film's response to history and myth involves a bricolage of different influences, a point that is even more apparent when we consider that, despite long-standing interest in the original ballad, 'The Daughter of Töre in Vänge', it was Isaksson who transformed it with the script. Given Bergman's ambivalence about the religious message, it is important that Isaksson had an established interest in Christian existential themes as well as a focus on women.⁷⁵

Bergman's explanation of the spring as an emotional release for the audience is on the face of it relatively conventional. He suggests that the audience required a resolution and a feeling of uplift. Yet, it is in contrast to a more mainstream cinema that a symbol was selected for resolution rather than an extended narrative development/set of actions. This allowed concentration on emotion, and is in keeping with the repeated use of symbolism throughout the film. Moreover, Bergman's explanation maintains an openness in relation to the emotional meaning. Given that this symbol is an answer to such traumatic events, the comparison with a Kleinian emphasis on the value of symbolism is clear. The Kleinian analyst Hanna Segal quotes from the art historian Roger Fry to convey the significance of symbolism in art:

I think that form, be it musical, visual, or verbal, can move us so deeply because it symbolically embodies an unconscious meaning. In other words, art embodies and symbolises and evokes in the recipient a certain kind of archaic emotion of a preverbal kind.⁷⁶

A psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious allows the symbol to be understood as something without a prescribed meaning. Kleinianism more than Freudianism focuses on infantile emotions and, thus, for Segal symbolism is not just about wish fulfilment but also expresses conflict involving even more primitive emotions. While the spring may seem to play the role of wish fulfilment, such a view ignores the fact that this miracle fails to remedy the damage and trauma represented by

Karin's death. It does not have this efficacy and may leave the spectator with questions: Why is God manifested now and not earlier? Is God in some way ever present but detached from causality? This element of ambiguity differentiates the integration in this text from one that just provides a happy resolution. The desire to raise questions remains important for both Bergman and Isaksson.

A further understanding of the role played by this symbol can be developed by drawing on Sartre's theory of the imagination. As Andreas Elpidorou argues, Sartre made it clear that abstraction can serve to bring forward an emotional response.⁷⁷ For Sartre, the spectator does not just respond at the cognitive level, but the derealising action of the imagination is given content through an emotional response. On this reading one can see that, for Sartre, abstraction may heighten the emotional force of a work of art or allow the expression of emotion alongside other types of content. This provides an insight into the emotional force of the symbol because not only does it have relevance to religious imagery and knowledge but it can also allow, in the intimation of infinity, a free projection of emotion into the space vacated. The style and content aim to provoke an imaginative response from the audience. The film raises questions about society, including the role of primitive emotions and the causes of violence. These questions, alongside belief in the power of art, show that, as Bergman's work advanced towards the 1960s, it continued to share ideas with Klein and Sartre. Although Bergman develops a range of styles during the 1960s, by the time we reach *Persona* and *Hour of the Wolf*, a markedly more experimental approach emerges. I will turn now to the latter film, which relies more intensely than *The Virgin Spring* on enigmatic symbolism.

6

The Destruction of the Artist: *Hour of the Wolf*

Hour of the Wolf (1967) started as a project for Ingmar Bergman three years before its eventual completion. It is unusual for a Bergman film to take so long, but the director's health problems, and then the inspiration to make *Persona*, were responsible for the delay.¹ Bergman also made clear that the personal nature of the story led to complications in the production, including the decision to edit out much of the opening prologue.² The original title, *The Cannibals*, is instructive of Bergman's intent in representing an artist surrounded by an aristocratic entourage who effectively devour him, and the way damage is enacted by malign elements that possess the artist's imagination and eat away at his sense of identity. The story, in the finished film, begins in digressive fashion with a figure that we may suppose is the director, recalling how he received the diary of Johan Borg, an artist who disappeared, from his wife Alma. This information is fictitious,³ although it obliquely refers to autobiographical elements in the film, including the pregnancy of Liv Ullmann (with Bergman's child), who plays Alma. The story goes on to tell through a range of flashbacks how the artist Johan (played by Max von Sydow) disappeared on the island of Baltrum. I will provide a detailed analysis of the film, but before this I will look at reasons why this work in particular justifies psychoanalytical and philosophical analysis.

Critical responses

In the previous chapter, we saw Bergman's preoccupation with the emotions of shame and guilt. It is thought by various commentators that these are even more extreme in their ferocity in *Hour of the Wolf*. For instance, Peter Cowie comments on the finale of the film: 'Forced back into insecurity, the Bergman artist figure finds himself assailed by waves

of humiliation, guilt and shame.’⁴ Cowie argues that von Sydow is used ‘as Bergman’s alter ego, the artist as fugitive... In *Hour of the Wolf* he is a painter, Johan Borg. In *Shame*, a violinist’.⁵

We can also reach back further into Bergman’s career for affiliations. For instance, John Simon notes the way in which this is a film about the artist and madness, thus positioning it alongside such Bergman works as *Prison*.⁶ These groupings revolve around Bergman’s authorship, and yet at one level *Hour of the Wolf* signals a sense of crisis around this whole concept with its story of the self-destructive artist unable to maintain a relationship with reality. After the doubts directed by critics towards Bergman’s allegorical style at the end of the 1950s, the director had regained favour from *Cahiers du Cinéma* through *Persona* in particular.⁷ This was partly because, like the journal itself, he appeared to be calling into question an uncritical humanism. The humanistic expressionism and symbolism of films like *The Seventh Seal* were challenged with a pared-down critical challenge to metaphysics in his trilogy of films in the early 1960s, *Through a Glass Darkly* (1961), *Winter Light* (1963) and *The Silence* (1963). This trend can be seen continuing with *Persona*, in which psychological complexity calls into question easy humanistic assumptions about character and narrative meaning. Formal experimentation at the expense of narrative accessibility appears to be maintained with *Hour of the Wolf*. The *Cahiers* critic, Jean-Louis Comolli, was most impressed, not by the range of expressive devices in the film, but by the way a kind of sleepwalking authorship evolves, allowing the film to achieve its true destiny as a dream, through the submersion of individual agency. He wrote, ‘The film unfolds like a dream in progress, ‘in-itself’ a kind of dream, resisting predetermined course, switching direction at will’.⁸

Meanwhile, British critics were very appreciative of *Hour of the Wolf* for its visual flair and imagination.⁹ However, looking more widely at the film’s reception shows that Bergman was equally being taken to task for overbearing authorship. Critics in a number of countries echoed the earlier concern of *Cahiers* in relation to *The Virgin Spring* and his heavily symbolic works that Bergman was narcissistic, indulging in melancholic reflections on his role as an artist.¹⁰

While the film has been predominantly read as both a representation of artistic process and as Bergman’s exploration of personal issues, Bergman himself offers an enigmatic assessment of the artist:

What Johan Borg wanted to say was that he is faced with a ‘must’; an unending torment, toothache. He can’t escape it. There’s no question

of a gift from on high. No otherworldly relationship. It's just here. Disease. A perversion. A five legged calf. He takes a very brutal view of the situation.¹¹

Some commentators respond to the way this is conveyed in the text as an expression of nihilism. For Robin Wood, Johan's demons represent a negative version of artistic creativity and not its true realisation. 'The point is made quite unequivocally that the demons are inimical to artistic creation – their emergence in the first stretches of the film corresponds to a decline in Johan's art.'¹² Thus, the film, for Wood, has a message about a negative psychological experience, but does not offer this as a full account of what art involves. Paisley Livingston goes further in stressing the expression of nihilism. For Livingston, *Hour of the Wolf* is a grotesque displacement of *The Magic Flute* narrative, a nihilistic reversal of the latter's expression of the power of art. A more positive evaluation is produced, however, through the expansive process of relating *Hour of the Wolf* to other texts and contexts. Thus, even Livingston feels that this morbid account of the artist gains in value when we compare it with the superior narrative of *The Magic Flute*, including Bergman's 1975 film production of the opera. As both Wood and Livingston stress, *The Magic Flute* is made a part of *Hour of the Wolf* itself with the puppet production of Wolfgang Mozart's opera. Livingston states that *Hour of the Wolf*: 'like all of Bergman's negative moments, must be perceived in a larger context'.¹³ Wood identifies much more positive meaning in the text itself, with Alma representing Pamina, a symbol of wholeness for the struggling artist Johan/Tamino.¹⁴

A horror film with psychoanalytical themes

Laura Hubner suggests that *Hour of the Wolf* lends itself to psychoanalytical interpretation more than other Bergman works.¹⁵ She develops this through a reference to sexuality: '*Hour of the Wolf* draws on the werewolf tradition of fission and conflict, traditionally associated with notions of confused sexuality.'¹⁶ The departure from realism becomes more forceful when eventually Johan is surrounded by a community of unreal characters in Baron von Merckens' castle. They are like a collection from the horror genre, carrying some of the names from the characters in *The Tales of Hoffmann*, a favourite for Bergman.¹⁷ The indication of horror-like excess, through elements that suggest vampirism, and the dual identity of man and wolf (the title), make the case for a focus on unconscious and sublimated material for an understanding of this film more

compelling. As Wood observes, 'What is surprising is Bergman's use of the traditions of the American horror film, from Whale and Browning to Hitchcock.'¹⁸ Supernatural images proliferate, as the story reaches its climax, including a moment in which the baron walks up the wall, like a fly, and another moment in which a woman removes her face and drops her eyeball in a glass. Hubner, like Wood, recognises the creativity involved in the bricolage of horror references.

In this chapter I want to argue that the horror conventions are used to represent a merger between the artist's imagination and his oppression by a group of aristocrats. The imagery of Johan's tormentors as vampire-like creatures adds to the alienation, which is shown through the application of Kleinian and Sartrean perspectives. In the previous chapters we considered films with a marked tension between the subjectivity of the characters and external reality. In *Hour of the Wolf*, it is as if the unreality of Johan's world takes over. This threatens any possibility of integration that for Melanie Klein depends on a closer relationship between phantasy and reality. Discussing how emotional development involves a modification of the process of splitting, Klein writes, 'as the adaptation to the external world increases, this splitting is carried out on planes which gradually become increasingly nearer and nearer to reality. This goes on until love for the real and internalized objects and trust in them are well established'.¹⁹ As we have seen, Sartrean theory also calls for recognition of the gulf between consciousness and reality such that pathological imagination is a failure to fully understand this division. These theories are relevant to the depiction of Johan's alienation because through the film we see him become swallowed up in an unreal world. Bergman uses the conventions of horror to represent a loss of reality for the main protagonist. At the same time, reality is referred to because the eerie figures that take over Johan's mind, dominate the artist. For Bergman this is a real issue. Although he was not dependent on aristocratic patrons, this situation can be seen as relevant to any artist who struggles in an insecure economic context. Throughout his career Bergman received good support from the Swedish film industry, but he also had to struggle with the logic of a capitalist market. For instance, *The Seventh Seal* was only made after the critical success of *Smiles of a Summer Night*.²⁰

Sartrean and Kleinian ideas also help with an understanding of Alma's role in the film. Johan's wife represents a reparative philosophy and an authentic project distinct from Johan's fatal flaws as she tries to help and understand his situation. Much of the film reveals that, while he is oppressed by a grotesque elite, she is victimised in their relationship. At

the same time she achieves greater detachment than Johan and is not engulfed by the hallucinatory world into which he falls. For Frank Gado, who writes from a Freudian perspective, all of the supernatural happenings in the story are an 'embarrassment', lacking dramatic purpose and only designed to express some elements of Bergman's psychological turmoil.²¹ Gado reads the film as a supernatural nightmare from start to finish, but this underplays the internal tension between narrative coherence and a dreamlike logic that resists explanation. Many critics, including Gado, recognise that Alma represents a counterpoint and alternative values to the world of nightmare that envelops Johan, but sufficient attention is not given to her prominence as a narrator and as a spectator. The film presents a degenerative spectacle as Johan visits the castle, having apparently shot his wife, but this episode is framed by a focus on Alma as an empathic presence and, furthermore, this passage is not the only example of a strikingly framed episode in the film as a whole. The whole film presents labyrinthine shifts in the sense of reality, which creates the potential for a creative exploration of alienation.

Livingston argues that we can trace a significant influence on Bergman's work in general from Eino Kaila, a Finnish philosopher, and opposes this to the tendency to discuss Bergman's work vaguely in relation to existentialism.²² Livingston draws many interesting parallels between Kaila's ideas and Bergman's work, including the psychological consequences of corporal punishment on a child (we will see how important this is in the film), but it can be noted at the outset that some of these ideas overlap with those of other thinkers. Of particular interest here is the notion that Bergman shares Kaila's interests in magical thinking and the way in which individuals are driven by irrational motivations. These are both explicit themes in the early work of Jean-Paul Sartre. For example, Sartre conveys the obsessive dynamic of emotion with reference to 'magical thinking'. He writes, 'when consciousness is living the magical world into which it has precipitated itself, it tends to perpetuate the world, by which it is captivated: the emotion tends to perpetuate itself'.²³

This focus on magical thinking in *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* describes an irrational world, like the one Johan perpetuates. This compares to the case of emotions which feed on themselves, discussed in Sartre's *The Imaginary*. While this solipsistic conception is pushed to the limit of comprehensibility in *Hour of the Wolf*, there is not a total collapse, but instead an expression of how the individual's imaginary world is inevitably permeated by social reality. The atmosphere of total breakdown in the film is signalled through enigmatic details that derail

a coherent sense of time and space, culminating in the ambiguity of Johan's disappearance: he appears to have vanished into the environment. However, Bergman keeps alive a coherent conception of a world in which experience accords with our concepts through the character of Alma. As the narrator, Alma is able to offer an explanation of what happens that does not fundamentally challenge our conception of empirical reality. Fundamental to the coherence of her explanation are the concepts of time and space. The whole story is her flashback, and her articulation emphasises key points that give the temporal and spatial quality of the story some plausibility even if they do not fully restore convincing realism to the narrative. Despite her common sense, Alma is also affected by Johan's psychic breakdown and disappearance, but this is dialectically incorporated into her position as someone who witnesses and empathises with her husband's problems. Through Alma we experience the relationship between the real and imaginary.

The power and dangers of imagination

Marsha Kinder argues that Bergman is reworking a recurring nightmare from his childhood. The nightmare is a condensation of the classic fairy-tale structure of 'Little Red Riding Hood' and mythologies of the werewolf. Kinder suggests:

These two myths are reverse sides of the same cannibalistic fear – of devouring the mother, or being devoured by her gaping red mouth. That's why Bergman's murderous nightmares always evoke the relationship between parent and child.²⁴

According to Kinder, the film is not determined by these folkloric structures, but is remarkable for the way Bergman produces an aesthetic that provides existential challenges to the audience, involving them in his 'hallucination'. She talks about how Bergman 'shifts from coded surrealistic visuals to a richer phenomenological experience of the dream'.²⁵ Klein's account of a surging psychotic oscillation in the consciousness of the infant between being devoured and devouring, or attacked and attacking, compares with the reference to these early horror tales and also mythology about vampires. Klein refers herself to these stories in her account of the destructive impact of the superego:

we know that the man-eating wolf, the fire-spewing dragon, and all the evil monsters out of myths and fairy-stories flourish and exert

their unconscious influence in the phantasy of each individual child, and it feels itself persecuted and threatened by those evil shapes.²⁶

For Klein, this means that all real objects encountered by the child, including people, are potentially transformed by a superego detached from reality. Klein shows how this dynamic takes over the individual. The film's account of the artist's self-torment can be thought of as a self possessed by demons in a way that compares to Klein's account of how the self may be attacked from within by bad objects. Klein's principal focus is on anxiety more than desire, and for much of the film this appears to be what eats at Johan. Like other psychoanalytical interpretations of the work, Klein's account suggests that Bergman is not just narcissistic, preoccupied with his own demons, but attempting to express an experience which has cultural and social dimensions. Julia Kristeva makes clear in her account of Klein that the individual's struggle with anxiety is lifelong, and thus desire becomes inevitably caught up in the search to alleviate anxiety. As Kristeva clarifies, for Klein it is when the death drive takes over that we become disassociated from pleasure, and from the life drive.²⁷

In the interview about *Hour of the Wolf*, Bergman refuses to pin down the psychoanalytical message, but he does refer to Sartre:

Sartre has said how inhibited he used to be as an artist and author, how he suffered because what he was doing wasn't good enough. By a slow intellectual process he came to realize that his anxieties about not making anything of value were an atavistic relic from the religious notion that something exists which can be called the Supreme Good, or that anything is perfect.²⁸

Bergman then goes on to make a comparison with his own work: 'When my top-heavy religious superstructure collapsed I lost my inhibitions as a writer.'²⁹ Sartrean theory provides a philosophical overview, which nonetheless maintains the role of contingency and individualism. The phenomenological method involves recognising the experiential qualities of the text rather than subsuming them under determining categories. This is why Sartre's ideas are compatible with Kinder's argument that in *Hour of the Wolf* Bergman 'moves his audience from external observation and analysis of the events to a fuller participation inside the hallucination'.³⁰ Sartrean theory can be used to explain how subjectivity is evoked, whilst attending to the disintegration of Johan's consciousness.

Sartre pulled back from dismantling individual identity completely, and maintained a degree of essentialism in *Transcendence of the Ego* and *Being and Nothingness*, with an idea of subjectivity alongside a transcendental philosophy of freedom.³¹ Sartre's anti-naturalism is also relevant to Bergman because it leads to an appreciation of how the self may be thought of outside common sense and the boundaries of empirical science. Bergman declines a common sense or straightforwardly scientific/psychological explanation for Johan's downfall. We recognise that the latter is a deeply flawed character, but the impossibility of substantive identification with him means that the film is more concerned with reflection on the conditions of his malaise. Bergman himself is once again a harsh critic of his own work, suggesting that he should have focused on the transference of Johan's difficulties to Alma.³² However, if Alma had also been fully afflicted (she shares Johan's vision of demons and so is partly afflicted), Bergman would have lost an important source of thematic tension in the opposition between Alma's nurturing character and the self-indulgence of Johan.

Analysis of the film; the prologue

The film begins with a simple direct statement of its subject. The intertitles, which inform about the diary and the artist's disappearance, initiate a digressive, self-reflexive, credits sequence, in which we hear a film crew. This beginning, which is followed by the director's instructions to his crew, heard against a black screen, compares with other self-reflexive 1960s art films like those of Jean-Luc Godard, with its self-conscious, experimental reference to the film-making process. However, the opening flows into the second shot, in which Alma makes it clear that she is talking to the director. It is worth noting here Bergman's comment that he felt he had to contain the interplay between a documentary-style reference to himself and the fictional world, and thus the material referring to his role was reduced from the original script.³³ The elliptical connection between the fiction and a documentary representation means that an omniscient perspective is undercut, thus heightening ambiguity. Nevertheless, the minimal presence of this omniscient perspective contributes to Alma's authority, and this is subsequently confirmed by her character and actions throughout the story.

In the transition from the credits, the director evolves as a fictional character. His presence, although still unseen, provides a focal point after the digression of the credits, in which noises and indistinguishable

conversation allow the viewer to wonder what is going on and/or to enjoy the imaginative freedom of eavesdropping on the daily routine of film production. The unseen director of the second shot makes camera position a psychological element in the story. This corresponds with Sartre's philosophy of imagination. For Sartre, imagination negates the world, but consciousness is immersed in it. Since consciousness is not securely detached, it must be the case that knowledge is perspectival, restricted by the viewpoint of the individual subject, and thus dispersed across a range of different perspectives.³⁴ Sartre recognises the role of elements in consciousness, including pre-reflective consciousness, as part of the way the individual determines his/her own reality. This intuitive, contingent linking is presented at the outset of the film. The relationship between the film's representation of fiction and its representation of reality is neither arbitrary nor surreal. Instead, it is a sketch of an enigmatic connection that refuses complete disclosure.

The second shot shows a thatched cottage with windswept tree, and a basket of fruit in front of it. Alma walks into this *mise-en-scène*. A digressive naturalistic quality is evoked, with Alma talking directly to the camera and stating that there is nothing more to say. She has given the director her husband's diary, but she continues, thus blurring the boundaries between the representation of events and the representation that will follow. Her speech foregrounds a consciousness of time, as she mentions the hour at which she arrived at this location with her husband. More startling, she explains that she is now expecting a baby in a month. Bergman's attention to time involves a deviation here, such that temporal reference points are established and then undermined at different levels in the rest of the narrative. When Alma says, in this opening scene, that she and her husband lived together for seven years, the information is planted for the audience, who may become puzzled later in the narrative by the time frame of Johan's affair with Veronica Vogler. If, as is stated later, Johan was with Veronica for five years and there was a public scandal, how are we to understand Alma's innocence, her apparent lack of knowledge about Veronica? This is just one of many enigmas that are distributed through the text. Bergman creates a troubling sense that temporal cues are floating free from other elements in the film. Aligned with this is the notion that if we lose our understanding of time, there is a kind of breakdown in reality. Previously, in the nightmare sequence in *Wild Strawberries* with its handleless clock, Bergman experimented with a distorted apprehension of time as signifier of mental confusion and terror.



Figure 6.1 Hour of the Wolf, Svensk Filmindustri, Tartan Video. The story begins with Alma talking directly to the camera

The absence of Alma's husband in this second shot elicits curiosity about his character, based on Alma's description of key elements in his personality: she talks about his preference for silence, his ease with her but no one else, and their arrival at the cottage. The long take is animated by camera movement, which responds to Alma's movement towards the camera. This develops the idea of a dialectical relationship between character and narration, and furthers the idea of the authorial consciousness immersed in the phenomenological reality of the narrative. It is also suggestive of a psychoanalytical relationship, as Alma's speech is like a confession, introducing *an other* (the director and/or the audience), for the first time, to the details of a private trauma. The long take and camera movement give Ullmann's performance a stronger profile. When she pauses reflectively, we experience the *longueur*, and a sense of her focus on an inner world, before she resumes her recollection. Already marked as excessive (the director has all the information already), the direct address is intimate, foregrounds emotion and prompts imaginative questioning. The audience will be struck by her

sense of loss, but also they might wonder about the backstory. How is Alma here to tell the story? Is this Alma or an actress playing Alma?

Alma's ambiguous status, like Monika when she addressed the camera, is a further demonstration of the need to understand consciousness and the external world as coexistent, rather than giving priority to one over the other. Alma's connection to the extra-diegetic, emphasised through direct address, is not used to comment on the meaning of the fictional world, but reminds us again of the way consciousness remains contingent across different situations, and this challenges the viewer to produce meaning. From the Kleinian perspective, the representation of gender is significant. The off-screen controlling male director is offset by the knowledgeable, maternal presence of Alma. The balance between knowledge and authority is revealed as ambiguous, like the divide between fiction and non-fiction. Against this background of uncertain meaning, Alma emerges as a nurturing empathic character, a source of information and understanding.

When Alma talks about her husband, we learn about his inner world. He is an artist carrying an atmosphere of melancholy. This recalls the way in which Kleinian theory can be affiliated with an aesthetic of melancholia, and how object relations theory is part of Klein's attempt to reconstruct the grieving psyche. In what follows we can read Johan's personality into the form and content of the film, but we can also read a kind of diagnosis, a move towards the reparation sought through analysis of object relations. Later in the narrative Johan is tormented in relation to other people. They lose their definition as characters with a separate life and become the bad objects of his psyche, an experience that is captured through a range of expressive film techniques. Meanwhile, Alma is the good object, the nurturing and patient wife. It is not just people who represent Johan's turmoil but also his environment. In fact, people become an element of the environment very explicitly later in the film.

Arrival on the island

Following Alma's introduction, we go back in time to the couple's arrival on the island. The long-take style is maintained through the four shots in this sequence. The direction suddenly has a more external quality, looking on without participation, but it is affiliated with Alma's act of recollection. The intimacy of the previous scene is eclipsed, and there is no dialogue. Alma's conversation in the previous scene contrasts now with Johan's taciturn character. He symbolises,

amongst other things, art's potential concentration on the visual, and in this respect is akin to Mrs Vogler in *Persona*, for whom silence is an existential choice. With the film stripped of noise and dialogue, we observe the action in more detail as the couple arrive by boat. The rocks of the island stand as impressive testimony to the couple's decision to choose this landscape over other people.³⁵ Alma and Johan are left by the boatman, and the shot is held, like the early Lumière film of a boat leaving the shore, while a degree of formal control is demonstrated because the climax of the shot coincides with the boat's disappearance behind the dark mass of a boulder in the foreground. The concentration on the solitary squeak of the wheelbarrow highlights the quietness of the location. There is a naturally strange quality to the situation in that we have been told it is 3 o'clock in the morning, and yet it is completely light in keeping with the Swedish summer, but in contrast to the rest of the film, much of which happens in darkness.

The couple disappear into the cottage and are seen, through the doorway, embracing in silhouette, by the light from a window at the back. The camera distance highlights the mood of aesthetic contemplation, which in Kleinian terms carries the possibility of psychic wholeness.³⁶ Continuity across the episodic structure of the narrative is provided by the motif of light because in the following shot, we find the couple basking in the sunlight, but these are transient moments. In Kleinian theory, the individual forms relationships with part objects, but the striving for greater integration is confronted with numerous obstacles, including the phenomenon of splitting. Nature appears to promise integration, but in Bergman's work we know that it will be difficult for this promise to break through the forces of alienation. When Alma poses for Johan, it is as if at this moment he turns to her for integration. She has an ideal nature for Johan, which must be crushed by his inner demons. His possession of Alma through representation only offers a temporary solace from his psychic turmoil. This arrangement of artist and model carries the promise and idea of integration, but it cannot be sustained and serves male subjectivity.

Alma is objectified because of Johan's precise instructions, and when she bares her shoulders, there is an echo of Monika's provocative appearance on the island. Although we see Alma pose, we never see the drawing, so that the viewer is kept at some distance from the artist's idealisation of the woman. There is another temporal reference as Johan suggests that he wants to draw Alma every day. The sense of time arrested contrasts with the confusion about time that emerges in

the rest of the story. Temporarily we have an idea of the artist finding sanctuary in his work. This is also one of the few moments of intimacy between husband and wife, and one of the only moments in which he shows sexual attraction towards her, a point which is significant in relation to the character of Veronica. She is a kind of femme fatale, but Johan's obsession with her is not just a problem exclusively driven by his desire. In the brief moment of tenderness with Alma and the eroticised encounters with Veronica, we see the hope for Johan that idealisation of the woman may resolve the psychic conflict that torments him. Kleinian theory is distinct on this issue from Freudian orthodoxy because for Klein sexuality is an impulse designed to combat the death drive. Robert Hinshelwood quotes Klein to this effect: "the sexual act serves to restore the mother's injured body and thus to master anxiety and guilt."³⁷ Hinshelwood goes on to say:

The implication is that the person (or ego) is in a position to struggle with their own impulses in a way that is not deterministic. Love is a state to be struggled for, and sex a strategy in that struggle. Eroticisation is not simply a mechanical discharge of libido.³⁸

Johan's idealisation of Veronica represents a split in his consciousness that comes to separate him from Alma, but following the Kleinian emphasis, the process of splitting can be read as the way in which he responds to the death drive.

The emergence of Johan's inner world

The following scene registers a change of mood and a more critical representation of the way in which Johan's self-obsession as an artist excludes his wife. When he returns to the cottage, the image of the obtrusive sheets blowing on the washing line expresses an element of discord in his consciousness, which contrasts with Alma's joy at this return.³⁹ Alma looks bewildered at his mood, and the fade that accompanies the end of the scene, which momentarily leaves her in twilight, registers the film's descent towards darkness. Long take and close-up concentrate attention on Alma's unease as she sits in the lamplight, while Johan restlessly moves around and then reaches across Alma for a bottle of spirits. The emphasis on Alma means that we are made aware of the objects of her consciousness in counterpoint to Johan's account of his internal demons. Johan is the disturbing object, occupying Alma's thoughts, and consequently we can empathise with her unease. Although Johan

does not speak here of the wolf, he makes it clear that the hour before dawn is in some way significant. This shows attention to time itself, but also suggests that uncanny and disturbing reality is located behind the façade of the normality of waking hours.

For Johan, the hour before dawn is filled with horror and coincides with a sense of personal crisis.⁴⁰ His loss of control is related to his identity as an artist. His paintings manifest the unruly content of his mind, which ushers in a more febrile Gothic imagination, unconstrained by taste and decorum. This is the onset of madness and what Livingston and Wood see as the nihilistic alternative to the artistic transcendence of *The Magic Flute*.⁴¹ The refusal of Bergman to identify with one character and one narrational perspective, nevertheless, allows the greater freedom, which Wood acknowledges, and draws on Bergman's empathy with the Gothic imagination, including the influence of horror films. In other words, this is not a self-indulgent endorsement of Johan's Gothic sensibility because the tension between Alma's perspective and Johan's actions already creates a critical distance on his character.

As Johan laments the horror he finds in his own work, these paintings are not presented to the viewer. This absence alludes to the process of projection involved in responding to art. Also, Johan's dialogue blurs the boundary between the work and subject matter, reminding us of Sartre's insistence that imagination is always an attempt to represent something beyond the work of art itself. Johan despairs about the work and its subjects simultaneously, consumed by his feeling that his paintings represent a grotesque world. He offers explanations, regarding one portrait as evocative of Papageno from *The Magic Flute*, but this comparison does not give him joy. Thus, Johan's paintings represent the demons who terrorise him. These are his bad objects, an internalised world in which his desires are destructive, linked by paranoia and fear. His fears produce isolated images without connection, ranging from a fear of birds to a possible fear of homosexuality, an excessive form of splitting in which the representation of negativity multiplies, creating a sense of inward futility.

As the pictures are off-screen, Alma's response is the centre of attention. Afterwards, as Johan speaks, we see her face trained on him, but there is no reverse shot, so that Johan becomes a shadowy figure. Only able to sleep by daylight, he seems to be connecting himself with the monster of the film's title. Johan strikes a match and asks Alma to think about the slowness with which a minute passes. Here, the passing of time is signalled by the sound of the clock ticking and Johan's assertion

that a minute can be like eternity. The sense that he is tortured by this time lag is a reversal of the joy with which he contemplated painting his wife for eternity. Alma also looks into the void and speculates about their love, about the possibility of total union in which identity dissolves. Bergman, like Sartre, is more interested in charting the illusions of love than producing sentimental effects.⁴² Alma's hope for the future is fragile alongside the fragmenting psyche of her husband. While Johan is traumatised by the pictures, which explore the wilder regions of his psyche, Alma knits, looks after the washing and, after he falls asleep during her romantic speech, she helps him to bed. This shows Alma's tenderness for her husband, but in the context of the film as a whole it reinforces how the wife serves the artist, and how his self-obsession creates an oppressive situation.

Alma's discovery of the diary

Alma is also launched on an exploration of Johan's inner world of disturbing objects. The pictures are just the introduction to this type of being/object. The couple will be confronted by a range of characters that appear to live, but then negate life, reverting to an objecthood that mirrors the drive to destruction. The confrontation with these negative forces is accompanied by a concentration on Alma's reactions, conveyed through Ullmann's subtle performance. In the scene which depicts Johan's return to the cottage and the image of the flapping sheets, a key moment involves a shot of Alma's attending to the sound of her husband's approach. The next day we see Alma aware of something off-screen, but without a sound to tell us who or what the arrival is. Continuity is provided across the scenes through a concentration on Alma's perception, as she is confronted suddenly by the incongruous figure of a smartly dressed old woman, who talks in a fluent, premeditated way about Johan. Alma is shocked. Bergman, with his acute awareness of stage entrance as a dramatic moment, makes the woman's appearance suggestive of sinister magic. At first, the woman appears to be merely incongruous on the remote hillside, but when she makes a slip of tongue, referring to herself as 216 years old, this plants a seed for the transition to the supernatural story of vampires later in the film. As if by a malign power, she knows that Alma has just looked at Johan's pictures, and encourages Alma's absorption into Johan's nightmare world, which launches a quest for further knowledge. Here the supernatural emerges as a controlling force in the narrative, as the demonic

old woman asks for Johan's pictures to be preserved and instructs Alma to read Johan's diary.

The reading sequence includes three episodes imagined by Alma, in which other characters suddenly appear before Johan. Between these appearances we see Alma's attention to the text as she discovers her husband's secret life. A montage aesthetic organised around Alma's imagination leaves us with questions about whether these characters are interrelated, how they connect with Johan's state of mind and how they represent external reality. In the first, a man who introduces himself as the baron, walks up to Johan as he is painting and invites the couple to dinner. The baron makes it clear that he and his wife admire the artist's work, a declaration which at least coheres with the narrative of Alma and Johan's arrival on the island. In the second episode, we see Johan on a stony stretch of ground, narrating his distress about work and health. The appearance of Veronica occurs slowly as we see just her legs walking towards Johan, whose face is in close-up, an enigmatic entrance. Tom Milne relates the baron's arrival in the previous shot to the strange arrival of Veronica: 'a car crawling over the horizon, a girl picking her way through the rocks on a sun-bleached beach, look momentarily like weird, threatening insects'.⁴³ Milne's comment captures the imagistic quality facilitated by the montage aesthetic that adds a different dimension to the narrative development. When Veronica starts talking, we are plunged into the middle of a situation which conveys their explicitly sexual relationship. The dialogue reaches beyond what we know, providing fragmentary details of Veronica's fears that antagonistic characters have watched her (or them) and are writing to her in a threatening way. Veronica is a good object for Johan, as her arrival overcomes his anxiety about his work, but the affair also signifies trouble through the references to an external threat and her bruise. The effect of the fragmentation is to provoke an imaginative interpretation from the audience, and this is guided by alignment with Alma's perspective as we return to her, the character who imagines this scene.

Thus, we proceed to the third fragmentary diary entry in which Johan is being pursued by a psychiatrist, Heerbrand. This is another variation on the stage entrance, as the flashback picks up the action in the middle of the scene with Johan and his pursuer striding across the countryside. Johan turns to strike down Heerbrand, annoyed by his psychobabble. Beyond the allusion to a clash of values between art and psychiatry, the sequence has an absurd quality. When the psychiatrist remains on the ground in order to stop his nose bleeding, it is as if Johan has expelled an invader from his consciousness.



Figure 6.2 *Hour of the Wolf*, Svensk Filmindustri, Tartan Video. Johan looks on at Heerbrand after their confrontation

The sequence of the three diary entries compares with the nightmare passage in *Wild Strawberries* because the surreal, and symbolic, episodes convey a hidden side to Johan's past. Like the memory content in *Wild Strawberries*, we are left to assume that what is seen actually happened in the story and is not a figment of the imagination. In both films, imagination of the past has an explicit spectator, but in this case the spectator position is layered because it is not just Johan's memories but also Alma's imaginative recreation of the scenes, and she remains reticent. This creates a more detached and passive point of view, which strengthens the work's focus on character relations rather than ego psychology. This perspective is consistent with both Kleinian innovations in psychoanalysis and the Sartrean focus on intersubjectivity⁴⁴ because it challenges the mastery of the individual ego and provides a tangible sense that neurosis has to be understood in a wider context of social relations.

Johan's confessions to his diary are enigmatic, as we are invited to make associations. Is Johan's lover the wife of the baron? Do the

woman's bruise and the physical attack on the therapist indicate Johan's propensity for violence? The fact that these questions are, at least partly, answered by later narrative developments testifies to Bergman's commitment to an aesthetic of narrative integration, but he is also inspired by singular images and fragmented happenings. These episodes, like curtailed stage entrances, provide a surreal montage, while tension is maintained because Alma herself is mysterious. The minimalism of her expression means that her reaction is not expressed, and in the following scene her energy is transferred into domestic details when she asks Johan to consider her use of the household budget: the cost of a toothbrush, for example. This is a level of reality with which Johan does not wish to engage. So, while the story emerges, based on Johan's private revelations about his past, a confessional mode familiar from Bergman's work, a parallel development involves epistemic ambiguity. We are drawn into questions about each of the central characters and whether the narrative details fit plausibly into a realist aesthetic. The viewer is invited to share knowledge with Alma. From this perspective we can appreciate that Johan's problems are related to the public scandal of his relationship with Veronica and his lack of autonomy in a world in which he depends on the patronage of powerful elites.

At the end of the meal scene, Alma replies that she knows they have been invited to the castle that night. This reveals that she has acquired information from Johan's diary, but a confrontation does not ensue. Instead, the transition to the castle is managed through a mysterious combination of point-of-view shots. After Alma's revelation, she gets up from the table, but Johan gazes intently in the other direction. The following shot shows the baron talking directly to an interlocutor who we can infer is Johan because of the editing pattern. It is revealed immediately, however, that he is talking to both Johan and Alma because the camera moves to indicate the baron's turning his attention from one to the other. We might wonder why there is a formal pattern linking Johan's gaze off-screen, and his implicit point of view in the following shot, a strategy which shows how the film is organised around conceptions of subjectivity. These are sufficiently complex to unsettle any straightforward identification that could be attributed to the relationship between the audience and Johan. Johan's gaze is prominent at this point because we are being drawn into his inner world, but we also become aware of the way Alma is integrated into the position from which the point-of-view perspective is seen. Thus, Alma remains integral to the narrative development, and the first shot at the castle asks the audience to imagine the subjectivity of both Johan and Alma.

An evening at the castle

The subjective camera and a wide-angle lens create a distancing effect as each member of the baron's entourage greets the guests. Further elements add to the unreality. When the baron introduces his wife, there is a jump cut, whilst the rest of the introductions, to his mother, brother Ernst, Lindhorst and Heerbrand, are conveyed through camera movement around the space occupied by the hosts, and through their movement and look towards the camera. These introductions are similar to the earlier stage-like entrances representing Johan's diary entries, but they also create another imaginative dimension. The members of the aristocratic party are like figures in a dream world, objects or fragments that have drifted from their original context, while the subjective camera unites the vision of Alma and Johan. Like the camerawork that showed Alma at the beginning without revealing the director, the diegetic look here is represented but not established with a reverse shot, an effect which conveys an indeterminate, unseen subjectivity immersed in a dreamlike, phenomenal reality. Since point of view is usually related to one character, the unity of this set-up becomes more dreamlike and part of the innovative approach to narration within the film.

The unusual style reinforces the shift in the narrative from the couple's isolation and in particular Johan's melancholic isolation, to a social environment. One effect of the camera work, here, is to show that the hosts are crowding in on their guests.⁴⁵ The representation of Alma and Johan's experience shows how they are psychologically dominated at the dinner table by their hosts. This means that the latter are negative internal objects for the couple. The aristocratic entourage imposes a fragmented discourse on to the consciousness of the guests. This effect is represented through the continuous unpredictable shifts in attention and focus. The combination of elided conversation, circling camera movement and whip pans constructs the feeling that Alma and Johan are overawed and out of place. Amongst this bricolage of elements are static shots, including one of the baron's looking on enigmatically at his guests. The static shots of the couple further develop the idea that they are captives of a situation that overwhelms. In one shot, Johan is shown from the back in darkness. In another, Alma's expression is one of blank bemusement.

Meanwhile, the conversations convey the narcissism of the rich and powerful hosts as they talk about their own medical and financial problems. The fragments of conversation about physical ailment and decline signify a sadistic subtext with gothic undertones. Corinne, the baron's

wife, talks blithely about Veronica, and feigns naivety whilst alluding to Johan's relationship with her. The baron's mother refers to her fangs, another suggestion of the horror already hinted at. When Lindhorst talks about 'hatred in her eyes', it is unclear whether this is a sadistic description of Alma's look as she is forced to respond on the subject of Veronica. The laughter at Lindhorst's remark can be read as reinforcing an enjoyment at the expense of Alma, or alternatively as another enigma playing on our lack of narrative knowledge. At the end of this sequence, the physical movement from Johan, as he drinks a glass of wine and wipes his fingers, with the candles burning in the foreground, isolates his figure in juxtaposition with the group-dominated environment. This nightmarish experience of the party relates to the Kleinian critique of groups, which suggests that they reinforce splitting. As Alford puts it:

If one takes Klein seriously, one will not, however, be terribly optimistic about the emergence of a reparative morality among elite – or any other – groups. Groups tend to remain stuck at the paranoid-schizoid stage.⁴⁶

The group exudes a sense that they form a reality in their own right, but the exclusion of others is conveyed through the experience of Alma and Johan.

Bergman shows himself drawn to the position of outsider, but this role is not a fixed identity and can be occupied temporarily by a couple, an individual or only retained through fleeting moments of imagination. Here, the representation of the oppressive elite is highly expressionistic. Bergman represents only part of the wider economic structure. We are given fragments about this group of characters, which intimates that they are part of a reality that is fading. Like the couple, they are cut off from the mainstream of society. They may have emotional and commercial power, but their dependence is on a privilege that is not explicitly connected with contemporary social organisation, and this means that they possess a quality of unreality. The ghoulish members of the upper class are not just representatives of a subjective madness but also represent a society in which psychic divisions naturally coexist with social and economic inequality. The Kleinian concept of splitting also represents this interplay, between social and subjective alienation, because it unmasks strategies which are used to achieve a false sense of integration. Bergman's style of film-making, in this sequence, repeats the sense of fragmentation conveyed in relation to Johan's psyche,

and Alma's attempt to imagine his diary. This attention to fragmentation parallels the Kleinian argument that splitting is inevitable at the level of the individual and society. Bergman's focus on fragmentation corresponds with the idea that individuals and groups will deny and perpetuate the unreality of this process of splitting.

At the castle, there are key moments that unify Alma and Johan, such as the point at which they kiss on the walk through the castle grounds, but they are also split, and this is focused on in their response to art. The puppet show of *The Magic Flute* captivates the whole crowd, and provides the kind of absorption in a shared experience that was lacking around the dinner table. The puppet show is a microcosm for art, and a personal symbol for Bergman, who grew up playing with his own miniature theatre, and whose love for *The Magic Flute* is well documented, not least through his later film of the opera. As Lindhorst, a keeper of the baron's archives, explains, this opera unifies aesthetic pleasure and disturbing emotions. Lindhorst is suddenly a civilised host who even singles out Alma as 'the guest'. Her viewing of the scene from *The Magic Flute* is highlighted through editing, camera scale and her dreamlike expression, with her empathic response shown in close-up. In contrast, when Johan is called upon to talk about his response, he chooses to present his own philosophy of art, an existential rejection of value, a viewpoint that the hosts enjoy.

Considering the scene as a whole is vital to the understanding of the film. Kinder and Beverle Houston say that Bergman is preoccupied with art's achieving a 'balance' of the conflicting forces facing the artist. These conflicts involve 'a precarious balance between genius and madness, between passion and reason, between spontaneity and control'.⁴⁷ They argue that Mozart's opera is included because it is 'the supreme example' of a work 'that successfully maintains this balance'.⁴⁸ The inclusion of a theatrical performance is used regularly by Bergman (for instance, the theatre troupe performs in *The Seventh Seal*), but as already indicated, *Hour of the Wolf* is particularly self-reflexive in the way in which a performance is incorporated. The choice of scene from *The Magic Flute* returns to the idea of a protagonist's emotional upheaval, isolated in the midst of the night, and the absence of the loved one, suggested by the story of Veronica. Across these ideas the focus on Alma is significant because the achievement of integration shifts from the idealised world of the performance to the experience of spectatorship, which is similarly confronted with the challenge of splitting and the need to achieve meaningful integration. In the dark, Alma's face, which is shown in close-up more frequently than those of the other characters, absorbs the

information as Lindhorst informs the audience about Tamino's anxiety. Tamino yearns for an answer to the question 'does Pamina live?' – and the affirmative reply comes from the chorus. Across this articulation of a happy ending there is consciousness of division as Lindhorst pauses, in his explanation of the play, between the syllables of the word Pamina. Johan's face is shown in a mirroring shot alongside Alma's, with both of them half covered in shadow. The opera is, thus, related to the idea of overcoming division, but the latter persists in the visual presentation of the spectators.

The scene emphasises Lindhorst's role as the controller of the theatre, whilst Alma, and, to a lesser extent, Johan and the others are spectators. This conveys the idea of art as an interaction with both formal control and emotional projection as key components. The understanding of art's dual capacity for manipulation and regeneration is also important as a contrast to Johan's state of mind. When the play ends, Johan speaks of art's irrelevance to the real world. For the crowd of aristocrats, he sounds like a true intellectual. However, Johan's words raise questions: Does he say this simply to please his audience? Is this a mask? Alma thinks he is being inauthentic, excusing his drunkenness as he tussles with the countess, who has scratched him with a rose. Thus, across the whole scene the focus on Alma is not simply to make a comparison with Pamina, but instead to elaborate her position as a spectator and active agent, providing a point of identification for the viewer which is detached from Johan's identity as an artist.

In the baroness' room the couple are invited to look at Johan's portrait of Veronica, and the baroness talks about Johan's relationship with this woman. The feeling of entering a labyrinth of mirrors in which identity loses certainty is expressed through the *mise-en-scène*. We do not see the portrait of Veronica but rather the baroness, reinforcing the pattern of sublimation and transference involved in this text. When Johan turns round to the baroness, she points to her bruise. However, Alma, at the edge of the frame on the left, is reflected in the mirror on the right. Self and image are confused. Johan's desire and violence cast a shadow over his sense of self, while Alma's association with an integration of image and reality is reinforced. Although the film-making reveals a fascination with the surreal and the irrational, overpowering death drive, the narration offers detachment through the representation of Alma.

Since Veronica's portrait is unseen, the dramatic focus switches to the couple. Both are in portrait form, half in shadow. The expressions show incomprehension, but also, in Alma's case fear, which she confirms verbally. Alma's self-expression becomes even more forceful as they travel

home. The long take allows us to see her beseeching face as she protests about the baron's entourage, but this expression is transformed as she gets no response from Johan. A match on action emphasises Alma's move away from him, as her fear intensifies. Johan's passivity and weak attempts to comfort her are not sufficient. The windswept landscape expresses their tumult, and the negativity now associated with his character, is shown more fully as he walks away to the cottage.

Alma's faith in Johan means that she projects hope towards him, but we see how this is contradicted. Violence is an integral part of human nature in the Kleinian scheme, but the transcendence of violence can be achieved through a process involving recognition of negativity and a level of detachment from this experience. This is not a linear process. Although Alma has progressed from seeing demons in her husband's psyche to a more complete sense that he is haunted, she is still bound to him. She listens to his difficulties, which intensifies her understanding of his alienation.

Hour of the Wolf

Marilyn Johns Blackwell criticises the way Alma is represented as passive and transparent, whilst male subjectivity is mysterious. Johns Blackwell argues that the film expresses fears about homosexuality and the female body, and retreats from the radicalism of *Persona*. However, she acknowledges that it does 'avail itself of some disjunctive strategies that contribute to a feminist reading'.⁴⁹ My argument, drawing on the work of others, such as Wood, is that the positive role of Alma works with 'disjunctive strategies' as a means of understanding the artist's isolation in society and his self-obsession. Bergman's decision to reintroduce the title suddenly prior to the next scene reveals his formal innovation and parallels the moment in *Persona* when we are suddenly shown the film reel, a moment that, according to Linda Rugg, represents a breaking of psychic integration.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the moment of fracture in *Hour of the Wolf* relies on a very simple convention and is related to silent cinema. Bergman explains this moment as one in which he tries to wake the audience.⁵¹ Putting these observations together, we can account for this moment as another example of Bergman's project to represent fragmentation, at a general level, alongside the process of splitting represented in the story of Johan. The sequence that follows burrows deeply into Johan's madness.

At the start of this sequence, Alma is passive as they sit in the depths of the night while Johan narrates the story of how he was abusively

punished by his father. The impulse towards the imaginary is doubled here because, as Alma listens, Johan relates how he experienced imagined horror. The threat of an unseen creature in this cupboard is one of Johan's bad objects or demons. The creature in the cupboard evokes the cruelty of the parents, and this theme continues with the violence of the father which follows, as Johan recalls the beating he is given when he leaves the cupboard. The creature in the cupboard is a subliminal product of fear and desire, which is displaced by the violence of reality. Instead of concentrating on the way in which the violence exceeds his understanding, Johan confesses to masochism in the beating. In Sartrean terms he relinquishes his freedom and is masochistically involved in his earlier suffering to the point that this negativity is projected onto the external world.

Johan's story about his imprisonment by his parents in a cupboard was a key autobiographical episode for Bergman. When asked if he ever experienced being beaten as a child Bergman replied, 'How I ever got out alive passes my understanding. In the original script I'd intended to show the whole episode taking place.'⁵² A powerful case can be made that this episode is structured by a real engagement with society in the form of violence within the family. As Maria Bergom-Larsson notes:

It is against this background of harrowing experience and conflicts, conscious and unconscious, that Bergman's confrontation with the bourgeois authoritarian family must be seen. He has experienced it with his nerve-ends, and it does not cease to fascinate and at the same time repel him.⁵³

The incident in the cupboard refers back to Bergman's own experience of punishment as a child. The linking of this story with the immediately following one that Johan tells us of his encounter with a boy, conveys a complex psychological relationship, in which the child lives on as a presence within the adult. Johan needs to find the internalised violence. This erupts in the second story as Johan recounts how he killed a young boy who taunted him whilst he was fishing. Johan becomes the Oedipal tyrant, but the violence is played out through a series of views and objects without words as we watch his encounter with a boy next to the sea, an encounter which shows Johan battering the boy to death. The boy creeps up while Johan stands alone fishing, a drama orchestrated by alienating, discordant music. The absence of dialogue represents this as Johan's subjective experience, and the overexposed look and obtuse angles heighten the alienation. Horror returns because the boy is like a

vampire child and thus connected to the oppressive social world represented in the castle. The viewer is forced again to step outside a naturalistic interpretation. As Kinder and Houston put it:

The boy like the other demons is clearly a projection – a combination of the frightened child in the closet and the demon who threatens to bite off his toes: Johan is both the authoritarian father with the whip and the child receiving the beating.⁵⁴

Alma's comprehension reaches a certain level before it is terminated in the chaos of the material. A curious stasis takes over. We might expect, based on earlier Bergman films, a more concrete response or outcome to the revelation that Johan has murdered a child. The conflict has been articulated in highly dramatic form, but the resolution remains elusive. Suddenly Heerbrand, the curator, another member of the baron's party, knocks at the door and gives Johan the gun, ostensibly to kill wild animals, but effectively allowing Johan to use violence without compunction. Whilst Heerbrand's first appearance in the diary showed Johan's determination to expel the psychiatrist's analysis from his consciousness, now he accepts the latter's invitation to use the gun.

We do not see the results of the shooting but instead the three shots fired by Johan. They are about intention rather than result. Johan's actions usher in a self-determined path in which he follows his own desire. At this point, however, it is not certain that Johan is doomed. As Philip Mosley points out, 'There is still the hope that this mad act might bring him to his senses.'⁵⁵

Freed from his relationship with Alma, Johan's demons take over. Each character promises to be a sign on the way to Veronica, who is now the goal and origin of his desire. In Johan's confrontations with these characters we see more and more fragmentation.

Johan's return to the castle

When Johan meets Baron von Merkens' mother, she entrances him with her foot. She is another representative of Veronica, the idealised woman he pursues but cannot obtain. He is now in a world stripped of empathic emotions, devoid of the pity exhibited by Alma. Next, the baron confesses that he is another lover of Veronica. As unresolved conflicts are put centre-stage, the veneer of civilisation maintained by the aristocracy continues. It is absurd, as the baron suddenly reveals his ability to



Figure 6.3 *Hour of the Wolf*, Svensk Filmindustri, Tartan Video. Johan sees the baron walk up the wall

defy the rules of gravity by walking up the wall and across the ceiling, reinforcing the established association of the aristocracy and vampires. An old woman removes her face and places her eyeball in a glass. Johan's passive acceptance of make-up highlights his loss of identity.

Voyeurism is a key component in this paranoid-schizoid world. According to Hanna Segal, it is also one of the phenomena to which artists are drawn in their engagement with the fractured psyche.⁵⁶ In this sequence it becomes a more prominent theme as the baron promises to be close by, watching Johan with Veronica. When Johan finds Veronica, it appears to be a sublime fulfilment of his desire. She lies on a bed, which looks like a stage, as if her body has been preserved for him. The close camerawork that follows as he touches her skin down to the foot presents an objectification of the female body. Like one of Johan's images, this is a dream only founded on his desire. When Veronica suddenly springs to life, her laughter and savage desire are excessive, breaking through Johan's voyeuristic trance. Her independence is shocking for Johan, and her laughter is echoed in the assembly

who watch, as Johan with his clown-like make-up looks devastated by the public humiliation.

Sartre emphasised, in his theory of imagination, the gulf that can emerge between perception and imagination. We see continual oscillations in Johan's trip to the castle which present variations on this division, most notably in the way Veronica is transformed from corpse to animated laughter, and in the switch from their isolation to the revealed presence of a mocking crowd whose laughter cements Johan's humiliation. In other words, Johan is continually surprised by the phenomena he confronts, as apparently empirical realities are revealed to be deceptive. Johan's desire is apparently just part of a wider plot controlled by others. As he caresses Veronica, we see his possession of her, and as he turns to the crowd, we see that he is possessed by forces outside his influence. This paranoid-schizoid pattern of oscillation contrasts with the concern and empathy offered, elsewhere in the film, by Alma.

Bergman has made it clear that humiliation and shame are key emotional states for him. The scene with Veronica also returns to his fascination with theatrical performance. The fact that only Veronica is presented in this way reminds us of Monika's naked appearance as a key symbolic moment. Without Alma's presence, Bergman's work would be more self-indulgent. In this film she is the key element that retains a link with the presentation of a recognisable social world. She can only speculate on what would have saved her husband and has the role of questioner, which for Bergman, despite his aesthetic opposition to theorising, is a valued activity, a philosophy for everyday life. The abrupt end, with Alma in midsentence, undercuts the idealisation of her character, reinforcing the realism of her discourse, and returns to the opening set-up in which there is an emotional interface between Alma, director and spectator. Bergman's message is made clearer because Alma remains a quiet character, unrealised. Her love for Johan is unconditional. Looking for him in the woods, she found him, but now time and space are fragmented and he cannot be recovered. This landscape is the *mise-en-scène* of Johan's abjection and his loss of freedom with the baron's entourage.

The ambiguity of the conclusion reinforces the connection with philosophical and psychoanalytic discourses. The fact that Johan's downfall is related to his own imagination has been set-up and played out in the focus on his obsessive character. The excesses of his imagination are also the representation of an oppressive social situation in which the artist is defeated by his dependence on a powerful elite. Johan's imagination provides an expressive and distorted representation of the elite

class who haunt him, the alienation of his emotions and the collapse of his marriage. The imaginative excess also reveals childhood terror and the fear of annihilation. In the character of Alma we also find a balance between the values and dangers of imagination. She participates to an extent in Johan's nightmare, but remains moderate and grounded. This can be understood as the result of the focus on male artistic subjectivity. However, Bergman's other work backs up the argument that he does not restrict himself to the imaginative life of his male characters. As this chapter has shown, the character of Alma can also be read as representing the value of empathic imagination and the possibility of linking imagination and reality.

7

Conclusion

Issues and points for further debate

The combination of Kleinian and Sartrean theories expands upon the established idea that Ingmar Bergman's cinema involves a mixture of realism and more symbolic, expressionistic techniques. For both theorists, the imagination plays a central role in consciousness and is a key to understanding the relationship between the individual and society. The application of Kleinian and Sartrean ideas has pointed to issues for further debate. For instance, we have seen how a Sartrean response to the character of Monika may involve condemnation based on her selfish abandonment of Harry and the baby, or a degree of empathy for her rebellion based on its negation of an oppressive social context. In *The Virgin Spring*, ambiguity was a key element in the film's design, notably in the symbolic representation of divine intervention. The argument that this is an image which can be subjected to humanist appropriation, as an aesthetic investment in the ambiguity of the image itself, is clearly open to further discussion given Bergman's changing attitude towards religion. Another point for debate arises because the Kleinian focus on integration is wedded, in my analysis, to an appreciation of the empathic qualities of Alma in *Hour of the Wolf*, a reading which tempers the apparent turn to a more experimental mode signalled by this film and, also, *Persona*.

Kleinian and Sartrean ideas do not provide definitive readings of Bergman's work, but their critical relevance has a specific focus. Kleinian theory puts across the idea that art gains from the artist's confrontation with psychic conflict. On this score Bergman's work has been shown to succeed in a range of films. The analysis of how this conflict is translated into film form and narrative has also drawn on Kleinian ideas

of integration and a synthesis of control and expression in Bergman's handling of the film medium. Sartrean theory has been used to show Bergman's fascination with the imagination, but also his representation of oppression and the possibility of freedom for his protagonists. Both Sartrean and Kleinian ideas work most effectively as an extension of Bergman's intuitive pursuit of psychological and philosophical themes.

We also have to note that the work of Bergman, Melanie Klein and Jean-Paul Sartre involves historical transformation. It has been argued, for instance, in *The New Kleinian Dictionary* that Klein placed more emphasis on the negative qualities of epistemophilia in her early work, and that later, in 1935, she emphasised a more positive value for this instinct, speaking of 'the way the capacity to learn and to work may be hampered by depression and despair about damaged objects'.¹ In other words, she increasingly sees greater integration of this instinct as part of the reparative process. In the case of Sartre, his turn towards Marxism in the 1950s provides a different set of criteria for evaluating fictional characters. This was already apparent in *What Is Literature?*, which argues that artists must engage with social injustice. The ongoing vitality of debate about the concepts of each thinker, including the relationship between their early and later work, testifies to their continued relevance. However, the broader historical perspective of their engagement with social circumstances, outlined in Chapter 1, means that despite significant changes in their work, a degree of convergence can be recognised. Through the discipline of film analysis, general points of convergence have been clarified involving an inclusive aesthetic, which seeks to express conflicts whilst retaining an ideal of autonomy in the imagination. It has been argued that in this respect the Bergman films analysed parallel concerns in Klein and Sartre through the representation of character, development of narrative, the creativity of film form and the way the audience are engaged in imaginative interpretation of the material.

The analysis of key works from Bergman has revealed continuities and discontinuities in style and theme. One of the clearest accounts of film style at a general level is provided by David Bordwell's account of different cinematic modes, including European art cinema. The three films analysed in depth fit with key elements of this mode identified by Bordwell, including the prevalence of ambiguity, alongside the theme of reality and illusion, and an investment in characterisation.²

Both Sartrean and Kleinian perspectives relate to Bergman's preoccupation with internal worlds, represented through character subjectivity and overt authorial narration. At the same time, Kleinian and Sartrean perspectives share Bergman's concern with recognising social reality.

While Sartre and Klein themselves can be criticised for not focusing sufficiently on social reality, it is clear that each theorist seeks to establish a connection between the world of imagination and the social context. For Sartre, this connection is focused initially on recognising a tension between the individual and the external world, which maps onto a tension between the individual and his/her social context. For Klein, the individual has to overcome self-destructive tendencies by progressing through the depressive position. This requires a reorientation to the external world through internalised objects, and consequently her theory points to the obstacle of self-destructive tendencies within the external world. The fact that these theorists express a connection between the individual and social reality, which is often oblique, makes them even more relevant to Bergman because we can recognise that he also includes recognition of social reality as a significant element, despite his forceful emphasis on the world of imagination.

Bergman's comments on his art

In the course of the analysis, I have referred to Bergman's insights into his own work. More general comments made by Bergman in interviews can now be briefly considered to get a measure of how his insights relate to the theoretical perspectives provided by Klein and Sartre. In an interview with Jean Béranger in 1958, Bergman makes it clear that he is still religious, but marks out his divergence from his upbringing by stating that his belief is not connected to the Church and relates his faith to a critique of 'materialism': 'Integral materialism could only lead humanity to an impasse without warmth.'³ In the same interview, Bergman makes clear his aspiration to communicate at a universal level, whilst recognising that his identity is indissolubly linked with Swedish culture: 'An artist cannot express himself fully and thereby succeed in touching the public in other countries except by remaining attached to all the particularities of his native soil'.⁴

At this stage in his career Bergman shared, at a very general level, the humanist opposition of Klein and Sartre to a world dominated by materialism, and the consequent search for value at a universal level.

By 1965, Bergman's pronouncements on art and his own reasons for making art take a more sceptical turn in the form of his acceptance speech for the Erasmus Prize in Amsterdam. Here he turns to the idea that his art originated in his childhood dreaming, which he suggests was characterised by a self-centred rebellion against the external world. 'A contact-seeking child, beset by fantasies, I was quickly transformed

into a hurt, cunning and suspicious day-dreamer.¹⁵ At this point in the speech, Bergman's words echo the distinction between dreaming and art developed in Freudian and Kleinian thought, and he considers how he had to progress from this solipsistic interest to a more social domain. 'The need to get people to listen, to correspond, to live in the warmth of a fellowship, remained.'¹⁶ However, from this Bergman takes a sceptical turn saying, 'Now, to be completely honest, I regard art (and not only the art of cinema) as lacking importance.'¹⁷ He offers the image of a dead snakeskin still moving due to the activity of parasitic ants. Art proliferates, but it is an object deprived of life, like a dead snakeskin and Bergman imagines himself as one of the ants, attached to this skin. However, as with *Hour of the Wolf*, Bergman's negativity masks a more complex position. In his brutal honesty he seeks to recover a sense of art as his destiny, his personal project, removed from the pomp of expressing universal truths. He also obliquely places himself in a changed world in which the dynamic of increasing freedom for artists, through the expansion of the media and technological developments, raises new questions about the artist's place in society. Thus, Bergman articulates a more existential Sartrean sense of intractable individualism, while clinging to the idea that this identity cannot be reduced to a commercial function (of course, he acknowledges his need to make a living). This piece also conveys a hidden potential for imaginative creation beyond the elitist world of his own success: 'There are film-makers who live their films and would never abuse their gift by materializing them in reality.'¹⁸

Aware that he is treading a thin line in self-justification, Bergman concludes by claiming that ultimately the benefit of being 'an artist for one's own sake' is that this places him (Bergman) 'on an equal footing with every other creature who also exists solely for his own sake'.⁹ This rhetoric may seem like a dismal retreat from his earlier ambition of expressing a universal message and themes through imaginative representations of his own culture and psyche, until one recognises that Bergman's position shares characteristics with the revision of humanism in other strands of modernist theory. Arguably this idea links with Sartre's attempt to reformulate his philosophy as a democratic ethics in *Existentialism Is a Humanism*, and his search to link individuals by virtue of their shared experience of isolation and confrontation with meaninglessness. This sentiment was located in the representation of the boy in *The Virgin Spring*, but also in the concern with isolated characters across his films. If Bergman does not go as far as Sartre's programmatic rhetoric of inclusion, it is because Bergman also hints at the therapeutic value of art for himself, so that through art he coexists with his internal world.

'I revolve with the objects I have captured for myself and am cheerfully or melancholically occupied.' There is a recognition that others (the audience) cannot be coerced into this process, but that the artist is still connected, part of 'a fairly large brotherhood who exist ... in selfish fellowship'.¹⁰

This speech is rather like a performance, an extension of Bergman's persona as a showman. A more measured perspective emerges from *Bergman on Bergman*, the most extensive interviews given by the director. Asked by Stig Björkman, whether he felt 'solidarity with the social, cultural, and philosophical currents of the mid-forties?', Bergman agrees. He goes on to say, 'Then came existentialism – Sartre and Camus. Above all Sartre. Camus came later, with a sort of refined existentialism.'¹¹ Bergman does not expand much on this, acknowledging later that he was far from being well read in existential philosophy, but the idea that existentialism expressed a position with which he could identify can be read into his commentary in this set of interviews. As I noted earlier, it is in these interviews that Bergman compares his final rejection of religion to Sartre's experience. However, Bergman fashions his affiliation with existentialism according to his own concerns. He is insistent on his detachment from politics, at least during the first half of his career, and his ongoing preoccupations with religion. He pushes any sympathy with existentialism away from political engagement by proclaiming his hostility to any concept of ideology, and puts this in the present tense. When Björkman says, 'You give an account of your experience of the world. But you don't make films programmatically?', Bergman responds, 'No, never tied to an ideology. I can't. For me nothing of that sort exists.'¹² However this position seems to be slightly modified in a later interview: 'I've stated firmly and clearly, that though as an artist I'm not politically involved, I obviously am an expression of the society I live in. Anything else would be grotesque.'¹³

Whilst comments on Sartre are fleeting, references to psychoanalysis are minimal and references to Klein are non-existent. However, we have seen how *Wild Strawberries* overtly courted a process of engagement with past emotions and the unconscious through the character of Isak, and how Klein's concepts apply to Bergman's films at different points in his career. Without taking on board the concepts of particular psychoanalysts, Bergman's reflections on his work suggest that he recognises a connection. In an interview with Björkman and Olivier Assayas in 2006, Bergman suggests that his initial writing involved a feeling that it was a pleasurable and therapeutic activity. Bergman refers to a period in 1941 when he was allowed to suspend his military service and stayed at the

house of his grandmother.¹⁴ Here he found peace through writing. He mentions that his mother was also living there, which contributes to the idea of a creative element in his relationship to his mother, and he goes on to say he felt that in the writing he could escape from the tensions of the war. About the writing he says, “it was a completely new feeling that I had not experienced before, this business of just sitting down and writing in longhand and seeing the words emerge. I liked it a lot... It was just an enormous... comfort... Something opened up for me”.¹⁵ As Steene remarks:

Bergman’s statement points to the therapeutic function that the creative act would come to have for him. The transformation of a subjective world into artistic form, be it as a play, a script, a piece for television, or a novel, was to become a continuing form of psychological purgation, without which he says he probably would have gone mad.¹⁶

One interpretation of Bergman’s representation of emotional reality in his film-making career is that, despite his focus on characters’ feelings, he remains detached. We saw an apparent example of this in *Hour of the Wolf*, in which the idea of a detached creator controlling his characters and their emotions was alluded to in the puppet performance of *The Magic Flute*. In an interview, Bergman acknowledges his own actions in manipulating characters and audience. However, as we have seen, there is a complex interplay between the representation of characters’ emotions and more detached representation. We saw how, for instance, *Hour of the Wolf* is focused primarily on psychic conflict in the experience of Johan and Alma. Bergman comes closer to expressing an affiliation with psychoanalysis when he focuses on emotion and the idea of emotional structures permeating social relationships. This emerges clearly when he discusses humiliation. Like Klein, he demonstrates here awareness of a repetitive pattern in which destructive impulses are perpetuated at an unconscious level across society.

Generally, Bergman is most comfortable talking about his films as a creative process. In interviews, a repeated question has concerned his feelings about cinema and theatre. Implicit in the application of Kleinian and Sartrean ideas is the notion that the distinction between art forms is at some level transcended in favour of a focus on imagination itself. At the same time it has to be acknowledged that detailed analysis of Bergman films required specific attention to film form. Bergman himself produces different answers at different times on the relationship between

cinema and theatre and his preferences. The conclusion I draw is that a philosophy of imagination gains in insight by avoiding too much reduction to the specific art form in question. More conclusively, it is clear that Bergman's films involve a creative combination of different film styles, ranging from the silent era to his more disjunctive style in *Hour of the Wolf*, and this extends to a creative combination of theatrical and filmic devices, including in particular his brilliant use of close-ups and lighting. All of this refers us to the importance of his working relationships with key members of his film crew, such as the cinematographers Gunnar Fischer and Sven Nykvist.

The creative link between Bergman's film and theatre work is most apparent in his focus on acting. Bergman suggests that on both the stage and the film set he seeks to position the actor so that 'they feel they are at their best'.¹⁷ What Bergman appears to be expressing here is the cultivation of the actor's image of himself/herself. And this takes place in an intimate working relationship with Bergman, who says that he 'must always function as a kind of radar' using his 'intuition' to focus on the actor's feelings.¹⁸ Bergman conveys in this interview that both film and theatre must cultivate the imagination of the audience. He elaborates this in relation to *Persona*. In this film, the nurse Alma recounts to her patient Elisabet Vogler, an actress who has withdrawn from all conversation, a shocking story of her participation in an orgy. Bergman explains that he chose only to show Vogler's reaction:

the only thing we see, practically the entire time, is the face of Liv Ullmann (in the role of the actress, Elisabet Vogler), who eats the scene. She eats with her lips what she is being told – and it is a very erotic scene. If you had tried to re-create the scene with the two boys and the two girls, it would have been merely disgusting. Now, it's very erotic. It's strange, isn't it.¹⁹

Bergman in effect suggests that he can achieve chemistry with his actors and his audience through emphasis on the emotions and images that are not self-evidently contained in perception.

There are examples in which Bergman's interview material has been considered more directly significant from a psychotherapeutic perspective. The psychotherapist Ira Progoff published an article, in a 1968 edited collection of essays, which drew its key ideas from a television interview with Bergman. Progoff's approach is Jungian, but shares certain concerns with Kleinian and Freudian thought, as well as Sartre's account of the imagination. Progoff attaches great importance to the

way Bergman conceives of his pictures as 'dreams'. This suggests to Progoff that Bergman 'intuitively grasps the symbolic dimension of dream imagery'. He is interested that Bergman feels that "The dream is never intellectual" ... "But when you have dreamt, it can start your intellect... It can give you a new way of thinking, or feeling" ...²⁰ Progoff's account of the interview draws attention to the way in which Bergman makes creative use of his own 'demons' and seeks to 'integrate' such material. Although Progoff's emphasis is clearly Jungian, in his idea that Bergman references a 'symbolic dimension {which} is an all pervasive, universal ground of transpersonal meaning',²¹ there is a proximity to Klein in the thought that Bergman's demons are within him – and that art provides a means of release. Bergman is quoted as saying, "I always have been interested in those voices inside you." {...} "I think everybody hears those voices and those forces." "And I have wanted to put them in 'reality', to put them on the table."²² As Progoff notes, Bergman says that his aim is to "treat the inner demons not as though they were unreal imaginings but to treat them as facts, and therefore to relate to them in a serious way."²³

Concluding points

Thus, Bergman's interviews provide some material which suggests the relevance of Sartrean and Kleinian ideas to his work. However, these theories were not introduced merely to clarify the intention of the artist. Instead, the motivation in exploring convergence, and points of difference, between Bergman, Klein and Sartre is that this allows a dialogue across disciplines and specialist fields of knowledge which may exceed the director's self-analysis. In particular, it suggests that Bergman's work is more than an aesthetic achievement. Taking on board Sartrean ideas, we can see how Bergman provides challenging representations of social reality through his portrayal of the tension between individual subjectivity and social forces. By looking at films from different periods of his career, variations on this project have been made clear. In *Summer with Monika*, the film is driven by the tension between the young lovers as dreamers and their alienation in society. In *The Virgin Spring*, the division between subjectivity and social context is represented through a range of characters. Centrally we have Töre's dialogue with a hidden God, accompanying his brutal revenge of his daughter, but the subjectivity of the female characters is equally significant, including the juxtaposition of Ingeri's imaginative search for the infliction of malice against Karin, and the real source of the crime in the form of the goat herders' instinctive

attack. Finally, we have seen how, in *Hour of the Wolf* Johan's downfall results from his own demons and, at the same time, is an allegory of an oppressive social arrangement, in which the artist is fatally dependent on a cannibalistic aristocracy. In all three films the isolation of the individual is articulated through access to his/her imagination, which hints at solipsism, but decisively marks the inevitability of a social horizon that must be confronted.

Drawing on Kleinian ideas, we have seen how the idea of imaginative struggle for reparation is applicable to Harry at the end of *Summer with Monika*. While some reconciliation with social reality is achieved through this conclusion, Monika remains enigmatically an image which represents the deeper reality of his romance with her and their split from society. Monika's disappearance conveys the failure of reparation, and thus Bergman reminds the audience of the difficulties in a transition to this resolution. The tension between feelings of persecution and guilt are vividly demonstrated through the character of Töre in *The Virgin Spring*, but also in the transition made by Ingeri and the youngest goatherd. These examples remind us of the path of reparation described by Klein and the difficulties in overcoming 'the death drive' in all its forms. In *Hour of the Wolf* Johan, like Monika, represents a failure to achieve reparation, but empathy is projected through the narration of Alma. Thus, characters in these films play out themes and issues, which connect with Kleinian concepts.

In works from Sartre and Klein, I pointed to an emphasis on the relationship between the real and the imaginary. For both theorists, a sense of reality played a vital role in tempering the excesses of imagination. The dialectic between the real and the imaginary was noted at various levels in the three films which were analysed in depth. This included noting the way in which Harry and Monika's dreamy escape from society fails; Karin's tragic discovery of the real intent of the goatherds in the context of her idealistic pilgrimage; and Alma's role mediating between Johan's nightmare world and a more plausible sense of reality in her account of how the couple arrived on the island.

Drawing on the example of *The Seventh Seal* in Chapter 3, it was shown that Bergman mastered a polyphonic style representing interlocking but disjunctive character trajectories. In the films analysed, we can see that there is the suggestion of a developing pattern in the characterisation, from a focus on the couple to a more disparate engagement with a greater range of characters. With *Summer with Monika*, I noted the focus on the subjectivity of the two protagonists. *Wild Strawberries* and *The Seventh Seal* showed that, despite the concern with an individual protagonist

and his inner world, Bergman also explored a flow between and across different subjectivities. In *Wild Strawberries*, this is organised around the focal point of Isak's consciousness, but the narrative trajectory involved the evolution of his thoughts and feelings about others to a more socialised state. In *The Seventh Seal*, Bergman focused on the consciousness of the knight, but also the enigmatic conclusion of the film involved reference to different character perspectives, including those of Jof and his wife, Mia. Looking at *The Virgin Spring*, I suggested that a comparable range of characters gives rise to a stronger sense of dispersed subjectivities, including the brutal mindset of the elder goatherds, and the anguish of Töre, Ingeri and the younger goatherd. In *Hour of the Wolf*, a return to a focus on the couple, Alma and Johan, with concentration on the latter's mental complexity was considered. It was shown that an even stronger sense of split subjectivities resulted in a diminution of coherence in the diegesis. Despite this pattern moving from concentration on the couple to a more pluralistic conception and finally a sense of disintegration, the idea of a linear development in Bergman's organisation of his characters should be treated with some caution. Other work on Bergman has explored the idea of different patterns across his work.

For example, at the beginning of Chapter 3, I noted Birgitta Steene's categorisation of Bergman's work. However, Steene does not seek to impose these as rigid categories, and her organisation allows perceptive observations of contrast between the categories. Thus, she notes that in *The Seventh Seal*, the juggler Jof is 'a naïve visionary' who suffers abuse from the crowd; whereas, in the films headed 'Exploring the Role of the Artist and/or Directorial Persona', there is a more acute development of the idea that the artist is a figure to be persecuted and, as in *Hour of the Wolf*, this can culminate in the artist's destruction.²⁴ It is also worth noting here that in this category Steene includes such early films as *To Joy*, made in 1949, which focuses on a classical music composer, and *The Naked Night*, made in 1953, which focuses on a circus troupe. In fact, Steene's grouping of films concerned with the identity of the artist is the most diverse category in terms of the historical dates of the Bergman productions.

A brief survey across all of Steene's categories reveals that one of Bergman's repeated strategies is to use artists as characters. For example, in addition to the early films included, we can point to the role of the blind composer in *Music in Darkness*, and the ballerina in *Summer Interlude*. This is not to disagree that both of these works focus on the young couple, as classified by Steene, but it does reinforce the idea of Bergman's determination to represent creativity through his characters.

At a general level, detached from a close analysis of film style, Bergman's use of creative/artistic figures provides an impression of the role he assigns to imagination across his career. We find that Bergman retains a fundamental need to give imagination an active presence in the diegetic world. However, this is not a transparent and uniform attempt to find a vehicle for his own beliefs but rather part of a more complex process such that the audience are presented with creativity in many forms. This disparate use of the artist/creator as character means that throughout Bergman's work there are suggestions of a relationship between creativity and social reality. Furthermore, there is great variation in this pattern. We have seen how the role of the artist may be represented through more minor characters including, for instance, the storyteller in *The Virgin Spring*. We have also seen that the role of the one who imagines or dreams is not reserved exclusively for the artist, but ranges from the religious anxieties of the knight in *The Seventh Seal* and the introspection of a retired doctor in *Wild Strawberries*, to the pagan beliefs of Ingeri in *The Virgin Spring*.

Connected to Bergman's continued use of characters involved in the act of imagining, I have explored the way his films convey a mixture of realism and more expressionistic and symbolic techniques. In the close analysis of Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the theme of reality recognition was evident in the way excursions into a more imaginative register, principally through the representations of character subjectivity, are ultimately in all three films framed by a return to a more 'realistic' mode. However, this was achieved with a distinct level of ambiguity. In *Summer with Monika*, we end with Harry's subjective image of Monika, but this is a memory juxtaposed to his presence as a father holding his baby. In *The Virgin Spring*, the miracle of the water manifests a metaphysical intervention, but is restricted to a naturalistic image. In *Hour of the Wolf*, Johan's disappearance is enigmatic, but Alma's narration provides at least some explanation. As Bordwell makes clear, ambiguity is highly valued in the art cinema, and this is consistently apparent in Bergman's work. The appreciation of this through Kleinian and Sartrean perspectives reveals that this is not just about Bergman's creativity with film form but also is relevant to psychoanalysis and philosophy. The imagination consistently plays a role in Bergman's work representing the internal conflicts of the psyche, the possibility of creative freedom and the continuing relationship between the individual and his/her reality.

Notes

1 The Imagination: Bergman, Klein and Sartre

1. Proffoff, I. 'Waking Dream and Living Myth', quoting Bergman from Radio TV Reports in Campbell, J. (ed.) (1990) *Myths, Dreams and Religion*, Dallas, TX: Spring Publications (originally published in 1970 by E.P. Dutton), p. 186.
2. Strindberg, A. *Author's Note for A Dream Play*, quoted in *Fanny and Alexander*.
3. Johns Blackwell, M. (1997) *Gender and Representation in the Films of Ingmar Bergman*, Columbia, SC: Camden House. In the conclusion, 'Genderness and the Imagination', pp. 197–217, Johns Blackwell argues that Bergman's films after *Wild Strawberries* demonstrate the 'redemptive power of imagination' with varying success, and she suggests that in this period Bergman frequently equates imagination with female experience.
4. Bergman, I. (1988) *The Magic Lantern: An Autobiography*, translated from the Swedish by Joan Tate, London: Hamish Hamilton (originally published in 1987), p. 61.
5. Koskinen, M. (ed.) (2008) *Ingmar Bergman Revisited: Performance, Cinema and the Arts*, Great Britain, London: Wallflower Press.
6. Wood, R. (1969) *Ingmar Bergman*, London: Studio Vista; Gado, F. (1986) *The Passion of Ingmar Bergman*, Durham: Duke University Press.
7. Steene and Kalin will be discussed as part of Chapter 3.
8. Godard, J-L. (1958) 'Bergmanorama', published in *Cahiers du Cinéma* (July 1958). Material is quoted from this original, but another version of this article is available at: http://www.bergmanorama.webs.com/godard_july58.htm.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
15. Cowie, P. (2004) *Revolution! The Explosion of World Cinema*, London: Faber and Faber, p. 7.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 9 (emphasis is in the original).
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, p. 240, Cowie quotes Bergman, from *Positif*, Paris, July-August 2002, and Fellini from *Fellini on Fellini*. The latter refers to Bergman as a "showman" and makes clear his appreciation of Bergman's work.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
20. *Ibid.*, p. xii.
21. Braudy, L. and Cohen, M. (eds.) (1999) *Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings*, New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, Fifth edition. This

- edition includes Bordwell, D. 'The Art Cinema as a Mode of Film Practice', pp. 716–724 (originally published in *Film Comment*, Volume 4, no. 1, Fall, 1979).
22. Cowie includes here Bergman's *Persona*, *Shame*, *The Virgin Spring* and *The Silence* as films which incorporate a challenging representation of contemporary culture. Cowie, op. cit., p. 153.
 23. The first article is Elsaesser, T. (1994) 'Putting on a Show: The European Art Movie', *Sight and Sound*, April 1994, pp. 22–27; and the second version is 'Ingmar Bergman – Person and PERSONA: The Mountain of Modern Cinema on the Road to Morocco (1994)', in Elsaesser, T. (2005) *European Cinema Face to Face with Hollywood*, Amsterdam; Amsterdam University Press, pp. 134–153.
 24. Elsaesser, op. cit., *European Cinema Face to Face with Hollywood*, p. 148.
 25. Ibid., pp. 146–147.
 26. Ibid., p. 147.
 27. Elsaesser, *European Cinema Face to Face with Hollywood*, op. cit., p. 140.
 28. Ibid.
 29. Ibid., p. 141.
 30. Ibid., p. 152.
 31. Björkman, S., Manns, T. and Sims, J. (1973) *Bergman on Bergman*, English translation by Paul Britten Austin, New York: Simon and Schuster (originally published in Sweden in 1970), p. 211.
 32. Kristeva, J. (2001) *Melanie Klein*, translated by Ross Guberman, New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press. Kristeva, J. (2001), p. 14.
 33. Ibid., p. 16.
 34. Bott Spillius, E., Milton, J., Garvey, P., Couve, C. and Steiner, D. (2011) *The New Dictionary of Kleinian Thought*, Hove; New York: Routledge, p. 3.
 35. Ibid., p. 5.
 36. Sayers, J. (2000) *The Kleinians: Psychoanalysis Inside Out*, Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity Press, p. 9.
 37. Ibid., pp. 9–10.
 38. Ibid., p. 11.
 39. Ibid., p. 13.
 40. Ibid., p. 19.
 41. Ibid.
 42. Ibid., p. 17.
 43. Ibid.
 44. Klein, M (1946) 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms', in Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works*, op. cit., pp. 1–24; p. 4.
 45. Bott Spillius et al., (ed.), op. cit., p. 63.
 46. Ibid., p. 84.
 47. Sayers, op. cit., p. 25.
 48. Macey, D. (2000) *The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory*, London: Penguin, pp. 213–215. Macey describes Lacan's objection to Klein's reductionism, p. 214.
 49. Kristeva explains how Lacan was sympathetic to key Kleinian ideas but also how he criticised her work. For instance, he spoke of the 'utter brutality' of her concepts as well as the 'failure to acknowledge the paternal function or to create a theory of the subject'. Kristeva, op. cit., p. 229.

50. Lionel Bailly, for instance, criticises Klein from a Lacanian perspective for being too concerned that an integrated ego was the goal of therapy. Bailly, L. (1998) *Lacan: A Beginner's Guide*, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, pp. 180–181.
51. For instance, Rose, J. (1993) *Why War? – Psychoanalysis, Politics, and the Return to Melanie Klein*, Oxford: Blackwell.
52. Kristeva, op. cit., pp. 215–216.
53. Sartre's work on Flaubert was an enormous psycho-literary study entitled *The Family Idiot* (1971–1972).
54. Sartre, J-P. (1967) *Words*, translated by Irene Clephane, London: Penguin (originally published in France in 1964), p. 34.
55. Sartre describes his early reading and daydreaming, pp. 45–49.
56. Drake, op. cit., p. 14.
57. Drake, op. cit., p. 20.
58. Sartre, J-P. (2004) *The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination*, revisions and Historical Introduction by Arlette Elkaim-Sartre, translated with a philosophical introduction by Jonathan Webber, London: Routledge (originally published in France in 1940).
59. Drake, op. cit., p. 33.
60. Sartre, J-P. (2004) *The Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description*, translated by Andrew Brown, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge 2004; first published in France in 1937.
61. In Part 1 of *Being and Nothingness* Sartre demonstrates his challenge to common sense with his account of the 'nothingness' that is dialectically entwined with Being. He shows his debt to Hegel in placing negation at the centre of his metaphysics, but also draws on the existentialism of Kierkegaard to represent the significance of anguish. Only after he has discussed the problem of bad faith does Sartre turn in Part 3 to a systematic definition of the concept of the 'for-itself'. In Part 2 Sartre develops his explanation of how these concepts fit into his philosophy. Sartre, J-P. (1953) *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, translated by Hazel Barnes, Philosophical Library, New York (originally published in France in 1943).
62. A Hegelian dialectical interpretation of Klein's work suggests a link with Sartre's Hegelianism. The Hegelian account of Klein is explored by Jon Mills in 'Hegel on Projective Identification: Implications for Klein, Bion and Beyond', in Mills, J. (ed.) (2006) *Other Banalities, Melanie Klein Revisited*, Hove; New York: Routledge.
63. Drake, op. cit., pp. 49–50.
64. For instance, as Drake puts it: 'In order to get *The Flies* past the German censors Sartre turned to Greek mythology'. Drake op. cit., p. 54.
65. Drake, op. cit., p. 45; quotation from Sartre, *Carnets*, p. 244; in English, Sartre, J-P. (1984) *War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phoney War 1939–40*, translated by Quentin Hoare, London: Verso.
66. Mészáros, I. (1979) *The Work of Sartre, Volume 1, Search for Freedom*, Brighton: The Harvester Press, p. 81.
67. This is discussed by Mészáros with reference to the concept of the 'singular universal' in Sartre's later work. This is a concept which seeks to retain an emphasis on lived experience, whilst taking account of historical determinations, pp. 85–87.

68. Ibid., p. 251, endnote for p. 79; quotation from Sartre, 'Itinerary of a Thought', *New Left Review* (1969), November–December 1969, p. 53.
69. Ibid., p. 73, quotation from Sartre, 'Itinerary of a Thought', op. cit., p. 51.
70. Koskinen, M. (2007) *Ingmar Bergman*, The Swedish Institute, first published 1993, p. 6.
71. Bergman, op. cit. p. 8.
72. Bergman, I. (1995) *Images: My Life in Film*, translated by Marianne Ruuth, London: Faber and Faber, p. 38–41. Bergman quotes from his own work, *The Magic Lantern*, op. cit.
73. Björkman et al. (eds.), op. cit., p. 219.
74. Young, V. (1971) *Cinema Borealis, Ingmar Bergman and the Swedish Ethos*, New York: Avon Books, p. 8.
75. Bergman (1988), op. cit., p. 124.
76. Ibid.
77. Johns Blackwell refers to Bergman's biographical account of his childhood to show that he 'learned early to equate the familial, social, and religious hierarchies of which he perceived himself as a victim'. Johns Blackwell, op cit., p. 1.
78. For this observation Johns Blackwell references a lecture by Mark Sandberg, 'Motherhood and Modernism in Early Swedish Cinema: Victor Sjöström's Ingeborg Holm' (lecture given at Ohio State University, 1992), p. 67.
79. Young, op. cit., p. 10.
80. Ibid.
81. Hedling, E. 'The Welfare State Depicted: Post-Utopian Landscapes in Bergman's Films', in Koskinen (ed.) *Ingmar Bergman Revisited: Performance, Cinema and the Arts*, op. cit., 2008, pp. 180–193.
82. Koskinen, *Ingmar Bergman*, op. cit., 2007, p. 6.
83. Koskinen, 'The Typically Swedish in Ingmar Bergman', *Chaplin* 1984, pp. 5–11; p. 10.
84. Ibid.
85. Steene, B. (2005). *Ingmar Bergman: A Reference Guide*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Steene presents this as one objective for this book, p. 12.
86. Sánchez-Pardo, E. (2003) *Cultures of the Death Drive: Melanie Klein and Modernist Melancholia*, Durham; London: Duke University Press, p. 215.
87. Gado and Rustin are returned to regularly for different points in the thesis.
88. Parker, I. (1997) *Psychoanalytic Culture: Psychoanalytic Discourse in Western Society*, London: Sage, p. 95.
89. Kristeva, op. cit., p. 232.
90. Ibid., p. 15.
91. Jameson's response to Sartre is referred to by Jay in Jay, M. (1984) *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 359. Jay quotes Jameson's words that the revolutionary developments of May '68 in France were 'a "corroboration of Sartre's theory"', Jameson (1971), *Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature*, p. 272.
92. Bergman describes how making the commercials was an economic necessity for him. Björkman et al. (eds.), op. cit., p. 54.
93. In relation to *Smiles of a Summer Night*, Bergman states, 'the situation was simply that I needed another success'. Ibid., p. 99.

94. Bergman describes how his success at Cannes with *Smiles of a Summer Night* made his studio receptive to the script for *The Seventh Seal*, *ibid.*, pp. 102–103.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 229.
96. Donner, J. (1964) *The Personal Vision of Ingmar Bergman*, translated by Holger Lundbergh, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, (originally published in Sweden in 1962), p. 232.
97. Rustin, M. 'Lacan, Klein and Politics: The Positive and Negative in Psychoanalytic Thought', in Elliott, A. and Frosh, S. (eds.) (1995) *Psychoanalysis in Context: Paths between Theory and Modern Culture*, London: Routledge, pp. 223–245; p. 224.
98. Jameson, F. (1991) *Post-Modernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, London: Verso.
99. Merquior, J. G. (1986) *From Prague to Paris, A Critique of Structuralist and Post-Structuralist Thought*, London; New York: Verso.
100. Elliot and Frosh, *op. cit.*, p. 223.
101. Hayward, 'Imaginary/Symbolic', in Hayward, S. (2002), *Cinema Studies, The Key Concepts*, London; New York: Routledge (originally published 2000), pp. 196–200.
102. Mulvey, L. (1975) 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', *Screen*, Vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 6–18.
103. Lacan, J. 'The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience', from *Ecrits: A Selection*, translated by Alan Sheridan, 1977 (originally an address at the 16th International Congress of Psychoanalysis, Zurich, 17 July 1949), reprinted in Kearney, R. and Rainwater, M. (eds.) (1996), *The Continental Philosophy Reader*, Routledge, p. 331. The date of the original address is explained on p. 330, Kearney and Rainwater (eds.) (emphasis is in the original).
104. *Ibid.*, p. 332 (emphasis is in the original).
105. *Ibid.*, p. 334 (emphasis is in the original (brackets added)).
106. *Ibid.*
107. Nowell Smith suggests that semiotics could not account for how audiences create meaning, and thus Lacanian psychoanalysis was turned to for a theory of subject formation. 'How Films Mean, or, from Aesthetics to Semiotics and Half-Way Back Again', in Gledhill, C. and Williams, L. (eds.) (2000) *Reinventing Film Studies*, London: Arnold, pp. 8–17.
108. Marwick, A. (1998) *The Sixties; Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy and the United States, 1958–1974*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 295 (emphasis is in the original).
109. *Ibid.*
110. *Ibid.*
111. *Ibid.*, p. 301.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 290 (emphasis is in the original).
114. Merquior, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–6.
115. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
116. *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26 (emphasis is in the original).
117. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
118. Mészáros, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

2 From Freud to Klein, and *Wild Strawberries*

1. Klein's notes on *Citizen Kane* describe the eponymous character's narcissistic personality and the manic way he attempts to stave off loss and melancholia through internal objects. The latter involves his accumulation of possessions, amongst which are the sled, and his wife, whom he manipulates. Laura Mulvey introduces these notes commenting on how the film demands 'a psychoanalytic imagination' and how Klein provides this: Stonebridge, L. and Phillips, J. (eds.) (1998), *Reading Melanie Klein*, London: Routledge, pp. 245–254.
2. Riviere, J. 'The Unconscious Phantasy of an Inner World Reflected in Examples From Literature', in Klein, M., Heimann, P. and Money-Kyrle, R. E. (eds.) (1977) *New Directions in Psycho-Analysis: The Significance of Infant Conflict in the Pattern of Adult Behaviour*, London: Tavistock, first published in 1955 by H. Karnac (Books), pp. 346–369; p. 348.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 349.
4. Klein, M. (1923) 'Early Analysis', in Klein, M. (1998) *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945*, London: Vintage (originally published in 1975 by The Hogarth Press), pp. 77–105; p. 86.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
7. Klein, M. (1929) 'Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in The Creative Impulse', in Klein, *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945*, op. cit., pp. 210–218.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 211–214.
9. Klein, M. (1957) 'Envy and Gratitude', in Klein, M. (1997), *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963*, London: Vintage (originally published in 1975 by The Hogarth Press), pp. 176–235; pp. 190–191.
10. Alford, C. F. 'Kleinian Theory Is Natural Law Theory', in Mills, J. (ed.) (2006) *Other Banalities, Melanie Klein Revisited*, Hove, New York: Routledge, pp. 217–245; p. 222.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 223.
12. Riviere, J. 'The Unconscious Phantasy of an Inner World Reflected in Examples From Literature', in Klein, Heimann, Money-Kyrle (eds.), op. cit., p. 357.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Likierman, M. (2001) *Melanie Klein: Her Work in Context*, London: Continuum, p. 76.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
17. *Ibid.* p. 78.
18. Freud, S. (2005) *On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia*, translated by Shaun Whiteside, (essays first published from 1913 to 1933), London: Penguin, pp. 201–218.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
21. Klein, M. (1940) 'Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States', in Klein, *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945*, op. cit., pp. 344–369; p. 344.

22. Rustin, M. 'Klein on Human Nature', in Mills, J. (ed.) (2006) *Other Banalities, Melanie Klein Revisited*, op. cit., pp. 25–44; p. 34.
23. Bott Spillius, E., Milton, J., Garvey, P., Couve, C. and Steiner, D. (2011) *The New Dictionary of Kleinian Thought*, Hove; New York: Routledge, p. 408.
24. Klein, in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works*, op. cit., p. 363.
25. Klein, M. (1946) 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms' in Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963*, op. cit., pp. 1–24; p. 1.
26. Ibid., p. 2.
27. As Rustin points out, 'Richard Wollheim, the leading philosophical advocate of psychoanalysis in Britain in recent years, defended psychoanalysis for its affinities with the psychological understandings embedded in everyday language', in Mills (ed.), op. cit., p. 41, n16. Rustin references Wollheim, R. (1994), 'Desire, Belief and Dr Grunbaum's Freud', in *The Mind and Its Depths*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
28. *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works*, op.cit., pp. 176–235.
29. Ibid., p. 181.
30. Segal, H. (1979) *Klein*, [S.I.]: Harvester Press, p. 140.
31. Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963*, op. cit., p. 182.
32. Ibid.
33. Segal, *Klein*, op. cit., p. 141.
34. Ibid., p. 43.
35. All of these writers have essays collected in Klein, Heimann, Money-Kyrle (eds.), *New Directions in Psycho-Analysis*, op. cit.
36. Klein, *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945*, op. cit., p. 215.
37. Ibid., p. 217.
38. Segal, H. 'Art and the Depressive Position', in Segal, H. (1991) *Dream, Phantasy and Art*, London: Routledge, pp. 85–101.
39. Klein, M. (1955) 'On Identification', in Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963*, op. cit., pp. 141–175.
40. Ibid., p. 145.
41. Ibid., p. 175.
42. Ibid., p. 156.
43. Ibid., p. 157.
44. Segal, *Klein*, op. cit., p. 125.
45. Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963*, op. cit., p. 157.
46. Klein's review of the opera in which the child saves the wounded squirrel illustrates in simple form a process that she elaborated subsequently.
47. Rustin emphasises Klein's significance as a moral theorist, in Mills (ed.), op. cit., pp. 35–39.
48. Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963*, op. cit., pp. 165–166.
49. Ibid., p. 166.
50. Segal is best known for developing this approach to art.
51. Steene compares *Wild Strawberries* with Strindberg's *To Damascus* and Strindberg's 'use of dreams as a structural device'. Steene, B. (1968) *Ingmar Bergman*, Boston: Twayne, p. 72.
52. Hubner describes how Bergman grew up knowing *The Phantom Carriage* and how Swedish viewers of *Wild Strawberries* would have already known about Sjöström and Selma Lagerlöf, the author of the original novel, which was adapted for *The Phantom Carriage*. Hubner, L. (2007) *The Films of Ingmar*

- Bergman: Illusions of Light and Darkness*, Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 94.
53. Gado notes Bergman's account of how the story of *Wild Strawberries* arose when he revisited a house where he had lived as a child, but also how Bergman related Isak's egoism to his own. Gado, F. (1986) *The Passion of Ingmar Bergman*, Durham: Duke University Press, p. 212.
54. Donner, J. (1964) *The Personal Vision of Ingmar Bergman*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, translated by Holger Lundbergh (originally published in Sweden in 1962), p. 155.
55. 'Wild Strawberries represents the culmination and fulfilment of the Christian side of Bergman; the presence of a benevolent deity seems to permeate the film, in form as well as in an overall mellowness of tone that easily assimilates the incidental asperities.' Wood, R. (1969) *Ingmar Bergman*, London: Studio Vista, p. 80.
56. Wood, op. cit., p. 78.
57. Riviere, J. 'The Unconscious Phantasy of an Inner World Reflected in Examples from Literature', in Klein, Heimann, Money-Kyrle (eds.), op. cit., p. 360.
58. Ibid.
59. Gado, op. cit., p. 213.
60. Ibid.
61. Riviere, J. 'The Unconscious Phantasy of an Inner World Reflected in Examples from Literature', in Klein, Heimann, Money-Kyrle (eds.), op. cit., p. 358.
62. Stokes, A. 'Form in Art', in Klein, Heimann, Money-Kyrle (eds.), op. cit., pp. 406–421; p. 410.
63. Ibid., pp. 406–421; p. 411 in particular.
64. Bach, S 'Discussion of Greenberg's Article', in Kaminsky, S. and Hill, J. F. (eds.) (1975) *Ingmar Bergman: Essays in Criticism*, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 194–201; p. 197.
65. Cowie, E. 'The Cinematic Dream-Work of Ingmar Bergman's *Wild Strawberries* (1957)', in Sabbadini, A. (ed.) (2003) *The Couch and The Silver Screen: Psychoanalytic Reflections on European Cinema*, Hove: Brunner-Routledge, pp. 181–203; p. 198; Cowie references French, P. and French, K. (1995) *Wild Strawberries*, London: BFI, p. 23.
66. Ibid. Cowie references French, P. and French, K. op. cit., p. 37.
67. Ibid.
68. Klein (1963) analyses the problems of competitiveness and hubris in her study of the Oresteia: 'Some Reflections on *The Oresteia*', in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963*, op. cit., pp. 275–299.
69. Gado, op. cit., p. 215.
70. Ibid.
71. As Gado points out, the choice is a well-known part of the Swedish Hymnal 'marked "The Last Judgement" under the heading "The Christian Hope Before Death."' Ibid., pp. 215–216.
72. Greenberg, H. R. 'The Rags of Time', in Kaminsky, Hill (eds.), op. cit., pp. 179–194; p. 184.
73. Johns Blackwell, M. (1997) *Gender and Representation in the Films of Ingmar Bergman*, Columbia, SC: Camden House, pp. 199–200.
74. Ibid. (brackets added).
75. Wood, op. cit., p. 81.

76. Gado, op. cit., pp. 224–227.
77. Bergom-Larsson, M. (1978) *Film in Sweden: Ingmar Bergman and Society*, translated by Barrie Selman, London: Tantivity Press, p. 21.
78. Ibid., p. 43.
79. Ibid., p. 21.
80. Johns Blackwell, op. cit., p. 200.
81. Ibid.
82. Bergman, I. (1995) *Images: My Life in Film*, translated by Marianne Ruuth, London: Faber and Faber (originally published 1990), p. 22.
83. Donner, J., op. cit. ('ergman' added with brackets to the original).
84. Alford lays out his reworking of Kleinian theory in Alford, C. F. (1989) *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory: an Account of Politics, Art and Reason Based on Her Psychoanalytic Theory*, New Haven; London: Yale University, chapter 4, and pp. 107–108, in particular.
85. Steene, B. (1968) *Ingmar Bergman*, Boston: Twayne, p. 71.

3 Sartre's Theory of Imagination and *The Seventh Seal*

1. Cox, G. (2006) *Sartre: A Guide for the Perplexed*, London: Continuum, pp. 3–12.
2. Sartre, J-P. (1953) *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, translated by Hazel Barnes, New York: Philosophical Library (originally published in France in 1943), p. 52.
3. Rustin, M. 'Lacan, Klein and Politics', in Elliott, A. and Frosh, S. (eds.) (1995) *Psychoanalysis in Context: Paths between Theory and Modern Culture*, London: Routledge, p. 244.
4. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 547.
5. Ibid.
6. Sarris, A. 'The Seventh Seal', in Steene, B. (ed.) (1972) *Focus on The Seventh Seal*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall (originally published in 1959 in *Film Culture*), pp. 81–91; p. 81.
7. Caws, P. (1979) *Sartre*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 42 (emphasis is in the original). Caws quotes from de Beauvoir, S. (1962) *The Prime of Life*, World Publishing, p. 168.
8. Moran, D. (2000) *Introduction to Phenomenology*, London; New York: Routledge, p. 379.
9. This follows from Sartre's understanding of all consciousness as intentional.
10. Sartre, J-P. (2004) *The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination*, revisions and Historical Introduction by Arlette Elkaim-Sartre, translated with a philosophical introduction by Jonathan Webber, London: Routledge (originally published in France in 1940), pp. 5–7.
11. Stawarska, B. (2005) 'Defining Imagination: Sartre between Husserl and Janet', in *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, Vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 133–153; p. 134.
12. Streminger, G. (1980) 'Hume's Theory of Imagination', in *Hume Studies*, Vol. 6, no. 2, November 1980, pp. 91–118; pp. 113–114 (emphasis in the original).

13. Ibid., p. 95, quotation from Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects* (originally published in 1739–1740 (L. Selby-Bigge/P.H. Nidditch edition), p. 32.
14. Explained by Streminger, *ibid.*, p. 95.
15. Sartre, *The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination* op. cit., p. 6.
16. Ibid., p. 6.
17. Stawarska, op. cit., p. 135.
18. Manser, A. (1966) *Sartre: A Philosophic Study*, London: The Athlone Press, p. 21.
19. Ibid., p. 12.
20. Ibid., p. 14.
21. Ibid., p. 12.
22. Cox explains the difference between different definitions of consciousness for Sartre, in Cox, G. (2008) *The Sartre Dictionary*, London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, p. 48.
23. Sartre, *The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination* op. cit., p. 17.
24. Ibid., p. 19.
25. Ibid., p. 26 (emphasis is in the original).
26. Ibid., p. 27.
27. Ibid., p. 28.
28. Ibid., pp. 28–29.
29. Ibid., p. 29.
30. For Moran, Sartre's introduction of this term defeats the aim of talking about imagination in a purely relational way. Moran states that Sartre's 'account of imagining, though an interesting attempt to get beyond representation-alism, ends up endorsing what it sets out to reject'. Moran, op. cit., p. 384.
31. Sartre, *The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination* op. cit., p. 20. (emphasis is in the original).
32. Ibid., p. 20.
33. A further example of how Sartre elaborates on the limitations of imagination is his discussion of the Panthéon as a mental image. For Sartre, the image of the Panthéon is limited in two fundamental and interrelated ways: firstly the image is imbued with a sense of its absence, and secondly its details cannot be fully developed. Sartre illustrates his case by saying that in the imagined version we are unable to count the columns of the building: *ibid.*, p. 87.
34. Ibid., p. 134.
35. Ibid. (emphasis is in the original).
36. Ibid., p. 137.
37. Ibid., p. 139.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 140.
40. Ibid., p. 180.
41. Ibid., p. 184.
42. Ibid., p. 187.
43. Ibid., p. 189.
44. Ibid., p. 193.

45. Warnock, M. (1965) *The Philosophy of Sartre*, London: Hutchinson & Co, p. 28.
46. Ibid., pp. 28–29 (emphasis is in the original).
47. Sartre, J-P. (2004) *The Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description*, translated by Andrew Brown, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge (originally published in France in 1937).
48. Sartre, J-P. (2002) *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, London; New York: Routledge (originally published in France in 1939).
49. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 557 (emphasis in the original).
50. Sartre notes that in hallucination, ‘the higher forms of psychic integration have disappeared’. *The Imaginary*, op. cit., p. 155.
51. As noted in note 1, for this chapter, this is well explained in relation to Hegelian philosophy by Cox.
52. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 56.
53. Ibid., p. 59.
54. Ibid. (emphasis is in the original).
55. Ibid. (emphasis is in the original).
56. Cox, *The Sartre Dictionary*, op. cit., pp. 17–18.
57. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 60 (emphasis is in the original).
58. Ibid. (emphasis is in the original).
59. Ibid., p. 556.
60. Daigle, ‘The Ethics of Authenticity’, in Webber, J. (ed.) (2011) *Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism*, London: Routledge, pp. 1–15; p. 5.
61. This argument is developed across Daigle’s chapter and draws on the influence of de Beauvoir to develop the insights of *Being and Nothingness* in a more ethical direction with more emphasis on authenticity in relationships to ‘the other’, pp. 8–13.
62. Sartre, J-P. (1978) *What Is Literature?*, London: Routledge, first published in France in 1947, p. 33.
63. Ibid., pp. 33.
64. Chapter 3, ‘For Whom Does One Write’ (pp. 49–122) and Chapter 4, ‘Situation of the Writer in 1947’ (pp. 123–232) in *What Is Literature?* demonstrate how Sartre situates his ideas in a historical context. Ibid.
65. Ibid., p. 160.
66. Ibid., p. 166.
67. Ibid., p. 174 (emphasis is in the original).
68. Deleuze, G. (1992) *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, London: The Athlone Press (originally published 1983 in France), pp. 56–57.
69. Rohmer, E. (1989) *The Taste for Beauty*, translated by Caroline Volk, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 97 (emphasis is in the original).
70. Andrew, D. (1978) *Andre Bazin*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 70 (emphasis is in the original).
71. Bazin, A. ‘Theatre and Cinema – Part Two’, in Bazin, A., *What Is Cinema?, Volume 1* (Gray, ed.), 1967, pp. 95–124; p. 108.
72. See Bazin, A. ‘The Evolution of the Language of Cinema’, in Bazin, A., *What Is Cinema?, Volume 1*, p. 29, and Bazin, A. ‘De Sica: Metteur en Scène’ (originally published in 1953 by Parma) in *What Is Cinema?, Volume 2* (Gray, ed.), 1971 edition, pp. 61–79.

73. Andrew, op. cit., p. 76.
74. Ibid., p. 79.
75. Bazin, A. 'The Ontology of the Photographic Image', in *What Is Cinema?, Volume 1*, pp. 9–16; pp. 13–14.
76. Sarris, A. 'The Seventh Seal', in Steene, *Focus on The Seventh Seal*, op. cit., p. 81.
77. Ibid., p. 84.
78. Steene, B. 'The Seventh Seal: An Existential Vision', in Steene, *Focus on The Seventh Seal*, op. cit., pp. 92–99.
79. Ibid., p. 92.
80. Ibid., p. 93.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., p. 96.
83. Ibid., p. 97.
84. Lauder, R. 'Bergman's *Shame* and Sartre's *Stare*', in Kaminsky, S. and Hill, J.F. (eds.) (1975) *Ingmar Bergman: Essays in Criticism*, London: Oxford University Press (originally published in *New Catholic World*, Vol. 209, September 1969), pp. 278–285; p. 279.
85. Kalin, J. (2003) *The Films of Ingmar Bergman*, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 197 (emphasis is in the original).
86. Bergman, I. (1995) *Images: My Life in Film*, translated by Marianne Ruuth, London: Faber and Faber, p. 231.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., p. 232.
89. Ibid., p. 236.
90. Steene (ed.), *Focus on The Seventh Seal*, op. cit., p. 90.
91. Ibid., p. 89.
92. Stawarska, op. cit., p. 61.

4 From Three Early Bergman Films to an Analysis of *Summer with Monika*

1. Christina Howells explores the convergence between Sartrean thought and psychoanalysis. Howells makes a stronger connection between Sartre and Lacan but also sees links with other post-Freudian thinkers, including those of 'the object relations school'. See Howells, C. (1979b) 'Sartre and Freud', in *French Studies: A Quarterly Review*, Vol. 33, pp. 157–176.
2. The creative overlap between Bergman's methods in the theatre and the cinema is illustrated in his discussion with the Markers. For instance, Bergman discusses the example of a play by Sartre, which depicts torture, but for Bergman the most successful adaptation of this involved suggesting the violence, rather than showing it. As Bergman puts it, 'That is one of secrets of our business – not to show everything.' Marker, L-L. and Marker, F. J. (1982) *Ingmar Bergman: Four Decades in the Theater*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 25.
3. Steene, B. (2005). *Ingmar Bergman: A Reference Guide*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 141–153.
4. Ibid., p. 172.

5. Ibid., p. 170.
6. Ibid., p. 172.
7. Ibid.
8. Bengt can only understand his love for Ingrid after their separation and a range of negative experiences.
9. A reviewer in *The New York Times* in 1963 called it “cinematic juvenilia of a painful sort”, *ibid.*, p. 173, quoting the *New York Times Film Reviews*, 1913–1968, p. 3371.
10. Björkman, S., Manns, T. and Sims, J. (1973) *Bergman on Bergman*, English translation by Paul Britten Austin, New York: Simon and Schuster (originally published in Sweden in 1970), p. 32.
11. Ibid., Bergman largely attributes this style to the influence of Rossellini, p. 33.
12. Ibid.
13. Koskinen, M. (2007) *Ingmar Bergman*, Stockholm: The Swedish Institute (first published 1993), p. 11.
14. Ibid.
15. Young, V. (1971) *Cinema Borealis, Ingmar Bergman and the Swedish Ethos*, New York: Avon Books, p. 64.
16. Ibid.
17. Bergman talks about the film in Bergman, I. (1995) *Images: My Life in Film*, translated by Marianne Ruuth, London: Faber and Faber, p. 145 (emphasis in the original).
18. Ibid., p. 152.
19. Björkman et al., op. cit., p. 40.
20. Webber comments on Sartre's concept of bad faith as follows: ‘What does depend on bad faith is the assumption that the other person will be ascribing to one a fixed nature ...’ Webber, J. ‘Bad Faith and the Other’, in Webber, J. (ed.) (2011), *Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism*, London: Routledge, pp. 180–194; p. 192.
21. ‘Indeed, if bad faith is part of one's cultural fabric, then one will come to learn that people generally see one another this way as a result of growing up within that culture and relying on the people around one to help one to make sense of the world.’ Webber, *ibid.*
22. This is discussed by Matthew C. Eshleman, ‘What Is It Like to Be Free?’, *ibid.*, pp. 31–48.
23. Bergman discusses *Summer with Monika* briefly in Bergman, op. cit. p. 295. Aumont's comments are discussed later in this chapter.
24. Ibid., pp. 295–296.
25. Direct address to the camera was a pronounced feature in early cinema.
26. Gado, F. (1986) *The Passion of Ingmar Bergman*, Durham: Duke University, p. 160.
27. ‘Certainly, judged strictly as a piece of fiction, it is a slight thing – in which, moreover, the extent of Bergman's contribution is difficult to determine.’ *ibid.*, p. 158.
28. This emphasis is particularly strong in Hanna Segal's account of art: Segal, H. (1991) *Dream, Phantasy and Art*, London: Routledge.
29. See Chapter 1 for Godard's comments on *Summer with Monika*, and Chapter 3 for the influence of Sartre on Bazin.

30. 'Almost everywhere, interest centred on the erotic appeal of Harriet Andersson, not on the director: France was the exception.' Gado, op. cit. p. 160.
31. Flynn, T. (Spring 2010 edition) 'Jean-Paul Sartre', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* Edward N. Zalta (ed.), '6. Art and Philosophy', <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/sartre/> (emphasis is in the original).
32. Aumont, J. (2003) Ingmar Bergman 'Mes films sont l'explication de mes images', *Cahiers du Cinéma*, p. 228.
33. Ibid., p. 194.
34. The openness of style is present in many aspects of *Summer with Monika*, including the introductory sequence which demonstrates the creative influence of cinematographer Gunnar Fischer.
35. See Howells' article for a discussion of how Sartre incorporates romantic values into his theory of imagination: Howells, C. (1979a) 'Sartre and the Language of Literature', in *Modern Language Review*, Vol. 74, Issue 3, July, pp. 527–579.
36. Strick points to the influence of French poetic realism in this passage of the film with its transition from the street to the interior world of the courtyard: http://bergmanorama.webs.com/films/summer_with_monika_strick.htm. I would suggest that this is a stepping stone towards the interior world of the main characters, a change of focus, which becomes the dominant priority for Bergman in his later works. We shall see this in *The Virgin Spring* and *Hour of the Wolf*.
37. One of the most radical ideas in the Kleinian theory of art suggests that the material of the work of art itself is symbolic of the maternal body. This perspective was applied extensively to fine art by Adrian Stokes and Richard Wollheim. The work of Stokes and Wollheim is summarised clearly by Glover: Glover, N. (2009) *Psychoanalytic Aesthetics: An Introduction to the British School*, London: Karnac.
38. Sartre's analysis of love is complex and convoluted, but part of the futility which he attributes to 'love' is captured when he says 'The problem of my being-for-others remains therefore without solution. The lovers remain each one for himself in a total subjectivity ...' Sartre, J-P. (1953) *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, translated by Hazel Barnes, New York: Philosophical Library (originally published in France in 1943), p. 376.
39. Wollheim discusses how for Freud artistic intentionality is never just about wish fulfilment. Wollheim also alludes to the way Freud begins to lay the foundations for the theory of reparation through unconscious phantasy developed by Klein. Wollheim, R. 'Freud and the Understanding of Art', in Neu, J. (ed.) (1991) *The Cambridge Companion to Freud*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 249–266; in particular pp. 264–265.
40. Glover, op. cit., p. 75 (emphasis is in the original).
41. According to the Lacanian model, the imaginary fails to express the way reality contradicts the wish fulfilment inherent in cinematic narratives. This point can be found throughout Lacanian analysis, but is explained succinctly by Tarja Laine: Laine, T. (2007) *Shame and Desire: Emotion, Intersubjectivity, Cinema*, Brussels: Peter Lang, Introduction, pp. 9–27.
42. Gado, op. cit., p. 161.

43. Aumont, op. cit., p. 30.
44. 'if we strip Sartre's psychology of its particular philosophical terminology, it turns out to be fundamentally an Adlerian psychology'. Barrett, W. (1962) *Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy*, New York: Anchor Books (originally published by Doubleday, in 1958), p. 258. William Barrett does not consider that Sartre is analysing a historical juncture in social relations rather than an ontological condition.
45. Cannon spells out the positive contribution that imagination can provide according to Sartre: 'Although throughout most of *The Psychology of Imagination*, Sartre insists on the magical, impoverished character of the imagination as opposed to perception, toward the end of the book he surprises the reader by noting that without this capacity to imagine – to create the unreal – human beings would be totally engulfed in the real. Indeed, Sartre identifies this capacity to imagine with the very nihilating power of consciousness itself ...' Cannon, B. (1991) *Sartre and Psychoanalysis: An Existentialist Challenge to Clinical Metatheory*, Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, p. 248. Cannon discusses, on pp. 351–352, how the legacy of Sartre's philosophy involves recognising the intentionality in imaginative and emotional modes of consciousness. As she makes clear, for Sartre such modes may be self-destructive or contribute to greater freedom. The point here is that as a theorist Sartre recognises a strong role for emotion and imagination in consciousness.
46. Sartre's development of existential psychoanalysis was an additional chapter in the 1953 version of *Being and Nothingness*, in which he discusses how the individual can reorient towards his/her past.
47. Eshleman in Webber (ed.), op. cit. p. 35. We will also see this emphasis on an inaccessible mode of consciousness in the next two chapters (emphasis is in the original).
48. Just before starting *Summer with Monika*, Bergman considered making a whole film without dialogue, Bergman op. cit., p. 291.
49. See Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of Klein's account of jealousy, envy and greed.
50. Cannon, op. cit., p. 46.
51. See note 46.
52. Sánchez-Pardo, E. (2003) *Cultures of the Death Drive: Melanie Klein and Modernist Melancholia*, Durham; London: Duke University Press, p. 12.
53. 'For Sartre, even when imagining is at its most perceptual, as for instance in visualizing, it has features quite different from those perception involves... While perceiving is the paradigm state that teaches us how things are, imagining is the reverse... It is uninformative through-and-through.' Robert Hopkins, 'Imagination and Affective Response', in Webber (ed.), op. cit., pp. 100–117; p. 100. Nevertheless, Hopkins goes on to explore how imagination, on Sartre's account, tells us about the world, affectively.
54. Richmond, 'Magic in Sartre's Early Philosophy', in Webber (ed.), op. cit. pp. 145–160, in particular, pp. 155–156. The obscure work by Sartre, which Richmond discusses, is 'Faces' (originally published in 1939 in *Verve* magazine).
55. Sánchez-Pardo, op. cit., p. 12.

56. Many reasons have been given for Bergman's strong female characters. I will just mention here the inheritance from Swedish drama including the works of Henrik Ibsen, with an emphasis on autonomous modern female characters, and that Bergman's enjoyment of Hollywood cinema, including so-called remarriage comedies, provided many sources of inspiration for strongly independent female characters. The last two influences are discussed by John Orr, in 'Bergman, Nietzsche, Hollywood', in Koskinen, M. (ed.) (2008) *Ingmar Bergman Revisited: Performance, Cinema and the Arts*, London: Wallflower Press, pp. 143–160.

5 Revenge and Reparation in *The Virgin Spring*

1. Steene, B. (1968) *Ingmar Bergman*, Boston: Twayne, p. 89.
2. Ibid., pp. 89–90.
3. Ibid., p. 89.
4. The Swedish press response to *The Virgin Spring* is summarised by Steene in Steene, B. (2005). *Ingmar Bergman: A Reference Guide*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press on pp. 242–243.
5. Ibid.
6. Most famously, Bergman himself dismissed the film saying, for instance, that 'he and Isaksson had influenced one another in the wrong way, and it was rather unfortunate'. Gado, F. (1986) *The Passion of Ingmar Bergman*, Durham: Duke University Press. Gado is quoting Bergman from Björkman, S., Manns, T., and Sims, J. (1973) *Bergman on Bergman*, English translation by Paul Britten Austin, New York: Simon and Schuster (originally published in Sweden in 1970).
7. MacNab, G. (2009) *Ingmar Bergman: The Life and Films of the Last Great European Director*, London; New York: I.B. Tauris, p. 109.
8. Wood, R. (1969) *Ingmar Bergman*, London: Studio Vista, pp. 100–105.
9. Ibid., p. 101.
10. Hubner, L. (2007) *The Films of Ingmar Bergman: Illusions of Light and Darkness*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 62.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 153.
13. Braudy, L. and Cohen, M. (eds.) (1999) *Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings*, New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, Fifth edition. This edition includes Bordwell, D. 'The Art Cinema as a Mode of Film Practice', pp. 716–724 (originally published in *Film Comment*, Volume 4, no. 1, Fall, 1979), p. 718.
14. Ibid.
15. Gervais, M. (1999) *Ingmar Bergman: Magician and Prophet*, Montreal; London: McGill-Queen's University Press, p. 68.
16. Steene, B. (1968) *Ingmar Bergman*, Boston: Twayne, p. 90.
17. Smith, M. (1995) *Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion, and the Cinema*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 188.
18. Wood, op. cit., p. 103.
19. Nykvist provides an anecdote about how Bergman corrected him for lighting a scene in *The Virgin Spring* in a non-naturalistic way. ("God damn it! How

- can there be shadows when the sun has gone down?"), quoted in Eteddgui, P. (1998) *Cinematography Screencraft*, Woburn, Mass.: Focal Press, p. 38. But Nykvist also suggests that they shared a fascination with the emotional impact of lighting: 'Because Ingmar had worked in the theatre, he was fascinated by light and how it can be applied to create a mood.' *Ibid.*
20. Wollheim, R. (1987) *Painting as an Art*, London: Thames and Hudson, pp. 293–294.
 21. For an analysis of the representation of hands in *Persona*, see Linda Haverty Rugg, 'Self-Projection and Still Photography in the Work of Ingmar Bergman', in Koskinen, M. (ed.) (2008) *Ingmar Bergman Revisited: Performance, Cinema and the Arts*, London: Wallflower Press, pp. 107–119.
 22. Alford insists that Kleinian art theory can move on from the idea that catharsis is just an emotional release: 'Art, at its best, allows us to work through – that is, to obtain emotional clarification about – our fear so that we can realise our potential to feel pity, the ground of reparation. This working though is, of course, quite different from mere purgation, just as Kleinian psychoanalysis is quite different from therapies aimed at promoting emotional catharsis. Working though is a combination of insight (illumination) and emotional integration of love and hate, evidently the same type of emotional experience that Aristotle had in mind in the definition of tragedy.' Alford, C. F. (1989) *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory: An Account of Politics, Art and Reason Based on Her Psychoanalytic Theory*, New Haven; London: Yale University, p. 121.
 23. Steene, B. (1968) *Ingmar Bergman*, Boston: Twayne, p. 93.
 24. *Ibid.*, Steene is quoting here from Sven Stolpe, 'Jung-framst regikonst', *Aftonbladet*, February 1960.
 25. Klein, M (1934) 'On Criminality', in Klein, M. (1998) *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945*, London: Vintage, first published in 1975 by The Hogarth Press, pp. 258–261; p. 260.
 26. Donner, J. (1964) *The Personal Vision of Ingmar Bergman*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, translated by Holger Lundbergh (originally published 1962), p. 198.
 27. *Ibid.* (emphasis is in the original ('ergman' added with brackets to the original)).
 28. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
 29. Sartre writes in *Existentialism Is a Humanism*: 'Subjectivism means, on the one hand, the freedom of the individual subject and, on the other, that man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity. It is the latter which is the deeper meaning of existentialism'. p. 4. Sartre seeks to avoid the pitfalls of idealism through his phenomenological focus on material reality and his account of intersubjectivity. Sartre, J-P. (1989) 'Existentialism Is a Humanism', first published 1946; published in Kaufman (ed.), *Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre*, Meridian, 1989; this copy at <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sart.htm>.
 30. Livingston, P. (1982) *Ingmar Bergman and the Rituals of Art*, Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, p. 49.
 31. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
 32. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

33. Odin is thought to have been based on a real chieftain from the Viking period who invaded Sweden. Walter Gibbs, *New York Times*, November 2001. 'In Germanic mythology, the one-eyed deity of battle, magic, inspiration and the dead', Cotterell, A. (1979) *A Dictionary of World Mythology*, Leicester: Windward, p. 150.
34. Donner, op. cit., p. 193.
35. Freud introduced the superego in *The Ego and the Id* (1923). For discussion of this and why Klein elaborated the concept, see Chapter 2.
36. The way the characters are defined by their physical movements compares with the loss of freedom and submission to the body that Sartre discusses in his examples of 'bad faith'. Here we might say that the individuals have lost their recognition of the relationship between imagination and freedom.
37. Klein, *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945*, op. cit., p. 259.
38. Laine, T. (2007) *Shame and Desire: Emotion, Intersubjectivity, Cinema*, Brussels: Peter Lang, p. 17.
39. This interpretation is put forward by Gado in his comments on the feelings of 'guilt' in *The Virgin Spring* and Bergman's status as a 'the favored child', Gado, op. cit., pp. 247–253; p. 251.
40. Steene, B. (1968) *Ingmar Bergman*, Boston: Twayne, p. 91.
41. The relationship of the film's imagery to religious imagery has been widely noted. For example, Steene describes the second meal scene in the film as having 'the ceremonial buildup of an altar painting of Christ's last supper'. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
42. Steene makes it clear that, whilst Ingeri is at one level associated with the role of evil as a stepsister, she is actually adopted. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
43. See Smith, op. cit., pp. 207–212.
44. Wood, op. cit., p. 103.
45. See Chapter 2 for a fuller account of Klein's theory of projection.
46. Steene, B. (1968) *Ingmar Bergman*, Boston: Twayne, p. 91, and Donner op. cit., p. 193.
47. *The New Kleinian Dictionary* explains that, although 'introjection' was used by Freud, he did not extend it to the process of mourning. Klein builds on the work of Freud and others to represent introjection as a process significant in the infant mind and involving incorporation of good and bad objects, Bott Spillius, E., Milton, J., Garvey, P., Couve, C., and Steiner, D. (2011) *The New Dictionary of Kleinian Thought*, Hove; New York: Routledge, pp. 374–379.
48. Cowie, Criterion essay, *The Virgin Spring: Bergman in Transition*, <http://www.criterion.com/current/posts/410-the-virgin-spring-bergman-in-transition>.
49. This concept can be used as a contribution to differentiating Kleinianism from structuralist or Lacanian theory, which seeks to explain instincts through reference to language.
50. For a critical analysis of Klein's account of Iago, see Sodré, Ignês. "'Even now, now, very now ...' On Envy and Hatred of Love", pp. 19–34; and Capér, R. 'Envy, Narcissism and the Destructive Instinct', pp. 35–49, in Roth, P. and Lemma, A. (eds.) (2008) *Envy and Gratitude Revisited*, London: Karnac.
51. *Ibid.*, Sodré, I., p. 31.
52. *Ibid.*, Capér, R., op. cit., p. 46.
53. Steene, B. (1968) *Ingmar Bergman*, Boston: Twayne, p. 92.

54. This is much more pronounced, for instance, in *Persona*, with the young boy, whose point of view is represented optically in the opening scenes before the drama attaches to the subjectivity of the female protagonists. Donner discusses Bergman's early commitment to a narration that avoided traditional storytelling, Donner, op. cit., p. 16.
55. Donner says that 'Almost all the weaker scenes are enacted indoors, in the studio'. Ibid., p. 191.
56. Hedling argues that 'Sometimes a Bergman film displays the Swedish welfare mirror cracked through drab images of earlier canonised Swedish landscapes.' p. 185. 'The Welfare State Depicted: Post-utopian Landscapes in Ingmar Bergman's Films', in Koskinen, M. (ed.) op. cit., pp. 180–193. In discussing the representation of existential anxiety against the dominant ideology of Swedish society, Hedling focuses on landscapes in Bergman's post-1960s films. We can add that *The Virgin Spring* also challenges the tradition of Swedish landscape films with its disquieting representation of horror in the woods.
57. Eric Nordgren, Bergman's regular collaborator, was responsible for the music in *The Virgin Spring*.
58. Gado explains that Ingeri 'interprets a roar heard from outside the house as the sound of three dead men riding north' which she takes as a sign of Karin's impending doom. Gado, op. cit., p. 245.
59. Steene, *Ingmar Bergman: A Reference Guide*, op. cit., pp. 242–243.
60. 'Play may involve a minimum of imagination or on the contrary be very imaginative.' Segal, H. (1991) *Dream, Phantasy and Art*, London: Routledge. p. 107. Ultimately for Segal, art provides deeper engagement with emotion and the unconscious than play or dreaming, which are related activities.
61. Sartre, op. cit., p. 4.
62. In 'The Early Development of Conscience in the Child' (1933), Klein reminds the reader of Freud's insight that sadism results from a fusion of aggression and libido so that aggression is redirected away from subjective reality towards targets in the external world. Klein, *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945*, op. cit., p. 250.
63. Steene, *Ingmar Bergman: A Reference Guide*, op. cit. pp. 242–243.
64. Donner, op. cit., p. 190.
65. Young, V. (1971) *Cinema Borealis, Ingmar Bergman and the Swedish Ethos*, New York: Avon Books, p. 195.
66. Sartre uses the idea of abandonment in *Existentialism and Humanism*.
67. For the introduction and relevance of this aspect of Kleinian theory, that is, the concept of 'splitting', see Chapter 2.
68. See Johns Blackwell, 'Platforms and Beds: The Sexualisation of Space in Ingmar Bergman's Theatre and Films', in Koskinen (ed.), op. cit. pp. 64–88.
69. Livingston argues that 'The problem of a violence that is senselessly repeated at every level of human interaction is central to Bergman's vision of art.' Livingston, op. cit. p. 173. Livingston develops this argument partly through reference to the recurrent theme of humiliation in Bergman films.
70. Aumont draws attention to this motif in Bergman's work. For example, see Aumont, J. (2003) Ingmar Bergman 'Mes films sont l'explication de mes images', in *Cahiers du Cinéma*, p. 114.

71. Donner begins his analysis with attention to the image of Töre looking at his hands and speaking to God. Donner, op. cit., p. 188.
72. Björkman et al., op. cit., p. 120.
73. Ibid.
74. Alpert, 'Style Is the Director', *Saturday Review*, December 23, 1961, http://bergmanorama.webs.com/satrev_alpert61.htm, Bergman is quoted (emphasis is in the original).
75. See the entry on Ulla Isaksson by Rose-Marie G.Oster, in Zuck, V. (ed. in chief) (1990) *Dictionary of Scandinavian Literature*, Chicago; London: St James Press, pp. 271–272.
76. The quotation is from Roger Fry, *The Artist and Psychoanalysis* (1929), in Segal, op. cit., p. 81.
77. Andreas Elpidorou, 'Imagination in Non-Representational Painting', in Webber (ed.), op. cit., pp. 15–30.

6 The Destruction of the Artist: *Hour of the Wolf*

1. Steene, B. (2005) *Ingmar Bergman: A Reference Guide*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, p. 278.
2. Björkman, S., Manns, T., and Sims, J. (1973) *Bergman on Bergman*, English translation by Paul Britten Austin, New York: Simon and Schuster (originally published in Sweden in 1970, p. 215).
3. Steene, op. cit., p. 278.
4. Cowie, P. (1982) *Ingmar Bergman: A Critical Biography*, London: Secker and Warburg, p. 242.
5. Cowie adds the point that *Passion of Anna* focuses on Max von Sydow as a recluse (Bergman, as we know, escaped society for the remote island of Fårö). Cowie also mentions *Persona*, suggesting that across all these films 'the humiliation grows more violent in its manifestation'. p. 246.
6. Simon, J. 'Ingmar Bergman and Insanity', in Petri, V. (ed.) (1981) *Film & Dreams: An Approach to Bergman*, South Salem, N.Y.: Redgrave Publishing Company, pp. 127–138.
7. 'In France *Persona* Redeemed Ingmar Bergman to the Critics.' Steene, op. cit., p. 271.
8. Comolli, J. L. (1968) 'Postscript: *The Hour of the Wolf*', *Cahiers du Cinéma* 203, August 1968, in Hillier, J. (ed.) (1986) *Cahiers du Cinéma, New Wave, New Cinema, Re-evaluating Hollywood: 1960–68*, London: Routledge, pp. 313–316; p. 314.
9. Steene, op. cit., pp. 279–280. A strong example cited by Steene is the review by Philip Strick in *Sight and Sound*, Vol. 37, no. 4 (Autumn 1968, pp. 203–204).
10. 'Swedish press reacted to *Vargtimmen* as to a cinematic déjà vu. Though recognizing Bergman's virtuosity as a film-maker, the critics had reservations about the portrait of the self-absorbed artist Johan Borg.' Goran O. Eriksson in BLM, Vol. 38, no. 3 (March 1968): 212–214, found that Bergman overestimated the importance of the artistic self, which was considered an obsolete theme in today's world'. Ibid., p. 278.
11. Björkman et al., op. cit. p. 219.
12. Wood, R. (1969) *Ingmar Bergman*, London: Studio Vista, p. 165.

13. Livingston, P. (1982) *Ingmar Bergman and the Rituals of Art*, Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, p. 235.
14. Wood, op. cit., p. 161.
15. Hubner, L. (2007) *The Films of Ingmar Bergman: Illusions of Light and Darkness*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 100.
16. Ibid., p. 101.
17. Bergman explains that the names of several characters are taken from Hoffman: 'Kreisler the "kapellmeister", Heerbrand the curator, Lindhorst the archivist', Björkman et al., op. cit., p. 218.
18. Wood, op. cit., p. 159.
19. Klein, M. (1935) 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States', in Klein, M. (1998) *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945*, London: Vintage, first published in 1975 by The Hogarth Press, pp. 262–289; p. 288.
20. See Chapter 1, note 94, p. 35.
21. Gado, F. (1986) *The Passion of Ingmar Bergman*, Durham: Duke University Press, p. 345.
22. Livingston argues that Bergman may have been significantly affected by Kaila's *Psychology of the Personality*. As Livingston notes, Bergman said that he was very struck by Kaila's philosophy in this book. Bergman singles out, in particular, the idea from Kaila 'that man lives strictly according to his needs', Livingston, P. (2009) *Cinema, Philosophy, Bergman: On Film as Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 126. The Livingston quotation is from Bergman's film script (1960), *Wild Strawberries: A Film*, translated from the Swedish by Lars Malmström and David Kusher. Livingston refers to 'many film scholars' assumption that Bergman can be unproblematically situated in a general "European" existentialist tradition or movement', and notes in a footnote that apart from 'Camus' *Caligula*, Bergman never chose to stage any of the great existentialist dramas'. p. 127.
23. Sartre, J-P. (2002) *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, London; New York: Routledge (originally published in France in 1939), p. 53.
24. Kinder, M. (1981) 'From *The Life of the Marionettes* to *The Devil's Wanton*: Bergman's Creative Transformation of Recurring Nightmare', in *Film Quarterly*, Vol. 34, no. 3, Spring 1981, pp. 28–29.
25. Ibid., p. 28.
26. Klein, (1933) 'The Early Development of Conscience in the Child', in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945* op. cit., pp. 248–257; p. 249.
27. Explaining Klein's account of 'the fear of life', Kristeva writes, 'In a word, it is for Eros' sake that our anxiety about the annihilation of life penetrates the deepest layers of the psyche'. Kristeva, J. (2001) *Melanie Klein*, translated by Ross Guberman, New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, p. 84.
28. Björkman et al., op. cit., p. 219.
29. Ibid.
30. Kinder, op. cit., p. 28.
31. Gardner, S. (2009) *Sartre's Being and Nothingness: A Reader's Guide*, London; New York: Continuum International Publishing. Gardner discusses the significance of *The Transcendence of the Ego* in Sartre's work. pp. 32–34.
32. Björkman et al., op. cit., p. 224.

33. Ibid., p. 216.
34. This seems to follow from Sartre's account of the imagination, his work on consciousness and *Existentialism Is a Humanism*, but it becomes more pronounced later in his career. In his engagement with Marxism in *The Search for a Method* Sartre criticises overly subjective existentialism: 'Kierkegaard realised some progress over Hegel by affirming the *reality* of the lived: Jaspers regresses in the historical movement, for he flees from the real movement of *praxis* and takes refuge in an abstract subjectivity, whose sole aim is to achieve a certain inward *quality*.' Sartre, J.-P. (1960) *The Search for a Method*, in *Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre*, Meridian; originally published in France in 1957; this copy at <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/critic/sartre1.htm> p. 7 (emphasis in the original).
35. The island resembles Fårö where Bergman moved in the 1960s.
36. See Chapter 2 for an account of integration and reparation in Kleinian theory.
37. R. D. Hinshelwood, 'Who wants to be a scientist', in Mills, J. (ed.) (2006) *Other Banalities, Melanie Klein Revisited*, Hove; New York: Routledge, pp. 8–24; pp. 18–19. Hinshelwood is quoting Klein, M. (1932) *The Psychoanalysis of Children: The Writings of Melanie Klein*, Vol. 2, London: Hogarth, p. 248.
38. Ibid., p. 19.
39. This image is discussed by Gordon Thomas in *Bright Lights Film Journal*. He interprets the sheets as representing Alma's experience of conflict in this situation. <http://www.brightlightsfilm.com/53/wolf.htm>.
40. Steene explains that Bergman is drawing here on Swedish folklore, Steene, op. cit., p. 276.
41. Livingston, op. cit and Wood, op. cit.
42. See note 38, Chapter 4, this volume.
43. Tom Milne, *Time Out*, http://bergmanorama.webs.com/films/hour_of_the_wolf.htm.
44. Michael Rustin provides a good account of the political and philosophical relevance of Klein on this point: 'We could say that Klein's revision of Freud's theory of infancy, and her postulation of a state of initial, innate relatedness of infant to parents, is an indirect riposte to the atomistic theory of liberal individualism first formulated by the English empiricist philosophers.' Rustin, 'Klein on Human Nature', in Mills, J. (ed.) (2006) *Other Banalities, Melanie Klein Revisited*, Hove; New York: Routledge. pp. 25–44; p. 27.
45. As we saw in Chapter 2, a number of recent contributions to Kleinian theory make this point. For instance, Sánchez-Pardo, E. (2003) *Cultures of the Death Drive: Melanie Klein and Modernist Melancholia*, Durham; London: Duke University Press, p. 150.
46. Alford, C. F. (1989) *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory: An Account of Politics, Art and Reason Based on Her Psychoanalytic Theory*, New Haven; London: Yale University, p. 84.
47. Kinder, M. and Houston, B. (1972) *Close Up: A Critical Perspective on Film*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p. 278.
48. Ibid.
49. Johns Blackwell, M. (1997) *Gender and Representation in the Films of Ingmar Bergman*, Columbia, SC: Camden House, p. 207.

50. In Rugg's words, this part of the film shows how Bergman 'wants to make the audience understand the disconnect in the self-model that usually occurs while watching a performance'. Rugg, L. 'Self Projection and Still Photography in the Work of Ingmar Bergman', in Koskinen, M. (ed.) (2008) *Ingmar Bergman Revisited: Performance, Cinema and the Arts*, London: Wallflower Press, pp. 107–119; p. 118.
51. Björkman et al., op. cit., p. 222.
52. Ibid., p. 220.
53. Bergom-Larsson, M. (1978) *Film in Sweden: Ingmar Bergman and Society*, translated by Barrie Selman, London: Tantivity Press, p. 15.
54. Kinder and Houston, op. cit., p. 276.
55. Mosley, P. (1981) *Ingmar Bergman: The Cinema as Mistress*, London; Boston: Marion Boyars Publishers Inc., p. 97.
56. Segal, H. and Abel-Hirsch, N. (ed.) (2007) *Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, London; New York: Routledge. Segal is in interview here with Jacqueline Rose, p. 254.

Conclusion

1. This is explained in Bott Spillius, E., Milton, J., Garvey, P., Couve, C., and Steiner, D. (2011) *The New Dictionary of Kleinian Thought*, Hove; New York: Routledge, p. 323, with a quotation illustrating Klein's new emphasis on learning from her 1935 essay 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States'. The latter is in Klein, M. (1998) *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945*, London: Vintage (first published in 1975 by The Hogarth Press), pp. 262–289.
2. Braudy, L. and Cohen, M. (eds.) (1999) *Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings*, New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, Fifth edition. This edition includes Bordwell, D. 'The Art Cinema as a Mode of Film Practice', pp. 716–724, originally published in *Film Comment*, Vol. 4, no. 1, Fall, 1979.
3. Interview with Béranger, 'Meeting with Ingmar Bergman: An Interview', in Steene, B. (ed.) (1972) *Focus on The Seventh Seal*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, pp. 10–15.
4. Ibid., p. 15.
5. 'The Snakeskin', in Bergman, I. (2002) *Persona and Shame, The Screenplays of Ingmar Bergman*, London: Marion Boyars (originally published in 1972), p. 11.
6. Ibid., p. 12.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 13.
9. Ibid., p. 15.
10. Ibid.
11. Björkman, S., Manns, T., and Sims, J. (1973) *Bergman on Bergman*, English translation by Paul Britten Austin, New York: Simon and Schuster (originally published in Sweden in 1970), p. 12.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 178.

14. Steene, B. (2005) *Ingmar Bergman: A Reference Guide*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, p. 50.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 51.
17. Marker, L-L. and Marker, F. J. (1982) *Ingmar Bergman: Four Decades in the Theater*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 24.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 25.
20. Progoff, quoting Bergman from Radio TV Reports, p. 9, in 'Working Dream and Living Myth', in Campbell, J. (ed.) (1990) *Myths, Dreams and Religion*, Dallas, Texas: Spring Publications (originally published in 1970 by E. P. Dutton), pp. 176–195; p. 188.
21. Ibid. (brackets added).
22. Ibid., p. 189 (brackets added).
23. Ibid.
24. Steene, op. cit., p. 147.

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Kris 1946, *Crisis*
Musik I Mörker 1948, *Music in Darkness*; *Night is My Future/Music in Darkness* (US)
Hammstad 1948, *Port of Call*
Fängelse 1949, *Prison*; *The Devil's Wanton* (initial American title)
Till Glädje 1950, *To Joy*
Bris-Filmerna 1951–3, *Breeze Soap Commercials*
Sommarlek 1951, *Summer Interlude*; *Illicit Interlude* (US)
Sommaren Med Monika 1953, *Summer With Monika*; *Monica: The Story of a Bad Girl/Monica/Summer with Monica*
Gycklarnas Afton 1953, *Sawdust and Tinsel*; *The Naked Night* (US)
Sommarnattens Leende 1955, *Smiles of a Summer Night*
Det Sjunde Inseget 1956, *The Seventh Seal*
Smultronstället 1957, *Wild Strawberries*
Nära Livet 1958, *So Close to Life*; *Brink of Life* (US)
Ansiktet 1958, *The Magician/The Face*; *The Magician* (US)
Jungfrukällan 1960, *The Virgin Spring*
Djävulens Öga 1960, *The Devil's Eye*
Såsom I En Spegel 1961, *Through a Glass Darkly*
Nattvardsgästerna 1963, *Winter Light/The Communicants*; *Winter Light* (US)
Tystnaden 1963, *The Silence*
Persona 1966, *Persona*
Vargtimmen 1968, *Hour of the Wolf*
Skammen 1968, *Shame*
Trollflöjten 1975, *The Magic Flute* (TV opera)
Fanny Och Alexander 1982–3, *Fanny and Alexander*
Saraband 2003, *Saraband*

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Les Quatre Cents Coups, d.Truffaut, 1959, France
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